FatPet Awards vs. Lovell

Both sides must be mindful of the following: Courts must treat a self-represented party in the same manner as a represented party. And self-represented parties must follow the same rules of procedure, including the same rules of professional conduct that apply to attorneys, to extent that those rules govern conduct in the actual course of litigation.

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice: The court DENIES Defendants’ Requests for Judicial Notice (ROAs 86, 116). There is no apparent basis to take judicial notice of certain TICA board minutes, an invoice, and by-laws. Moreover, the documents do not appear to be relevant to the issues presented in either the demurrer or motion to strike. Also, the second request for judicial notice was submitted with the reply papers (ROA 116) and “[t]he general rule of motion practice ... is that new evidence is not permitted with reply papers.” (Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537.)

1. Demurrer

The court OVERRULES Defendants’ entire demurrer. Defendants generally demur to the entire FAC. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e).)

The FAC asserts the following causes of action against each defendant:

1. Breach of contract 2. Breach of contract 3. Common counts 4. Common counts (money had and received) 5. Fraud 6. Fraud

Defendants begin their brief by arguing that “[o]n its face, the FAC alleges claims that are time-barred, internally inconsistent, and unsupported by any cognizable legal theory. Because these defects are legal rather than factual, further amendment would be futile.” (Mov. Pts. & Auth. at p. 2, lines 2-5.)

The moving papers thereafter primarily consist of a series of general legal statements with caselaw citations, and little to no analysis. The moving papers do not discuss the causes of action separately, except to generally refer to “contract claims” and “fraud allegations” for example. As there are multiple contract and fraud claims in the FAC, it’s not clear which cause of action is being attacked at times.

Reviewing the little analysis provided, the demurrer appears to lack merit. For example, Defendants appear to argue that contract claims (the first and second causes of action) are barred by the two-year limitations period applicable to obligations not founded on an instrument in writing because Plaintiffs did not file this action until 8/21/25. But even assuming a two-year limitations period applies, the argument does not show that claims are timebarred. According to the FAC, Defendants’ breaches continued through September 2023. The action was filed less than two years thereafter, on 8/21/25 (i.e., within the purported 2-year limitations period).

As another example, Defendants state (without analysis) that “[t]he FAC pleads no terms, obligations, or consideration” in support of the contract causes of action. However, the FAC alleges the following for example:

On or about August 2020, TICA and Defendants entered into a partly oral and partly written agreement under which Defendants agreed to organize and host TICA’s annual awards banquet and related events, collect the associated revenues, and use those funds to pay the event expenses. (FAC, ¶ BC-1.) From approximately August 2020 through September 2023, Defendants allegedly breached the agreement by collecting revenues from banquet tickets, show entries, vendor spaces, TICA sponsorships, and other sources but failing to pay the event expenses. (FAC, ¶ BC-2.) TICA alleges that it performed its obligations, except for those it was prevented or excused from performing, and suffered resulting damages. (FAC, ¶¶ BC-3–BC-4.)

On or about December 2022, Plaintiff FatPet and Defendants entered into a partly oral and partly written agreement under which FatPet agreed to design and manufacture custom awards and related items for the 2023 TICA Annual Awards and show, and Defendants agreed to pay $6,400, plus shipping and handling, before the event began. (FAC, ¶ BC-1.) On or about August 10, 2023, Defendants allegedly breached the agreement by failing to pay the amounts due. (FAC, ¶ BC-2.) FatPet alleges that it performed its obligations, except for any performance that was prevented or excused, and suffered $6,357.20 in resulting damages. (FAC, ¶¶ BC-3– BC-4.)

In other words, the FAC adequately asserts causes of action for breach of contract and Defendants have failed to support their conclusory argument. The FAC alleges the existence of a contract, performance or excuse for nonperformance, Defendants’ breach, and resulting damages.

