North Bay Steel Mill Supply & Recycling Inc. vs. California Department of Resources Recycling and Recovery

34-2021-00292686-CU-BT-GDS: North Bay Steel Mill Supply & Recycling Inc. vs. California Department of Resouces Recycling and Recovery 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

Defendants Odin Real Estate Group LLC and Odin Environmental Solutions, LLC’s (“Defendants” or “Odin”) Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff North Bay Steel Mill Supply & Recycling, Inc.’s (“Plaintiff” or “North Bay”) operative Fifth Amended Complaint (“5AC”), or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication of Plaintiff’s fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action is ruled upon as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties are directed to notify the clerk and opposing counsel at the time of the request which of moving defendant’s 40 Undisputed Material Facts, which of plaintiffs’ 141 Additional Material Facts, and/or which written objections to evidence will be addressed at the hearing. The parties should be prepared to point to specific admissible evidence already in the record which is claimed to show the existence or non-existence of a triable issue of material fact. ***

Opposing counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1354(b), expressly prohibiting objections to evidence from being “restated or reargued in the separate statement.”

Each of Plaintiff’s objections to evidence fail to comply with CRC Rule 3.1354(b), requiring objections to evidence to quote or set forth the objectionable material (so the Court need not unnecessarily expend its finite resources trying to find the evidence at issue in order to rule on its admissibility).

Factual Background

This action arises from the California Department of Resources Recycling and Recovery and California Office of Emergency Services’ (the “State”) fire cleanup activities following the 2018 Camp Fire, including contracts entered into with private companies to assist with the cleanup. The operative Fifth Amended Complaint (“5AC”) alleges the State awarded fire clean-up contracts to three prime contractors. (5AC ¶ 10.) One of the three primes, ECC Contractors LLC (“ECC”), allegedly entered into a subcontract with Plaintiff to handle disposal and recycling of Camp Fire metal debris, but the 5AC alleges that the State and Odin allegedly interfered with this subcontract by selecting Odin to process the debris. (5AC ¶ 10.)

Plaintiff alleges the State circulated an Invitation for Bid (“IFB”) on December 19, 2018. (5AC ¶¶ 24-25.) On January 16, 2019, in IFB Addendum 4, the State announced it

34-2021-00292686-CU-BT-GDS: North Bay Steel Mill Supply & Recycling Inc. vs. California Department of Resouces Recycling and Recovery 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

would select the debris receiving facilities and would direct prime contractors to use them. (5AC ¶ 36; [“Question 84: a potential bidder asked whether CalRecycle would direct each of the three primes to their own separate facility to disperse the trucks between all available disposal sites. CalRecycle said: “This is yet to be determined. CalRecycle will direct Contractors to use facilities based on overall Project operation efficiency and costs and will work with the Contractors in making those determinations.’”].)

Plaintiff alleges it furnished debris/recycling work for ECC on past projects (including the earlier Carr Fire) and that ECC “assured [it] that [it] would be its exclusive metal debris recycling subcontractor if ECC won the work.” (5AC ¶¶ 27, 28, 41.) Plaintiff alleges ECC timely submitted its bid to the State as a prime contractor on January 22, 2019, and that Odin untimely submitted its bid to be the debris processing facility on January 31, 2019. (5AC ¶¶ 41, 51, 56.)

On January 28, 2019, the State issued a Notice to Proceed to ECC. (5AC ¶ 44.) The next day, on January 29, 2019, the State issued a press release announcing that the “Odin Metal Processing Facility in Oroville” was “tapped to handle Camp Fire metal debris.” (5AC ¶ 47.) The State “instructed ECC and the other two primes to deliver all metal to Odin’s processing site in Oroville.” (5AC ¶ 78.) On January 31, 2019, ECC allegedly entered into a contract with Odin for debris disposal/recycling work. (5AC ¶¶ 58-59.)

Plaintiff alleges it should have been selected to process the debris instead of Odin because Plaintiff’s work location in Paradise was closer to the fire epicenter and it was more qualified and efficient. (5AC ¶¶ 51-54, 82.) Plaintiff also alleges Odin lacked required business licenses and/or permits and did not comply with various California requirements (5AC ¶¶ 66-68), that Odin conspired and colluded with the State to violate competitive bidding requirements (5AC ¶¶ 15, 82, 84, 89, 215), and Odin received unjustified favorable treatment. (5AC ¶¶ 89, 114, 128)

Plaintiff’s 5AC alleges causes of action for: (1) intentional interference with contractual relations against State; (2) intentional tortious interference with prospective economic relations against State; (3) negligent interference with prospective economic relations against State; (4) failure to discharge mandatory duties against State; (5) intentional interference with contractual relations against Odin; (6) intentional tortious interference with prospective economic relations against Odin; and (7) negligent interference with prospective economic relations against Odin.

