Vikki Vang vs. Uniqua Sharma

On June 27, 2025, the Sharmas filed the operative FACC. The FACC alleges, for the first time, three new causes of action for civil extortion, fraud, and professional negligence against Miller. Miller, Plaintiffs’ former attorney, filed the Complaint on Plaintiffs’ behalf. On May 23, 2024, Miller withdrew from the representation of Plaintiffs. (Declaration of John Miller, Jr. (“Miller Decl.”), ¶ 2; Minute Order, dated 5/23/24.) The Sharmas allege that Miller claimed false facts regarding Plaintiffs’ actual injuries, demanded settlement of those damages, and then filed a lawsuit on Plaintiffs’ behalf to put pressure on the Sharmas for a quick settlement. (FACC, ¶¶ 2-9, 53-55, 64, 66, 72.) The Sharmas further allege that Miller filed a motion for trial preference to pressure the Sharmas into a settlement, learned there was no applicable insurance coverage, moved

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to continue the trial, and then withdrew from Plaintiffs’ representation. (Id., ¶¶ 9, 56-59, 66.) The Sharmas were allegedly damaged by incurring attorneys’ fees and costs in defending the instant action. (Id., ¶¶ 60-61, 67-68, 73-75.) The Sharmas attach a document entitled “Plaintiffs’ Settlement Demand,” which contains Miller’s letterhead and is on pleading paper, as Exhibit 2 to the FACC. (Id., ¶ 2.)

Miller now moves to strike the sixth through eighth causes of action alleged in the FACC. Miller also seeks “sanctions” in the amount of $4,235.00 against the Sharmas and their counsel pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1). The Sharmas oppose.

Moving Papers. Miller argues that gravamen of the Sharmas’ claims arises from Plaintiffs’ prelitigation settlement demand. Miller contends that sending a settlement demand is protected speech for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. Miller further argues that the Sharmas have no chance of prevailing on the merits of the FACC as the litigation privilege completely bars each asserted cause of action.

Opposition. The Sharmas argue that Miller’s conduct constitutes illegal and/or criminal conduct that is not protected by the litigation privilege. The Sharmas contend that Miller lied about Plaintiffs’ medical costs and damages to extort a settlement, filed a complaint based on outright lies, and then withdrew from representation after realizing that the Sharmas would not be extorted.

Reply. Miller argues that the Sharmas fail to present any evidence in support of their opposition and fail to meet their burden of proof with respect to both prongs of the anti- SLAPP analysis.

Legal Standard

“A SLAPP suit - a strategic lawsuit against public participation - seeks to chill rights to free speech or petition by dragging the speaker or petitioner through the litigation process, without genuine expectation of success in the suit.” (Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City of Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581, 591-592.) The California Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, known as the anti-SLAPP statute, to provide a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits and causes of action brought to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances. (See Rushen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055-1056.)

In evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion, courts look to the gravamen of a plaintiff’s complaint to see if it is based on a defendant’s protected First Amendment activity. The

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critical consideration is to determine whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected speech or petitioning activity. (McConnell v. Innovative Artists Talent and Literary Agency, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 169, 177.) The focus of the statute is not the form of the plaintiff’s cause of action but rather the defendant’s activity that gives rise to the asserted liability. (Navallier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92.)

“The analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion thus involves two steps. First, the court decides whether the defendant moving to strike has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one ‘arising from’ protected activity. If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then must consider whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute – i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merits – is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 819-820 [citations omitted].)

In order to sustain the initial burden on an anti-SLAPP motion, a defendant bears the burden of showing that plaintiff’s lawsuit “arises from” defendant’s exercise of free speech or petition rights as defined in section 425.16, subdivision (e). (Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 61.) In other words, the defendant need only make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff’s complaint “arises from” their constitutionally-protected free speech or petition activity. (Governor Gray Davis Committee v.

American Taxpayers Alliance (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 449, 458- 459.) “When relief is sought based on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded at this stage.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396.) “While an anti-SLAPP motion may challenge any claim for relief founded on allegations of protected activity, it does not reach claims based on unprotected activity.” (Id. at p. 382.) “If the court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached.” (Ibid.)

As to the second prong, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 820.) In considering the second prong, the court “accept[s] as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff and evaluate[s] the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.” (Ibid. [citations omitted].)

If the plaintiff’s showing is not sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment, “the claim is stricken.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.) “Allegations of protected activity supporting

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the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.” (Ibid.) The statute “does not provide a form of immunity, ‘insulat[ing] defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech.’” (Area 51, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 592 [quoting Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) “Rather, the statute ‘only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.’” (Ibid.)

Discussion

Prong 1 – Arising from Protected Activity

The anti-SLAPP statute applies specifically to “any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, subd. (e)(2).) This provision “includes statements made in connection with civil court litigation.” (Seltzer v. Barnes (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 953, 962.) “[A] statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.” (Neville v.

Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266 [fn. omitted].) In general, courts “have adopted a fairly expansive view of what constitutes litigation-related activities within the scope of section 425.16.” (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 908.)

Prelitigation statements fall under section 425.16, subdivision (1) or (2) if the statement “concern[s] the subject of the dispute” and is made “in anticipation of litigation contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration.” (Digerati Holdings, LLC v. Young Money Entertainment, LLC (2011) 194 Cal. App. 4th 873, 886–887 [internal quotation marks omitted].) Additionally, “[a] claim for relief filed in [] court indisputably is a ‘statement or writing made before a.judicial proceeding’ (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)).” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 90.) “[T]he constitutional right to petition includes the basis act of filing litigation or otherwise seeking administrative action.” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1110.)

The Sharmas argue that Miller’s allegedly false statements about Plaintiffs’ medical treatment and his settlement communication constitute illegal extortion and therefore is not protected conduct as set forth in Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 317, which states:

[W]here a defendant brings a motion to strike under section 425.16 based on a claim that the plaintiff's action arises from activity by the defendant in furtherance

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of the defendant’s exercise of protected speech or petition rights, but either the defendant concedes, or the evidence conclusively establishes, that the assertedly protected speech or petition activity was illegal as a matter of law, the defendant is precluded from using the anti-SLAPP statute to strike the plaintiff’s action.

As is relevant here, “Extortion is the obtaining of property . . . from another, with his or her consent . . . induced by a wrongful use of force or fear . . .” (Pen. Code, § 518, subd. (a).) Fear, for purposes of extortion “may be induced by a threat of any of the following: [¶] 1. To do an unlawful injury to the person or property of the individual threatened or of a third person. [¶] 2. To accuse the individual threatened ... of a crime. [¶] 3. To expose, or to impute to him ... a deformity, disgrace or crime. [¶] 4. To expose a secret affecting him, her, or them. [¶] 5. To report his, her, or their immigration status or suspected immigration status.” (Pen. Code, § 519; see also Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 326; Falcon Brands, Inc. v. Mousavi & Lee, LLP (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 506, 519.)

In Flatley, the plaintiff, Flatley, sued an attorney, Mauro, who represented a woman who claimed that the plaintiff had raped her. (Flatley, at p. 305.) Mauro sent a demand letter to Flatley and made subsequent phone calls demanding a seven-figure payment. (Ibid.) In describing the content of the demand letter, the California Supreme Court stated, “[a]t the core of Mauro's letter are threats to publicly accuse Flatley of rape and to report and publicly accuse him of other unspecified violations of various laws unless he ‘settled’ by paying a sum of money to Robertson of which Mauro would receive 40 percent.” (Id. at p. 329.) “Mauro’s letter accuses Flatley of rape and also imputes to him other, unspecified violations of various criminal offenses involving immigration and tax law as well as violations of the Social Security Act.” (Id. at p. 330.)

Additionally, “the threat to disclose criminal activity entirely unrelated to any alleged injury suffered by Mauro's client ‘exceeded the limits of respondent’s representation of his client’ and is itself evidence of extortion.” (Id. at pp. 330–331.) Thus, the Supreme Court concluded “that the letter and subsequent phone calls constitute criminal extortion as a matter of law. These communications threatened to ‘accuse’ Flatley of, or ‘impute to him,’ ‘crime[s]’ and ‘disgrace’ (Pen. Code, § 519, subds. 2, 3) unless Flatley paid Mauro a minimum of $1 million of which Mauro was to receive 40 percent.” (Ibid.)

Similarly, in Falcon Brands, Inc. v. Mousavi & Lee, LLP (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 506, 511- 512, an attorney, Mousavi, sent her client’s former employer, Falcon, several emails demanding settlement. In an email on October 8, Mousavi detailed alleged illegal activities that Falcon had engaged in and threated to notify a third party, Harvest, which intended to acquire Falcon through a merger, of the illegal activities. (Id. at p. 512.) The employer’s counsel claimed that during a conversation on October 9, “Mousavi told him that if Falcon did not settle [plaintiff’]s claims against it, she would inform Harvest that

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Falcon had engaged in illegal activities in violation of the Bureau of Cannabis Control’s regulations and various statutes regulating cannabis.” (Id. at p. 513.) In a subsequent email on October 11, Mousavi stated, “I have put the attorneys for Harvest [] on notice about [plaintiff]’s claim for wages, without disclosing other issues mentioned in my letter of October 8, 2019. However, Harvest has requested that I forward the demand letters I have sent you. I am planning to e-mail those letters on Tuesday.” (Id. at p. 514 [emphasis retained].)

The Court of Appeal found that Mosavi’s October 8 communication “contained at least an implicit threat, as Mousavi specified the crimes Falcon had allegedly committed, though she never directly linked her settlement demands to them.” (Id. at p. 521.) However, the Court concluded that when the October 8 email was considered in the context of the October 11 email, “[t]he implication is clear: settle the case now or Harvest will become aware of Falcon’s alleged criminal misconduct next week.” (Ibid.) Therefore, the Court concluded:

Mousavi's $490,000 settlement demand, as explained in her October 8 e-mail correspondence, was for unpaid wages, commissions, and related expenses. The demand was unrelated to any alleged criminal conduct. Thus, to paraphrase Flatley, Mousavi's threat to disclose criminal activity entirely unrelated to her client’s damage claim “‘exceeded the limits of respondent's representation of his client’ . . .”

