Curtis Jackson, et al. v. Jenero Jefferson, et al.

I. MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS

Defendant Timothy Robbins moves for an order expunging the lis pendens recorded by Plaintiffs Curtis Jackson and Shannon Imani Jackson. In a motion to expunge a notice of lis pendens, the claimant who filed the lis pendens has the burden of proof. (CCP § 405.30.) Thus, the court must order the notice expunged if it finds the pleading on which the notice is based does not contain a real property claim (CCP § 405.31) or the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim (CCP § 405.32). A claim has “probable validity’ where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on that claim. (CCP § 481.190; CCP § 405.3.)

Defendant Robbins first argues the notice of pendency is void and invalid. The Code of Civil Procedure requires that a person who files a lis pendens must “prior to recordation of the notice, cause a copy of the notice to be mailed, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to all known addresses of the parties to whom the real property claim is adverse and to all owners of record of the real property affected by the real property claim as shown by the latest county assessment roll.” (CCP § 405.22.) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 405.23,”[a]ny notice of pendency of action shall be void and invalid as to any adverse party or owner of record unless the requirements of Section 405.22 are met for that party or owner and a proof of service in the form and content specified in Section 1013a has been recorded with the notice of pendency of action.”

Here, Plaintiffs submit no opposition and no evidence to meet the burden to oppose the motion. There is no proof of service attached to the notice of pendency of action that Plaintiffs recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County.

Defendant Robbins also argues Plaintiffs cannot establish the probable validity of any claim purporting to affect the title to the Triplex. As noted above, a claim has “probable validity’ where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on that claim. (CCP §481.190; CCP §405.3.) Here, Robbins testifies and the complaint alleges it was Mr. Jackson who approached Mr. Robbins about buying the Triplex; Plaintiff was forced to sell the Triplex; and Robbins wrote a check in the amount of $100,000.00 to show good faith for the purchase. There are no allegations of the basis of Robbins’ breach or misrepresentation. The motion is unopposed. Accordingly, the motion to expunge notice of pendency of action is GRANTED.

II. DEFENDANT TIMOTHY ROBBINS? DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO STRIKE

Defendant Timothy Robbins demurs to each of the causes of action in Plaintiffs? Curtis Jackon and Shannon Imani Jackons? First Amended Complaint, including the first cause of action for financial elder abuse, second cause of action for fraud and concealment, third cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, fourth cause of action for negligence, fifth cause of action for quiet title, and sixth cause of action for unjust enrichment and restitution. Plaintiff did not oppose the demurrer.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) A “demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law.” (S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732 (internal citations omitted).)

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant Robbins requests this court take judicial notice that the document identified as Exhibit 1 to the concurrently-filed Sinclair Decl. is a true and correct copy of the Grant Deed recorded on May 21, 2021 as Inst. No. 20210822188 in the Official Records of Los Angeles County, California. The court GRANTS the request for judicial notice.

Sham Pleading

Defendant Robbins first demurs to the complaint on the grounds the sham pleading doctrine precludes Plaintiffs from amending the complaint to omit harmful allegations. “Under the sham pleading doctrine, allegations in an original pleading that rendered it vulnerable to demurrer or other attack cannot simply be omitted without explanation.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 751.) “The purpose of the doctrine is to enable the courts to prevent an abuse of process.” (Id.) “The doctrine is not intended to prevent honest complainants from correcting erroneous allegations or to prevent the correction of ambiguous facts.” (Id.)

Defendant Robbins argues Plaintiffs’ initial complaint alleged that Mr. Jefferson’s actions ultimately culminated in a “forced sale’ of the Triplex to Defendant Robbins, to Plaintiffs’ detriment. However, Plaintiffs’ amended complaint now removes this allegation. The only mention of Mr. Robbins in the amended complaint is: “Defendant Timothy Robbins is an individual residing in California who participated in the transactions alleged herein.” (FAC ¶ 6). The amended complaint then removes references to “Jefferson’ from the original complaint, and now broadly refers to unspecified “Defendants.”

The court finds the allegations in the FAC do not constitute a sham pleading. Courts must examine whether the changes are designed “to conceal fundamental vulnerabilities in a plaintiff's case[.]? (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, fn. 25.) Here, the new allegations do not contradict specific prior allegations.

First Cause of Action? Financial Elder Abuse

Defendant Robbins demurs to the first cause of action for financial elder abuse on the ground Curtis cannot allege that he was unaware of a conveyance until May 2021 when he signed the instrument conveying the title in February 2019. Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.7 establishes that “an action for damages pursuant to Sections 15657.5 and 15657.6 for financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult, as defined in Section 15610.30, shall be commenced within four years after the plaintiff discovers or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, the facts constituting the financial abuse.”

Here, it is alleged there was transfer of the subject property in 2019. However, it was not until 2021 when Plaintiffs discovered the fraudulent conduct when they obtained a certified title report. (FAC ¶22.) Defendant contends the grant deed was signed in February 2019, making later discovery untrue. The court does not understand moving party’s argument as the judicially noticed Grant Deed shows it was signed by Plaintiff Curtis Jackson on March 8, 2021. As such, Defendant Robbins has not shown that the discovery rule cannot apply in this case. Moreover, as noted above, Plaintiff “shifting positions’ is not enough to sustain the demurrer. Based on the foregoing, the demurrer is OVERRULED.

