GARDNER vs ALLIANT INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, INC.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver

24CV006522: GARDNER vs ALLIANT INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, INC. 01/27/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication in Department 54

and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

Defendant Alliant International University, Inc.’s (“Defendant” or “Alliant”) motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication is ruled on as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties are directed to notify the clerk and opposing counsel at the time of the request which of the issues identified in the Notice of Motion, which of moving defendant’s Undisputed Material Facts, and/or which of opposing plaintiff’s Additional Material Facts will be addressed at the hearing. The parties should be prepared to point to specific admissible evidence which is claimed to show the existence or non-existence of a triable issue of material fact. ***

Moving counsel failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(g), requiring a separately bound volume of evidence (including all declarations) with a table of contents when the evidence exceeds 25 pages.

I. Overview

This is an action brought under Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) by Plaintiff Kimberly Gardner (“Plaintiff” or “Gardner”). Defendant is a private university offering undergraduate and graduate programs at six campuses across California. (Boozer Decl., ¶¶ 2-4.) Defendant hired Plaintiff in April 2014 as a Student Affairs Representative II for the Sacramento Campus. (Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) No. 4.) In 2015, Plaintiff made a complaint of harassment against her supervisor. (UMF No. 5.) In April 2015, Plaintiff was promoted to the position of Coordinator for Campus and Student Services. (UMF No. 7.) In 2017, Plaintiff’s title was changed to Campus Director. (See UMF No. 8.) On April 3, 2023, Plaintiff went on medical leave. (UMF No. 15.) On May 17, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a resignation letter. (UMF No. 16.) Plaintiff ultimately resigned in July 2023. (See UMF No. 17.)

Plaintiff, who is an African American, alleges that during her tenure as the Coordinator for Campus and Student Services and Campus Director for the Sacramento Campus she was paid less wages than non-African American Campus Directors and male Campus Directors doing substantially similar work under substantially similar working conditions. (Complaint, ¶¶ 14, 25.) Plaintiff alleges the reasons for her lower pay was due to her sex, race, and in retaliation for making a prior complaint against her

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV006522: GARDNER vs ALLIANT INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, INC. 01/27/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication in Department 54

supervisor. (Complaint, generally.) Plaintiff asserts seven causes of action, including for violations of the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), FEHA and unfair competition law, and for constructive discharge in violation of public policy.

Defendant moves for summary judgment. Alternatively, Defendant requests summary adjudication of thirteen issues, which seek adjudication of each of Plaintiff’s seven causes of action and Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

II.

Legal Standard

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, the Court engages in a three-step process.

First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) Because a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is limited to the issues raised by the pleadings (Lewis v. Chevron (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 690, 694), all evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings.

The Court cannot consider an unpled issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not create issues outside the pleadings and are not a substitute for an amendment to the pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.) Indeed, it has often been noted that “[i]t would be patently unfair to allow plaintiffs to defeat [defendant’s] summary judgment motion by allowing them to present a “moving target” unbounded by the pleadings.” (Melican v.

Regents of University of California, (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 176-177.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [quoting Code Civ. Proc. §437c(p)(2)].) A defendant is not required to conclusively negate one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Saelzer v.

Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780- 781). Rather, to meet its burden, the defendant is required to show only that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of its cause of action, i.e., that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence necessary to show this element. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 853-855.) Further, the initial burden requires a showing that the plaintiff “could not prevail on any theory raised by the pleadings.” (Hawkins v. Wilton

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV006522: GARDNER vs ALLIANT INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, INC. 01/27/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication in Department 54

(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 939-940.)

At the same time, a defendant cannot shift the burden to the plaintiff simply by suggesting the possibility that the plaintiff cannot prove its case; a moving defendant must still make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854-855, n.23; Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.) Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or a defense to it. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p); see generally Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. One of these differences is that California Rule of Court, Rule 3.1350, subdivision (b) mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.

Additionally, according to Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Id. at p. 252 [citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1].)

Finally, in ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV006522: GARDNER vs ALLIANT INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, INC. 01/27/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication in Department 54

III. Objections

Plaintiff’s Objection Nos. 1 and 3 are sustained, as set forth herein. Defendant’s Objection No. 49, is overruled, in part, to the extent Defendant objects to Xavier Romano’s testimony regarding his tenure as the Campus Director of the Fresno campus and whether he shared such duties with Penny Shafer.

The Court need not rule on the remainder of Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s objections as they are not relevant to the disposition of the motion. The Court also need not rule on Plaintiff’s request to strike Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Additional Facts as it was immaterial to the Court’s decision.

III.

Discussion

Violation of Equal Pay Act

Defendant asserts two issues for summary adjudication of the first cause of action for violation of the EPA. First, Defendant asserts “Gardner’s Equal Pay Act Claim Fails As A Matter Of Law Because She Cannot Demonstrate That She Was Paid Less Than Campus Directors Of A Different Sex, Race Or Ethnicity That Performed Substantially Similar Work Under Similar Working Conditions.” Second, Defendant asserts “Alliant Set Campus Director Salaries Based on Bona Fide Factors Other Than Sex or Race/Ethnicity And, Thus, Satisfied Its Burden.” (Notice, p. 2:9-13.) In support of the first issue, Defendant relies on UMF Nos. 52 through 83. In support of the second issue, Defendant relies on UMF Nos. 84 through 115.

The EPA requires employers to offer the same wage to employees doing “substantially similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions,” regardless of their sex, race, or ethnicity. (Labor Code § 1197.5(a)-(b).) To establish a prima facie case for violation of the EPA, a plaintiff must establish that, based on gender, sex, race or ethnicity, “the employer pays different wages to employees doing substantially similar work under substantially similar conditions.” (Hall v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 318, 323.) “If that prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the employer to prove the disparity is permitted by one of the EPA's statutory exceptions[.]” (Id., pp. 323-324.)

Issue No. 1

The moving memorandum does not expressly identify which of the arguments presented are offered in support of the first issue for summary adjudication. Further, as the moving memorandum fails to cite to any of the UMFs set forth in the separate

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV006522: GARDNER vs ALLIANT INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, INC. 01/27/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication in Department 54

statement, the Court cannot easily determine which arguments relate to which issues for summary adjudication. However, upon review, Defendant appears to argue summary adjudication is appropriate as to issue no. 1 because “Gardner cannot show that she was paid less than a proper comparator because no other employee did substantially similar work under substantially similar conditions as Gardner.” (Moving Memo., p. 14:14-16.) Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s role as Campus Director was different and unique from the work of other Campus Directors because of differences in the geographic scope and size of the campuses, the number and types of programs offered, and the size of the student, staff and faculty population.

The EPA does not require Plaintiff to identify a comparator who performs identical work under identical working conditions. Rather, as Defendant acknowledges, in evaluating whether a comparator is suitable, “Courts examine whether the jobs at issue have a ‘common core of tasks’ and then determine whether any additional tasks required for one job but not the other make the two jobs substantially different.” (Allender v. Univ. of Portland (2010) 689 F.Supp.2d 1279, 1285 quoting Stanley v. Univ. of Southern Cal. (9th Cir. 1999) 178 F.3d 1069, 1074.) “Thus, minor differences in responsibility do not make the equal pay standard inapplicable.” (Allender, supra, 689 F.Supp.2d at p. 1285.)

Defendant has failed to assert UMFs showing that Plaintiff and the other Campus Directors do not share a common core of tasks and has failed to demonstrate that the differences in campuses are anything more than minor differences in responsibility. Indeed, notably absent from Defendant’s separate statement is any UMF describing the duties Plaintiff performed as a Campus Director and the duties performed by other Campus Directors. Without such UMFs, the Court cannot determine, based on undisputed material facts, whether Plaintiff and the other Campus Directors share a common core of tasks and therefore cannot determine whether the Campus Director positions at different Campuses require substantially similar work under substantially similar conditions.

