JACOBS vs AMEEN, et al.

25CV022511: JACOBS vs AMEEN, et al. 04/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 54

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE: The Sacramento Superior Court is transitioning operations from the Gordon D. Schaber and Hall of Justice buildings to the new Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse through a phased move plan beginning on April 13, 2026. Visit the court’s website at www.saccourt.ca.gov for the most current and up to date information regarding the transition. The physical and mailing address of the new downtown courthouse is:

Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse 500 G Street Sacramento, CA 95814

Please take notice, effective April 13, 2026, Department 54 is moved to Department 16C at the Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse. The Honorable Christopher E. Krueger remains presiding over all Home Court proceedings, including Case Management and Law & Motion. All hearings currently scheduled or reserved after the effective date shall remain in place and will be heard in Department 16C.

Hon. Christopher E. Krueger Department 16C 916-874-7848

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff in pro per Adam Jacobs’ (“Plaintiff”) motion for preliminary injunction against defendants Anwar Ameen (“Ameen”), Mustafa Zahid (“Zahid”), and Muna Fahmi (“Fahmi”) (collectively, “Defendants”) is DENIED.

Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is granted. In taking judicial notice of these documents, the Court accepts the fact of their existence, not the truth of their contents. (See Professional Engineers v. Dep’t of Transp. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 543, 590 [judicial notice of findings of fact does not mean that those findings of fact are true]; Steed v. Department of Consumer Affairs (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 112, 120-121 [“[W]hile the existence of any document in a court file may be judicially noticed, the truth of the matters asserted in those documents, including the factual findings of the judge who was sitting as the trier of fact, is not entitled to notice.”].)

Background

25CV022511: JACOBS vs AMEEN, et al. 04/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 54

Plaintiff filed the Complaint on September 22, 2025, and the operative First Amended Complaint (“1AC”) on October 6, 2025. The 1AC alleges 16 causes of action for: (1) invasion of privacy; (2) retaliation (Civil Code § 1942.5); (3) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; (4) violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; (5) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (6) “negligence – premises liability; negligent hiring and supervision[;]” (7) private nuisance; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (9) tenant harassment; (10) declaratory relief; (11) treble damages for unlicensed contracting; (12) defamation; (13) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; (14) unfair business practices; (15) restitution; and (16) breach of contract.

Plaintiff seeks an order preventing “(1) targeted interference with Plaintiff’s prospective housing through third-party contacts, (2) harassment and pressure-by-shaming through Plaintiff’s family and other nonparty third persons, and (3) publication of materially false accusations to third parties that impair Plaintiff’s housing prospect.” (Notice of Motion at 1:24-27.) More specifically, Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion indicates he seeks the following with respect to each category.

“1) Prospective Housing Provider Interference (Conduct-Based / Narrow Safe Harbor):

Defendants shall not initiate contact with any “Prospective Housing Provider” about Plaintiff, except that Defendants may respond to a written rental reference inquiry initiated by the Prospective Housing Provider, and only as follows:

(a) the response must be in writing; (b) the response must be limited to objective, verifiable facts about tenancy (e.g., dates, amounts, notices served), and must not include threats, inflammatory accusations, or any knowingly or recklessly false statements of fact described in Paragraph 2 below; and (c) Defendants must simultaneously provide Plaintiff a copy of the written response.

2) Severable Criminal-Complaint/Charges Misrepresentation Clause:

Defendants shall not knowingly or recklessly publish to any third party any materially false statement of fact that:

(a) a new criminal complaint has been filed against Plaintiff, or (b) new criminal charges are currently pending against Plaintiff, arising out of or in connection with the tenancy or this dispute, or (c) Plaintiff committed fraud in connection with the tenancy or this dispute.

This paragraph does not prohibit truthful statements, statements of opinion that do not

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV022511: JACOBS vs AMEEN, et al. 04/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 54

imply false underlying facts, or good-faith communications to law enforcement. This paragraph is severable from the remainder of the requested relief.

3) Family / Nonparty Harassment and Rent-Shaming:

Defendants shall not initiate contact with Plaintiff’s spouse, minor child, parents, in-laws, or other close family members to demand payment, discuss alleged rent delinquency, threaten litigation consequences, or disparage Plaintiff in connection with the tenancy or this dispute, except as required for lawful service of process, subpoena, or court order.”

(Notice of Motion at 2:4-27.)

Legal Standard

“As its name suggests, a preliminary injunction is an order that is sought by a plaintiff prior to a full adjudication of the merits of its claim[s]. [Citation.]” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554.) “The purpose of such an order ‘is to preserve the status quo. It ‘does not constitute a final adjudication of the controversy.’ [Citation.]” (Costa Mesa City Employees Assn v. City of Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 305.)