Second Cause of Action

Defendant demurs to the second cause of action for fraud and concealment on the grounds Plaintiffs have failed to plead the cause of action with the requisite particularity. The elements of fraud are:”(a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or “scienter”); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Charnay v. Cobert (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 170, 184.) “The particularity demands that a plaintiff plead facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469.) The statute of limitations for fraud is three years. (See CCP § 338(d).)

Defendant argues the amended complaint does not allege that Mr. Robbins misled anyone about anything (nor does it allege why Mr. Robbins should have any responsibility for any scheme that may have involved Mr. Jefferson). The court agrees the FAC fails to allege facts sufficient to support a claim against Defendant Robbins. The complaint only generally alleges “Defendants represented that the transaction would preserve ownership and be fully disclosed’ and?[t]hose representations were false.” None of these allegations are plead with the requisite specificity.

Defendant also demurs to the fraudulent cause of action on the grounds it is barred by the statute of limitations. Defendant contends even considering the alleged delayed discovery, the statute of limitations would have been tolled until May 2024. This action was not filed until September 2024. The court agrees. The fraudulent cause of action as alleged is barred. Based on the foregoing, the demurrer is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Third Cause of Action

Defendant Robbins demurs to the third cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty because it does not contain any allegations against Defendant Robbins and is barred by the statute of limitations. The elements for a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action are “the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach, and damage proximately caused by that breach.” (Thomson v. Canyon (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 594, 604.) The statute of limitations for a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action is four years, unless the gravamen of the claim is actual or constructive fraud, in which case the statute of limitations is three years. (See American Master Lease LLC v. Idanta Partners, Ltd. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1451, 1479.)

Defendant Robbins brings this demurrer out of caution as it is unclear whether the claim is against him. The original complaint did not name Mr. Robbins in the breach of fiduciary claim. Moreover, it is well settled that the buyer and seller of real property do not stand in a fiduciary relationship to one another in an ordinary real estate transaction. (Driver v. Melone (1970) 11 Cal. App. 3d 746, 753.) If Plaintiffs wish to contradict their original complaint, Plaintiffs must allege that new relationship. However, Plaintiffs have failed to do so. Moreover, the three-year statute of limitations applies since the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ complaint is the alleged fraud. As such, even considering the delayed discovery alleged, the complaint is untimely. The court agrees. There are no clear allegations of what duty was owed by Mr. Robbins and if Plaintiffs are relying on Mr. Robbins’ status as a buyer, there is no fiduciary relationship. Moreover, the action is barred by the statute of limitations. Based on the foregoing, the demurrer is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Fourth Cause of Action

Defendant Robbins demurs to the fourth cause of action for negligence on the grounds there are no allegations against Defendant Robbins and is barred by the statute of limitations. To plead a cause of action for negligence, one must allege (1) a legal duty owed to plaintiffs to use due care; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damage to plaintiff. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal. App. 4th 292, 318.) If a negligence claim is based on fraud, California law provides a three-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 338(d).

Defendant argues Plaintiffs have never alleged personal injury or property damage in this case. Moreover, the economic loss doctrine bars Plaintiffs from suing Mr. Robbins and is time barred. The court finds the allegations insufficient. Plaintiffs fail to allege any cognizable negligence claim against Defendant Robbins. Moreover, the action is barred by the two-year statute of limitations even assuming delayed discovery. Based on the foregoing, the demurrer is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Fifth Cause of Action

Defendant demurs to the fifth cause of action for quiet title on the grounds the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. The applicable statute of limitations for actions to quiet title depend on the underlying theory of relief. (See Salazar v. Thomas (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 467, 476.) Generally, the time limit for a quiet title action is the four-year limitations period for cancellation of an instrument or the three-year limitations period for fraud. (See id.) The limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff is not in exclusive and undisputed possession of the property. (See id. at 477-78.)?[M]ere notice of an adverse claim is not enough to commence the owner’s statute of limitations.” (Id.) Because the claims arise out of the alleged fraud, the three-year statute of limitations applies. Even considering Plaintiffs’ alleged delayed discovery in May of 2021, the court finds the claim is time barred as it is primarily an action for fraud. Based on the foregoing, the demurrer is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Sixth Cause of Action

Defendant Robbins demurs to the sixth cause of action for unjust enrichment/restitution on the grounds there is “no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment,” (City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (2022) 83 Cal. App. 5th 458, 477), and “restitution is a remedy and not a freestanding cause of action,” (Reid v. City of San Diego (2018) 24 Cal. App. 5th 343, 362). Even if there was such a cause of action, it would be barred by the statute of limitations.

The court agrees there is no cause of action for unjust enrichment. (See e.g. McBride v. Boughton (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 387 [“Unjust enrichment is not a cause of action, however, or even a remedy, but rather a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies .... [Citation.] It is synonymous with restitution.”].) Similarly, restitution functions as a remedy, not cause of action. Based on the foregoing, the demurrer is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Motion to Strike

Defendant Robbins seeks to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages. A motion to strike punitive damages allegations may lie where the facts alleged do not rise to the level of “malice, fraud or oppression’ required to support a punitive damages award. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central Calif., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) As noted above, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a cause of action against Defendant Robbins for Elder Abuse. Those allegations are