Moving Papers. Defendants now seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that “Plaintiff did not have a valid contract with ECC Constructors LLC

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00292686-CU-BT-GDS: North Bay Steel Mill Supply & Recycling Inc. vs. California Department of Resouces Recycling and Recovery 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

(“ECC”) at the time of the alleged interference, that Plaintiff’s relationship with ECC was not ‘certain’ or even ‘probable’ to result in future economic benefit to Plaintiff, that Defendants had no knowledge of any contract or economic relationship between Plaintiff and ECC, and that Defendants engaged in no ‘independently wrongful’ conduct that could support an interference with prospective economic advantage claim. Additionally, Defendants owed no duty of care to Plaintiff.” (Not. of Mot., p. 2:8-14.) As support for these contentions, Defendants rely on Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) Nos. 1-40.

Alternatively, Defendants move for summary adjudication on the following grounds:

(1) Plaintiff cannot establish the essential elements of its 5th cause of action for intentional interference with economic relations because the undisputed facts show it had no valid contract with ECC at the time of the alleged interference, and Defendants had no knowledge of any contract between Plaintiff and ECC.

(2) Plaintiff cannot establish the essential elements of its 6th cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic relations because the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff’s expectation of future economic benefits was purely speculative, Defendants had no knowledge of any relationship between Plaintiff and ECC, and Defendants engaged in no “independently wrongful” conduct.

(3) Plaintiff cannot establish the essential elements of its 7th cause of action for negligent interference with prospective economic relations because the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff’s expectation of future economic benefits was purely speculative, Defendants had no actual or constructive knowledge of any relationship between Plaintiff and ECC, and Defendants engaged in no “independently wrongful” conduct. Defendants also owed no duty of care to Plaintiff.

The Court notes that the 40 UMFs offered in support of summary judgment and in support of summary adjudication on each of the three issues are identical. Because both Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and alternative motion for summary adjudication rely on the exact same 40 UMFs, the existence of a single triable issue of material fact in connection with any UMF will mandate denial of both summary judgment and summary adjudication.

Opposition. Plaintiff opposes, arguing that there are triable issues of material fact with respect to each cause of action alleged against Defendants. In support of its opposition,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00292686-CU-BT-GDS: North Bay Steel Mill Supply & Recycling Inc. vs. California Department of Resouces Recycling and Recovery 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

Plaintiff proffers Additional Material Facts (“AMF”) Nos. 41-181.

Standards for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the Court engages in a threestep process. First, the issues framed by the pleadings must be identified since the pleadings themselves define the scope of what may be addressed via a motion for summary judgment/adjudication (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382). The evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must address the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to such a motion may not create triable issues beyond the scope of the pleadings, nor are they a substitute for filing amended pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its initial burden of production. A defendant moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [the defendant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1301.) This burden may be met by establishing either that one or more elements of a cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ.

Proc. §437c(p)(2).) A defendant cannot successfully shift the burden to a plaintiff by merely suggesting the possibility that the latter cannot prove his/her case but must make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.) If a plaintiff pleads several theories of liability against the defendant, then the latter has the burden of demonstrating there are no material facts requiring trial on any of them. A moving defendant whose evidence omits facts as to any theory of liability effectively permits that portion of the complaint to be unchallenged and even where no opposition is presented, a moving defendant must still make a showing sufficient to eliminate all triable issues of fact. (Wright v.

Stang Manufacturing Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1228; see also, Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 397.)

A plaintiff opposing summary judgment/adjudication has no evidentiary burden unless the moving defendant has first met its initial burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1151-1152; Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085-1086.) If a moving defendant has met its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to show the existence of a material factual issue as to the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00292686-CU-BT-GDS: North Bay Steel Mill Supply & Recycling Inc. vs. California Department of Resouces Recycling and Recovery 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

cause of action alleged or the defense to it. (Code Civ. Proc. §437c(p)(2); see also, Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) Only where the moving defendant makes the requisite initial showing does a court need to examine the opposition papers to determine if the latter demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) The opposing party must present admissible evidence and may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleading. (Id.)

