City of San Jose vs Roy Abbott

The City also moved for default judgment against the Defendant. On September 5, 2024, Entry of Default was entered against Defendant Abbott. On March 4, 2025, Defendant Abbott filed a motion to set aside the default and for leave to file an answer that was heard on September 30, 2025 by the Honorable Shella Deen. After the hearing, Judge Deen granted the defendant’s motion to set aside the default based on a plausible showing of mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect and directed Defendant to file responsive pleadings to the Complaint within ten court days. The City’s request for penalty in the amount of $1,000.00 was denied without prejudice. Defendant Abbott filed an Answer on November 25, 2025 and then a First Amended Answer on December 23, 2025.

On May 20, 2025, Plaintiff City of San Jose filed this motion for permanent injunction and entry of default judgment against Defendant Roy Abbott.

Per Code of Civil Procedure section 1005(b) opposition papers were due on June 30, 2026. No opposition papers were filed. A failure to oppose a motion may be deemed a consent to the granting of the motion. (California Rule of Court Rule 8.54(c); Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410). Failure to oppose a motion leads to the presumption that the plaintiff has no meritorious arguments. (Laguna Auto Body v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 481, 489).

The Court has carefully reviewed the City’s moving papers including a notice of the motion for permanent injunction and entry of judgment (totaling 2 pages); memorandum of points and authorities in support of the motion (totaling 8 pages); Declaration of Vance Chang in support of Plaintiff’s motion (totaling 3 pages) and attached Exhibit; Request for Judicial Notice and attached Exhibits A-C; proof of service; case status conference statements; and the pleadings.

II. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Civil Code section 3422, “a final injunction may be granted to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in favor of the applicant: (1) Where pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief; (2) Where it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief; (3) Where the restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings; or (4) Where the obligation arises from a trust.” (Civ. Code § 3422).

A final judgment on the merits. (Aspen Grove Condominium Association v. CNL Income Northstar LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 53, 58).

“The first two statutory grounds embody the requirement that to obtain an injunction a plaintiff ordinarily must show that the defendant's wrongful acts threaten to cause irreparable injury, meaning injury that cannot adequately be compensated in damages.” (Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Helliker (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1167).

III. ANALYSIS On January 13, 2026, the parties filed statue conference statements. It is undisputed that Defendant Abbott no longer resides at the Property. The defendant asserts that the City did not allege any recent wrongful acts by the defendant. Defendant Abbott is not seeking a termination of the preliminary injunction that was authorized on September 9, 2024. (Defendant’s Case Management Statement, p. 2). However, Defendant Abbott seeks status quo to continue and that no permanent injunction be issued pending resolution of the criminal cases (Santa Clara County dockets C2407675 and C2512367) and this civil case. (Id.).

Plaintiff asserts that the defendant’s blanket assertion of his Fifth-Amendment rights to all facts is an insufficient response to the Complaint and argues that C2512367 is not related to the civil matter, but concedes that docket C2407675 involved overlapping facts in the civil matter. (Plaintiff’s Case Management Statement, p. 2). Plaintiff objects to any stay in the civil proceedings and argues that the defendant has not filed a motion. The Court agrees that the motion at hand does not involve a motion to stay and will not address any stay at this time.

Plaintiff also argues, “Defendant has failed to oppose Plaintiff’s Motion for Permanent Injunction and the Court should therefore grant Plaintiff’s Motion.” (Id.). The Court rejects the argument that a failure to oppose a motion results in an automatic grant of a motion without further analysis. While the Court notes that a failure to oppose a motion leads to the presumption that there is has no meritorious arguments (Laguna Auto Body v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 481, 489), the Court analyzes the substantive merits of the request for a permanent injunction at this juncture.

Here, most notably, there is no final judgment. Permanent injunctions are obtained through judgment after trial. The plaintiff’s motion for entry of default judgment is rendered MOOT as Judge Deen granted the motion to vacate the default entered on September 30, 2025. Defendant filed an Answer on November 25, 2025, and First Amended Answer on December 23, 2025 in response to the Complaint in this matter.

In DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Kaleidescape, Inc. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 697, 721–722, the Court held that: “It is common to speak of the need to show threatened irreparable harm as the basis for an injunction. (6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2008) Provisional Remedies, § 295, p. 236). But the concept of irreparable harm means more than harm that cannot be repaired. Irreparable harm includes “ ‘that species of damages, whether great or small, that ought not to be submitted to on the one hand or inflicted on the other.’. . . [Citation.] . . . ‘The argument that there is no “irreparable damage,” would not be so often used by [defendants] if they would take the trouble to observe that the word “irreparable” is a very unhappily chosen one, used in expressing the rule that an injunction may issue to prevent wrongs ... which occasion damages estimable only by conjecture and not by any accurate standard.’ ” (Wind v.

Herbert (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 276, 285, 8 Cal.Rptr. 817). Irreparable harm may be established where there is the fact of an injury, such as that arising from a breach of contract, but where there is an inability to ascertain the amount of damage. In other words, to say that the harm is irreparable is simply another way of saying that pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief or that it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount that would afford adequate relief. (Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v.

Helliker (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1167, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 191; Civ. Code, § 3422.).”

Plaintiff City fails to show entitled to a permanent injunction. Critically, Plaintiff does not explain why a permanent injunction is needed as the defendant no longer resides at the Property, there have allegedly been no new violation of the preliminary injunction in place; pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief; no showing that it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation; that the restraint would prevent multiplicity of

judicial proceedings – in fact, there are two carinal case pending: Santa Clar County dockets C2407675 and C2512367 against the Defendant; and no showing that the obligation arises form a trust.

IV. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the plaintiff’s motion for permanent injunction is DENIED without prejudice as premature on the grounds that there is no final judgment. The Preliminary Injunction executed by Judge Williams on September 9, 2024 remains in effect until a final determination of the merits of the claims at issue are adjudicated.

The plaintiff’s motion for entry of default judgment is rendered MOOT as noted above based on the September 30, 2025 Court Order authorized by Judge Shella Deen granting the motion to vacate the default judgment.

The Court will prepare the formal Order.

Calendar Lines # 4 Case Name Leticia Reyes Parral vs Sandridge LLP et al Case No. 24 CV451675 Motion for Leave to File Before the court is Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend the complaint to add punitive damages against defendant Coe Orchard Equipment, Inc. Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308, the court issues its tentative ruling as follows.

I. BACKGROUND On October 12, 2023, decedent Ofelio Castro Reyes, Jr. (“Decedent”) was in the course and scope of his employment with Kings FLC, a subcontractor hired, supervised and controlled by defendant Sandridge Partners L.P. (“Sandridge”) to perform farming and harvesting work at defendant Sandridge’s property located at Utica Avenue and 25th Street in Kettleman City, California (“Premises”). (Complaint, ¶¶3 and 14).

Decedent was operating a B8 R-Series Reservoir Cart (“Cart”) to harvest pistachios when he was crushed to death by the screw conveyor in the equipment. (Complaint, ¶¶14 – 15). Defendant Coe Orchard Equipment, Inc. (“COE”) is the designer, manufacturer, distributor, lessor and/or seller of the Cart. (Complaint, ¶¶4, 9, 12, and 15).

On November 13, 2024, plaintiffs Leticia Reyes Parral (“Parral”), individually and as successor-in-interest and personal representative of Decedent’s estate, and Ofelio Castro Reyes, Sr., filed a complaint against defendants Sandridge and COE asserting causes of action for: (1) Premises Liability [against defendant Sandridge] (2) General Negligence [against defendant Sandridge] (3) Strict Products Liability—Design Defect (4) Strict Products Liability—Manufacturing Defect (5) Strict Products Liability—Failure to Warn (6) Products Liability—Negligence (7) Products Liability—Negligence—Failure to Warn

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