(Id. at p. 522.)

The Court has reviewed the settlement communication attached as Exhibit 2 to the FACC and is unable to locate any similar threat to disclose allegedly illegal conduct to a third party. In their opposition papers, the Sharmas fail to identify any statements or threats that were allegedly made by Miller that would rise to the level of criminal extortion. (See Pen. Code, §§ 518-519.) Miller’s stated intention to proceed with litigation concerning Plaintiffs’ claims and damages in the event the matter was not settled cannot be properly characterized as extortion. Indeed, the settlement agreement does not appear to reference any matters outside of Plaintiffs’ causes of action and damages. (See FACC, Ex. 2.)

The Sharmas also fail to present any legal authority or evidence that would conclusively establish that extortion occurred simply because Miller’s statements regarding Plaintiffs’ damages were false or incorrect. The Sharmas’ citation to Freeman v. Schack (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 719 is unavailing. In Freeman, the court found that a cause of action for attorney malpractice did not arise of the attorney’s filing or settlement of litigation, but

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instead arose from the attorney’s alleged breach of the duty of loyalty. (Id. at pp 732 [“the ‘activity that gives rise to [Schack’s] asserted liability’ [citation] is his undertaking to represent a party with interests adverse to plaintiffs, in violation of the duty of loyalty he assertedly owed them”].)

Here, the Miller’s alleged “illegal and fraudulent” conduct arises directly from the prelitigation settlement demand he sent to the Sharmas and his conduct during the subsequent litigation, including moving for trial preference and then continuing trial. Even accepting the Sharmas’ allegation that Miller’s statements regarding Plaintiffs’ damages were false, the Sharmas present no evidence or authority showing that the statements were made outside of the anticipated and actual litigation of Plaintiffs’ claims.

In the absence of evidence conclusively establishing that Miller’s conduct constitutes unprotected criminal extortion, the Court concludes that Miller has met its burden to demonstrate that the sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action arise from activity protected by Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 as the settlement demand occurred within the context of and in anticipation of the suit that was eventually filed.

Prong 2 – Probability of Prevailing

As discussed above, in order to satisfy the second prong, the Sharmas “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 820.) If a plaintiff’s showing is not sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment, “the allegations supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5 at p. 396.)

The Sharmas claims against Miller are plainly barred by the litigation privilege set forth in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). This section bars a civil action for damages for communications made in the course of judicial proceedings and also “in the initiation or course of any proceeding authorized by law[.]” (Civ. Code § 47, subd. (b)(2), (4).) “This privilege is absolute, and even covers false and malicious statements.” (Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 931, 952.) The litigation privilege extends not only to statements made during litigation or official proceedings but also to pre-litigation communications. (Rusheen v.

Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1057.) Pre-litigation communications are protected when it “relates to litigation that is contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration” and is “connected with, or ha[s] some logical relation to” the anticipated litigation or is “in furtherance of the objects of the litigation.”

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(Action Apartment Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1251.)

Here, each of the Sharma’s causes of action are based on Miller’s representation of its clients in the underlying action. As stated above, the Sharma’s allege that Miller claimed false facts regarding Plaintiffs’ actual injuries, demanded settlement of those damages, and then filed a lawsuit on Plaintiffs’ behalf to put pressure on the Sharmas for a quick settlement (FACC, ¶¶ 2-9, 53-55, 64, 66, 72) and that Miller filed a motion for trial preference to pressure the Sharmas into a settlement, learned there was no applicable insurance coverage, moved to continue the trial, and then withdrew from Plaintiffs’ representation. (Id., ¶¶ 9, 56-59, 66.)

Even accepting the Sharma’s allegations that Miller’s statements were false and malicious, the conduct alleged in the sixth through eighth causes are premised on communications that were made in the course of a judicial proceeding. That conduct is plainly protected by Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), even if Miller’s statements regarding Plaintiff’s damages were objectively false.

Thus, the Sharmas have failed to establish that there is minimal merit to any of their causes of action as all three causes of action are barred by the litigation privilege.

Sanctions

Miller’s request for “sanctions” is denied. Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c) states, in relevant part, “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs.” This provision does not authorize sanctions in connection with an anti-SLAPP motion. Therefore, such a request is denied. To the extent Miller seeks attorney’s fees and costs as the prevailing defendant, the Court’s ruling is without prejudice to Miller filing a motion to attorney’s fees.

Disposition

Accordingly, Miller’s special motion to strike is GRANTED. The Court orders the sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action stricken they apply to Miller. Miller may submit a proposed judgment of dismissal as to itself only.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

NOTICE: