Motion of Defendants Robert Seidler and PoloDonkey, LLC to Stay Proceedings in Case after Jury Trial in Related Case No. 24CV05259
the parties' stipulation to arbitrate the claim between Plaintiff and Defendant Sanchez, and to dismiss Defendant Lyft, Inc. On January 20, 2026, Plaintiff Jason Jeremy Carter filed the complaint in case No. 26CV00402 against Defendants Santiago Charco and Lyft, Inc. (Note: Defendant Santiago Charco is the same person as Defendant Santiago Charco Sanchez in case No. 24CV04992.)
Answers were filed in case No. 26CV00402 by Defendant Charco Sanchez on April 8, 2026, and by Defendant Lyft, Inc., on April 28, 2026. On April 24, 2026, Defendant Charco Sanchez filed this motion in both case No. 24CV04992 and case No. 26CV00402 to consolidate both cases for all purposes. No opposition or other response has been filed by any party.
"When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the Court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1048, subd. (a).) Both cases arise out of the same automobile accident. (Mendez decl., P.P. 2, 7, 8.) Consequently, there is overlap in questions of fact with respect to the accident.
However, in presenting this motion, Defendant Charco Sanchez does not explain how the different procedural postures of the cases would be affected by consolidation. In particular, the remaining parties in case No. 24CV04992 were ordered to arbitration in 2025. In case No. 26CV00402, Lyft remains a party to the action but has indicated an intent to move to compel arbitration. Additionally, this motion is not presented as a motion to consolidate arbitrations under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.3, but as a motion to consolidate the Court actions under section 1048. There is no showing that there would be judicial efficiency in consolidating a case that is pending in arbitration with a case that may be tried, partially or fully, in Court. The motion to consolidate will be denied without prejudice.
Tentative Ruling: Diana Sandoval v. Robert Seidler, et al. Tentative Ruling: Diana Sandoval v. Robert Seidler, et al. Case Number
Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Wed, 06/24/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Motion of Defendants Robert Seidler and PoloDonkey, LLC to Stay Proceedings in Case after Jury Trial in Related Case No. 24CV05259 Tentative Ruling For Plaintiff Diana Sandoval, trustee of the Sandoval Quiel Revocable Living Trust: Stephen M. Sanders, Jeff G. Coyner, Sanders Coyner Cade PC For Defendants PoloDonkey, LLC and Robert Seidler: Todd A. Amspoker, Jeff F. Tchakarov, Price Postel & Parma LLP RULING For all reasons discussed herein, Defendants' motion to stay proceedings in this case is denied.
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Background
This action commenced on August 5, 2024, by the filing of the original petition and complaint by Plaintiff Diana Sandoval, trustee of the Sandoval Quiel Revocable Living Trust (Sandoval) against Defendants County of Santa Barbara Department of Planning and Development (CSBDPD) for: (1) Writ of Administrative Mandamus, (2) Nuisance, and (3) Negligence. In the original complaint, PoloDonkey was identified as the real party in interest.
On February 6, 2025, Sandoval filed her operative second amended petition for writ of mandate and complaint for damages (SAC), asserting causes of action for: (1) Writ of Administrative Mandamus, (2) Writ of Mandate, (3) Violation of California Coastal Act, (4) Nuisance, (5) Negligence, (6) Inverse Condemnation, (7) Fraud/Deceit, (8) Negligent Misrepresentation, (9) Waste & Trespass, (10) Ejectment, (11) Quiet Title on Easement & Action for Possession Based on Unlawful Use, and (12) Declaratory Relief, against Defendants CSBDPD, County of Santa Barbara Board of Building Appeals (collectively the "County Defendants"), California Coastal Commission (the "Coastal Commission"), PoloDonkey, and Robert Seidler (Seidler). Following the sustaining of demurrers, without leave to amend, Sandoval's complaint was dismissed as to the County Defendants and the Coastal Commission.
As alleged in the SAC: Sandoval is the owner of real property located at 3196 Serena Avene, Carpinteria (the Serena Property). (SAC, P. 1.) PoloDonkey owns real property located at 3215 Foothill Road, in Carpinteria, California (the Foothill Property). (SAC, P. 5.) Seidler is the principal, beneficiary, and interested owner of PoloDonkey. (SAC, P. 6.) On or before October 30, 2006, PoloDonkey's predecessor in interest, through its manager and principal Michael Rothbard (Rothbard), confirmed in writing that they would abandon one existing residential driveway and the use therefore of the Serena Property easement, road access, and previous bridge. (SAC, P. 34 & Exh. 12.)
Rothbard expressly stated to the County that they would create two new driveways, one for residential access and one for commercial equestrian facility use, both of which driveways were located with access onto Foothill Road. (Ibid.) Rothbard, and PoloDonkey's predecessor company, maintained this abandonment of the Serena Property easement and did not use the tertiary road and previous bridge associated with the easement until Rothbard sold the Foothill Property to PoloDonkey. (SAC, P. 35.) PoloDonkey, through Seidler, purchased the Foothill Property on July 31, 2014, and thereafter used it unlawfully, without permitted use or entitlement thereto, or right of legal access to the Serena Property. (SAC, P. 36.)