Notably, in the memorandum, Defendant argues that larger campuses require substantially more effort than the Sacramento campus because “Campus Directors are responsible for the ‘delivery of academic and student support services’ and the coordination of day to day campus operations.” (Moving Memo., p. 17:14-17.) Thus, it appears Defendant recognizes that facts regarding the essential duties of Campus Directors are material to the outcome of this motion. Again, however, Defendant failed to include any such facts in the separate statement. “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See, Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v.

Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 (italics in original).) In reply, Defendant cites to Plaintiff’s evidence submitted in opposition as evidence that Plaintiff admitted she performed different duties than other Campus Directors. However, due process requires Defendant

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV006522: GARDNER vs ALLIANT INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, INC. 01/27/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication in Department 54

to define the issues to be addressed in a motion for summary judgment. (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 946.) Thus, Defendant cannot rely on evidence submitted in opposition to create additional issues where the tendered facts themselves are deficient. (Id. At p. 947.) By failing to include all of the material facts in the separate statement, Defendant has failed to meet its initial burden.

Defendant has also failed to support all of its UMFs with sufficient evidence. Defendant asserts “Alliant compared the following factors when determining Campus Director salaries: campus size; scope of work; number of students, staff and faculty; programs offered; and regional cost of living.” (UMF No. 82.) The only evidence offered in support of this declaration is the declaration of Andrea Boozer (“Boozer”), p. 3:12-14. Plaintiff objects to this evidence on grounds Boozer lacked personal knowledge of how Alliant determined Campus Director salaries before Boozer’s employment in 2022, including when Plaintiff as given the title of Campus Director.

Boozer’s declaration confirms she “worked at Alliant as the Vice President People and Culture (Human Resources) from March 2022 to July 2024” and provides no other explanation as to how she has personal knowledge of how Alliant determined salaries prior to 2022. (Boozer Decl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff’s objection is therefore is sustained. As Defendant did not offer any admissible evidence in support of UMF No. 82, Defendant has failed to meet its initial burden.

As Defendant failed to meet its initial burden, the burden never shifts to Plaintiff. Nonetheless, as an additional basis for denying the request for summary adjudication, the Court finds that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of material fact as to whether the differences between campuses make the other Campus Directors improper comparators. In opposition, Plaintiff asserts additional material facts explaining that because Sacramento was a small campus, Plaintiff had to perform additional duties that were delegated to Student Advisors at other campuses, requiring Plaintiff to frequently work long hours. (AMF Nos. 11-13, 78.)

In reply, Defendant contends Plaintiff admits that due to the lack of support staff she had a different role and therefore did not perform substantially similar work. However, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) Here, the evidence supports a reasonable inference that Plaintiff performed the same duties as other Campus Directors and that the additional duties required Plaintiff to work additional hours.

Under those circumstances, the other Campus Directors would remain proper comparators. Plaintiff also submits evidence she was tasked with performing additional tasks, including work at other campuses, such as in San Francisco. (AMF Nos. 28, 30, 34, 37, 39, 50-54, 96-98.) These additional material facts support Plaintiff’s argument that she performed more work, not different work than other Campus Directors. Collectively, Plaintiff’s AMFs create a triable issue as to whether Plaintiff was

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV006522: GARDNER vs ALLIANT INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, INC. 01/27/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication in Department 54

actually tasked with less work than Campus Directors at other campuses and whether the positions are comparable.

Plaintiff has also successfully raised triable issues as to Defendant’s UMFs. For example, Defendant concedes, as a material fact, that “Alliant’s Sacramento Campus Director in 2015 (P.S.) . . . [c]oncurrently served as the Campus Director for the Fresno Campus.” (UMF No. 67.) In opposition, Plaintiff submits a declaration from Xavier Romano, who indicates he, not “P.S.,” was the Campus Director of Fresno Campus in 2015. Defendant’s objections to this portion of Romano’s declaration are overruled. Thus, Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of material fact as to whether the former Campus Director of Sacramento concurrently served as the Campus Director at the Fresno Campus and whether the former director is a proper comparator.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Defendant failed to meet its initial burden and further, that Plaintiff has successfully raised triable issues of material facts. The motion as to this issue is denied.