As for the fraud claims, the FAC alleges sufficient facts. For example, the FAC alleges the following:

Defendants Nicholas and Andres represented that they would organize and host the banquet, show, and related events; collect sponsorship and other event revenues; use those revenues to pay the event expenses; advance any additional funds necessary to conduct the event; and ensure that TICA would not be responsible for the event costs other than providing sponsorships. (FAC, ¶¶ FR-1, FR-2, Attachment FR-2.)

Defendants did not intend to use the collected funds to pay event expenses and instead intended to, and did, divert those funds for their personal use. As a result, TICA was required to pay the outstanding expenses to allow the show and awards banquet to proceed. (FAC, ¶ FR-2.b.)

When Defendants made the representations, they knew they were false, or had no reasonable ground for believing the representations were true. (FAC, ¶ FR-2.c.)

Defendants concealed the fact they had no ability to fund the events and no ability to cover any of the expenses associated with the events. (FAC, ¶ FR-3.)

Defendants promised without intent to perform. (FAC, ¶ FR-4.)

In justifiable reliance on those representations, TICA approved Defendants to host the annual banquet and related events. (FAC, ¶ FR-5.)

As a result, Plaintiff incurred damages. (FAC, ¶ FR-6.)

The court finds the allegations sufficient to overcome the demurrer.

The general demurrer is OVERRULED.

Plaintiffs to give notice.

2. Motion to Strike

The court DENIES Defendants’ motion to strike punitive damages allegations (FAC ¶ FR-7 and Prayer) and alter-ego allegations (Attachment 9a).

Punitive damages are available where plaintiff shows by clear and convincing evidence that defendant was guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294(a); Krieger v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 137, 148.) Malice, oppression and fraud are defined as follows: (1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. (3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civ.

Code, § 3294(c).)

The complaint must allege specific factual allegations to support a request for punitive damages. (See, e.g., Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643 [allegations that defendant’s conduct was intentional, willful, malicious, performed with ill will, and in conscious disregard of plaintiffs’ rights does not satisfy the specific pleading requirement].) “Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim . . . .” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.)

As noted above, the FAC alleges that Defendants made promises to TICA without intending to perform them and diverted event funds for their own use. These allegations sufficiently support punitive damages based on fraud.

To recover on an alter ego theory, two requirements must be satisfied: (1) there be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist and (2) if the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone, an

inequitable result will follow. (Automotriz Del Golfo De California S.A. De C.V. v. Resnick (1957) 47 Cal.2d 792, 796; Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 415.)

Defendants argue, but do not show, that the alter-ego allegations are merely conclusory or otherwise subject to being stricken under Code of Civil Procedure section 436. Attachment 9a alleges that Defendants disregarded business formalities, commingled personal and SeaCats funds, used SeaCats’ assets to pay personal expenses, inadequately capitalized and depleted SeaCats, and operated it as a shell or conduit for their personal affairs. (FAC, Attachment 9a, ¶ 1.) It further alleges that respecting SeaCats’ separate existence would sanction fraud or produce an inequitable result. (Ibid.) These allegations track recognized alter-ego factors and sufficiently plead both unity of interest and an inequitable result.

Accordingly, the motion to strike the alter-ego allegations is DENIED.

Defendants (ANDRES A. MUNT-LOVELL and NICHOLAS P. MUNT-LOVELL) SHALL answer the First Amended Complaint within 30 days.

Plaintiffs to give notice.

15 Young vs. Young Demurrer (re First Amended Complaint) Motion to Strike

1. Demurrer

The court OVERRULES Defendant BARBARA YOUNG’s demurrer to the First Amended Complaint (FAC) filed by Plaintiff BRIAN YOUNG.

RJN - GRANTED: As requested by Defendant, the court takes judicial notice of (1) the original Complaint, (2) the notice of ruling on Defendant’s demurrer to the Complaint and motion to strike, and (3) the First Amended Complaint. (Evid. Code, § 452(d).)

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