In 2016, Siedler misrepresented and submitted on behalf of PoloDonkey an application stating, "Access will continue to be provided off of Foothill Road" without reference to or disclosure of PoloDonkey's and Siedler's unlawful use of the expressly abandoned bridge and the Serena Property easement. (SAC, P. 37.) On June 30, 2025, Seidler and PoloDonkey answered the SAC admitting some allegations and denying others.
Related Case: On December 18, 2024, Sandoval filed a notice of related case regarding Case No. 24CV04379, PoloDonkey v. Quiel, et al. In that matter: On September 23, 2024, Plaintiff PoloDonkey, LLC, (PoloDonkey) filed a verified complaint against Defendants Tyler N. Quiel (Quiel) and Diana Sandoval (Sandoval) (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging six causes of action: (1) interference with easement; (2) private nuisance; (3) quiet title; (4) declaratory relief; (5) temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions; and (6) quiet title to prescriptive easement.
As alleged in the complaint: PoloDonkey owns real property located at 3215 Foothill Road/3200 Serena Avenue, in Carpinteria, California. (Compl., P. 8.) Defendants are the owners of property located at 3196 Serena Avenue, in Carpinteria, California. (Compl., P. 9.) The PoloDonkey Property is benefitted by an express easement located on a portion of the Serena Property. (Compl., P.P. 11-13.) Contrary to the express language of the easement, Defendants have maintained a fence on and across the easement, blocking PoloDonkey's access and denying PoloDonkey a safe and unobstructed easement area. (Compl., P.P. 15-16.)
On November 26, 2024, Defendants filed a verified answer to the complaint, responding to its allegations and asserting forty-three affirmative defenses. The matter was tried simultaneously before a jury and the Court on January 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 22, and 23, 2026. Following the presentation of each side's respective cases, judgment was entered in favor of PoloDonkey.
On February 9, 2026, the Court issued its final statement of decision, and on March 17, 2026, the Court signed the judgment. The judgment requires Defendants to do, or abstain from doing, several things, including: (1) refraining from interfering with PoloDonkey's valid easement, including by maintaining or installing immobile fencing on the easement area or by preventing PoloDonkey free access through a swinging gate, (2) maintaining and keeping the easement area free of any obstructions that could unreasonably interfere with PoloDonkey's use and enjoyment of the easement for its purpose and scope as set forth in the Official Records of Santa Barbara County, (3) sign and deliver to PoloDonkey, within 10 calendar days after formal written request by PoloDonkey, the Owner/Applicant Consent Form referenced in the Letter re: Determination of Application Incompleteness, dated May 9, 2025, and sent by the Santa Barbara County Planning and Development Department to Ms.
Eva Turenchalk, and any other documents required by the County, in order to allow the County to proceed with review and processing of Plaintiff's currently pending Coastal Development Permit application submitted on April 10, 2025, (4) remove the black locked mailbox, which Defendants installed at the intersection of the easement roadway and Serena Avenue and return and reinstall PoloDonkey's old mailbox to its previous location, and to refrain at any time in the future from removing or otherwise tampering with PoloDonkey's mailbox, (5) remove the bamboo fence from PoloDonkey's easement and refrain from installing any immobile fencing or other unreasonable obstructions on the easement area at any time in the future, and (6) PoloDonkey has the right to maintain and preserve the existing access bridge within its full structural footprint.
It was also ordered that PoloDonkey is entitled to recover its costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033, et seq.
On February 10, 2026, Defendants filed a notice of appeal of the judgment. The appeal remains pending. On May 13, 2026, the appellate Court entered an Order for Writ of Supersedeas, that vacated the March 26, 2026 temporary stay, staying enforcement the judgment's mandatory injunctions, and allowing the prohibitory injunctions to remain in full force and effect while the appeal is pending. In the present case, on March 6, 2026, PoloDonkey and Seidler filed their motion to stay proceedings following the jury trial in Case No. 24CV05259. Quiel and Sandoval oppose the motion to stay proceedings.
Analysis
"(a) Except as provided in Sections 917.1 to 917.10, inclusive, and in Section 116.810, the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial Court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial Court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order. (b) When there is a stay of proceedings other than the enforcement of the judgment, the trial Court shall have jurisdiction of proceedings related to the enforcement of the judgment as well as any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order appealed from." (Code Civ.
Proc., Sec. 916.) " 'The purpose of the automatic stay provision of section 916, subdivision (a) ' "is to protect the appellate Court's jurisdiction by preserving the status quo until the appeal is decided. The [automatic stay] prevents the trial Court from rendering an appeal futile by altering the appealed judgment or order by conducting other proceedings that may affect it." ' " [Citation.] (URS Corp. v. Atkinson/Walsh Joint Venture (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 872, 881.)
