Jalal Soltanian-Zadeh vs. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

34-2019-00271228-CU-OE-GDS: Jalal Soltanian-Zadeh vs. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), Preetranjan Sahota (“Sahota”), and Manjula Bobbala’s (“Bobbala”) motion for summary adjudication is ruled upon as follows.

In this employment action, Plaintiff Jalal Soltanian-Zadeh alleges numerous causes of action, including FEHA based causes of action for religious and national origin discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate. Plaintiff was employed by CDCR as a family physician at CSP-Sacramento (CSP-SAC). Plaintiff alleges he raised concerns regarding safety and that as a result CDCR assigned him to more dangerous areas of the prison. Plaintiff was later diagnosed with bladder cancer and had been approved for leave. Prior to the leave, he reported to the Office of Inspector General that his supervisors were falsifying patient care data. Days later, CDCR rescinded his leave and later terminated Plaintiff’s employment.

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a third amended complaint was denied on July 7, 2026. The second amended complaint (“SAC”) remains the operative pleading.

The Court considered Plaintiff’s opposition despite Defendant’s assertion in reply that it received the opposition papers one day late. Defendant was able to file a complete reply.

At the outset, since the motion was filed, Plaintiff has dismissed Defendants Sahota, and Bobbala with prejudice. As a result, the motion is moot as to these defendants.

CDCR moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s first, second, third, fourth, seventh, eighth and fifteenth causes of action.

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication the Court engages in a three-step process. First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary

34-2019-00271228-CU-OE-GDS: Jalal Soltanian-Zadeh vs. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

judgment or summary adjudication. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) The papers filed in response to a defendant's motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not create issues outside the pleadings and are not a substitute for an amendment to the pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, quoting Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2).) A defendant is not required to conclusively negate one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Saelzer v Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780- 781).

Rather, to meet its burden, the defendant is only required to show that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of its cause of action, i.e., that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence necessary to show this element. (Aguilar, supra, at 853-855.) Further, the initial burden requires a showing that the plaintiff “could not prevail on any theory raised by the pleadings.” (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 939-940.)

Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or a defense to it. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p); see, generally Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) In ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar, supra, at 843.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. One of these differences is found in CRC Rule 3.1350(b), which mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for [punitive] damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2019-00271228-CU-OE-GDS: Jalal Soltanian-Zadeh vs. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for [punitive] damages, or an issue of duty.

Finally, before turning to the specific issues raised by this motion and the oppositions, the Court reminds the parties of the “Golden Rule” of summary judgment/adjudication: “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See, Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 (italics in original).) Moreover, according to Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, at 252 (citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1).)

CDCR’s separate statement includes the following facts which it asserts are undisputed. Plaintiff began working for CDCR as a physician at Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”) in 2007. (UMF 1.) Plaintiff was assigned to CSP-SAC in November 2016 as a result of a settlement arising from an administrative complaint filed against CDCR. (UMF 3.) Plaintiff reported to Sahota, CSP-SAC’s Chief Physician and Surgeon (“CP&S”). Sahota reported to Bobbala, CSP-SAC’s Chief Medical Executive (“CME”). Bobbala reported to Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) Michael Felder. (UMF 4.)

When Plaintiff was assigned to CSP-SAC, the medical team was responsible for approximately 2,200 patients. (UMF 5.) There were seven to eight physicians assigned to CSP-SAC and each physician saw between six and eleven patients. (UMF 6.) It was essential that physicians see all scheduled patients assigned to the physician. (UMF 7.) For continuity of care, physicians were required to create on-call notes. Plaintiff repeatedly refused to write oncall notes. (UMF 8.)

Plaintiff received a Letter of Instruction (“LOI”) from Sahota on May 26, 2017 for canceling and rescheduling patients despite a directive from Felder not to do so. (UMF 9.) Plaintiff received a second LOI from Sahota on June 23, 2017, for unprofessional conduct towards female supervisors. (UMF 10.) On September 27, 2017, Bobbala referred Plaintiff to CRCR’s Professional Practice Evaluation Committee (“PPEC”) after becoming concerned he presented a risk to prisoner patient safety. (UMF 11.) PPEC informed Plaintiff that the Medical Peer Review Committee (“MPRC”) was initiating a formal review based upon the PPEC’s initial investigation. (UMF 12.) During this time, Plaintiff was placed on a monitoring plan that was modified into an individual improvement plan. (UMF 13.) Plaintiff received a third LOI on February 19, 2018 for

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2019-00271228-CU-OE-GDS: Jalal Soltanian-Zadeh vs. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

further canceling and rescheduling patient appointments. (UMF 14.)

