Consuel Esquivel Alcala, et al. v. General Motors LLC

Plaintiffs’ counsel must pay said monetary sanctions to Defendant’s counsel within 15 business days of the Court’s order. Defendant is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order. BACKGROUND This is a lemon law case. On October 30, 2025, plaintiffs Consuelo Esquivel Alcala (Consuelo)[1] and Daniel Alcala (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this action against defendant General Motors LLC (Defendant) and Does 1 through 10, alleging causes of action for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act breach of express warranty and violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act breach of implied warranty.

On April 22, 2026, Defendant moved for compliance and sanctions. On May 6, 2026, Plaintiffs opposed the motion. On May 11, 2026, Defendant replied. LEGAL STANDARD (c) Within 120 days after the filing of the answer or other responsive pleading, all parties have the right to conduct initial depositions, each not to exceed two hours, of the following deponents: (1) The plaintiff. (2) The defendant, and if the defendant is not a natural person, the person who is most qualified to testify on the defendant's behalf.

This deposition shall be limited to the topics listed in subdivision (i).? (i) If the defendant is not a natural person, the initial deposition of the person who is most qualified to testify on the defendant's behalf shall be limited to the following topics: (1) All warranties that accompanied the plaintiff's motor vehicle at the time of purchase or lease. (2) Questions relating to the nature and extent of the entire service history, warranty history, and repairs relating to the motor vehicle. (3) Questions relating to recalls applicable to the motor vehicle. (4) Questions relating to a reasonable number of Technical Service Bulletins or Information Service Bulletins reasonably related to the nonconformities pertaining to the motor vehicle. (5) Questions relating to relevant diagnostic procedures consulted and followed while diagnosing the plaintiff's concerns for the motor vehicle. (6) Questions relating to relevant repair procedures consulted and followed during the repairs for the motor vehicle. (7) Questions relating to relevant communications between the plaintiff and defendant regarding the motor vehicle. (8) Questions relating to relevant communications between the defendant and any dealership or other third parties regarding the motor vehicle. (9) If a pre-suit restitution or replacement request was made, questions relating to why the defendant did not replace the motor vehicle or provide restitution. (10) If a pre-suit restitution or replacement request was made, any nonprivileged evaluation prepared by the manufacturer. (11) If a pre-suit restitution or replacement request was made, the manufacturer's policies and procedures regarding the restitution or replacement of vehicles in response to a consumer's request for restitution or replacement under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, in effect from the date of the notice of the consumer's request for restitution or replacement of the vehicle to the present, and any changes thereto. (j) Unless the party failing to comply with this section shows good cause, notwithstanding any other law and in addition to any other sanctions imposed pursuant to this chapter, a court shall impose sanctions as follows:? (2) A one-thousand-five-hundred-dollar ($1,500) sanction against the plaintiff's attorney or two-thousand-five-hundred-dollar ($2,500) sanction against the defense attorney respectively, paid within 15 business days for failure to comply with the provisions relating to depositions as prescribed in subdivision (c). (Code Civ.

Proc., § 871.26, subds. (c), (i), (j)(2).) PRELIMINARY ISSUE Plaintiffs’ opposition was untimely filed on May 6, 2026. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) The Court exercises its discretion to still consider the opposition, but nevertheless admonishes Plaintiffs to comply with the Code of Civil Procedure going forward. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1300, subd. (d); Juarez v. Wash Depot Holdings, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1197, 1202.)

DISCUSSION Meet and Confer Although Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26 does not contain a meet and confer requirement, this Court requests parties to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by videoconference before filing a discovery motion. (See Code Civ Proc., § 871.26; Dept. 6 Courtroom Information, p. 3 of pdf.) Defendant’s counsel indicates no efforts to meet and confer by any of these methods. (Kay Decl., ¶¶ 6-7.) The Court will still consider the motion, but admonishes Defendant to comply with this Court’s discovery motion requirements going forward.

Summary of Arguments Defendant seeks to compel Plaintiff Consuelo’s initial deposition under Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26, subdivision (c)(1), based on Consuelo’s failure to appear for deposition within the time allotted thereunder. Defendant indicates having filed its answer to Plaintiffs’ complaint on November 26, 2025, which put Plaintiffs’ depositions completion deadline as March 26, 2026. Defendant indicates having noticed Plaintiffs’ depositions for February 24, 2026, which Plaintiffs initially confirmed but then ended up cancelling Consuelo’s deposition on the morning of February 24, 2026.

Defendant indicates having been unable to complete Consuelo’s deposition by March 26, 2026. Defendant contends it is unable to adequately prepare its defense without Consuelo’s deposition and to meaningfully participate in the required mediation. In opposition, Plaintiffs contend Consuelo’s deposition is unnecessary because she is only an elderly cosigner who has virtually no knowledge regarding the facts of this case. Plaintiffs contend that compelling Consuelo’s deposition is harassment and that she has no relevant information.

