Lopez vs FCA

TENTATIVE RULING(S) FOR JULY 17, 2026 Department S37 – Judge Winston Keh This court follows California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(b) for tentative rulings. (See San Bernardino Superior Court Local Emergency Rule 8.) Tentative rulings for each law & motion will be posted on the internet (https://www.sb-court.org) by 3:00 p.m. on the court day immediately before the hearing.

You may appear in person at the hearing although remote appearance by CourtCall is preferred. (See www.sb-court.org/general-information/remote-access).

If you do not have Internet access or if you experience difficulty with the posted tentative ruling, you may obtain the tentative ruling by calling the department (S-37) at (909) 708-8707 or the Administrative Assistant (909) 708-8756, who prepared the ruling.

If you (or both parties) wish to submit on the Tentative, notify the other party and call the department by 4:00 pm the day before and your appearance may be excused unless the Court orders you to appear.

You must appear at the hearing if you are so directed by the court in the tentative ruling. Be prepared to address those issues set forth by the court in its ruling.

UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, THE PREVAILING PARTY IS TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE

RULING.

Lopez vs FCA

__________________________________________________________________________

TENTATIVE RULING(S):

Before this Court is Plaintiff’s motion for prevailing party’s attorney’s fees pursuant to Song

Beverly.

For context, this matter was removed to Federal Court on December 2, 2019. On February 3,

2020, Plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) eliminating the Magnuson-

Moss cause of action, and therefore renumbering the fraudulent inducement-concealment claim

as the sixth cause of action. The matter was remanded to Orange County on February 11, 2020.

A motion to compel arbitration was filed on March 10, 2020 by FCA and then withdrawn on June

4, 2020. A protective order was entered into on June 8, 2020. Plaintiff moved to compel further

responses to discovery on June 16, 2020 and Defendants moved to transfer venue on June 23,

2020. On September 25, 2020, the Court signed the order transferring venue to San Bernardino

County. Judge Gilbert Ochoa held a trial setting conference on July 6, 2021, and set a jury trial

for May 30, 2023.

After opposition and reply, the Court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the

sixth cause of action on June 16, 2023.

On January 11, 2024, a notice of settlement of the entire case was submitted. The Court set an

OSC for dismissal for July 18, 2024. The matter was reassigned from Department S24 to

Department S37 on July 18, 2024. On August 5, 2024, then-Judge Corey Lee ordered a joint

stipulation to dismiss with prejudice and retain jurisdiction.

On November 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed this present motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Plaintiff

asserts he is the prevailing party and pursuant to Song Beverly, attorneys fees are mandatory.

Plaintiff seeks: (1) attorney’s fees of $33,591; (2) a multiplier of 1.35 ($11,756.85); (3) $7,984.56

in costs and expenses; and (4) an additional $4,000 to review the opposition and draft the

reply. Together with the motion, Plaintiff filed a request for judicial notice as to other judicial

decision granting fees; declarations by Ange M. Baker, Esq. and Payam Shahian, Esq. together

with a compendium of evidence.

FCA US LLC filed an opposition on March 10, 2026, together with evidentiary objections and the

declaration of Colin P. Cronin, Esq.

On March 16, 2026, the Plaintiff filed a reply and evidentiary objections.

Request for Judicial Notice. Plaintiff requests judicial notice of 33 cases from other courts

(mainly Federal and Los Angeles Superior Court cases) whereby their attorneys’ fees were

approved. Requests 23 and 24 were from Riverside and San Bernardino, however none of the

cases were provided to the Court. While Court decisions are entitled to judicial notice pursuant to

Evid. Code, §452, subd. (d), unpublished decisions cannot be cited or relied upon by a Court or

a party in any action other that the actions in which the decisions are rendered. (Rule 8.1115,

subd. (a), California Rules of Court.) Trial courts do not make binding precedent. (King v. Order

of United Commercial Travelers (1948) 333 U.S. 153, 160-61; Santa Ana Hospital Medical

Center v. Bleshe (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 830.) What another court ruled upon the hours and

fees in another county is not relevant to this proceeding. Additionally, Plaintiff failed to provide

the Court with copies of decisions pursuant to Evid. Code, §453. Thus, the Court DENIES the

request.

Objections. Attorney Shahian is the founder of the firm and is able to talk about their practices

and the attorneys who work at his firm. He can comment on Court’s decisions regarding his firm

and their attorneys fees in his declaration. Therefore, the Court OVERRULES objections 1-22.

