Miller vs Hidalgo, et al.

24CV025212: MILLER vs HIDALGO, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 16D

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiffs Brandon Miller and KDC Holdings, LLC’s motion for preliminary injunction is denied.

The Court declines to consider self-represented Defendant Helina Hidalgo’s opposition filed on July 9, 2026, only five Court days before the hearing. CCP § 1005(b) requires all oppositions to be filed and served no later than nine Court days prior to the hearing.

Plaintiffs’ unopposed request for judicial notice is granted for the limited purposes permitted for judicial notice. (See, Evid. Code §451, subd. (a); §452, subds. (b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

Plaintiffs filed this action on December 10, 2024. By way of its original complaint, Plaintiffs did

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025212: MILLER vs HIDALGO, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 16D

not seek any injunctive relief, nor did Plaintiffs seek any provisional relief pending trial. (see Complaint and Register of Actions.) On February 9, 2026, Plaintiffs for the first time in this action alleged entitlement to injunctive relief. (See First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Helina Hidalgo and others forged signatures and fraudulently transferred title of a 1972 Chevy Blazer from Plaintiffs to themselves. Plaintiffs allege causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief, conversion, fraud, negligence and conspiracy.

In their first cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief Plaintiffs “seek declaratory relief to restore title to the vehicle to Plaintiff Brandon subject to Plaintiff KDC’s lien.” (FAC ¶ 17.) At the same time, in connection with their conversion cause of action, Plaintiffs seek money damages “according to proof but no less than $175,000.00” and in the alternative to possession of the vehicle, seek damages “for its value according to proof, against Defendants.” (FAC ¶ 27, Prayer.)

Despite filing this action nearly one and a half years ago, Plaintiffs now seek an “order requiring the California Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) to immediately restore and transfer title of the 1972 Chevy Blazer, License Plate No. 9HFH957, Vin No. CCE182F1 (“the vehicle”) back into Plaintiff’s name and enjoining Defendant Helina Hildago (“Hildago”) from asserting, transferring, encumbering, or otherwise exercising ownership over the vehicle pending final adjudication.” (Not. 2:2-6.) Plaintiffs argue that their handwriting expert has concluded that the signatures on the transfer application from Miller to Hidalgo was forged by Hidalgo.

Plaintiffs also contend that the individuals to who the vehicle has since been transferred could not be good faith purchasers for value because of the inadequacy of consideration paid. To that end, they submit evidence that their expert appraised the vehicle at approximately $130,000 but that the vehicle was transferred to Omero Garza for $5,000 in June 2024 and then to Sal Prieto for $1,500 in March 2025. (Miller Decl. ¶¶ 8, 9; Exhs. 4, 5.)

The DMV has responded to the motion stating that it does not believe that Plaintiffs have met the requirements for the requested relief but that it will comply with any order issued by the Court. None of the other defendants, all of whom are self-represented, have opposed the motion.

By way of the instant motion, Plaintiffs essentially request that the Court grant the ultimate relief demanded in this action, specifically, an order requiring that title to the subject vehicle be restored to them. Thus, Plaintiffs essentially seek relief which would mandate the DMV take affirmative action altering the status quo and essentially find that they are entitled to judgment in their favor in such regard.

“As its name suggests, a preliminary injunction is an order that is sought by a plaintiff prior to a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025212: MILLER vs HIDALGO, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 16D

full adjudication of the merits of its claim[s]. [Citation.]” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554.) “The purpose of such an order ‘is to preserve the status quo . . . . It ‘does not constitute a final adjudication of the controversy.’ [Citation.]” (Costa Mesa City Employees Assn v. City of Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 305.) “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as a right.” (Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (2008) 555 US 7, 129 S. Ct. 365, 376.)

“To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ordinarily is required to present evidence of the irreparable injury or interim harm that it will suffer if an injunction is not issued pending an adjudication of the merits.” (White, supra, 30 Cal.4th at 554.)

