Motion to Hold Judgment Debtor in Contempt
issue a subpoena are a judge, court clerk, or an attorney at law who is an attorney of record. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1985(c).) Parties representing themselves who are not licensed to practice law are not authorized to issues subpoenas, and any subpoenas they attempt to issue are invalid.
A subpoena however may be issued by the Clerk “signed and sealed but otherwise in blank to a party requesting it, who shall fill it in before service.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1985(c). See also, Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.210(a) [“The clerk of the court in which the action is pending shall issue a deposition subpoena signed and sealed, but otherwise in blank, to a party requesting it, who shall fill it in before service”]; McLeod v. Board of Pension Commissioners (1970) 14 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [“[w]hen a civil action is pending in the courts, issuance of an ordinary subpoena is a matter of statutory right and neither a clerk nor court has discretion to refuse such issuance (Citation), even though the subpoena may be subject to a motion to quash or suppress, after issuance.”].)
Here, it appears that Plaintiff already obtained a signed and sealed subpoena from the Clerk. That subpoena is directed at “Custodian of Records, CLOUDFLARE INC” and the subpoena is attached to the motion at page 11. The subpoena, however, is not accompanied by a proof of service. As such, Plaintiff does not show that the subpoena has been served.
In sum, it remains unclear what more Plaintiff seeks from this court, and accordingly, the court denies the motion.
Clerk to give notice.
9 Lynch vs. Liberty Motion to Hold Judgment Debtor in Contempt Debt Solution, LLC The court DENIES Judgment Creditors/Cross-Complainants PREFERRED FINANCE, LLC (fka LIBERTY DEBT SOLUTIONS, LLC) and BRIAN ROCHE’s motion to hold Cross- Defendant/Judgment Debtor THOMAS LYNCH (“Lynch”) in contempt of court.
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Moving parties argue that Lynch failed to pay $5,037.40 in monetary sanctions previously ordered by the court on 2/20/26.
Moving parties request a contempt order requiring Lynch to pay $7,362.50 in additional attorney’s fees and costs, or to fine him an additional $1,000 and imprison him for 5 days. In addition, Moving parties request that Lynch be ordered to pay $1,5000 to the court pursuant to Section 177.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Where contempt is committed outside the view of the court, the charging party must file an affidavit or declaration of the facts constituting the contempt. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1211(a); In re M.R. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 49, 57.) A contempt proceeding is commenced by the filing of an affidavit showing the facts satisfying four requirements, the “charging allegations.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1211.) These include: “(1) the rendition of a valid order, (2) actual knowledge of the order, (3) ability to comply, and (4) willful disobedience. [Citation.]” (Conn v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 774, 784.) The affidavit frames the issues to be tried. (Reliable Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 604, 616.)
The filing of a sufficient affidavit is a “jurisdictional prerequisite” to a contempt proceeding and without one, any contempt order is void. (In re Koehler (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1169.) Each allegation must be pleaded by factual statements. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1211.5(b).) If the court finds the affidavit alleges sufficient grounds for contempt, it signs an “OSC re Contempt,” setting the date and time for a hearing. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1212.)
Here, moving parties show: (1) the rendition of a valid court order awarding monetary sanctions payable within 30 days (ROA 615; Orland Decl. ¶ 4 [incorrectly identified as a second paragraph “1”]); (2) actual knowledge of the order, as Lynch attended the hearing and was served with notice thereafter (ROAs 615, 616); and disobedience, in that Lynch had personal notice of the contents of the order (see ROAs 615, 616).
Moving parties, however, do not show Lynch’s ability to comply with the court’s 2/20/26 sanctions order. In fact, Lynch shows he is unable to pay the sanctions order. (See Lynch Decl. ¶¶ 3-11, Exh. 3 [re inability to work and income insufficient to cover monthly costs].) As such, moving parties have not shown willful disobedience, a prerequisite for a contempt order.
Moreover, a sanctions order is enforceable in the same was as a “money judgment”. As such, contempt does not appear to be appropriate here.
In sum, the motion is DENIED.
Moving parties to give notice.
10 Torres vs. Motion for Spoliation Sanctions Northgate Gonzalez Markets, The court DENIES Plaintiff JAVIER NAVARRO TORRES’s Inc Motion for Spoilation Sanctions against Defendant NORTHGATE GONZALEZ, LLC.
Sanctions for Spoilation of Evidence
The court may impose sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030.) Sanctionable discovery abuses include, among other things, spoliation of evidence. (Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection v. Howell (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 154, 191, disapproved of on other ground by Presbyterian Camp & Conference Centers, Inc. v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 493.) Spoliation of evidence “is defined as the destruction or alteration of relevant evidence or the failure to preserve evidence for another party’s use in pending or future litigation.” (Victor Valley Union High School District v.
Superior Court (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1139 [citing other cases].) “[T]he party moving for discovery sanctions based on the spoliation of evidence must make an initial prima facie showing that the responding party in fact destroyed evidence that had a substantial probability of damaging the moving party’s ability to establish an essential element of his claim or
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