Plaintiffs contend that Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26 does not mandate Consuelo’s deposition since she has no relevant information and had virtually no involvement in this matter other than being a cosigner. Plaintiffs contend the requested deposition is unnecessary and duplicative. Plaintiffs also contend that Defendant’s motion is untimely because the mediation was completed on March 12, 2026, and the purpose of the initial deposition was to prepare for the mediation. Plaintiffs contend the motion is moot because Plaintiffs agreed to produce Consuelo for deposition on May 11, 2026.

Plaintiffs further contend sanctions are not warranted here because good cause exists due to Consuelo’s lack of knowledge which renders the deposition unnecessary, harassing, and duplicative of other already available evidence in Defendant’s possession. Plaintiffs also contend Defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of not deposing Consuelo because they proceeded with the mediation without Consuelo’s deposition. In reply, Defendant contends Plaintiff still has not been deposed as of May 11, 2026.

Defendant contends Plaintiffs opposition grossly mischaracterizes the events that lead to Defendant filing this motion and that Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding Consuelo’s lack of knowledge or her deposition being unnecessary and duplicative do not justify her failure to appear for her mandatory deposition by the March 26, 2026 deadline.

Analysis

The Court finds Defendant is entitled to an order compelling Consuelo’s deposition. Defendant filed its answer to Plaintiffs’ complaint on November 26, 2025, which made March 26, 2026, the deadline for Consuelo to complete her initial deposition. (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.26, subd. (c)(1).) Consuelo did not comply with this deadline. (Kay Decl., ¶¶ 4-7.) Moreover, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ arguments that Consuelo’s deposition is unnecessary based on her limited knowledge of the underlying facts and old age unpersuasive.

Consuelo is a plaintiff in this case and Defendant is entitled to depose her. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 871.26, subd. (c)(1), 2025.010.) The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s motion. Consuelo must appear for deposition within 15 calendar days of this order. The Court further finds Plaintiffs have not demonstrated good cause to avoid imposition of the mandatory $1,500.00 sanctions against Plaintiffs’ counsel. As discussed above, Defendant is entitled to depose Consuelo, and Consuelo’s purported limited knowledge of the case does not demonstrate good cause.

The Court therefore awards Defendant monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,500.00 against Plaintiffs’ counsel per Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26, subdivision (j)(2). (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.26, subd. (j)(2).) Plaintiffs’ counsel must pay said monetary sanctions to Defendant’s counsel within 15 business days of the Court’s order. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Defendant General Motors LLC?s motion for compliance and sanctions. Plaintiff Consuelo Esquivel Alcala must appear for her initial deposition within 15 calendar days of the Court’s order. The Court further GRANTS Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiffs’ counsel in the amount of $1,500.00 per Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26, subdivision (j)(2). Plaintiffs’ counsel must pay said monetary sanctions to Defendant’s counsel within 15 business days of the Court’s order.

Defendant is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order. [1] The Court refers to Consuelo by her first name to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended. Case Number: 25PSCV04622 Hearing Date: May 18, 2026 Dept: 6 CASE NAME: Stephen Paschal, et al. v. Yong Jiang, et al. Defendants Yong Jiang, Yinglin Zhao, and Deshan Zhao’s Partial Demurrer or, Alternatively, Motion to Strike First Amended Complaint as to Cause of Action for Premises Liability TENTATIVE RULING The Court OVERRULES Defendants Yong Jiang, Yinglin Zhao, and Deshan Zhao’s partial demurrer or, alternatively, motion to strike First Amended Complaint as to cause of action for premises liability.

Defendants must file an amended answer to all causes of action in the FAC within ten calendar days of this order. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order. BACKGROUND This is a motorcycle accident case. On December 23, 2025, plaintiffs Stephen Paschal (Stephen)[1] and Ashley Paschal (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this action. On March 6, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) against defendants Yong Jiang, Yinglin Zhao, and Deshan Zhao (collectively, Defendants) and Does 1 to 50, alleging causes of action for general negligence, premises liability, and loss of consortium.

On April 6, 2026, Defendants filed an answer as to the general negligence and loss of consortium claims. On April 13, 2026, Defendants filed an amended answer as to the general negligence and loss of consortium claims. On April 2, 2026, Defendants demurred to, or alternatively moved to strike, the FAC?s premises liability claim. On May 5, 2026, Plaintiffs opposed the motion. Defendants did not reply. LEGAL STANDARD A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). (Code Civ.

Proc., § 422.10; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (Donabedian).) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Id. at pp. 993-994.) A