CTM IRON WORKS, INC. v. ASSOCIATED CONSTRUCTION LLC, ET AL.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD A demurrer may be brought if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).) “A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law.” ¿ (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare ¿ (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.) Allegations are to be liberally construed. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 452.) In testing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. (See Blank v.

Kirwan ¿ (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (See SKF Farms v. Superior Court ¿ (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) To the extent factual allegations conflict with the content of the exhibits to the complaint, we rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits. (See Barnett v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505.)

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court a pleading can be amended successfully. (See id.) However,”[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245.) /// ///

V. JUDICIAL NOTICE The Court GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial notice. (See Evid. Code § 452(h).) But the Court takes judicial notice only as to the existence, content, and authenticity of such documents, not the truth of the factual matters asserted therein. (See Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 389, 400.)

VI. ANALYSIS “A mechanic's lien is a claim against the real property upon which the claimant has bestowed labor or furnished materials. (Kim v. JF Enterprises ¿ (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 849, 854 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 141] (Kim ¿).) A mechanic's lien is perfected by filing a claim of lien within certain time limitations and by meeting other statutory requirements. (Ibid.) One such statutory requirement is the service of a preliminary 20-day notice.” ¿ (Shady Tree Farms, LLC v. Omni Fin., LLC ¿ (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 131, 135.) ¿ Under Civil Code § 8200, before recording a lien claim, a claimant shall give preliminary notice to the owner, the direct contractor to which the claimant provides work, and the construction lender if any. (See Civ.

Code § 8200(a).) “A claimant with a direct contractual relationship with an owner is required to give preliminary notice only to the construction lender or reputed construction lender, if any.” (Id., § 8200(e)(2).) A preliminary notice shall be given no later than 20 days after the claimant has first furnished work. (See Civ. Code § 8204(a).) Under Civil Code § 8460,”[t]he claimant shall commence an action to enforce a lien within 90 days after recordation of the claim of lien. If the claimant does not commence an action to enforce the lien within that time, the claim of lien expires and is unenforceable.”

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s first cause of action for foreclosure of mechanic’s lien fails to state a claim because it expired under Civil Code § 8460. Defendants argue Plaintiff’s initial complaint was filed in propria persona and was thus void, as a result, Plaintiff did not commence its action to enforce the lien within the 90-day period prescribed by § 8460. Defendants argue the FAC, which was filed with the assistance of counsel, cannot cure this defect. (See Dem. at 9:9-23.) Defendants argue even though a corporation’s failure to appear through counsel is a correctible defect under CLD Construction, Inc. v.

City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1149, this relief cannot extend to Plaintiff’s circumstances, because the defect here was not merely procedural, it was substantive. (See Dem. at 13:10-13.) Second, Defendants argue the first claim fails because the FAC contains no allegations Plaintiff served a valid preliminary notice as required by Civil Code § 8200(c). (See id., at 9:24-26.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues it timely commenced its action as its initial Complaint was not void under CLD Construction and it subsequently cured the procedural defect of its initial pleading. (See Opp. at 2:6-10, 3:1-5 citing CLD Construction, 120 Cal.App.4th at 1149.) Plaintiff also argues paragraph 21 of the FAC alleges Plaintiff complied with Civil Code § 8200. (See Opp. at 4:12-18.)

Defendants argue though CLD Construction held the procedural rule mandating a corporation must be represented by counsel is a curable defect in the complaint, Plaintiff’s reliance on CLD Construction is misplaced. Defendants argue by the time Plaintiff obtained counsel and filed its FAC, the lien had already expired by operation of law under § 8460. (See Reply at 3:1-20, 4:16-21, citing Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 627, 635 [holding action to foreclose the lien was neither commenced in the proper court nor transferred to the proper court within 90 days thus foreclosure was barred].) Defendants also argue the FAC does not allege strict compliance with § 8200, as Plaintiff was required to affirmatively allege it actually served a preliminary notice in the correct form, by the correct method, on the correct parties. (See Reply at 5:11-18.)

The Court is unpersuaded by Defendants’ argument Plaintiff did not “commence an action to enforce a lien within 90 days after recordation of the claim of lien.” (Civ. Code § 8460.) First, Defendant’s reliance on Automatic is misplaced, as that case held that foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien was barred because the plaintiff failed to commence its action in the proper court within 90 days. (See Automatic, 216 Cal.App.3d at 635.) There is no dispute here about whether Plaintiff filed this action in the correct county. Here, Plaintiff commenced this action on January 2, 2026, when it filed its Complaint. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 350.) Plaintiff alleges it recorded a Claim of Mechanic's Lien October 10, 2025. (See FAC, ¶ 18.)

The Court finds Plaintiff commenced this action within the 90-day period after recording the lien despite that the initial pleading was filed without representation of counsel. CLD Construction rejected the argument a pleading is void because it was filed on behalf of a corporation by a non-attorney, “Given the weight of nationwide authority and this state’s increasing acceptance of the view that representation of the corporation by an attorney is not an absolute prerequisite to the court’s fundamental power to hear or determine a case, we are persuaded it is more appropriate and just to treat a corporation’s failure to be represented by an attorney as a defect that may be corrected, on such terms as are just in the sound discretion of the court?

The rule requiring representation by an attorney’is not a fact essential to the corporation's cause of action or an element constituting its right of action.” (CLD Construction, 120 Cal.App.4th at 1149-50.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint, which was filed within the 90-day period, was not void by virtue of having been filed without representation. Plaintiff then obtained counsel and filed its FAC to foreclose the identical lien, for the identical work, labor, and materials, arising out of the identical transaction and covering the same property. In an action to foreclose mechanic’s lien, where amended complaint does not change cause of action, the time to which 90?day statute of limitations runs is the filing of original complaint. (See Kirman v. Borzage (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 865, 871 (discussing Ginsberg v. Faraone (1932) 126 Cal.App. 337, 343).) Thus, having cured the lack of representation defect and filing the FAC to foreclose the identical lien, the Court finds Plaintiff timely commenced its action to foreclose its lien within the 90-day period prescribed by Civil Code § 8460.

Second, the Court finds Plaintiff properly alleges compliance with § 8200. The FAC alleges “Plaintiff has performed all conditions precedent to the enforcement of its Mechanic’s’ and “Plaintiff has complied with all of the statutory prerequisites to maintaining this action for enforcement of its mechanic’s lien.” (FAC, ¶¶ 21, 28.) ¿ This is sufficient at the pleadings stage. (See Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Industrial Accident Com. (1926) 78 Cal.App.584, 590 [pleadings in civil actions need not be couched in the exact language of the statute provided sufficient facts be shown to bring them within its plain intent].) ¿ Defendants provide no authority supporting their position Plaintiff must specifically plead it served a preliminary notice in the correct form, by the correct method, on the correct parties to survive demurrer.

Thus, the Court OVERRULES Defendants? Demurrer to the First Cause of Action for Foreclosure of Mechanic’s Lien.

VII. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES Defendants? Demurrer to the First Cause of Action for Foreclosure of Mechanic’s Lien. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: May 18, 2026 Hon. Michael R. Amerian Judge, Superior Court [1] All statutory references are to California codes unless stated otherwise. Home -->)" -->