MALEK vs NASRAWI, et al.

24CV005885: MALEK vs NASRAWI, et al. 07/15/2026 Status Conference (Pre-Trial Conference) in Department 8B

Tentative Ruling

AMENDED TENTATIVE RULING:

The Court has reviewed the parties’ briefs regarding Defendants’ request to submit the equitable defense of unclean hands to the jury for a binding determination. The Court’s tentative ruling is to DENY this request pursuant to Gonzalez v. Community Mortuary, Inc. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 1006. The Court will decide the equitable defense of unclean hands following the jury's verdict on the legal claims and will make its own independent findings on the defense based on the trial record.

Counsel may address this tentative ruling at the hearing this afternoon.

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Governing Standards Common to the Motions

Motions in limine rest on the trial court’s inherent authority to manage trial and to exclude evidence that is irrelevant or whose probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice, confusion, or undue consumption of time. Only relevant evidence is admissible, and the Court may exclude evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will necessitate undue consumption of time or create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. (Cal. Evid. Code § 352.)

Character evidence — whether opinion, reputation, or specific instances of conduct — is inadmissible when offered to prove a person acted in conformity with that character on a specified occasion. (Id., § 1101.) But the same evidence is admissible when offered to prove a fact other than disposition, such as motive, intent, or plan. (Ibid.) Evidence of specific instances of conduct offered only to prove a character trait is also inadmissible to attack a witness’s credibility. (Id., § 787.) Out-of-court statements offered for their truth are inadmissible hearsay unless an exception applies. (Id., § 1200.)

For expert testimony, the Court acts as a gatekeeper to exclude opinion that is based on matter of a type an expert may not reasonably rely on, based on reasons unsupported by the material relied on, or speculative. (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770.) The gatekeeping inquiry asks whether the matter relied on can provide a reasonable basis for the opinion or whether the opinion is a leap of logic; the expert must bring the same intellectual rigor used in the field, and the Court does not weigh the opinion’s persuasiveness. (Id., at p. 772.) That role “does not involve choosing between competing expert opinions.” (Ibid.) The Court may nonetheless exclude an opinion where “there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” (Id., at p. 771.) An expert

24CV005885: MALEK vs NASRAWI, et al. 07/15/2026 Status Conference (Pre-Trial Conference) in Department 8B

may relate general background in the field but cannot relate case-specific facts about which the expert has no independent knowledge. (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 686.) ________________________________________

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 1 — Inflammatory character and other-acts evidence

GRANTED in part; DENIED in part.

Plaintiff moves to exclude five categories: (a) the alleged firearm/“pull a gun” incident described by Hoang Bui and Nasrawi; (b) the “revenge” characterization in Jitesh Raja’s August 18, 2022 email; (c) the “harassment and blackmail” testimony about the security vendor “Crime Alert”; (d) the undated George Cloud III character letter; and (e) witness epithets (“greedy,” “not a good human being,” “a piece of shit”). Defendants respond that none is offered for propensity; each bears on the cross-complaint’s judicial-expulsion and fiduciary-duty theories, on financing difficulties, operational disruption, and on valuation.

a. Firearm incident — GRANTED in part, to the following extent: all parties, counsel, and witnesses are precluded from referring to a firearm, gun, or weapon, or to Malek's vehicle trunk or a gun case, in connection with the dealership incident; and no party may argue or suggest that the dealership incident shows Malek is violent, dangerous, or prone to violence. Otherwise DENIED. The underlying dispute between Malek and Hoang Bui, and its business consequences — including Bui's departure from the companies and the effect of that departure on the companies' management, ownership, and valuation — are not excluded and may be presented for the non-character purposes Defendants identify.

b. Raja “revenge” email and (c) “blackmail”/Crime Alert — DENIED without prejudice; limited to non-character purpose. These items bear on disputed cross-complaint issues: whether Malek’s conduct impaired financing (Raja was involved in the companies’ financing efforts) and vendor/licensing relationships during the 2022 distress. Offered for those non-propensity purposes, they are not barred by §§ 787 or 1101. This is without prejudice to: (i) Plaintiff requesting a limiting instruction that the jury may not use the evidence to infer character or conformity, and (ii) a renewed § 352 objection at trial should the presentation become inflammatory or consume undue time. To the extent the Raja email is offered for the truth of Raja’s characterization, a hearsay objection is preserved.

d. George Cloud III letter — GRANTED. The undated, unauthenticated letter is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of its characterizations of Malek (“a very negative influence,” “bluntly rude”) and is inadmissible hearsay; it also relays a further out-of-court statement (hearsay within hearsay). Its character content is barred by sections 1101(a) and 352. This ruling does not preclude Cloud, if called, from testifying from personal knowledge to project delays and operational facts; those foundation questions may be addressed at trial.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV005885: MALEK vs NASRAWI, et al. 07/15/2026 Status Conference (Pre-Trial Conference) in Department 8B

e. Witness epithets — GRANTED. Name-calling such as “greedy,” “not a good human being,” and “a piece of shit” has no tendency to prove a disputed issue and every tendency to inflame; it is excluded under §§ 1101(a), 787, and 352. This does not bar percipient testimony about Malek’s business conduct and its effect on the companies, offered for a non-character purpose.

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Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 2 — Testimony of defense industry expert David Hickok

GRANTED in part; DENIED in part.