“To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ordinarily is required to present evidence of the irreparable injury or interim harm that it will suffer if an injunction is not issued pending an adjudication of the merits. (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554 [emphasis added]; see generally Code Civ. Proc. § 426, subd. (a)(2) [a preliminary injunction “may be granted . . . [w]hen it appears . . . that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce . . . great or irreparable injury . . . to a party to the action].)

“‘[T]he extraordinary remedy of injunction’ cannot be invoked without showing the likelihood of irreparable harm. [Citation.]” (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1352.) The threat of “irreparable harm” must be imminent. “An injunction cannot issue in a vacuum based on the proponents’ fears about something that may happen in the future.[..i]t must be supported by actual evidence that there is a realistic prospect that the party enjoined intends to engage in the prohibited activity.” (Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. California Presbytery (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1084.) The showing must be strong enough to “support the exercise of the rather extraordinary power to restrain the defendant's actions prior to a trial on the merits.” (Tahoe Keys Property Owners’ Ass’n v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1471.)

“If the threshold requirement of irreparable injury is established, then [the court] must examine two interrelated factors to determine whether . . . a preliminary injunction should be [issued]: ‘(1) the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately prevail on the merits and (2) the relative interim harm to the parties from issuance or non-issuance of the injunction.’ [Citation.]”

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV022511: JACOBS vs AMEEN, et al. 04/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 54

(Costa Mesa City Employees Assn., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at 306 [emphasis added].) The greater the showing on one factor, the lesser the showing must be on the other. (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.) However, a preliminary injunction may not be granted, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless it is reasonably probable that the moving party will prevail on the merits. (San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 438, 442.)

The party seeking injunctive relief bears the burden of showing all elements necessary to support issuance of a preliminary injunction. (O'Connell v. Super. Ct. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.)

Further, where the preliminary injunction mandates an affirmative act that changes the status quo, it is scrutinized even more closely for abuse of discretion. A preliminary mandatory injunction is rarely granted. The granting of a mandatory injunction pending trial is not permitted except in extreme cases where the right thereto is clearly established and it appears that irreparable injury will flow from its refusal. (Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assn. v. Furlotti (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1493; Integrated Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. VitaVet Labs, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1184; Perez v. Hastings College of the Law (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 453, 456.)

Service as to Zahid and Fahmi

Defendants Zahid and Fahmi are self-represented. Defendant Ameen is represented by counsel.

Plaintiff served this motion on Zahid and Fahmi via electronic service on January 13, 2026, but neither Zahid nor Fahmi has consented to electronic service per Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6(c) and Cal. Rules of Court Rule. 2.551. Both Zahid and Fahmi have opposed and objected on the ground that electronic service is defective.

In addition, although Plaintiff filed a proof of service on March 19, 2026, indicating that Zahid and Fahmi were served with the moving papers by mail on March 14, 2026, service by mail on that date does not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 1005. Section 1005 mandates that service by mail provide 16 court days, plus five additional calendar days. With a hearing date of April 7, 2026, the deadline for mail service was March 9, 2026 (the last day for service was Sunday, March 8, 2026, which is a holiday pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 12a and March 31, 2026, was a Court holiday). (Code Civ Proc. § 12, 12a [defining “holiday”], 12b, 12c [“(a) Where any law requires an act to be performed no later than a specified number of days before a hearing date, the last day to perform that act shall be determined by counting backward from the hearing date, excluding the day of the hearing as provided by Section 12.”].)

Both Zahid and Fahmi have opposed and objected on the ground that mail service is defective.

Recently, the Court also raised the service issue in its three March 5, 2026, Orders on Plaintiff’s discovery motions. In a footnote, the Court stated, “The Court notes that Zahid and Fahmi are

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV022511: JACOBS vs AMEEN, et al. 04/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 54

also appearing in pro per. Neither have consented to electronic service per Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6(c) and Cal. Rules of Court Rule. 2.551. As a result, to the extent Plaintiff has electronically served Zahid and Fahmi, such service may be defective. The Court need not reach this issue since the Court is dropping the motion for defective service.”

Regardless of the foregoing service defects, and the service objections raised by both Zahid and Fahmi, Zahid and Fahmi have also filed substantive oppositions and there does not appear to be any prejudice suffered. Thus, any issue of insufficient notice is waived. (Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697 [opposing a motion on the merits waives any defects or irregularities in the notice of motion, even if no notice was given at all].)

Electronically Signed Declarations

In support of this motion, Plaintiff submits his declaration, along with declarations from four other individuals. One declaration contains an original signature (Noora Tebatebaei), but the remaining declarations bear only typed “/s/” signatures, rather than original wet signatures or properly authenticated electronic signatures.

