MCCLORY vs CFF HOLDING CORPORATION, et al.

25CV024111: MCCLORY vs CFF HOLDING CORPORATION, et al. 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8C

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 8C Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-8380 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 8C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16039062174 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 160 3906 2174. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-services-transcripts. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

25CV024111: MCCLORY vs CFF HOLDING CORPORATION, et al. 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8C

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 28 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION***

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties are directed to notify the clerk and opposing counsel at the time of the request which of the Issues identified in the Notice of Motion/Separate Statement and which of the Undisputed Material Facts offered by the moving defendant and/or the Additional Material Facts offered by plaintiff will be addressed at the hearing and the parties should be prepared to point to specific evidence which is claimed to show the existence or non-existence of a triable issue of material fact. ***

Defendants CFF Holding Corporation and California Family Health, LLC dba California Family Fitness’ (collectively, “Defendants”) motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff Troy McClory (“Plaintiff”) is ruled upon as followed.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing by Zoom or in person.

Evidentiary Issues

Defendants’ Objection Nos. 1-2 are SUSTAINED. (Great American Ins. Co. v. Gordon Trucking, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 445, 450 [a party cannot rely on his own written discovery responses in support of or opposition to a motion for summary judgment].)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV024111: MCCLORY vs CFF HOLDING CORPORATION, et al. 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8C

Defendants’ Objection No. 3 is SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2) [a plaintiff cannot rely on the allegations in his complaint in opposition to motion for summary judgment].)

Plaintiff did not submit written objections.

Background

This is a personal injury action. Plaintiff filed the Complaint alleging a single cause of action for personal injury on October 13, 2025. Plaintiff alleges that on October 19, 2023, he was injured at a gym owned/operated/controlled by Defendants when a leg press machine he was using snapped. (Complaint, ¶¶ 3-6.)

Defendants present evidence that at the time Plaintiff joined the subject gym as a member, he electronically signed and executed a New Member Waiver. The New Member Waiver states:

You agree on behalf of yourself (and all your personal representatives, heirs, executors, administrators, agents, and assigns) to release and discharge California Family Fitness (and our affiliates, employees, agents, representatives, and assigns) from any and all claims or causes of action (known or unknown) arising out of the negligence of California Family Fitness or any of its affiliates, employees, agents, representatives, successors, and assigns. This waiver and release of liability includes, without limitation, injuries which may occur as a result of (a) your use of any exercise equipment or facilities including, but not limited to, the locker room, children’s room, lobby aera, basketball court, rockwall and pool area which may malfunction or break, (b) California Family Fitness’ improper maintenance of any exercise equipment or facilities, (c) California Family Fitness’ negligent instruction or supervision, including personal training, and participation in any activity, class, program, instruction or any CFF sponsored event (d) you slipping and falling while on or in the facility or any portion of the premises for any reason, including California Family Fitness’ negligent inspection or maintenance of its facility.

I agree, for myself and my successors, heirs and assigns, that the above representations are contractually binding and are not mere recitals, and that should I or my successors assert any claim in contravention of this agreement, the asserting party shall be liable for the expenses (including reasonably attorneys fees) incurred by the other party or parties in defending against such action. You agree that you are voluntarily participating in the aforementioned activities and using the CFF facilities and premises.

You acknowledge that you have carefully read this waiver and fully understand that it is a release of liability, and express assumption of risk.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV024111: MCCLORY vs CFF HOLDING CORPORATION, et al. 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8C

(Skow Decl., Exh. A.)

The signature is dated April 14, 2021. (Skow Decl., Exh. A.) Plaintiff does not dispute that he executed the New Member Waiver at the time he became a member of the gym. (See Plaintiff’s Resp. to UMF Nos. 5 & 10.) Although Plaintiff has not asserted any evidentiary objections, the Court notes that the New Member Waiver is authenticated by Eric Skow, the Director of Risk Management for Defendants. (See Skow Decl., ¶¶ 1, 3.)

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s personal injury claim is barred by the doctrine of express assumption of the risk based on Plaintiff’s execution of the New Member Waiver. Plaintiff opposes and raises several arguments that the New Member Waiver is unenforceable and/or does not exculpate Defendants from liability in this case.

Discussion

Legal Standard

Summary judgment must be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c); Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 35.) Summary judgment is properly granted only if the moving party’s evidence establishes that there is no issue of material fact to be tried. (Upson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 362, 374.) A judge may not grant summary judgment when any material factual issue is disputed. (O’Riordan v. Federal Kemper Life Assur. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 281, 289.)