Plaintiff seeks to (1) bar Hickok from any opinion on the value, salability, or marketability of the entities or Malek’s interest; (2) confine him to his disclosed general cannabis-industry opinions; (3) bar him from relating case-specific Capital Green facts learned from Nasrawi or defense counsel; (4) bar reliance on the “terms.law” website for Opinion 3; and (5) prevent the excluded content from reaching the jury through another witness. Defendants concede Hickok is not a valuation expert and was retained only for industry context.

a. Value / salability / marketability opinions — GRANTED. Defendants stipulate that Hickok was not retained to value the entities, did not value Malek’s interest, and offers no opinion on value “as of any time.” An opinion he did not form on a subject he was not retained to address cannot assist the jury; any value opinion he offered (e.g., that without local approval the companies are “not worth much”) lacks foundation in the entities’ financials and would be a leap of logic. Hickok is barred from opining that the interests have “minimal” value, value limited to “hard assets,” or are difficult or impossible to sell.

b. Confinement to disclosed industry opinions — GRANTED. Hickok may testify to the general cannabis-industry conditions, licensing/regulatory realities, market structure, and marketability considerations for which he was disclosed, consistent with Defendants’ own description of his role.

c. Case-specific Capital Green facts — GRANTED. Hickok may not relate as true case-specific facts about these entities that he learned from Nasrawi or defense counsel and that are not otherwise proven. He may provide general background but may not supply case-specific facts within the Sanchez rule.

d. “terms.law” website / AI-generated materials — DENIED (goes to weight). Hickok testified his basis for Opinion 3 is his industry experience and that the website merely corroborated it; he did not rely on the unvalidated AI summaries. A dispute over a corroborative source and over discovery-produced but unused materials goes to weight and cross-examination, not admissibility. The Court will not exclude Opinion 3 on this ground, subject to renewed objection if the disclosed foundation proves to be the website alone.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV005885: MALEK vs NASRAWI, et al. 07/15/2026 Status Conference (Pre-Trial Conference) in Department 8B

e. Anti-conduit provision — GRANTED. Testimony excluded by this order may not be introduced through any other witness, as opinion, basis testimony, or by hypothetical. (See the companion ruling on MIL No. 3 as to expert Hall.)

Industry-decline testimony under § 352 — DENIED as a blanket matter. General industrycondition testimony is relevant context and is not excluded wholesale, but it may not be used to carry a value-suppression inference about Malek’s specific interest, and a § 352 objection is preserved if the presentation threatens a mini-trial on statewide conditions.

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Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 3 — Testimony of defense valuation expert Kristoffer M. Hall

DENIED as to the return-of capital deduction; GRANTED in part as to the Hickok conduit.

Plaintiff seeks to (1) exclude Hall’s “return of capital” deduction ($631,797, Schedule I) as derived from section 11.03 — the dissolution provision — of the operating agreements, which Hall conceded never operated because the companies were never dissolved; and (2) preclude Hall from relating Hickok’s out-of-court statements.

a. Return-of-capital deduction — DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff raises a Sargon argument: Hall conceded that section 11.03 is the only provision requiring a return of members’ capital, that it sits in the dissolution article, and that no dissolution occurred, which Plaintiff contends leaves an analytical gap between the contract and the deduction. But Hall also testified that his deduction does not assume dissolution or liquidation; rather, he apportions capital because of the “significantly disparate capital accounts” (over $600,000 attributed to Orchard versus roughly $7,000 to Malek), drawing on the K-1s and tax returns, and performs a going-concern fairmarket-value analysis.

Because Hall articulates a basis beyond section 11.03, the objection is directed principally at the persuasiveness of his methodology, and the Court’s gatekeeping role does not involve choosing between competing expert opinions. Plaintiff’s cross-examination on the section 11.03 concession, the absence of any dissolution, and the going-concern premise remains fully available.

b. Reliance on Hickok’s statements — GRANTED in part. Consistent with the ruling on MIL No. 2 and with Sanchez, Hall may not relate to the jury, as true, Hickok’s case-specific out-ofcourt statements about these entities’ market trajectory or licensure status. Hall may rely on general background industry knowledge and may state in general terms that he did so, but to the extent any Hall opinion rests in significant part on case-specific matter excluded under MIL No. 2, that component is excluded, with leave for Hall to restate the opinion on the proper bases that remain.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV005885: MALEK vs NASRAWI, et al. 07/15/2026 Status Conference (Pre-Trial Conference) in Department 8B

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Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 4 — Prior warehouse appraisals

GRANTED as to the BBG appraisals (June 30 and July 13, 2022) and the Smith & Associates appraisal (January 19, 2023); the parties essentially stipulate that these appraisals are irrelevant and cumulative given the parties’ stipulation that the warehouse is worth $3,700,000 as of December 2022, with authentication of the March 2026 (Colliers) appraisal.

However, in opposition, Plaintiff also seeks to exclude Defendants’ November 2025 Colliers/Bones “Opinion of Value." Plaintiff contends that (1) Mr. Bones should be precluded from testifying because he was not disclosed as a retained expert; and (2) his opinion of value is irrelevant because it values the property nearly three years after the stipulated December 2022 date and is, if anything, further removed from the operative period. The Court is reviewing the parties' supplemental briefs on these issues and will address these issues further at the 1:30 p.m. hearing.