Plaintiff’s exam room was relocated to the A7 facility on August 6, 2018 following his complaints that his prior exam room was exposed to construction noise. Shortly after being assigned to A7, Plaintiff began refusing to see patients in the assigned room entirely. (UMF 15.) Plaintiff demanded that a custody officer be present in the exam room at all times, and met with Correctional Lieutenant John Mayhew in August 2018. (UMF 16.) Mayhew’s supervisor, Fergus Leckie, the Health Care Access Captain, confirmed that Plaintiff’s request did not conform with standard procedure and could not be granted. (UMF 17.) During this time, other physicians used the A7 exam room without incident. (UMF 18.) Felder requested an internal affairs investigation of Plaintiff after he refused to see patients in the A7 exam room for several months. (UMF 19.)

Plaintiff filed a whistleblower complaint with the State Personnel Board against CDCR on October 28, 2019. (UMF 20.) Plaintiff was informed that the complaint did not conform with Government Code § 8547 and that he could file an amended complaint by December 3, 2019. Plaintiff did not file an amended whistleblower complaint. (UMF 21.)

Plaintiff requested Compensating Time Off (“CTO”) from March 7, 2022, through March 11, 2022. (UMF 22.) Sahota rescinded that leave due to patient backlog and institutional demands. (UMF 23.) Plaintiff was absent from work from March 7, 2022 through March 13, 2022. (UMF 24.) After several communications, Plaintiff did not provide an explanation for his absence and was issued a Notice of Involuntary Resignation Based on an Absence of Work Leave. (UMF 25.)

The Court will address CDCR’s arguments in the order presented in the moving papers.

Fifteenth Cause of Action (Breach of Contract)

CDCR’s motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s fifteenth cause of action for breach of contract is granted.

Public employment is held by statute, not contract, and civil service employees cannot assert breach of contract causes of action. (Shoemaker v. Meyers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 23-24; Miller v State of California (1977) 18 Cal.3d 808, 813-814; Boren v. State Personnel Board (1951) 37 Cal.2d 634, 641 [“The terms and conditions of civil service employment are fixed by statute and not by contact”]; Hill v City of Long Beach (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1684, 1690.) “The statutory provisions controlling the terms and conditions of civil service cannot be circumvented by purported contracts in conflict therewith” to argue that she has stated a cause of action. (Boren, supra, 37 Cal.2d at 641.) This applies equally to causes of action for breach of the implied covenant of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2019-00271228-CU-OE-GDS: Jalal Soltanian-Zadeh vs. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

good faith and fair dealing. (Shoemaker, supra, 52 Cal.3d at 23-24.) Under certain scenarios a breach of contract may exist when there is a labor agreement such as a Memorandum of Understanding which “may contain binding contractual promises” between a public employer and public employees. (Retired Employees Assn. of Orange County, Inc. v. County of Orange (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1171, 1182.)

CDCR’s evidence shows that it is a public agency and that Plaintiff has alleged that CDCR breached its contractual obligations by failing to pay him all owed wages upon termination. (UMF 1, 2, 26) CDCR’s evidence is sufficient to shift to Plaintiff the burden to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact.

Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden. Plaintiff does not dispute the three facts asserted in support of the motion for summary adjudication as to this cause of action. Instead, Plaintiff argues that his breach of contract claim arises from a settlement whereby CDCR “agreed as part of the settlement to (1) provide Plaintiff a sit/stand ergonomic workstation and adjustable examination table, (2) transfer Plaintiff to CSP-SAC, and (3) restore 900 hours of leave credits.” (Opp. 24:19-22.) Plaintiff asserts that CDCR breached that agreement by failing to provide the workstation and restore leave credits. (Id. 24: 22-27.)

However, the operative cause of action in the SAC contains no such allegations and is premised solely on allegations that CDCR breached its contractual obligations by failing to pay him all owed wages upon termination. Plaintiff may not oppose a motion for summary adjudication by presenting argument and evidence that is outside the pleadings. (Tsemetzin, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at 1342.) While Plaintiff attempted to add these allegations by way of a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, that motion was denied on July 7, 2026.

Indeed, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend given that it was improper to add these allegations while CDCR’s motion for summary adjudication was pending. (See Minute Order, dated July 7, 2026 [citing to Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1280; Melican v. Regents of University of California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 176].)

As a result, CDCR’s motion for summary adjudication as to the fifteenth cause of action for breach of contract is granted.

Seventh Cause of Action (Violation of Government Code § 8547 and Labor Code § 1102.5)

CDCR’s motion for summary adjudication as to the seventh cause of action is denied.