Additionally, the Court OVERRULES objections 1-4 to the Barker’s declaration and all objections

to the declaration of Colin P. Cronin, Esq. The discussions in the declarations are standard for

this motion.

Analysis. Where the buyer of a vehicle prevails in an action under the Song-Beverly Act, they

“shall be allowed by the court to recover ... a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and

expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to

have been reasonably incurred ....” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) Here, the Plaintiff is the

prevailing party pursuant to the settlement entered into between the parties which FCA US LLC

does not dispute. Plaintiff seeks: (1) attorney’s fees of $33,591; (2) a multiplier of 1.35

($11,756.85); (3) $7,984.56 in costs and expenses; and (4) an additional $4,000 to review the

opposition and draft the reply. In the opposition, Defendants claim that Plaintiff should recover no

more than $15,035.00 in costs or $16,625.00 applying a maximum blended rate of $350. The

costs should be taxed in their entirety or alternatively should be no more than $3,028.90.

(Opposition at 15:18-24.)

Hourly Rate. Generally, a reasonable hourly rate is prevailing in the community where the case

is litigated for similar work. (PLCM Group v. Dexter (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 [“PLCM”];

MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Gorman (2006) 147 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 13.) But when the

evidence reveals the plaintiff could not secure a local attorney to represent him, the out-of-town

attorney’s home market rate is applied. (Caldera v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation

(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 601, 609; Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University

(2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 397-99.)

The chart showing the attorneys who worked on the case and their hours and fees claimed:

Attorney Name Bar Position Hourly Year of Hours Fee

Admit Rate Work

Christopher 2015 Trial Counsel 495 2023 8.5 4,207.50

Campbell

Tionna Carvalo 2014 Partner 495 2020 2.3 1,138.50

Tionna Carvalo 570 2023 1.2 684.00

Tionna Carvalo 595 2024 0.7 416.50

Dhara Chanfy None Provisionally 350 2024 0.1 35.00

Licensed

James Doddy 2004 Attorney 595 2021 1.1 654.50

Mark Gibson 2008 Attorney 435 2019 2.2 957.00

Mark Gibson 450 2020 1.9 855.00

Christine Haw 2013 Senior Atty 500 2023 1.0 500.00

Jared Kaye 2019 Attorney 395 2023 2.1 829.50

Eleazar Kim 2017 Attorney 360 2020 14.2 5,112.50

Elizabeth 2002 Attorney 595 2024 0.9 535.00

Larocque

Daniel Law 2016 Attorney 425 2020 8.0 3,400.00

Daniel Law 475 2023 7.6 3,610.00

Jacob Lister 2009 Attorney 495 2023 4.0 1,980.00

Julian Moore 2003 Attorney 525 2019 0.5 262.50

Julian Moore 525 2020 1.4 735.00

Rebecca 2014 IL Attorney 435 2021 6.7 2,914.50

Neubauer

Rebecca 2021 495 2023 0.2 99.00

Neubauer CA

Anh Nguyen 2012 Attorney 435 2020 2.4 1,044.00

Nino Sanaia 2015- Attorney 425 2023 0.7 297.50

GA;

CA

Marcy Sanchez 2006 Attorney 485 2020 1.7 824.50

Payam Shahian 2003 Founder 875 2025 1.2 1,050.00

Yenok Tantanyan Law Clerk 345 2025 4.2 1,449.00

Total 74.8 33,591.00

(See Shahian Decl., ¶¶ 11-17, Ex. 1.)

“What a plaintiff may be bound to pay and what an attorney is free to collect under a fee

agreement are not necessarily measured by the ‘reasonable attorney's fee’ that a defendant

must pay pursuant to a court order.” (Reynolds v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th 1105,

1116 (internal citations omitted).) Further, when awarding attorney fees, a trial court is limited by

the terms of subdivision (d) of section 1794, which “controls what the losing defendant must pay,

not what the prevailing plaintiff must pay his lawyer. The attorney fees provision of the Song-

Beverly Act “was not intended ‘to replicate exactly the fee an attorney could earn through a

private fee arrangement with his client.’” (Reynolds, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th 1105, 1116, citing to

Pa. v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (1986) 478 U.S. 546, 565.) As such, the only

issue regarding rates before the Court is whether they are reasonable.