In ruling on the motion, a court must construe the evidence of the opposing party liberally and that of the moving party strictly, resolving any doubts in the opposing party’s favor. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Cortez v. Vogt (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 925-926; see also, Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. One of these differences is cited above: CRC Rule 3.1350(b) mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for [punitive] damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for [punitive] damages, or an issue of duty.

(Underline added for emphasis.)

Finally, in Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, the Court of Appeal explained that a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, at 252 (citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1).)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00292686-CU-BT-GDS: North Bay Steel Mill Supply & Recycling Inc. vs. California Department of Resouces Recycling and Recovery 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

Guided by these principles, the Court will now consider the merits of the present motion and the specific contentions advanced therein.

Objections to Evidence

Plaintiff’s objections to evidence are overruled for failure to comply with CRC Rule 3.1354(b). To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to object to Defendants’ evidence in Plaintiff’s responsive separate statement, in violation of CRC Rule 3.1354(b), the objections are similarly overruled.

Defendants’ objections to evidence are ruled upon as follows:

- Objection Nos. 6, 37-44 are sustained; - Objection Nos. 1-5, 7-36 are overruled.

Plaintiff’s objections to Defendants’ reply separate statement and Defendants’ reply to objections to evidence are sustained.

Discussion

Defendants’ Initial Burden of Production. The threshold question here is whether the moving papers are sufficient to meet Defendants’ initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) and if not, both summary judgment and summary adjudication must be denied regardless of whether the opposition presented evidence showing a triable issue of material fact.

UMF No. 12 states, “On January 29, 2019, the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) issued a press release announcing that the State (CalRecycle) had selected ODIN’s processing facilities in Oroville for all metal debris processing/recycling from the Camp Fire.” In support, Defendants cite to the January 29, 2019 press release, which states, “All concrete will be, processed and either used for local projects or will be transferred outside the county for recycling. Locally-based facilities identified include Granite's Pacific Heights Recycling Facility in Oroville and the Franklin Neal Road Recycle Facility in Paradise for concrete and, for metal, the Odin Metal Processing Facility in Oroville.” (Exh. 20.[1]) A statement that Odin’s Orville facility was identified as a local facility does not support the assertion that all metal was to be processed through said facility.

This is particularly true given the statement that concrete would be used locally or transferred out of the county for recycling. Likewise, citation to the response to Request of Admission No. 14 does not support that Odin was selected to process all metal debris; rather, the request asks for an admission to Odin was selected to perform debris recycling services, but not all debris recycling services. (Exh 5 at p. 97:17-25.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00292686-CU-BT-GDS: North Bay Steel Mill Supply & Recycling Inc. vs. California Department of Resouces Recycling and Recovery 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

UMF No. 19 asserts that “Mark Lutz’s communications with ECC did not include anyone from CalRecycle or any other subcontractors bidding on the Project, and North Bay has produced no documents evidencing any communications between Odin and ECC that relate to North Bay.” The cited deposition testimony by Mr. Lutz states that other parties did not participate in calls between Mr. Lutz and ECC, but not that there were no other communications which contained other subcontractors. Similarly, the declaration of counsel asserts that his review of documents produced by Plaintiff found “no documents that show a cc to or contain any mention of Odin.” (Foster Decl. ¶ 7.) However, this does not establish that no such communications exist with respect to any other subcontractor.

UMF No. 32 states, “Mark Lutz was aware of no other evidence to support NORTH BAY’s contention that ODIN knew about its ‘contract’ with ECC.” Defendants’ assertion that Mr. Lutz “was aware of no other evidence” raises an inference that evidence which supports “NORTH BAY’s contention that ODIN knew about its ‘contract’ with ECC,” both exists and is known by Mr. Lutz. Defendants do not provide any explanation as to which evidence this UMF might be referring to, and the previous UMFs do not provide any insight into exactly what evidence Mr.

Lutz was aware of. (Lutz Dep. at p. 262:3-10 [“Q: . . . Having said that, other than what we have discussed in terms of people who may have information about that or documents, such as the text you mentioned, are you aware of any other evidence supporting the idea that our client knew about this alleged contract between ECC and North Bay? A: No.”] (emphasis added).) As phrased, the UMF cannot be sufficiently supported by evidence, because Defendants have not established which initial evidence gives rise to the UMF.