CDCR argues that Plaintiff’s claim under Government Code § 8457 is time barred because Plaintiff did not file a timely administrative complaint.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2019-00271228-CU-OE-GDS: Jalal Soltanian-Zadeh vs. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

First, the Court finds that the motion must be denied because CDCR’s arguments would not completely dispose of any cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for damages, or an issue of legal duty as required by CCP § 437c(f)(1). This is true because the arguments are only directed at the alleged violations of Government Code § 8457 and the seventh cause of action is also premised on alleged violations of Labor Code § 1102.5 which CDCR does not address. (SAC ¶¶ 50-54.) Nor has CDCR obtained a stipulation from Plaintiff which has been approved by the Court allowing a motion for adjudication of certain legal issues or damages not covered by subdivision (f)(1). (Code Civ.

Proc. § 437c(t).) Further, CDCR did not request summary adjudication of any separate act based on Lilienthal & Fowler v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1848. The notice does not mention Lilienthal at all. On this basis alone, the motion is denied.

In any event, even assuming the cause of action only included allegations premised on Government Code § 8457, CDCR did not meet its initial burden. To that end, CDCR simply asserts that the cause of action is untimely because the SPB indicated that Plaintiff’s administrative complaint was deficient. “However, any action for damages shall not be available to the injured party unless the injured party has first filed a complaint with the State Personnel Board pursuant to subdivision (a), and the board has issued, or failed to issue, findings pursuant to Section 19683.” (Gov’t Code § 8547.8(c).)

Government Code § 8547.8(c) “is, in effect, a prerequisite to suit for damages under section 8547.3 ” (Bjorndal v. Superior Court (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1107.) “The Legislature could hardly have used stronger language to indicate its intent that compliance with the administrative procedure of sections 8547.8 and 19683 is to be regarded as a mandatory prerequisite to a suit for damages under the Act than to say a civil action is ‘not available’ to persons who have not complied with the procedure.” (Id. at 1112-1113.) “However, the right to bring an action for civil damages is expressly conditioned on first filing a complaint with the State Personnel Board.” (Hood v.

Hacienda La Puente Unified School Dist. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 435, 440 [emphasis added].) While Defendant cites to allegations in the SAC which state that the SPB informed him that the administrative complaint did not comply with the Government Code, it does not address his allegations that the SPB also informed him that if he did not file an administrative complaint that he “will have exhausted his administrative remedies before the SPB.” (SAC ¶ 26.) Plaintiff alleged that he did not file an amended administrative complaint and that the SPB failed to issue findings pursuant to § 19683 regarding the complaint he did file. (SAC ¶¶ 27, 28.)

Thus, CDCR has not met its burden to demonstrate that Plaintiff failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies such that any cause of action premised on Government Code § 8457 is barred. Thus, the motion is denied on this additional basis.

First, Second, and Third Causes of Action (Religious, National Origin and Disability Discrimination)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2019-00271228-CU-OE-GDS: Jalal Soltanian-Zadeh vs. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

CDCR’s motion is denied.

CDCR argues that Plaintiff cannot set forth a prima facie claim for his discrimination causes of action, that it had legitimate-non-discriminatory reasons for all the alleged discriminatory acts, and Plaintiff has no evidence of pretext. All these arguments are premised on CDCR’s UMFs 1-23.

Prima Facie Case

The California Supreme Court has held that to establish an action for discrimination in violation of FEHA, “the plaintiff must provide evidence that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355; Joaquin v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1220.) The burden of showing a prima facie claim in a FEHA action is not “onerous” and the evidence necessary to meet the burden is “minimal.” (Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 149.)

CDCR argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because Plaintiff failed to perform the essential duties of writing on-call notes and because he refused to see patients. Thus, CDCR asserts that Plaintiff did not competently perform his job. Here, assuming that CDCR met its burden, Plaintiff has met his burden to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. To that end, CDCR’s UMF 6 states that seven to eight physicians were assigned to CSP-SAC, and each physician saw between six and eleven patients.

Plaintiff presents evidence that there were times when he had substantially more than six to eleven patients, including days he had 17 and 23. (Soltanian Decl. ¶ 103.) Plaintiff has disputed UMF 6. According to Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Id. at 252 [citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1].)

In Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506, the trial court found that although the moving party “enumerated purportedly undisputed material facts in its separate statement, some of which [opposing party] disputed” those facts were not material and granted summary judgment. (Id. at 521.) However, the appellate court reversed, concluding that summary judgment was improper “[b]ecause a dispute as to any one of these facts means there was a dispute as to a concededly material fact.” (Id. at 522.)

Thus, because Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2019-00271228-CU-OE-GDS: Jalal Soltanian-Zadeh vs. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

disputed UMF 6, the motion must be denied.

While the Court need not proceed any further, UMF 16 states that Plaintiff demanded a custody officer be present in the exam room at all times. Plaintiff declares that he never asked for a custody officer to be in the exam room and instead asked for a custody officer to be present outside or by the A7 room while Plaintiff was working. (Soltanian Decl. ¶¶ 199, 204.) This dispute is yet another independent basis upon which the motion must be denied.

As a result, to the extent that CDCR moves for summary adjudication of the discrimination causes of action on the basis that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case, that motion is denied.

Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Actions and Lack of Pretext

CDCR’s motion is denied.

CDCR next argues that it had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for all the alleged conduct and that Plaintiff cannot show pretext. In this regard, CDCR only addresses the LOIs issued to Plaintiff, the Peer Review Investigation and Monitoring Program, the Internal Affairs investigation, and the termination of Plaintiff’s employment.

Here, even if CDCR was correct with respect to all of the arguments regarding the above identified adverse actions, it would not be entitled to summary adjudication. This is true because CDCR’s arguments would not completely dispose of any cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for damages, or an issue of legal duty as required by CCP § 437c(f)(1). Indeed, Plaintiff has alleged additional instances of adverse actions which CDCR has not addressed on this motion. Plaintiff alleged that he was denied reasonable ergonomic workplace accommodations, that he was forced to work in an unsafe work environment, and that his approved time off was rescinded. (SAC ¶¶ 14, 16, 34.)

All of these allegations are incorporated into the discrimination causes of action which allege they are based on the foregoing allegation. (SAC ¶¶ 38-43.) None of these allegations are addressed in the motion. Thus, CDCR’s arguments would not completely dispose of any of the discrimination causes of action. Nor has CDCR obtained a stipulation from Plaintiff which has been approved by the Court allowing a motion for adjudication of certain legal issues or damages not covered by subdivision (f)(1). (Code Civ.

Proc. § 437c(t).) Further, CDCR did not request summary adjudication of any separate act based on Lilienthal & Fowler v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1848. The notice does not mention Lilienthal at all. On this basis alone, the motion is denied. The burden never shifted to Plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2019-00271228-CU-OE-GDS: Jalal Soltanian-Zadeh vs. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

Moreover, even if CDCR had met its burden, which it did not, as mentioned above, Plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of numerous triable issues of material fact as described above. Again, CDCR relies on the same asserted UMFs 1-23, including asserted UMF 6 and UMF 16.

As a result, to the extent that CDCR moves for summary adjudication of the discrimination causes of action on the basis that it had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its conduct and Plaintiff cannot show pretext, that motion is denied.

Fourth Cause of Action (FEHA Retaliation)

CDCR’s motion is denied.

CDCR argues that Plaintiff cannot succeed on a retaliation claim because it had legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its conduct and Plaintiff cannot show pretext. This motion fails for the same reasons the motion directed to the discrimination causes of action fails. Again, CDCR bases its motion in this regard on similar UMFs, including asserted UMF 6 and UMF 16.

Additionally, UMF 25 states that after several communications, Plaintiff did not provide an explanation for his absence in March 7-13, 2022 and was issued a Notice of Involuntary Resignation Based on an Absence of Work Leave. Plaintiff presents evidence that he emailed Sahota, Bobbala and his care team on March 13, 2022, informing him of his medical condition and that he would not be able to come into work. Plaintiff also presented evidence that no one contacted Plaintiff on March 8, 9, 10, or 11 regarding his absence on those days. (Soltanian Decl. ¶¶ 345-352.) Plaintiff has created a dispute with respect to whether he provided an explanation for his absence. This is another dispute that independently requires the motion to be denied.

Eighth Cause of Action (Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy)

CDCR’s motion is granted.

CDCR argues, among other things, that a Tameny claim for wrongful termination is not available against a public entity. CDCR is correct. The law is clear that Government Code § 815 bars Tameny claims against public entities. (Miklosy v. Regents of the University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899-900.)

Plaintiff has not opposed this portion of the motion. A party’s failure to oppose a motion is construed as a concession on the merits of the motion. (See D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2019-00271228-CU-OE-GDS: Jalal Soltanian-Zadeh vs. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

Superior Court (1964) 60 Cal.2d 723, 728, n.4.)

CDCR’s motion for summary adjudication of the eighth cause of action is granted.

In summary, CDCR’s motion for summary adjudication is granted as to Plaintiff’s Eighth and Fifteenth Causes of Action. The motion for summary adjudication is denied in all other respects.

The Court need not rule on Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections. The Court is not required to rule on objections to evidence that are not material to the disposition of the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(q).)

The Court also need not rule on Defendant’s evidentiary objections. The Court is not required to rule on objections to evidence that are not material to the disposition of the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(q).) None of the objected to evidence was relied upon by the Court in the instant ruling.

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is denied except as to the SAC as the remaining material was not relevant to the Court’s ruling.

Finally, while Defendant argued in reply that Plaintiff’s separate statement of additional undisputed material facts does not comply with the Rules of Court, any noncompliance had no bearing on the outcome of the instant motion. Indeed, the Court did not cite to Plaintiff’s separate statement of additional undisputed material facts in the above ruling.

CDCR shall submit a formal order for the Court’s signature pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312.