Wild Rivers Waterpark Irvine SPE, LLC vs. Whitewater West Industries LTD

The above interpretation is in line with the plain statutory language reviewed above, as Civil Code section 8488 expressly refers to a “prevailing party,” following a hearing on a petition for release. Additionally, given this provision immediately follows provisions which outline the requirements for a petition for release, where “the claimant has not commenced an action to enforce the lien within the time provided in Section 8460,” (Civil Code, § 8480, subd. (a)), it is reasonable to interpret the attorneys’ fees provision as being similarly limited.

Here, while Wild Rivers Waterpark Irvine SPE, LLC prevailed on a motion to expunge mechanic’s lien, it neither moved nor prevailed, on the basis “the claimant had not commenced an action to enforce the lien within the time provided in section 8460.” (Civil Code, § 8480, subd. (a).)

The supplemental briefing offered by Wild Rivers Waterpark Irvine SPE, LLC, does not dispute the above. In addressing Civil Code section 8488, Wild Rivers argues, only, that the provision is reciprocal. (See Supplemental Brief: 2:26-3:8 [ROA No. 112].) While it is true that Civil Code section 8488 provides for fees to the “prevailing party,” it nonetheless remains that recovery pursuant to this provision is limited to “a proceeding on a petition for release of the lien under California Civil Code § 8482....” (In re People Who Care Youth Center, Inc. (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2023) 2023 WL 6393729, at p. 40.)

Based on the above, the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees premised on Civil Code section 8488, subdivision (c) is DENIED.

Within its supplemental brief, Wild Rivers Waterpark Irvine SPE, LLC requests, for the first time, attorney’s fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1717. (See Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).) In requesting attorneys’ fees pursuant to this provision, Wild Rivers refers to the breach of contract claim asserted within the Whitewater Complaint, in consolidated Case No. 2023-01356055. (See Supplemental Brief: 3:26-4:9 [ROA No. 112].) However, Whitewater voluntarily dismissed its Complaint on April 29, 2026. (ROA No. 106.)

“Where an action has been voluntarily dismissed or dismissed pursuant to a settlement of the case, there shall be no prevailing party for purposes of this section.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b)(2).) In addition to the above, Wild Rivers briefly references a Promissory Note between Whitewater and Splash Management, LLC, which was referenced within the Wild Rivers Complaint. (Supplemental Brief: 4:9-15 [ROA No. 112]; See also ¶8 of Wild Rivers Complaint [ROA No. 2].)

In apparent acknowledgement that it was not a party to this agreement, Wild Rivers notes that “an award of attorneys fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1717 is proper when it is determined that the party sued is not a party to the contract or that no enforceable contract was ever formed, as long as the plaintiff would have been allowed attorneys fees if it had prevailed in enforcing the contractual obligation.” (Korech v. Hornwood (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1418-1419.)

Here, however, it does not appear that Whitewater asserted any claims against Wild Rivers, based on this Promissory Note, nor that Whitewater sought attorneys’ fees against Wild River, based thereon. In attempting to invoke this agreement, Wild River cites only to its own allegations. (See Supplemental Brief: 4:9-18 [ROA No. 112].)

Consequently, with respect to the Promissory Note, Wild Rivers was not a “person sued on a contract,” capable of invoking the above principle. (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 611.)

Similarly, while Wild Rivers asserts that “[p]resumably, had Whitewater prevailed, it would have been entitled to recover its attorney’s fees under one or both agreements,” this statement is wholly unsupported. (See Supplemental Brief: 4:28-5:2 [ROA No. 112].)

Moreover, even assuming the Complaint brought by White Water had included a claim based on the Promissory Note, the same was voluntarily dismissed, such that Wild Rivers cannot qualify as a prevailing party thereunder. (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b).)

Based on the above, Wild Rivers has not established that it is a prevailing party entitled to fees, under any relevant contract.

Additionally, Wild Rivers cites Summer Hill Homeowners’ Assn., Inc. v. Rio Mesa Holdings, LLC (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 999 (Summer Hill) (See Supplemental Brief: 4:3-6:2 [ROA No. 112]); however, that action is distinguishable. Here, in contrast to Summer Hill, moving party has not prevailed on a claim for slander of title or any other tort claim, in which the instant fees can be considered an item of damages.

Lastly, Wild Rivers attempts to invoke Code of Civil Procedure section 405.38; however, this provision admittedly applies only to the expungement of a lis pendens. (See Supplemental Brief: 7:26-8:18 [ROA No. 112].)

“Attorney’s fees are not available to a prevailing litigant absent a contractual agreement or statutory authorization....” (Abbett Electric Corp. v. California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 355, 358.) Here, as Wild Rivers has neither identified an applicable statute which provides for recovery of attorneys’ fees, nor demonstrated that it is the prevailing party on a contract with an attorney fee provision, the motion for attorney fees must be DENIED.

57 Austin vs. Hyundai Motor America

25-01257746

1. Motion for Attorney Fees 2. Motion to Strike or Tax Costs

The Court intends to post a Tentative Ruling in the morning. 58 Ally Bank vs. Bashir

26-01538983

Application/Request

Plaintiff Ally Bank’s unopposed Application for Writ of Possession against Defendant Ibrahim Bashir for the 2015 BMW I8 motor vehicle, Serial No. WBY2Z2C55FV392288 (the “Vehicle”) is GRANTED.

The Court ORDERS Defendant Ibrahim Bashir to turn over to Plaintiff the Vehicle which is believed to be located at 5517 Sugar Maple Way, Fontana, CA 92336. The failure to turn over the Vehicle to Plaintiff may subject Defendant to being held in contempt of court. The Court waives the requirement for Plaintiff to post an undertaking since the amount owed is higher than the estimated value of the Vehicle.

Defendant’s re-delivery bond shall be $42,977.25.

Moving Party is to give notice.

60 Hernandez vs. Dieterich

22-01246551

Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication

Defendant George Ahad, M.D.’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

Defendant Dr. Ahad moves for summary judgment, only. The request for summary judgment is improper as this motion does not seek to dispose of all causes of action asserted against Defendant in the Complaint by Plaintiff. (Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 587, 593 [“A defendant moving for summary judgment has the burden of making a factual showing negating the existence of all causes of action on all theories embodied in the complaint and if he fails to discharge that burden, the motion must be denied”]; Lopez v. Sup. Ct. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 705, 717 [a moving defendant has the burden to show it is entitled to judgment with respect to all theories of liability asserted by the plaintiff].)