Issue No. 2

Defendant argues it is entitled to summary adjudication of the first cause of action because Defendant based Campus Director salaries on bona fide factors other than sex, race, or ethnicity.

Significantly, UMF Nos. 99 and 114 offered in support of this issue are identical to UMF Nos. 67 and 82 offered in support of the first issue. For the same reasons as set forth above, the Court finds Defendant failed to offer sufficient evidence to support UMF No. 82 and that Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of material fact as to UMF No.

67. The motion as to this issue must therefore be denied. While, the Court need not go on, the Court will nonetheless address other reasons for denying the motion as to this issue.

Evidence that a company, as a general practice, bases salaries on various factors is insufficient to support summary judgment. (Allen v. Staples (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 188, 195.) Rather, to show there is no triable issue of material fact as to a defense based on “other bona fide factors,” a defendant must provide specific evidence of the factors relied upon to determine the plaintiff’s and comparative employees’ respective salaries. (Ibid.)

Defendant justifies paying its Campus Directors at the San Diego and Emeryville campuses more because they “possessed either an MBA or PhD and had significantly more experience using those degrees in higher education management roles.” (Memo, p. 19:10-11.) However, there are no UMFs in the separate statement indicating the San

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV006522: GARDNER vs ALLIANT INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, INC. 01/27/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication in Department 54

Diego Campus Directors had more experience. (See UMF Nos. 87, 89-92.) By failing to include all of the facts material to Defendant’s argument in the separate statement, Defendant has failed to meet its initial burden. Moreover, Defendant’s argument the Emeryville campus director had more experience in higher education is undermined by Defendant’s own argument and evidence. Specifically, Defendant asserts the Emeryville Campus Director from 2021 through 2023 had 10+ years’ experience in higher education. (UMF No. 97.)

In contrast, Defendant attributes 16 years’ higher education experience to Plaintiff in 2023. (Moving Memo, p. 16:9-12.) It Thus, based on Defendant’s own assertions, Plaintiff had more experiencein higher education than the Emeryville Campus Director. Such inconsistencies in Defendant’s own argument and evidence raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendant was relying on experience as a bona fide factor.

As noted above, Plaintiff’s opposition includes numerous AMFs indicating that due to the differences between Sacramento’s campus and the other campuses, Plaintiff was required to perform additional duties beyond those of the other campus directors. Further, Plaintiff offers AMFs indicating that despite her purported lesser experience, Plaintiff was considered qualified to serve as a backup for the other campuses. These AMFs raise additional triable issues of material fact as to whether bona fide factors identified by Defendant were the actual basis for the differences in salaries between the various campuses.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Defendant failed to meet its initial burden and further, that Plaintiff has successfully raised triable issues of material facts. The motion as to this issue is denied.

FEHA Causes of Action

Defendant asserts two issues for summary adjudication as to each of the Second Cause of Action for Sex Discrimination, Third Cause of Action for Race Discrimination, and Fourth Cause of Action for Retaliation. Specifically, Defendant argues it is entitled to summary adjudication as to each of these causes of action because Plaintiff cannot show she suffered an adverse action and because Plaintiff cannot show that her sex, race, or protected activity was a substantial factor in any such adverse action.

Issues Nos. 3, 5, and 7

Defendant argues it is entitled to summary adjudication on the FEHA causes of action because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate she suffered an adverse employment action.

For purposes of FEHA, an adverse action is conduct which, from an objective

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV006522: GARDNER vs ALLIANT INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, INC. 01/27/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication in Department 54

perspective, is reasonably likely to materially affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1054-1055.)

Defendant indicates Plaintiff alleges, as adverse actions, “that she was denied equal pay, merit increases, [a] comparable job title, [a] promotion, and support on medical leave, and that she was constructively discharged.” (Moving Memo., p. 21:1-4.)

