Gideon Fridman v. Jeffrey Paul Albert

On May 11, 2026, Defendant filed notices of non-opposition.

As of May 12, 2026, no oppositions have been filed.

II. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendant requests the court take judicial notice of the following documents: Ruling on Defendant’s Objections to Statement of Decision After Trial filed by the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles in Case No. LC105734 on May 21, 2024; Minute Order filed by the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles in Case No. LC105734 on August 16, 2024; Minute Order filed by the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles in Case No. LC105734 on August 28, 2024; Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel filed by Plaintiff as Defendant/Cross-Complainant in Case No. LC105734 on November 11, 2024.

The court may decline to take judicial notice of materials that are not “necessary, helpful, or relevant.” (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) l8 Cal.4th 739,748, fn. 6.)

The court declines to take judicial notice of these documents because they are not helpful to the court’s ruling on the demurrer with motion to strike.

III. TIMELINESS

? A person against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may, within 30 days after service of the complaint or cross-complaint, demur to the complaint or cross-complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., §¿430.40, subd. (a).)¿

Per Code of Civil Procedure section¿435, subdivision (b)(1), a motion to strike should also be filed within 30 days after service of the complaint. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 412.20, subd. (a)(3).)

Per Code of Civil Procedure section¿1005, subdivision (b), moving papers must be filed at least 16 court days before the set hearing, oppositions must be filed at least nine court days before the set hearing, and replies must be filed at least five court days before the set hearing.

Plaintiff served Defendant with the summons and complaint by substituted service on September 10, 2025. (Proof of Service filed 12/10/25.)

Plaintiff mailed documents to Defendant that same day. (Proof of Service filed 12/10/25.)

Defendant filed the demurrer with motion to strike on March 18, 2026, which is not timely under Code of Civil Procedure sections 430.40 and 435.

“A trial court has broad discretion to accept or reject late-filed papers.” (Jack v. Ring LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1186, 1210, brackets removed.)

The court will exercise its discretion and consider the demurrer with motion to strike.

The demurrer with motion to strike was timely filed under Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b).

IV. MEET AND CONFER

California Code of Civil Procedure section¿430.41, subdivision (a) requires parties to “meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference’ before the filing of a demurrer to attempt to resolve the objections raised in the demurrer.¿

The demurring party is required to file and serve with the demurrer a declaration either confirming that parties were unable to resolve the issues raised by the demurrer despite having met and conferred or that the opposing party failed to meet and confer with the demurring party in good faith. (Code Civ. Proc., §¿430.41, subd. (a)(3).)

Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5 also requires the moving party to meet and confer before filing a motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., §¿435.5, subd. (a).)

Defendant submits declarations stating they attempted to call Plaintiff to meet and confer but did not reach Plaintiff. (Alpert Declaration (Demurrer) ¶ 3; Alpert Declaration (MTS) ¶ 3.)

The court finds Defendant attempted to meet and confer and Plaintiff failed to meet and confer with Defendant in good faith.

Defendant satisfied the meet and confer requirements.

V. DEMURRER

Legal Standard

“A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or the facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.)

As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Id.)

The court also considers “judicially noticed matters.” (Id.)

A complaint must contain?[a]¿statement¿of the¿facts¿constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.” (Code Civ. Proc., §¿425.10, subd. (a)(1).)

A “complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.)

¿ ¿ A party may demur to a complaint because the complaint “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

¿ A party may also demur because the complaint is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).)??[U]ncertain’ includes ambiguous and unintelligible.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).)

Discussion

Legal Malpractice: Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for legal malpractice. (Demurrer p. 4.)

Specifically, Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing a breach of duty and a causal connection between the breach and Plaintiff’s damages. (Demurrer p. 4.)