“‘[T]he extraordinary remedy of injunction’ cannot be invoked without showing the likelihood of irreparable harm. [Citation.]” (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1352.) The threat of “irreparable harm” must be imminent. “An injunction cannot issue in a vacuum based on the proponents’ fears about something that may happen in the future.[..i]t must be supported by actual evidence that there is a realistic prospect that the party enjoined intends to engage in the prohibited activity.” (Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. California Presbytery (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1084.) The showing must be strong enough to 'support the exercise of the rather extraordinary power to restrain the defendant's actions prior to a trial on the merits.' (Tahoe Keys Property Owners' Ass'n v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1471.)

“If the threshold requirement of irreparable injury is established, then [the court] must examine two interrelated factors to determine whether . . . a preliminary injunction should be [issued]: ‘(1) the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately prevail on the merits and (2) the relative interim harm to the parties from issuance or non-issuance of the injunction.’ [Citation.]” (Costa Mesa City Employees Assn., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at 306 [emphasis added].) The greater the showing on one factor, the lesser the showing must be on the other. (Butt v.

State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.) However, a preliminary injunction may not be granted, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless it is reasonably probable that the moving party will prevail on the merits. (San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 438, 442.) “[T]he party seeking the injunction must present sufficient evidentiary facts to establish a likelihood that it will prevail.” (Tahoe Keys Property Owners’ Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Board (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1478; San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co. v.

Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal. App. 3d 438, 442.)

Irreparable Harm

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025212: MILLER vs HIDALGO, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 16D

First, to obtain an equitable remedy, there must be a showing of irreparable injury and the inadequacy of other remedies, including monetary remedies. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 526(a)(4); see Tahoe Keys Property Owners' Assn. v. State Water Resources Cntrl. Bd. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1471.) “The court may grant a preliminary injunction when there is evidence of the threat of committing an act in violation of the rights of another party respecting the subject of the action.” (ReadyLink Healthcare v. Cotton (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1023.)

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. To that end, the complaint was filed on December 10, 2024 and did not seek any injunctive relief, and Plaintiffs have only just now, over five months since the filing of their FAC, sought to obtain a preliminary injunction seeking to order the DMV to transfer title to Plaintiffs and to enjoin the other Defendants from transferring title and further. While Plaintiffs indicate that recently obtained documents showing that the vehicle has been transferred to additional individuals whose identity they did not know at the time the complaint was filed, their own evidence reflects that they were informed of the alleged fraud in May/June 2024. (Miller Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8.)

Yet, there is no explanation as to why Plaintiffs waited did not seek the requested relief until approximately two years later. Further, while Plaintiffs suggest that the vehicle might be further transferred to other individuals, there is no showing that this is so. Indeed, Plaintiffs evidence at most reflects that title to the vehicle was last transferred on March 26, 2025, more than a year ago. (Id. ¶ 9, Exh. 5.) While Plaintiff Miller contends that he lost the benefit of the vehicle which he relied upon for daily use, Miller also confirms that he purchased the vehicle on April 15, 2024 but that it was then transferred on May 3, 2024. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 3.)

Thus, even if Miller used the vehicle for “daily use” between April 15 and May 3, 2024, the fact that he waited until June 2026, more than two years later, to seek a preliminary injunction negates any claim that he has been irreparably injured. The threat of irreparable harm does not exist. At most, the complaints regarding Defendants’ conduct now relate to past wrongs. “As a general rule, an injunction lies to prevent threatened injuries and has no application to completed wrongs for the redress of which the plaintiff is relegated to an action at law.” (McManus v.

KPAL Broadcasting Corp. (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 558, 563.) Any wrongdoing that occurred is in the past. There is no showing that it is likely to be repeated.

Furthermore, among the factors to be considered when injunctive relief is sought is whether the moving party will, absent such relief, suffer great or irreparable harm for which pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief or where it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc. §526(a)(2), (4), (5); Jessen v. Keystone Sav. & Loan Ass’n (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 454,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025212: MILLER vs HIDALGO, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 16D

457.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief or that it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford such relief if Plaintiffs were successful in this action. While alleging that they will suffer “loss of possession and control of their personal property, for which there is no adequate remedy at law” (FAC ¶ 15.), Plaintiff provide no evidence demonstrating the accuracy of this allegation.