As discussed, supra, there are triable issues of material fact as to whether Plaintiff performed substantially similar work under substantially similar conditions as other campus directors and whether Plaintiff was paid less than other comparable campus directors based on her sex or race. Thus, for the same reasons as set forth above, there are triable issues of material fact as to whether Plaintiff was “denied equal pay.” Defendant fails to explain why the denial of equal pay would not constitute an adverse action. Defendant has therefore failed to meet its initial burden.

Moreover, even if Defendant had met its burden, Plaintiff has successfully raised a triable issue of material fact as to the UMFs asserted by Defendant. In support of these issues, Defendant asserts that “[a]t Gardner’s request, Alliant changed her job title to Campus Director on November 14, 2017.” (UMF Nos.118, 147, and 177 [underline added].).” By doing so, Defendant concedes it is material that Defendant changed Plaintiff’s job title and that the reason Defendant did so was because Plaintiff requested the change. In opposition, Plaintiff submits evidence that Defendant changed Plaintiff’s job title for budgetary reasons and due to a reorganization, not because of Plaintiff’s request. (See Eckert Depo., pp. 85:12-21, 87:5-88:24.) Thus, Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of material fact as to this UMF.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Defendant failed to meet its initial burden and further, that Plaintiff has successfully raised triable issues of material facts. The motion as to these issues is denied.

Issues Nos. 4, 6, and 8

Defendant argues it is entitled to summary adjudication on the FEHA causes of action because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that her sex, race, or protected activities were substantial factors in any adverse employment action.

UMF Nos. 144, 173, and 207 are identical to UMF Nos. 82 and 114. As noted above, Defendant failed to offer admissible evidence to support of these UMFs and therefore failed to meet its initial burden.

Similarly, UMF Nos. 132, 161, and 193 are identical to UMF Nos. 118, 147, and 177. As

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV006522: GARDNER vs ALLIANT INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, INC. 01/27/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication in Department 54

noted above, Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of material fact as to these UMFs.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Defendant failed to meet its initial burden and further, that Plaintiff has successfully raised triable issues of material facts. The motion as to these issues is denied.

Failure to Prevent Discrimination

Defendant asserts two issues for summary adjudication of the fifth cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination. First, Defendant asserts it is entitled to summary adjudication because Plaintiff cannot prevail on a FEHA discrimination claim. Second, Defendant asserts it is entitled to summary adjudication because Plaintiff cannot prevail on a FEHA retaliation claim.

In the memorandum, Defendant argues the fifth cause of action is dependent on the FEHA causes of action and fails for the same reasons. As noted above, the Court found there are triable issues of material fact as to each of the FEHA causes of action. For the same reasons, the Court finds there are triable issues of material fact as to these issues. In doing so, the Court notes that certain UMFs offered in support of these issues are identical to the UMFs offered in support of the request for summary adjudication of the FEHA causes of action which, as set forth above, the Court has previously determined lacked evidentiary support or for which Plaintiff has produced evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Defendant failed to meet its initial burden and further, that Plaintiff has successfully raised triable issues of material facts. The motion as to this issue is denied.

Unfair Business Practices

Defendant’s eleventh issue requests summary adjudication of the sixth cause of action for unfair business practices.

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claim for unfair business practices is derivative of Plaintiff’s Equal Pay, FEHA, and constructive discharge claims. As noted above, the Court finds there are triable issues of fact as to the Equal Pay and FEHA causes of action. For the same reasons, the Court finds there are triable issues of fact as to the sixth cause of action. In doing so, the Court notes UMF Nos. 277 and 282 are identical to UMFs the Court has previously determined are unsupported or to which Plaintiff has produced evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV006522: GARDNER vs ALLIANT INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, INC. 01/27/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication in Department 54

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Defendant failed to meet its initial burden and further, that Plaintiff has successfully raised triable issues of material facts. The motion as to this issue is denied.

Constructive Termination

Defendant’s twelfth issue requests summary adjudication of the seventh cause of action for constructive discharge. Defendant argues Plaintiff voluntarily resigned and that she cannot demonstrate an objectively intolerable work environment forced her to resign.