California Rules of Court, Rule 2.257, subsection (b) states:

“When a document to be filed electronically provides for a signature under penalty of perjury of any person, the document is deemed to have been signed by that person if filed electronically provided that either of the following conditions is satisfied:

(1) The declarant has signed the document using an electronic signature and declares under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of California that the information submitted is true and correct. If the declarant is not the electronic filer, the electronic signature must be unique to the declarant, capable of verification, under the sole control of the declarant, and linked to data in such a manner that if the data are changed, the electronic signature is invalidated; or

(2) The declarant, before filing, has physically signed a printed form of the document. By electronically filing the document, the electronic filer certifies that the original, signed document is available for inspection and copying at the request of the court or any other party.”

(Cal. Rules Court, Rule 2.257(b).)

As Plaintiff is the electronic filer, the electronic signature on his declaration is Code-compliant. However, the three third-party declarations fail to comply with Rule 2.257 because, even though

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV022511: JACOBS vs AMEEN, et al. 04/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 54

the documents were field electronically, the electronic signatures are not “unique to the declarant, capable of verification, under the sole control of the declarant, and linked to data in such a manner that if the data are changed, the electronic signature is invalid” or “[t]he declarant, before filing, has physically signed a printed form of the document.”

Thus, the declarations therefore are not signed in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5 and can carry no weight. Plaintiff’s request submitted on reply that he be permitted “leave to lodge original wet-signed copies or to file short supplemental declarations before or at the hearing” is denied.

Discussion

Turning to the merits of Plaintiff’s argument, Plaintiff asserts he has already suffered irreparable harm because he was denied one housing opportunity and that once a unit is offered to someone else, its loss cannot be remedied by money damages. He also asserts “[r]eputational ‘blacklist’ harm and the stigma of alleged criminal filings ripple unpredictably and cannot be reliably unwound.” (Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 5:20-23.)

Zahid, Fahmi, and Ameen have opposed.

In order to issue any preliminary injunction, irreparable harm must be presented. In this case, Plaintiff’s claim of irreparable harm includes that he is actively seeking alternative housing due to an ongoing landlord-tenant conflict and related litigation, and that a landlord declined to rent a unit to him after speaking with defendant Ameen. (Declaration of Adam Jacobs (“Jacobs Decl.”), ¶¶ 16-17.) That Plaintiff was denied a one prospective rental opportunity does not constitute irreparable harm.

Plaintiff presents no evidence that he is unable to secure another rental unit or that the denial by this landlord has left him unhoused and completely unable to secure an alternative rental until. Rather, Plaintiff plainly attests that he “reside[s] at 2612 Gunn Road, Carmichael, California, under a written rental agreement/lease.” (Jacobs Decl., ¶ 2.) He attaches a copy of the rental agreement to his declaration as exhibit 1. This is distinguishable from a situation where a homeowner, rather than a renter, faces the potential loss of their home, which can constitute irreparable harm.

Further, Plaintiff’s assertion that his spouse received a call from defendant Ameen threatening to “blacklist” Plaintiff from future rental opportunities also constitutes inadmissible hearsay and the declaration of Plaintiff’s spouse is not properly signed for the reasons already discussed above. Moreover, there is no concrete evidence that Plaintiff has been “blacklisted,” or is likely to be, such that he is unable to secure housing. Plaintiff’s claims that he is concerned Defendants will sabotage his potential housing opportunities is speculative at this time. “An injunction cannot issue in a vacuum based on the proponents’ fears about something that may happen in the future.[..i]t must be supported by actual evidence that there is a realistic prospect that the party enjoined intends to engage in the prohibited activity.” (Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV022511: JACOBS vs AMEEN, et al. 04/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 54

Church, supra, (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1084.) Indeed, Plaintiff himself states in his moving papers that “Defendants have verified in discovery that they have not contacted housing providers about Plaintiff and have not contacted Plaintiff’s relatives about alleged debts.” (Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 8:20-22; Jacobs Decl., ¶¶ 22-23.)

Based on the record, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the threshold requirement of irreparable harm. Thus, the Court need not evaluate the additional factors of the likelihood of prevailing and a balancing of the harms. The Court also need not evaluate Defendants’ additional arguments that the injunction is an invalid request purporting to restrain their constitutional right to free speech.

Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is therefore DENIED.

Plaintiff has indicated the incorrect address for Department 54 of the Sacramento County Superior Court in its notice of motion. The correct address is 813 6th Street, Sacramento, California 95814. Plaintiff shall notify Defendants immediately. However, please note that the Sacramento Superior Court is transitioning operations from the Gordon D. Schaber and Hall of Justice buildings to the new Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse through a phased move plan beginning on April 13, 2026. Visit the court’s website at www.saccourt.ca.gov for the most current and up to date information regarding the transition. The physical and mailing address of the new downtown courthouse is:

Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse 500 G Street Sacramento, CA 95814

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, or further notice is required.

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV022511: JACOBS vs AMEEN, et al. 04/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 54

conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure 367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings. The Department 54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.Pdf

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.