A review of decisions from the past few years have found that fees in the range presented by

Plaintiffs’ counsel to be on the higher side of what other judges have found reasonable in other

similar Song-Beverly fee motions. (See, e.g., Hamm v. FCA US LLC (S.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2019,

No. 3:17-cv-0577-AJB-BGS) 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141480, at *8-9 [finding rates of $350-

$550/hour to be reasonable]; Petropoulos v. FCA US LLC (S.D. Cal. May 29, 2019, No. 17-CV-

0398 W (KSC)) 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89984, at *5-6 [finding rates of $275-$550/hour to be

reasonable]; Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal. App. 5th 462, 473-74 [finding a

rate of $575 reasonable where BMW argued the case was not complex and provided evidence

that counsel for BMW charged much lower hourly rates]; Shaw v. Ford Motor Co., No.

5:18cv1169 JLS (KK), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2320, 2020 WL 57273, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3,

2020) [approving rates between $200 and $550].)

Different judges have different views on how high an hourly fee should be and Plaintiff cites

decisions where their hourly fee has been approved. (See Shahiian Decl.) For San Bernardino

County, as well as the area of law, the fees sought are too high. While there are attorneys with

significant work experience, the current titles and years of admittance are not the same when

looking from 2026 as from an attorney with a 2014 bar admittance and 2020 hourly fee. (See

e.g., Carvalo.) The hourly fees are reduced as shown below.

Attorney Name Bar Position Hourly Year of Hours Fee

Admit Rate Work

Christopher 2015 Trial Counsel 350 2023 8.5 2,975.00

Campbell

Tionna Carvalo 2014 Partner 375 2020 2.3 862.50

Tionna Carvalo 450 2023 1.2 540.00

Tionna Carvalo 450 2024 0.7 315.00

Dhara Chanfy None Provisionally 200 2024 0.1 20.00

Licensed

James Doddy 2004 Attorney 350 2021 1.1 385.00

Mark Gibson 2008 Attorney 350 2019 2.2 770.00

Mark Gibson 350 2020 1.9 665.00

Christine Haw 2013 Senior Atty 425 2023 1.0 425.00

Jared Kaye 2019 Attorney 325 2023 2.1 682.50

Eleazar Kim 2017 Attorney 350 2020 14.2 4,970.00

Elizabeth 2002 Attorney 350 2024 0.9 315.00

Larocque

Daniel Law 2016 Attorney 325 2020 8.0 2,600.00

Daniel Law 350 2023 7.6 2,660.00

Jacob Lister 2009 Attorney 350 2023 4.0 1,400.00

Julian Moore 2003 Attorney 350 2019 0.5 210.00

Julian Moore 350 2020 1.4 49.00

Rebecca 2014 IL Attorney 350 2021 6.7 2,345.00

Neubauer

Rebecca 2021 325 2023 0.2 65.00

Neubauer CA

Anh Nguyen 2012 Attorney 350 2020 2.4 840.00

Nino Sanaia 2015- Attorney 350 2023 0.7 245.00

GA;

CA

Marcy Sanchez 2006 Attorney 350 2020 1.7 595.00

Payam Shahian 2003 Founder 500 2025 1.2 600.00

Yenok Tantanyan Law Clerk 200 2025 4.2 840.00

Total 74.8 25,374.00

Reasonable Hours. The starting point for every fee award is calculating an attorney’s services

by the time expended on the case. (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4

Cal.App.4th 807, 815.)

“In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the

burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged.” (Premier Medical

Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564;

see also Gorman v. Tassajara Dev. Corp., (2009) 178 Cal. App. 4th 44, 101 (“The party

opposing the fee award can be expected to identify the particular charges it considers

objectionable”).) “[I]t is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable

determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant

inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal. App.

5th 24, 39.) In Morris, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s determination that the use of 11

attorneys, from two firms, was unreasonable for a non-complex lemon law case. (Id. at 41.) The

court further held that, where voluminous records are submitted, the trial court may strike all fees

incurred by the excess attorneys. (Ibid.)

Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 40-41 states:

The court could properly have made an across-the board reduction of 30 percent to accomplish

the same purpose. (See Warren, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 41 [“when a ‘“voluminous fee

application”’ is made ... the court may ... ‘“make across-the-board percentage cuts either in the

number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure”’”].) The court got to the same result by

cutting particular attorneys' billings. We are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its broad

discretion to determine the reasonable value of the professional services performed by Morris's

attorneys. (See PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1096 [“‘[t]he trial court may

make its own determination of the value of the services’”]; Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64

Cal.App.3d 618, 625 [134 Cal. Rptr. 602] [“the trial court ... is not bound by the itemization

claimed in the attorney's affidavit”].)

...