Rather, Plaintiffs instead assert that they are aware of “fair market value” of the vehicle in question by arguing that the amount paid by certain Defendants was inadequate and even make a claim for money damages as a result of the alleged conversion and other causes of action set forth in Plaintiffs’ FAC. Plaintiffs specifically pray for relief in their FAC that if possession of the vehicle is not obtained that they are entitled to “its value according to proof, against Defendants.” (FAC at Prayer.)

Plaintiffs’ allegations and their present motion do not demonstrate that they are without an adequate remedy at law.

Having failed to demonstrate irreparable injury, the motion is denied.

Likelihood of Success

While the Court need not proceed further given the failure to demonstrate irreparable injury, the motion also fails on the basis that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success.

“Where . . . the preliminary injunction mandates an affirmative act that changes the status quo, we scrutinize it even more closely for abuse of discretion. ‘The judicial resistance to injunctive relief increases when the attempt is made to compel the doing of affirmative acts. A preliminary mandatory injunction is rarely granted, and is subject to stricter review on appeal.’ [Citation.] As our Supreme Court noted years ago, ‘[t]he granting of a mandatory injunction pending the trial, and before the rights of the parties in the subject matter which the injunction is designed to affect have been definitely ascertained by the chancellor, is not permitted except in extreme cases where the right thereto is clearly established and it appears that irreparable injury will flow from its refusal. [Citations.]’” (Davenport v.

Blue Cross of California (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 435, 446; citing Board of Supervisors v. McMahon (1990) 219 Cal. App. 3d 286, 295-296 [emphasis added].)

The general rule is that an injunction is prohibitory if it requires a person to refrain from a particular act and mandatory if it compels performance of an affirmative act that changes the position of the parties. (Davenport, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at 446; CCP § 525; Kettenhofen v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal. 2d 189, 191; 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Provisional Remedies, § 241-246, pp. 210-214.) Here, because the requested order seeks to compel the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025212: MILLER vs HIDALGO, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 16D

DMV to transfer title back to Plaintiffs, which is in fact part of the ultimate relief that they seek in this case, Plaintiffs plainly seek mandatory injunctive relief. If the requested relief were granted, the DMV would be required to take affirmative action which would alter the position of the parties given it would change the current status of the vehicle’s title. As noted, a preliminary injunction of this nature can only be granted in extreme cases where the right to relief is clear and irreparable injury will flow if the injunction is not granted.

The Court has already concluded that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate irreparable injury. Moreover, while Plaintiffs contend that Omero Garza and Sal Prieto cannot be good faith purchasers for value because they only paid $5,000 in June 2024 and $1,500 in March 2025 while Plaintiffs’ expert valued the vehicle at approximately $130,000, Plaintiffs present no legal authority on this issue. Further, Plaintiffs do not analyze any of the causes of action in the First Amended Complaint in arguing that they are likely to succeed on the merits.

Indeed, they do not even indicate which cause of action they believe they will succeed on.

The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success.

Here, because the Court concluded above that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, the Court need not consider the balance of harms and whether the balance tips in Plaintiffs’ favor. (Hunt v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 984, 999 [“trial court may not grant a preliminary injunction, regardless of the balance of the interim harm, unless there is some possibility that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim.”]; see also Jessen v. Keystone Sav. & Loan Ass’n (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 454, 459 [court may deny preliminary injunction solely on finding that the moving party failed to demonstrate reasonable probability of success on the merits].) “Because we conclude plaintiff cannot succeed on the merits of his action, we need not address the balance of harms granting or not granting the injunction would impose on the parties ” (Jamison v.

Dept. of Trans. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 356, 366.)

The motion for preliminary injunction is denied.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Plaintiffs’ counsel is ordered to notify Defendants immediately of the tentative ruling system and to be available at the hearing in person, via Zoom, or by telephone, in the event Defendants appear without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025212: MILLER vs HIDALGO, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 16D