Thus, this assertion patently lacks sufficient specificity to support itself.

Triable Issues Exist. Even if Defendants had satisfied their initial burden of production and successfully shifted the burden to Plaintiff, there are triable issues of material fact which preclude both summary judgment and summary adjudication given that the evidence offered in opposition must be construed liberally while the moving party’s evidence is construed strictly and any doubts to be resolved in favor of the opposition. (See, e.g., Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc., supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at 773.)

UMF Nos. 24, 25, and 30 pertain to whether Odin or its CEO, Louay Owaidat had knowledge that ECC has contracted with Plaintiff for work on the Car Fire, had no knowledge of Plaintiff’s business operations, and had no knowledge of any business relationship between Plaintiff and ECC.

In opposition, Plaintiff presents evidence that before ECC was awarded the Camp Fire project, “ECC advised CalRecycle that North Bay was our intended subcontractor to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00292686-CU-BT-GDS: North Bay Steel Mill Supply & Recycling Inc. vs. California Department of Resouces Recycling and Recovery 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

handle the metal and vehicle recycling and disposal.” (Mizrahi Decl., ¶ 5.) The Deputy Director of Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, Charles Rabamad, had frequent interactions with the CalRecycle Camp Fire staff and received reports from the CalRecycle “Incident Management Team,” including reports identifying Plaintiff as ECC’s metal processor for the Camp Fire remediation. (Pltf.’s Ex. 9, p. 28:2 –29:22, 207:19-24; Pltf.’s Ex. 11, pp. 4-10; Pltf.’s Ex. 58.) Mr. Rabamad is good friends with Mr.

Owaidat, and they discussed that Mr. Owaidat “was going after the Camp Fire work.” (Pltf.’s Ex. 7, pp. 214:21-215:11.) Plaintiff argues that this is sufficient circumstantial evidence that, at some point before Odin began work, Mr. Rabamad informed Mr. Owaidat that ECC identified Plaintiff as its preferred metal recycling subcontractor. Plaintiff further presents evidence that Odin and ECC signed an agreement on or around February 5, 2019, at a time that Plaintiff had a contract with ECC, giving rise to an inference that Odin entered into an agreement with Plaintiff “involving the same work.” (Pltf.’s Ex. 46.)

While circumstantial, as the evidence must be construed liberally in favor of the opposition, this Court finds a triable issue of fact in connection with UMF Nos. 24, 25, and 30’s assertion that Mr. Owaidat and Odin had no knowledge of the pre-existing relationship between ECC and Plaintiff. (See also Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(e) [“summary judgment may be denied in the discretion of the court if the only proof of a material fact offered in support of the summary judgment is an affidavit or declaration made by an individual who was the sole witness to that fact; or if a material fact is an individual’s state of mind, or lack thereof, and that fact is sought to be established solely by the individual’s affirmation thereof.”].)

As noted above, the fact asserted in UMF 32 lacks the requisite identification of evidence known by Mr. Lutz in order to establish that he knew of no “other” evidence. Plaintiff further presents evidence that Mr. Lutz was aware of additional circumstantial evidence which would support Plaintiff’s contention that Odin knew of Plaintiff’s contract with ECC. (See re: UMF Nos. 24, 25, and 30 above.) When construed liberally in favor of Plaintiff, the Court finds that the evidence presented is sufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact with respect to whether other evidence existed which tends to show that Odin was aware of the contract between Plaintiff and ECC.

Disposition

Because Defendants failed to satisfy their initial burden of production with respect to UMF Nos. 12, 19, and 32 and because these UMF were offered as support for both summary judgment and summary adjudication as to each issue, both the motion for summary judgment and the alternative motion for summary adjudication must be denied regardless of whether the opposition presented evidence showing a triable issue of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00292686-CU-BT-GDS: North Bay Steel Mill Supply & Recycling Inc. vs. California Department of Resouces Recycling and Recovery 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

material fact. Moreover, as set forth above, the Court has found that triable issues of fact exist as to all causes of action.

For the reasons explained above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and alternative motion for summary adjudication must be DENIED in their entirety.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, Plaintiff shall prepare an appropriate order which conforms to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(g).

[1] The Court notes that Owaidat Decl. ¶ 40 and Foster Decl. ¶ 16, both cited in support

of the UMF, provide the press release in Exhibit 20.