“In making its calculation [of a reasonable hourly rate], the court may rely on its own knowledge

and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the

attorney requesting fees [citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill

was applied [citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the

community and rate determinations in other cases.” (569 East, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 437;

see Mountjoy, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 272 [“‘“[a] reasonable hourly rate is the product of a

multiplicity of factors ... [including] the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be

obtained in the litigation, the attorney's reputation, and the undesirability of the case”’”].)

Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240 is also a good discussion

of attorney’s fees.

Defendants claim that counsel’s hours are unsupported, excessive and unreasonable and should

be reduced; there was gross overstaffing on this case; requesting $345 for an unlicensed law

clerk; excessive, cumulative and unnecessary time; block billing should be reduced or rejected;

there was unreasonable time for this motion. Defense counsel submits various exhibits to show

where they seek reductions in hours. (Ex. 1-4.) The challenging part is that Plaintiff’s seek 5.4

hours and $2,999 for this motion and $4,000 to review the opposition, file the reply and attend

the hearing. While there is a template and the discovery requests, responses, meet and confer

and the attorneys fee demand are similar to other cases, each had to be modified for this

particular case and work does go into performing the task. The Defendants seek to reduce the

hours to 47.50. However, a total of 74.8 hours on an action filed in 2019, went to Federal court

and back, changed venues, had discovery motions and a motion for judgment on the pleadings

filed and argued, and reach a settlement whereby Plaintiff received $119,492.40 plus attorney’s

fees, is actually reasonable. The Court finds the hours allowed on the motion sufficient for

reviewing the opposition, reply and hearing as well.

Multiplier. “A trial court should award a multiplier for exceptional representation only when the

quality of representation far exceeds the quality of representation that would have been provided

by an attorney of comparable skill and experience billing at the hourly rate used in the lodestar

calculation. Otherwise, the fee award will result in unfair double counting and be unreasonable.”

(Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1139.) Although Plaintiff’s counsel obtained a

recovery on behalf of their client, it is not clear the quality of representation “far exceeds the

quality of representation that would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill and

experience billing at” the rates requested. (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1139.)

Further, based on a review of recent case law, multipliers do not seem to be awarded in typical

in Song-Beverly actions. (See, e.g., James Holcomb & Rotoco, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am.,

LLC (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2020) No. 18cv475 JM (BGS)) 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26094, at *25

(denying request for a 0.3 multiplier, stating it was counsel’s “own choice to take this case on a

contingency basis” and should not be the basis for a multiplier); Chavez v. Jaguar Land Rover N.

Am., LLC (S.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2020, No. 18-cv-2811 W (JLB)) 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12187, at *9

(rejecting 0.3 multiplier based on the posture and lack of complexity of case); Hamm, supra,

2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141480 (rejecting 0.5 multiplier because the case did not involve

complexity or novel or difficult questions of law or fact); Petropoulos, supra, 2019 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 89984 (“Plaintiffs were not litigating important constitutional rights here. Nor were they

representing the public interest. . . . They were seeking compensation and statutory penalties for

a defective Durango.”).) As stated by a sister-court in Los Angeles County, in denying a similar

multiplier request: “Lemon law litigation is not, as a general rule, complex, and Plaintiff has

offered no evidence to show this case was an exception. Defendant’s counsel may have

engaged in scorched-earth tactics, but that does not make the questions involved novel or

difficult. There is also no testimony or other evidence to suggest this litigation required special

skill or precluded [counsel] from taking on clients. The contingent nature of the award, by itself,

does not justify a multiplied award.” (Pttyan v. Aston Martin Lagonda of N. Am., Case No.

20STCV47129, Sup. Ct. Los Angeles, 2023 Cal. Super. LEXIS 72413, *9-10.) As such, the Court

DENIES Plaintiff’s request for a multiplier. Here, the hourly rate is already sufficient and these

cases are formulaic.

Costs. As for Plaintiff’s request for costs, a memorandum of costs was not submitted. Plaintiffs

just lists various costs in Exhibit 1 to the Shahian declaration. In Exhibit 3 of the Cronin

declaration, FCA brings up issue related to Ford litigation listed in the cost declaration which are

appropriate. The Court therefore DENIES the costs without prejudice to filing a proper

memorandum of costs.

RULING

For all the reasons stated above, the Court:

1. OVERRULES objections 1-22; OVERRULES objections 1-4 to the Barker’s declaration

and all objections to the Cronin’s declaration;

2. DENIES Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice;

3. AWARDS Plaintiff the total amount of $25,374.00 in attorney’s fees which includes any

review of opposition and reply;

4. DENIES any request for a multiplier; and

5. DENIES the costs without prejudice to filing a memorandum of costs pursuant to Code

Civ. Proc., §1033.5.