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication the Court engages in a three-step process. First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) The Court cannot consider an unpled issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff's cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, quoting Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2).) A defendant is not required to conclusively negate one or more elements of the plaintiff's cause of action. (Saelzer v Advance, Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780-781). Rather, to meet its burden, the defendant is only required to show that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of its cause of action, i.e., that the plaintiff does not possess

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV024111: MCCLORY vs CFF HOLDING CORPORATION, et al. 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8C

and cannot reasonably obtain evidence necessary to show this element. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 853-55.)

At the same time, a defendant cannot shift the burden to the plaintiff simply by suggesting the possibility that the plaintiff cannot prove its case; a moving defendant must still make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (Id. at pp. 854-855, fn. 23.)

Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or a defense to it. (Code. Civ. Proc. § 437c(p); see generally Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-27.) In ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th 826 at p. 843.)

There is a triable issue of material fact only if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Id. at 850.) The trial court's function in ruling on the motion is to determine whether such issues of fact exist, not to decide the merits of the issues themselves. (Furla v. Jon Douglas Co. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1076-77.) Whether or not a disputed fact is “material” is determined by the law applicable to the legal theories put in issue by the complaint. (Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 202, 210.)

Express Assumption of Risk

“When an individual signs an express waiver of liability, he ‘promises not to exercise the right to sue for harm caused in the future by the wrongful behavior of a potential defendant, eliminating a remedy for wrongdoing.’” (Brown v. El Dorado Union High School Dist. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1023.) “In order for a release of liability to be held enforceable against a plaintiff, it ‘must be clear, unambiguous and explicit in expressing the intent of the parties’; the act of negligence that results in injury to the releasee must be reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release is given; and the release cannot contravene public policy.” (Sweat v.

Big Time Auto Racing, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1304-1305, citations omitted.) “The determination of whether a release contains ambiguities is a matter of contractual construction.” (Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1357.) “If an ambiguity as to the scope of the release exists, it should normally be construed against the drafter.” (Ibid.) “Where the defendant moves for summary judgment [based on express assumption of the risk], it has the burden of establishing that the release is valid ‘as applied to the case at hand.’” (Joshi v.

Fitness Internat., LLC (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 814, 826.) Further, “an express assumption of the risk agreement does not inure to the benefit of those not parties to that agreement.” (Moser v. Ratinoff (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1218.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV024111: MCCLORY vs CFF HOLDING CORPORATION, et al. 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8C

“[F]or a release of liability to be held enforceable against a plaintiff, [1] it ‘must be clear, unambiguous and explicit in expressing the intent of the parties’ [citation]; [2] the act of negligence that results in injury to the releas[or] must be reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release is given [citation]; and [3] the release cannot contravene public policy [citation].” (Sweat, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1304-1305.) However, “[a] release need not be perfect to be enforceable.” (Id. at p. 1305.)

“An act of negligence is reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release was given if it is included within the express scope of the release.” (Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1357-1358.) Thus, “releases given in connection with fitness activities [have been held] applicable to injuries incurred while engaging in fitness activities.” (Id. at p. 1358, citing Sanchez v. Bally’s Total Fitness Corp. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 62, 68 and Lund v. Bally’s Aerobic Plus, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 733, 738.) “Exculpatory agreements in the recreational sports context do not implicate the public interest and therefore are not void as against public policy.” (Id. at pp. 1356-1357.)

Here, the New Member Waiver is clear in its intent to release Defendants from liability for negligence in exchange for Plaintiff’s membership and use of the facilities. Further, Defendants’ Director of Risk Management declares that execution of the New Member Waiver is required for a potential member to have access to Defendants’ gym facilities. (Skow Decl., ¶ 3.) Plaintiff does not dispute this assertion. (See Plaintiff’s Resp. to UMF No. 7.) It is also apparent from a review of the New Member Waiver that it applies to the alleged act of negligence that resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “carelessly and negligently operated, managed, and maintained” the gym “in a dangerous and unsafe condition such as to create an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm” by allowing the gym “to be in a condition which was hazardous to the public.” (Complaint, ¶ 5.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants “failed to remove, warn of, or protect from harm against” the dangerous condition, and that Defendants “knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the condition was present and dangerous to persons” on the subject premises. (Complaint, ¶ 5.)

Meanwhile, the New Member Waiver states that Plaintiff agrees to release Defendants from “any and all claims arising out of the negligence” of Defendants, including injuries that result from Plaintiff’s “use of any exercise equipment or facilities,” as well as Defendants’ “improper maintenance of any exercise equipment or facilities.” (Skow Decl., Exh. A.) Since the acts of negligence alleged in the Complaint are expressly included in the release, the acts are reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release was given. (Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1357-1358.)