PoloDonkey and Seidler argue that this action should be stayed because they directly affect the pending appeal of the judgment in Case No. 24CV05259. This argument is somewhat muted by PoloDonkey and Seidler's prior arguments with respect to their opposition to Plaintiffs' motion to consolidate. Relative to that opposition, PoloDonkey and Seidler argued that there was insufficient overlap of common facts and legal issues to warrant consolidation, that Sandoval's claim for Coastal Act violations and PoloDonkey's prescriptive easement claim cannot be adjudicated in the same trial, and that consolidation would complicate and confuse the issues.
In denying the motion for consolidation, the Court agreed with the opposition, finding: "That the only overlap of factual and legal issues between the Lead Case [this case] and the Related Case [Case No. 24CV05259] concerns the existence and validity of the Easement. Unlike the Lead Case, the issues in the Related Case have been narrowed down and PoloDonkey seeks merely to confirm the existence of the Express Easement (publicly recorded in 1915) and to establish the existence of a Prescriptive Easement over the Serena Property.
Should the Court confirm PoloDonkey's Easement rights, the Complaint filed in the Related Case prays
coordinated with Santa Barbara County Planning & Development Department's Senior Planner Brown to alter Defendants' Accessory Dwelling Unit plans applied for under 3200 Serena Avenue, Carpinteria CA by striking the 3200 Serena and replacing it with "3196" for next’day impeachment before Defendants ever received the plans; Fire Marshal Michael LoMonaco then falsely testified, during improper rebuttal, that he personally made these changes, and post’trial Public Records Act requests revealed spoliation of key Turenchalk-Brown communications. Together, these acts constitute fraud on the court, trial by ambush, and deliberate manipulation and fabrication of evidence, warranting vacatur or modification of the Judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 663 because the decision is not supported by the true facts, and, at minimum, a new trial under section 657.
Third, systematic irregularities cumulatively deprived Defendants of a fair trial: a mandatory reading burden applied to Defendants' exhibits but waived for Plaintiff; third’party hearsay admitted to show Plaintiff's thread while Sandoval's identical state’of’mind testimony was struck; Defendant's sole witness (David Tetzlaff) was tightly restricted while Plaintiff's witnesses were largely unrestricted, including undisclosed expert Fire Marshal LoMonaco, PPP's own client; and, after initially denying equitable’easement relief, the Court later granted an unpled equitable easement. Combined with selective motion’in’limine enforcement, systematic striking of Diana's testimony, questions surrounding the Court's reference to a property view, and jury’selection concerns, these constitute irregularities requiring a new trial under CCP Sec. 657.
The Judgment also exceeds both the pleadings and the verdict by imposing mandatory and prohibitory injunctions on unpled and untried theories and forms of relief, including compelling Defendants to sign an Owner/Applicant Consent Form and "any other documents" requested by the County, requiring perpetual and immediate maintenance of the alleged easement area, forcing relinquishment of a lawful mailbox, and granting an unpled equitable easement after denying that relief during trial and despite Plaintiff's inability to satisfy the "innocence" element--particularly in light of Plaintiff's own survey acknowledging that the bridge extends outside the disputed easement area. These vague and untried injunction terms, never pleaded, tried, or proven, warrant vacatur under CCP Sec. 663.
This action was pled, served, and tried solely against Tyler N. Quiel and Diana Sandoval in individual capacities, not against any trustee capacity or the Sandoval Quiel Revocable Living Trust. The Complaint nowhere identifies the Trust or trustees. The public docket showed only individuals; no amended complaint, new summons, or proof of service issued naming trustees. Trustee issues are being litigated separately in Case No. 24CV04379, ("Lead Case") in which the caption names Diana Sandoval, as trustee of the Sandoval Quiel Revocable Living Trust.
When the Trust and Sandoval in the Lead Case sought consolidation, Plaintiff, appearing as Defendant in the Lead Case, opposed consolidation, thereby excluding the trustee from this action. On October 29, 2025, the Court denied consolidation. This pretrial ruling confirmed that trust’capacity issues and trust property remained in the Lead Case, and the present case ("24CV05259") would proceed against individuals only.
The trial record further confirms that the Plaintiff expressly proceeded against the individuals not the Trust or Trustee capacity. On the morning of January 5, 2026, Plaintiff's counsel admitted to the Court that "[t]he property is owned by their family trust." Counsel hesitated on dismissing the Doe defendants, the Court explicitly warned that adding a new party would require starting all over again. Faced with the choice of starting over to properly serve the Trust and trustees, Plaintiff's counsel stated: "It's okay, your Honor.
Let's dismiss the Does." By dismissing the Does, the parties and Court proceeded on the understanding that the Trust and trustees were not parties to this action. Throughout trial, including in the jury verdict forms, the case was tried solely against the individuals, and even post’trial the Proposed Statement of Decision continued to identify only the individuals.
Defense Was Limited to Individuals, Not Any Trust or Trustee Capacity. Plaintiff's own trial insurance exhibit confirms that, while the Policy's Conditions automatically extend coverage to a later trust owner, the actual defense engagement was framed as "individuals only." The First American Homeowners Policy No. 5026100?6273661 lists only Quiel and Sandoval as the named insureds, and while Condition 2(b)(3) extends coverage to a later trust owner, the reservation’of’rights letter that actually defines the defense in 24CV05259 identifies only the individuals as the