Westside Merchandising, LLC v. Mount Westmore, LLC

California practice recognizes two types of motions for judgment on the pleadings. First, there is a statutory motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 438.) A defendant may bring a statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings when “the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).) A statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings must be filed within certain time limits, and it is subject to a statutory meet-and-confer requirement. (Id., subd. (e); Code Civ. Proc., § 439.) The grounds for a statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings must “appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d).)

Second, there is a nonstatutory motion for judgment on the pleadings, which “may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself.” (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 877; see also Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota) (1995) 11 Cal.4th 138, 145 fn. 2; Tarin v. Lind (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 395, 402; Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 644, 650.)

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is the functional equivalent of a demurrer. (People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transp. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 77; City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. State (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 13, 23.) “The standard for granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Bezirdjian v.

O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322; accord Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 494; Templo v. State (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 730, 735; Southern California Edison Co. v. City of Victorville (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 218, 227; see also 1 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial [2025] ¶ 7:275.)

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant Draper asks the Court to take judicial notice of the Court’s Minute Order dated February 4, 2026.. The request is granted.

Meet and Confer

Before filing a statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party must “meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).) This requirement is satisfied. (Veglia Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.)

Discussion

Defendant Draper moves for judgment on the pleadings on the Fourth Cause of Action in the FAC (for intentional interference with contractual relationship). The Court begins with a threshold issue raised by Plaintiff in its opposition. Draper previously demurred to the Fourth Cause of Action in the FAC. The demurrer was overruled on procedural grounds. Because Draper’s demurrer to this cause of action was previously overruled, Plaintiff argues that this motion for judgment on the pleadings is barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 438, subdivision (g)(1).

That statute provides that a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made when: “The moving party has already demurred to the complaint or answer, as the case may be, on the same grounds as is the basis for the motion provided for in this section and the demurrer has been overruled, provided that there has been a material change in applicable case law or statute since the ruling on the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (g)(1).)

Here, there has been no change in case law or statute since the Court overruled Draper’s demurrer to this cause of action. The Court has reviewed the arguments of each side and concludes that this motion is not barred by section 438, subdivision (g)(1). The manifest purpose of that provision is to prevent needless and duplicative litigation of the same issue; once a party has litigated a basis for a demurrer and lost, the party cannot relitigate the same issue a second time on a motion for judgment on the pleadings (unless, of course, there has been a change in law).

Here, however, the Court did not previously rule on the merits of Draper’s demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action. The demurrer was overruled on (dispositive) procedural grounds. A procedural defect in a demurrer is not a basis to bar Draper from having his defense to the FAC adjudicated on a statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings. Indeed, no purpose would be served by adopting Plaintiff’s interpretation of subdivision (g)(1). The parties to a litigation should not be compelled to incur the costs of litigating a cause of action that is (potentially) barred on the face of the pleadings. (Moreover, even if Plaintiff were correct as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Court could, and would, exercise its discretion to treat Draper’s motion as a common law, non-statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings.

A non-statutory motion is not governed by section 438, subdivision (g)(1).)

Turning now to the merits, the elements of a cause of action for intentional inference with contractual relations are: (1) that there was a valid and enforceable contract between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) that the defendant knew of the contract; (3) that the defendant prevented performance, made performance more difficult or expensive, or otherwise disrupted the performance of the contract; (4) that the defendant intended to prevent, to make more difficult or expense, or otherwise to disrupt performance of the contract; and (5) that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff. (Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 1140, 1148; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1118, 1126; PMC, Inc. v. Saban Entertainment, Inc. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 579, 601.)

A person cannot be held liable in tort for interfering with his or her own contract or business relationship. (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 513-514; Redfearn, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 997; Settimo Associates v. Environ Systems, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 842, 845.) Nor may an agent be held liable in tort for acts undertaken within the scope of the agency relationship that interfere with the contract of the principal. (Caliber Paving Co., Inc. v. Rexford Industrial Realty & Management, Inc. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 175, 186-187; Redfearn, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1003.) And a person with a financial interest in a contract cannot be held liable in tort for interfering with the contract to protect the financial interest. (Asahi Kasei Pharma Corp. v. Actelion Ltd. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 945, 962.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges Draper is the manager of Defendant Mount Westmore, LLC. (FAC, ¶ 12.) Draper, on behalf of Mount Westmore, met with Plaintiff to discuss the Master License Agreement (the “MLA”), the contract at issue. (FAC, ¶¶ 19-21.) Plaintiff alleges that subsequently, Draper (and Defendant Camara) contacted Forever 21 and represented that Mount Westmore was the exclusive owner of merchandising and licensing rights to Mount Westmore apparel; this was false, Plaintiff alleges, because of the existence of the MLA, and interfered with the performance of the MLA. (FAC, ¶¶ 29, 55.) As a result of Draper’s representations, Plaintiff alleges, Forever 21 withheld sales proceeds and royalties due to Plaintiff under the MLA. (FAC, ¶¶ 30, 58.)

As alleged in the FAC, the acts of interference by Draper were committed as an agent for Mount Westmore and within the scope of his agency. Accordingly, Draper’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the Fourth Cause of Action in the FAC is granted.

The Court exercises its discretion to grant Plaintiff leave to amend. Although the Court is skeptical that Plaintiff can cure the pleading deficiency in light of the allegations in the FAC and the sham pleading doctrine, the standard for leave to amend is liberal, and the Court will give Plaintiff the opportunity to state a cause of action for intentional interference based on (for example) actions taken that were outside of, and separate and distinct from, his agency relationship with the contracting principal.

Conclusion

The Court GRANTS the motion of Defendant Tony Draper for judgment on the pleadings on the Fourth Cause of Action in the First Amended Complaint. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff Westside Merchandising LLC LEAVE to file a Second Amended Complaint addressing the deficiencies set forth in this ruling by no later than June 8, 2026. Moving Party is ORDERED to give notice.

Case Number: 25STCV30223 Hearing Date: May 18, 2026 Dept: 514 Brazil v. Lyft, Inc. 25STCV30223 Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by Defendant Lyft, Inc.

Tentative Ruling

The motion is granted.

Background

On October 16, 2025, Dana Brazil (“Plaintiff”) filed the complaint in this action against Lyft, Inc. (“Lyft”), Mekhi Hassel, and Does 1 through 50, asserting one cause of action for negligence arising out of an automobile accident occurring on December 1, 2023. According to the complaint, at the time of the accident Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Defendant Hassel while Hasel was driving for Lyft. (Compl., ¶¶ 6-7, 9-11.)

On November 21, 2025, Lyft filed an answer. On January 15, 2026, Hassel filed an answer. On April 21, 2026, Lyft filed this motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff filed an opposition on April 23, and Lyft filed a reply on May 11. Trial is set for January 31, 2028.

Legal Standard

California law incorporates many of the basic policy objectives contained in the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), including a presumption in favor of arbitrability. (See Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 971-72.) Under the FAA: “A written provision in? a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the