“To prove a legal malpractice cause of action, the plaintiff must show: (1) a duty by the attorney to use such skill, prudence and diligence as members of his or her profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the attorney's negligence.” (Redante v. Yockelson (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1356.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty to competently represent Plaintiff. (Complaint p. 3.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant breached that duty by “failing to secure a court reporter, failing to act with diligence, and otherwise mishandling Plaintiff’s case.” (Complaint p. 3.)

Plaintiff also alleges that?[a]s a direct and proximate result, Plaintiff suffered harm, including but not limited to loss of appellate rights, loss of case value, and emotional distress.” (Complaint p. 3.)

These allegations sufficiently state a cause of action for legal malpractice.

Defendant also argues Plaintiff’s general allegations are convoluted. (Demurrer p. 4.)

“Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond. [Citations.] “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.”? (A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695, brackets removed.)

“Under our liberal pleading rules, where the complaint contains substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled or plaintiff given leave to amend.” (Id., brackets removed.)¿¿

Although not completely clear, Plaintiff’s allegations are not so uncertain that Defendant is not sufficiently apprised of the issues he is being asked to meet.

Plaintiff alleges Plaintiff retained Defendant to represent Plaintiff in Case No. LC105734. (Complaint p. 2.)

Plaintiff requested a jury trial, which was postponed. (Complaint p. 2.)

Plaintiff’s request for a jury trial was then denied and Defendant had Plaintiff sign a document to continue as a non-jury trial, despite the fact Plaintiff represented to Defendant “that he wanted to change the judge before the court decision.” (Complaint p. 2.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant knew Plaintiff was not fit to testify because of his medical condition, but Defendant allowed Plaintiff to testify. (Complaint p. 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “deliberately took advantage of Plaintiff[“s] . . . mental and physical condition and persuaded [P]laintiff . . . to sign a document agreeing to a bench trial with the same judge without explaining that the trial was over.” (Complaint p. 2.)

Plaintiff relied on Defendant to prepare for trial and requested Defendant arrange for a court reporter. (Complaint pp. 2-3.)

Defendant failed to secure a court reporter, so no trial transcript exists. (Complaint p. 3.)

Plaintiff alleges that this has harmed his “ability to appeal or protect his legal rights.” (Complaint p. 3.)

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant’s acts and omissions fell below the standard of care owed to Plaintiff as a client and caused Plaintiff significant damages.” (Complaint p. 3.)

The demurrer on this ground is overruled.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. (Demurrer p. 4.)

Specifically, Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing a breach of duty and a causal connection between the breach and Plaintiff’s damages. (Demurrer p. 4.)

“The elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty are (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) its breach, and (3) damage proximately caused by that breach.” (Mendoza v. Continental Sales Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1405.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant “owed Plaintiff . . . a duty of care arising from the attorney-client relationship.” (Complaint pp. 3-4.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant “breached that duty through negligent representation and violation of professional standards.” (Complaint p. 4.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant had Plaintiff sign documents waiving a right to a jury trial, failed to pay for a court reporter, and “refused to object to the court ruling . . .” (Complaint p. 3.)

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that?[a]s a direct and proximate result, Plaintiff . . . suffered actual damages and harm.” (Complaint p. 4.)

These allegations sufficiently state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.

Defendant also argues Plaintiff’s general allegations are convoluted.

The court rejects this argument here for the same reasons it rejected it above.

The demurrer on this ground is overruled.

Elder Financial Abuse: Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to plead a cause of action for elder abuse with the requisite specificity. (Demurrer p. 4.)

An??[e]lder’ means any person residing in [California], 65 years of age or older.” (Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.27.)

Elder abuse includes any of the following: Physical abuse, neglect, abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with resulting physical harm or pain or mental suffering.

The deprivation by a care custodian of goods or services that are necessary to avoid physical harm or mental suffering.

Financial abuse, as defined in¿Section 15610.30. (Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.07, subd. (a).)

Financial elder abuse occurs when a person or entity:”(1) Takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both.

(2) Assists in taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both.

(3) Takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains, or assists in taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining, real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult by undue influence, as defined in Section 15610.70.” (Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.30, subd. (a).)

