| Case | County / Judge | Motion | Ruling | Date |
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Motion for Attorney Fees
ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT DEPARTMENT F-51 MAY 15, 2026 MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 24CHCV04279 Motion Filed: 1/16/26 MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Martin Hernandez; and Christopher Hernandez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (“Defendant”) NOTICE: OK RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting Plaintiffs their attorney fees in the amount of $28,270.63. TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is granted in part. Plaintiffs are awarded $21,842.00 in attorney fees.
BACKGROUND Plaintiffs bring this action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code § 1790 et seq.) for a vehicle they purchased on or around 10/1/22, for which Defendant issued the manufacturer’s express warranty. (Compl. ¶ 8.)
On 11/20/24, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging against Defendant the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act? Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act? Breach of Implied Warranty; (3) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2. 12/27/24, Defendant filed its answer.
On 8/19/25, Defendant served a settlement offer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998, settling entire lawsuit. (Decl. of Kevin Y. Jacobson ¶ 74.)
On 12/8/25, Plaintiffs filed their Memorandum of Costs.
On 1/16/26, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion.
On 5/5/26, Defendant filed its opposition.
On 5/11/26, Plaintiffs filed their reply. // // // // //
ANALYSIS A. Right to Recovery An award of attorney fees is proper when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1032, subd. (b); 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).)
Here, the Song-Beverly Act authorizes a buyer “to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code § 1794
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Moreover, Plaintiffs base the instant motion on the parties’ settlement agreement, wherein the parties agreed to a settlement “in the amount of $97,382.00, plus attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses to be determined by Motion.” (Jacobson Decl. ¶ 74.)
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the instant motion is authorized both by contract and statute.
B. Attorney Fees Incurred A buyer prevailing under the Song-Beverly Act may recover “reasonable’ attorney fees and costs as determined by the Court. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).)
“The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove that the fees it seeks are reasonable.” (Gonzalez v. Santa Clara County Dept. of Social Services (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 162, 169.)
In determining a reasonable fee award, the Court begins with the lodestar method of calculation, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.¿(Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 744; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095?1096.)
Here, Plaintiff seeks to recover $19,416.50, encompassing 43.6 hours of his attorneys’ time, plus an anticipated $4,000.00 in fees, billed at the following rates:
Name Title Hourly Rate Hours Total Donald Mahnke Senior Associate Attorney $400.00 1.6 $640.00 $425.00 22.6 $9,605.00 Ellen Zakharian Associate Attorney $400.00 6.1 $2,440.00 Gregory Sogoyan Partner $525.00 4.2 $2,205.00 James Carroll Senior Associate Attorney $595.00 0.5 $297.50 Joshua Kohanoff Associate Attorney $425.00 0.4 $170.00 Derek
Chipman Associate Attorney $495.00 8.2 $4,059.00 Subtotal 43.6 $19,416.50 Anticipated Fee Motion Fees $4,000.00 Total $23,416.50 (Ex. 25 to Jacobson Decl.)
1. Counsel’s Hourly Rate When determining a reasonable hourly rate, courts consider whether the stated rates “are within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded [to] comparable attorneys for comparable work.” (Children's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.)
Here, Plaintiffs assert that the rates charged by their attorneys are commensurate with the experience and skill of the attorneys involved, and have been approved by courts in the past. (Pls.” Mot. 10:1?11:20; Jacobson Decl. ¶¶ 3?42.)
In opposition, Defendant argues that the Court should reduce counsel’s billing rates to $300 to $400 per hour because “this was a run-of-the-mill lemon-law case. Counsel displayed no special skill. The legal issues were routine, the work formulaic. Counsel has handled thousands of these case by now. No specialized understanding of protocols and procedures was needed, either; they are the same protocols that appear in every case.” (Def.”s Opp. 6:23?26.)
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that their attorneys’ hourly billing rates are commensurate with their experience, and fall within the range of reasonable rates charged by attorneys in similar cases. Accordingly, the Court declines to reduce Plaintiffs’ counsel’s hourly billing rates.
2. Hours Expended Plaintiffs seek to recover attorney fees for the 43.6 hours expended by their attorneys on this matter, totaling $19,416.50.
Plaintiffs proffer an itemized list of time entries detailing their attorneys’ work on this matter. (Ex. 25 to Jacobson Decl.)
Defendant does not challenge any of the specific time entries set forth by Plaintiffs’ counsel.
In their reply, Plaintiffs assert that counsel actually “spent 2.9 hours working on this Reply and accompanying Declaration for a total of $1,435.50 and anticipates 2 hours of time needed to attend and prepare for
the hearing for $990, for a combined sum of $2,425.50.” (Pls.” Reply 6:7?10; Supp. Decl. of Kevin Y. Jacobson ¶¶ 6?7.)
Based on the foregoing, the Court reduces the fees incurred for these tasks by $1,574.50.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the time was reasonably incurred.
C. Multiplier “Once the lodestar has been calculated, the second step is to apply any positive or negative multipliers. The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 351 [internal quotations omitted].)
“Perhaps the most common multiplier applied, at least where a plaintiff prevails, is a modifier for the contingent nature of the representation.” (Ibid.)
Whether a multiplier is applied to adjust the lodestar amount based on the contingent nature and risk associated with the action and other factors, such as degree of skill required and ultimate success achieved is within the discretion of the trial court.
Here, Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to recover a 1.25 multiplier enhancement because they obtained an excellent outcome and “litigating against VWGA poses a substantial risk of no recovery.” (Pls.” Mot. 14:15?15:14.)
Defendant argues in opposition that no multiplier enhancement is warranted because “Plaintiffs have not offered evidence to the contrary or shown that the questions involved in this matter were novel or difficult. Plaintiffs have also failed to provide any evidence that suggests this matter required special skill.” (Def.”s Opp. 9:14?17.)
Defendant further argues that a negative multiplier is warranted “given the routine nature of this case, lack of complexity, and minimal litigation required.” (Id. at 10:11?12.)
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that a multiplier enhancement is not warranted in this case. While Plaintiffs ultimately prevailed, the action appears to have been a relatively straightforward Song-Beverly case. As such, the Court finds the lodestar fee award sufficient to compensate Plaintiff’s counsel.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds it reasonable to award Plaintiffs $21,842.00 in attorney fees, as outlined below: Name Title Hourly Rate Hours Total Donald Mahnke Senior Associate Attorney $400.00
1.6 $640.00 $425.00 22.6 $9,605.00 Ellen Zakharian Associate Attorney $400.00 6.1 $2,440.00 Gregory Sogoyan Partner $525.00 4.2 $2,205.00 James Carroll Senior Associate Attorney $595.00 0.5 $297.50 Joshua Kohanoff Associate Attorney $425.00 0.4 $170.00 Derek Chipman Associate Attorney $495.00 8.2 $4,059.00 Subtotal 43.6 $19,416.50 Anticipated Fee Motion Fees $2,425.50 Total $21,842.00
CONCLUSION The motion is granted in part. Plaintiffs are awarded $21,842.00 in attorney fees.