“Whether conditions were so intolerable as to justify a reasonable employee's decision to resign is normally a question of fact.” (Valdez v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1056.) “The general rule, established in title VII cases, requires that a plaintiff alleging constructive discharge show the existence of ‘aggravating factors.’” (Id., p. 1056 quoting Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 1987) 823 F.2d 360, 361.) “This requirement can be met by showing a ‘continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment over a period of years.’” (Valdez, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 1056 quoting Nolan v. Cleveland (9th Cir. 1982) 686 F.2d 806, 813.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges a continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment based on violations of the EPA from the date Plaintiff was assigned the duties of a campus director until her resignation. Defendant fails to explain why the denial of equal pay for multiple years cannot, as a matter of law, support a claim for constructive discharge. Defendant has therefore failed to meet its initial burden.

Moreover, UMF No. 300 is identical to UMF No.118. As set forth above, the Court has already determined Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Defendant failed to meet its initial burden and further, that Plaintiff has successfully raised triable issues of material facts. The motion as to this issue is denied.

Punitive Damages

Defendant’s thirteenth and final issue for summary adjudication requests summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages on grounds Plaintiff cannot identify a managing agent who acted with malice, oppression or fraud.

In support of this issue, Defendant indicates it twice offered Plaintiff the opportunity to apply for the Regional Campus Director role and encouraged Plaintiff to remain

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV006522: GARDNER vs ALLIANT INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, INC. 01/27/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication in Department 54

employed after receiving her resignation. Defendant then conclusively states that no managing agent engaged in malice, oppression, or fraud towards Plaintiff and that Defendant did not subject Plaintiff to any unlawful, malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct.

Absent from Defendant’s argument on this issue is any explanation as to why the allegations that Defendant violated the Equal Pay Act for multiple years could not support a finding of malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct. As Defendant failed to present sufficient argument on the central dispute presented in this action, the Court finds Defendant failed to meet its initial burden.

Defendant has also failed to present evidence to support UMF No. 327, which asserts a third-party investigator concluded Plaintiff’s “2015 complaint had been appropriately resolved and that her compensation was in accord with the Plan.” The only evidence cited in support of this UMF is the declaration of Boozer, p. 4:21-24, in which Boozer testifies as to the third-party’s conclusion. Plaintiff’s objections to this evidence on grounds of lack of personal knowledge and hearsay is sustained. In sustaining the objection, the Court finds Defendant has failed to present sufficient evidence to support all of its UMFs asserted in support of this issue for adjudication. Defendant therefore failed to meet its initial burden.

Even if Defendant had met its initial burden, the Court finds Plaintiff has successfully raised triable issues of material fact. The Court notes UMF No. 315 offered in support of this issue is identical to UMF No. 118. As set forth above, the Court has already determined Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Plaintiff has also successfully raised a triable issue as to UMF No. 331, which asserts Boozer is not a managing agent of Defendant. In opposition, Plaintiff cites to various cases explaining managing agents are those employees with broad discretion over corporate policy and submits evidence that Boozer had broad discretionary authority over compensation decisions, pay policies, and the handling of discriminatory complaints. Thus, Plaintiff has successfully raised a triable issue of material fact as to whether Boozer is a managing agent. As Defendant conceded the materiality of that fact, the motion must be denied.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Defendant failed to meet its initial burden and further, that Plaintiff has successfully raised triable issues of material facts. The motion as to this issue is denied.

Summary Judgment

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV006522: GARDNER vs ALLIANT INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, INC. 01/27/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication in Department 54

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, Defendant must show it is entitled to judgment in its favor as to all causes of action asserted in the complaint. As noted above, the Court has determined there are triable issues of material facts as to all of the causes of action. Thus, for the same reasons as set forth above, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

IV.

Disposition

The motion is denied in its entirety.

The minute order is effective immediately. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, Plaintiff shall prepare an appropriate order which conforms to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (g).