Motion to Compel Arbitration
no evidence that Plaintiff requested repair logs, error logs, or emails documenting the corruption event and no evidence proffered that Defendant failed to provide such. There is also no evidence a forensic expert reviewed the relevant system(s) and documentation and concluded the file is unrestorable. The court notes that whether and to the extent the video file can be restored affects the level of prejudice Plaintiff may suffer.
Further, assuming the video file is corrupted, Plaintiff fails to show that the corrupted evidence had a substantial probability of damaging Plaintiff’s ability to establish an essential element of his claim. (Williams v. Russ, 167 Cal.App.4th at 1227.) No evidence is presented suggesting the video would have shown a failure to inspect or maintain the area or would have contained other unfavorable evidence. Again, the court cannot impose sanctions as punishment and Plaintiff cannot obtain more than he would have gotten had the evidence been produced in a non-corrupted form. (See e.g, Doppes, 174 Cal.App.4th at 992.)
As for the request for monetary sanctions for attorney fees and costs in bringing this motion, Plaintiff does not request or support any particular amount of monetary sanctions. Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.040 requires any request for sanction be “accompanied by a declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought.” Due process also requires notice of the amount being requested.
In sum, the court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions.
Defendant to give notice.
11 Vo vs. Mercedes- Motion to Compel Arbitration Benz USA, LLC The court GRANTS Defendant MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC’s (“Moving Defendant”) motion to compel Plaintiff PHAT TAN VO to arbitrate his claims against Defendant Mercedes-Benz and staying this action pending completion of arbitration.
Moving Defendant submits a copy of the California Motor Vehicle Lease Agreement apparently signed by Plaintiff on or about 11/5/25. (Leung Decl., ¶ 2, Exh. 1.) The document contains the following broad arbitration provision:
“Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort or otherwise (including any dispute over the interpretation, scope or validity of this lease, arbitration section or the arbitrability of any issue), between you and us or any of our employees, agents, successors, assigns, or the vehicle distributor, including Mercedes- Benz USA LLC (each a ‘Third Party Beneficiary’), which arises out of or relates to a credit application, this lease, or any resulting transaction or relationship arising out of this lease (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at the election of either you, us, or a Third Party Beneficiary, be resolved by a neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.”
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(Leung Decl., Exh. 1, p. 4, emphasis supplied.)
Third-Party Beneficiary
Plaintiff does not contest the validity or authenticity of this agreement. Plaintiff’s primary challenge is that Moving Defendant lacks standing to enforce the agreement as a third-party beneficiary.
“Under certain circumstances, a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement may seek to enforce it against a signatory. Whether such enforcement is permissible is a question of state law.” (Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324, 1332 [citing Kramer v. Toyota Motor Corp. (9th Cir. 2013) 705 F.3d 1122, 1128; Thomas v. Westlake (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605, 614, fn. 7].) State law provides six theories by which a nonsignatory may compel or be bound to arbitrate. These theories include: “‘(a) incorporation by reference; (b) assumption; (c) agency; (d) veil-piercing or alter ego; (e) estoppel; and (f) third-party beneficiary’ [citations].” (Suh v. Superior Court (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1513.)
When considering whether a third party may bring a breach of contract, courts determine “not only (1) whether the third party would in fact benefit from the contract, but also (2) whether a motivating purpose of the contracting parties was to provide a benefit to the third party, and (3) whether permitting a third party to bring its own breach of contract action against a contracting party is consistent with the objectives of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties. All three elements must be satisfied to permit the third party action to go forward.” (Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817, 829-830.)
Here, in disputing application of the third-party beneficiary doctrine, Plaintiff relies heavily on Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324 (“Ochoa”), which is currently under review by the California Supreme Court.
The case is distinguishable. In Ochoa, arbitration provisions expressly limited enforcement to “only three parties – [Plaintiff], the dealership, and the assignee....” (Ford Motor Warranty, 89 Cal.App.5th at 1338 [“Its direct benefits are expressly limited to those persons who might rely on it to avoid proceeding in court – the purchaser, the dealer, and the dealer’s employees, agents, successors or assigns.”]; Ngo, 23 F.4th at 946.) In both cases, the express language of the agreements limited enforcement to either “you or we,” which included limited definitions. (Ford Motor Warranty, 89 Cal.App.5th at 1338 and Ngo, 23 F.4th at 946.)
In Ochoa, based on the express language of the agreement, the court determined there was no intent to benefit the manufacturers, no motivation to benefit the manufacturers and permitting enforcement would be “inconsistent with the ‘reasonable expectations of the contracting parties.’” (Ford Motor Warranty, 89 Cal.App.5th at 1338-1340.)
In contrast, the arbitration agreement here expressly names Moving Defendant as a third-party beneficiary. (Leung Decl., Exh. 1.) By expressly designating Moving Defendant as a third-party beneficiary entitled to enforce the arbitration provision, the Lease Agreement clearly
benefits, and communicates an intent to benefit, Moving Defendant. Permitting Moving Defendant to enforce the arbitration provisions is also consistent with the objectives of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the parties. As such, Goonewardene elements are met. (Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817, 830.)
As explained in Ochoa, “If the signatories had intended to benefit [the manufacturer], such a purpose would have been easy to articulate. They could have simply named [the manufacturer] – directly or by class as the vehicle’s manufacturer – as a person entitled to compel arbitration.” (Ford Motor Warranty, 89 Cal.App.5th at 1339.) Such is in contrast to the instant action where the arbitration provision expressly names the manufacturer, Moving Defendant.
Unconscionability
Plaintiff also argues that the agreement is not enforceable because it is unconscionable.
Procedural and substantive unconscionability “must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability.” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114.) However, they need not be present in the same degree. (Ibid.) A sliding scale approach is used and the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required. (Ibid.) “The party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving unconscionability.” (Pinnacle, 55 Cal.4th at 247.)
“Procedural unconscionability focuses on the elements of oppression and surprise.” (Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 177.) “Oppression arises from an inequality of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice. Surprise involves the extent to which the terms of the bargain are hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by a party in a superior bargaining position.” (Ibid.) “[A] finding of procedural unconscionability does not mean that a contract will not be enforced, but rather that courts will
scrutinize the substantive terms of the contract to ensure they are not manifestly unfair or one-sided.” (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1244.)
Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreement is procedurally unconscionable because it was a contract of adhesion, as it was offered to Plaintiff on a take-it-or-leaveit basis. The court finds that there is some level of procedural unconscionability.
“Substantive unconscionability focuses on the actual terms of the agreement and evaluates whether they create ‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results.’” (Serafin, 235 Cal.App.4th at 177.) “A contract term is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one side a greater benefit; rather, the term must be ‘so one-sided as to ‘shock the conscience.’” (Pinnacle, 55 Cal.4th at 246.)
Citing Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312, Plaintiff argues that the arbitration provision is substantively unconscionable because it can be enforced by too many parties who are not specifically named, and because the Lease provides that it can be assigned without Plaintiff's consent. In Cook, the Court of Appeal held that an arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it would have required the plaintiff to arbitrate any claim she had against the defendant, even those unrelated to her employment with the defendant. (Id. at 317, 326-327.)
By contrast, the arbitration agreement here is limited to matters involving the subject vehicle and the provision is not one-sided.
Accordingly, the Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED and the action STAYED, until further order of this court and pending the completion of arbitration between Plaintiff and Moving Defendant.
The court sets an ADR Review Hearing for December 14, 2026 at 9:00 a.m. in Department W08. Plaintiff SHALL file a Status Report no later than 10 court days before the hearing.
The court VACATES the Case Management Conference scheduled for 8/17/26.
Defendant to give notice.
12 Villalobos vs. Demurrer Elizarraraz The court SUSTAINS Defendant ELIZABETH LARA’s (erroneously sued as JUANA ELIZABETH JIMENEZ ELIZARRARAZ) unopposed entire demurrer to the Complaint, with 30 days leave to amend.
The 2-page Complaint merely lists five purported causes of action without alleging a factual basis for each. (See Compl., p. 1, line 28 to p. 2, line 7.) Such is insufficient to survive the demurrer.
Upcoming Motion to Strike: OFF-CALENDAR
The court takes the scheduled 8/7/26 hearing on Defendant’s motion to strike OFF-CALENDAR. (ROA 21.)
The motion to strike is MOOT in light of the court’s ruling on the demurrer.
Moreover, while the motion to strike was filed on the same day that the demurrer was filed, it was not set for the same hearing date. The motion to strike is currently set for hearing on 8/7/26. When a demurrer is also filed, a motion to strike “must be noticed for hearing and heard at the same time as the demurrer.” (Rules of Court, rule 3.1322(b).) As explained in the Rutter Guide, “Where there are grounds both for demurring and moving to strike, the two documents must be filed together and noticed for the same hearing.” (Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial ¶ 7:162, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(3), Rules of Court, rule 3.1322(b).)
As such, the court takes the motion to strike set for 8/7/26 OFF-CALENDAR.
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