? A person or entity shall be deemed to have taken, secreted, appropriated, obtained, or retained property for a wrongful use if, among other things, the person or entity takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains the property and the person or entity knew or should have known that this conduct is likely to be harmful to the elder or dependent adult.” (Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.30, subd. (b).)

“For purposes of this section, a person or entity takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property when an elder or dependent adult is deprived of any property right, including by means of an agreement, donative transfer, or testamentary bequest, regardless of whether the property is held directly or by a representative of an elder or dependent adult.” (Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.30, subd. (c).)

“Undue influence’ is defined as’ excessive persuasion that causes another person to act or refrain from acting by overcoming that person's free will and results in inequity.” (Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.70, subd. (a).)

Plaintiff alleges he is over 65 years of age. (Complaint p. 4.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant “took, appropriated, obtained, or retained Plaintiff’s real or personal property for wrongful use with intent to defraud, or by undue influence.” (Complaint p. 4.)

Plaintiff also alleges Defendant “knew or should have known that their actions would cause Plaintiff . . . to be deprived of their property.” (Complaint p. 4.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s “actions were a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff harm’ and Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Complaint p. 4.)

Under the general allegations, Plaintiff alleges he paid Defendant “approximately $85,000.00[.]? (Complaint p. 3.)

Plaintiff also alleges Defendant “engaged in elder financial abuse by having misrepresented Plaintiff . . . for financial gain by manipulating Plaintiff . . . to pay more money to Defendant . . . and by having him sign legal documents such as waiving his right for a Jury trial, failing to pay for a court reporter despite Defendant . . . having sufficient funds to pay, and for abusing his power as an attorney.” (Complaint p. 3.)

It is unclear to the court what real or personal property Plaintiff is alleging Defendant took from Plaintiff for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud.

The demurrer on this ground is sustained.

IV. MOTION TO STRIKE

Legal Standard

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)

The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).)

The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

A motion to strike is appropriate to attack a claim for punitive damages. (Grieves v. Superior Court (? Grieves”) (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 164.)

“Punitive or exemplary damages are remedies available to a party who can plead and prove the facts and circumstances set forth in Civil Code section 3294[.]? (Id. at pp. 163-164, brackets removed.)

To justify a punitive damages award, the defendant must be “guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”¿(Civ. Code, § 3294.)¿¿¿ ¿¿

Malice is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)

Oppression is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).)

Fraud is defined as’ an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)¿¿

“Punitive¿damages¿may not be¿pleaded¿generally.” (Today’s IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193.)

“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of¿punitive¿damages.” (Grieves, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d 159 at 166.)

And “conclusory characterization of defendant's conduct as intentional, wilful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of “oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied,” within the meaning of¿section 3294.” (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)

“Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” (Grieves, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 166; Today’s IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 1193 [“In addition to the requirement that the operative complaint set forth the elements as stated in¿section 3294, it must include¿specific¿factual allegations showing that defendant's conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim for¿punitive¿damages.”].)¿¿¿

Discussion

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. (MTS p. 2.)

Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing malice, fraud, or oppression. (MTS pp. 3-4.)

The complaint lacks facts showing malice, fraud, or oppression that would support punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294.

The motion to strike is granted.

VI. LEAVE TO AMEND

“Where the defect raised by a motion to strike or by demurrer is reasonably capable of cure, “leave to amend is routinely and liberally granted to give the plaintiff a chance to cure the defect in question.”? (CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1146.)¿

Plaintiff has not had an opportunity to amend the complaint.

The court, therefore, finds there is a reasonable possibility Plaintiff can cure the defects identified above.

VII. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court overrules the demurrer as to the first and second causes of action but sustains it as to the third cause of action.

The motion to strike is granted.

Plaintiff is granted leave to amend within thirty (30) days of this order.

DATED: May 18, 2026 ________________________________ Hon. Eric Harmon Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court Home -->)" -->