Moreover, Plaintiff alleges he was injured while using an improperly maintained leg press machine. The purpose of the New Member Waiver is to grant Plaintiff access to the gym and the facilities and machines contained therein, including the leg press machine. Therefore, the alleged act of negligence is related to the purpose of the New Member Waiver. Finally, since the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV024111: MCCLORY vs CFF HOLDING CORPORATION, et al. 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8C

New Member Waiver relates to recreational fitness activities, it does not implicate the public interest or violate public policy. (Id. at pp. 1356-1357; Lund v. Bally’s Aerobic Plus, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 739.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the New Member Waiver is unenforceable for various reasons. However, Plaintiff’s arguments do not defeat the enforceability of the New Member Waiver.

Plaintiff first contends that the New Member Waiver violates Civil Code section 1714, which states, in part, “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” (Civ. Code § 1714.) The assumption of risk doctrine limits this general duty of ordinary care. (Agustin v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 426, 446.) Section 1714 has not relationship to the enforceability of a liability waiver.

Plaintiff next contends that the New Member Waiver violates public policy under Civil Code section 1668, which states, “All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.” (Civ. Code § 1668.) Plaintiff contends that terms in the New Member Waiver “allow Defendant to harm people negligently or intentionally which is against public policy under Civil Code 1668.” (Opp.

MPA, p. 7:6-7.) Plaintiff’s argument misreads Civil Code section 1668. The plain language of section 1668 renders exculpatory provisions invalid as against public policy “where the contract purports to avoid liability for fraud, willful injury, or violation of law, whether intentional or negligent.” (Capri v. L.A. Fitness International, LLC (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1084.) The phrase “whether willful or negligent” in section 1668 modifies the term “violation of law,” meaning a contract that exempts someone from liability for a willful or negligent violation of the law is invalid.

On the other hand, the phrase “injury to the person or property of another” is modified only by the word “willful,” meaning section 1668 does not invalidate an agreement exempting a person for liability for negligent injury. Nothing in the New Member Waiver attempts to limit Defendants’ liability for intentional injury.

Plaintiff next argues that the New Member Waiver violates public policy because going to the gym is not purely recreational and “there may be a public interest involved in going to the gym.” (Opp. MPA, p. 7:20.) In making this argument, Plaintiff attempts to distinguish two cases cited by Defendants for the proposition that liability releases in exchange for permission to enter and engage in recreational and social facilities do not violate public policy. (See YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 22, 27; see also Huylsey v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV024111: MCCLORY vs CFF HOLDING CORPORATION, et al. 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8C

Elsinore Parachute Center (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 333.) These cases involved a recreational gathering for senior citizens and a parachuting accident, respectively, and Plaintiff distinguishes these activities from going to the gym. However, Defendants also cite Benedek, supra, as well as several other cases involving liability waivers in relation to gym memberships. Plaintiff makes no effort to distinguish these cases. Thus, Plaintiff’s argument is rejected.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the New Member Waiver releases grossly negligent conduct. Plaintiff contends that the New Member Waiver “allow[s] it so that intentional, maliciously or willfully causing harm would be covered.” (Opp. MPA, p. 9:3-4.) This argument has been rejected in the discussion of Civil Code section 1668. Plaintiff does not identify any terms of the New Member Waiver that attempt to exculpate Defendants for intentional harm. Plaintiff then argues that Defendants knew the subject machine was malfunctioning but failed to remedy the situation or warn members not to use the machine.

Plaintiff may avoid the effect of the New Member Waiver if he can show Defendants’ gross negligence contributed to his injuries, but it is his burden. (Brown, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 1027.) However, Plaintiff presents no evidence to support his claim that Defendants knew the machine was malfunctioning or that they failed to warn. Instead, Plaintiff cites to the allegations of his Complaint. A plaintiff cannot rely on the allegations of his complaint to defeat summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2); see Roman v.

BRE Properties, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1054.) Plaintiff also relies on his own interrogatory responses, but “the responding party may not use its own interrogatory responses in its own favor.” (Great American Ins. Co., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 450 [affirming trial court’s sustaining of plaintiff’s objection to defendant’s use of its own interrogatory responses as evidence supporting its motion for summary judgment].) The Court has sustained Defendants’ objections to this evidence.

In sum, Defendants have established that the New Member Waiver is a valid liability release, that the New Member Waiver applies to Plaintiff’s alleged injuries, and that Plaintiff executed the New Member Waiver prior to the subject incident. Plaintiff has not met his burden in opposition to create a triable issue of fact on the validity of the New Member Waiver or on whether Defendants’ conduct is exculpated by the New Member Waiver. Thus, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Disposition

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Defendants are directed to prepare a formal order complying with Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(g) and California Rules of Court rule 3.1312.