MOORE, et al. vs HAVILAND, et al.

24CV004242: MOORE, et al. vs HAVILAND, et al. 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 8C Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-8380 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 8C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16039062174 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 160 3906 2174. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-services-transcripts. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

24CV004242: MOORE, et al. vs HAVILAND, et al. 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 28 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION***

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties are directed to notify the clerk and opposing counsel at the time of the request which of the Issues identified in the Notice of Motion/Separate Statement and which of the Undisputed Material Facts offered by the moving defendant and/or the Additional Material Facts offered by plaintiff will be addressed at the hearing and the parties should be prepared to point to specific evidence which is claimed to show the existence or non-existence of a triable issue of material fact. ***

Defendants John Haviland (“Mr. Haviland”) and Linda Haviland’s (“Mrs. Haviland”) (collectively, “Defendants”) motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication against Plaintiff’s Willie Moore (“Mr. Moore”) and Gale Moore (“Mrs. Moore”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) is ruled up as follows.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing by Zoom or in person.

The parties are admonished for failing to comply with California Rules of Court rule 3.1110(f)(4), which requires electronic exhibits to include electronic bookmarks linking to the first page of each exhibit. Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers not being considered, matters being continued so that papers may be submitted in the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV004242: MOORE, et al. vs HAVILAND, et al. 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

proper format, and/or the imposition of sanctions.

Evidentiary Issues

The Court need not rule on Defendants’ objections because they pertain to evidence not material to the Court’s disposition of the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(q).)

Plaintiffs did not submit written objections.

Background

This is an action for breach of a settlement agreement that was executed between the parties to resolve a property dispute. The parties are owners of adjoining parcels of real property. Plaintiffs allege that the properties share a common area driveway for ingress and egress. (Complaint, ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs further allege that beginning in November of 2022, Defendants and their guests began parking their vehicles in the driveway in a manner that unreasonably interfered with Plaintiffs’ ingress and egress to and from their property.

On November 8, 2023, the parties executed a settlement agreement (hereafter, the “Settlement Agreement”) to resolve the dispute over the driveway. Plaintiffs allege that despite agreeing not to park in specified areas of the driveway, Defendants breached the Settlement Agreement almost immediately by continuing to park and allowing their guests to park in areas of the driveway on which the Settlement Agreement specified they could not park. Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains three causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) declaratory relief.

The key term of the Settlement Agreement states:

Use of the Driveway by the Havilands. The Parties agree that neither they, their guests, and/or invities [sic] will obstruct passage or otherwise park (including a golf cart) in the common area Driveways depicted in Exhibit A. The Driveways, for 40’ north of the terminus of the public roadway shall be for passage only and no parking. The Moores may apply to the HOA for a lease of a portion of the Driveways near their property line. The Moores may also apply to the ARC for the right to install signage and delineators between the Driveways.

(Defendants’ Exh. A, ¶ 1.)

Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement consists of a survey of the driveway. (See Defendants’ Exh. A, p. 9.)

Defendants contend that “the evidence in this case, e.g., Plaintiffs’ initial disclosures, verified

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV004242: MOORE, et al. vs HAVILAND, et al. 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

discovery responses, and production of documents, contradicts Plaintiffs’ assertion [that Defendants have breached the Settlement Agreement] and establishes the allegation(s) of the Complaint are unsupported, Plaintiffs’ causes of action therein are without merit as a matter of law, and Defendants are entitled to Summary Judgment or, in the alternative, Summary Adjudication of Issues.” (Mot. MPA, p. 2:19-23.) Defendants’ evidence in support of their motion consists primarily of Plaintiffs’ written discovery responses and the related document production. (See Defendants’ Exhs.

B-L.) Defendants contend that although Plaintiffs’ interrogatory responses state that Defendants breached the Settlement Agreement by parking and allowing other vehicles to park in the designated area of the driveway that was agreed to be left clear of vehicles, the photographs produced by Plaintiffs do not show vehicles blocking Plaintiffs’ access to and from their property. Additionally, Defendants submit a video from a camera affixed to Defendants’ garage showing Plaintiffs’ vehicle driving through the shared driveway unimpeded despite a worker’s vehicle being parked in front of Defendants’ house. (J.

Haviland Decl., ¶ 6, Exh. M.) Based on this evidence, Defendants contend that “Plaintiffs can present no competent evidence to meet their respective burden(s).” (Mot. MPA, p. 6:27-28.)

Legal Standard

Summary judgment must be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c); Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 35.) Summary judgment is properly granted only if the moving party’s evidence establishes that there is no issue of material fact to be tried. (Upson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 362, 374.) A judge may not grant summary judgment when any material factual issue is disputed. (O’Riordan v. Federal Kemper Life Assur. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 281, 289.)

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication the Court engages in a three-step process. First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) The Court cannot consider an unpled issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff's cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 850, quoting Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2).) A defendant is not required to conclusively negate one or more elements of the plaintiff's cause of action. (Saelzer v Advance, Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780-781). Rather, to meet its burden, the defendant is only required to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV004242: MOORE, et al. vs HAVILAND, et al. 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

show that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of its cause of action, i.e., that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence necessary to show this element. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal. 4th at pp. 853-55.)

At the same time, a defendant cannot shift the burden to the plaintiff simply by suggesting the possibility that the plaintiff cannot prove its case; a moving defendant must still make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (Id. at pp. 854-855, fn. 23.)

Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or a defense to it. (Code. Civ. Proc. § 437c(p); see generally Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal. App. 4th 322, 326-27.) In ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal. 4th 826 at p. 843.)

There is a triable issue of material fact only if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Id. at 850.) The trial court's function in ruling on the motion is to determine whether such issues of fact exist, not to decide the merits of the issues themselves. (Furla v. Jon Douglas Co. (1998) 65 Cal. App. 4th 1069, 1076-77.) Whether or not a disputed fact is “material” is determined by the law applicable to the legal theories put in issue by the complaint. (Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. (1989) 208 Cal. App. 3d 202, 210.)

Breach of Contract – First Cause of Action

“The elements of breach of contract are ‘(1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff.’” (Kumaraperu v. Feldsted (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 60, 70.)

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ discovery responses, particularly their document production, show that they cannot establish the breach element of the breach of contract cause of action.

The Court finds that Defendants have not met their initial burden to show that Plaintiffs cannot establish the breach element. Since Defendants do not assert that there is a complete defense to this cause of action, Defendants’ burden in this motion requires them to either affirmatively negate one or more elements or show that Plaintiffs do not have and cannot reasonably obtain evidence to establish one or more elements. (Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.) Since summary judgment is framed by the pleadings, Defendants must show that the undisputed facts, when applied to the issues framed by the pleadings, entitle them to judgment. (See Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV004242: MOORE, et al. vs HAVILAND, et al. 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

59, 66; see also Hedayati v. Interinsurance Exchange of Automobile Club (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 833, 846.) In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege, “Under the Settlement Agreement and Exhibit A thereto, [Defendants] agreed not to park in specified areas of the common area driveway and not to interfere with the Moore’s ingress and egress from their home.” (Complaint, ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs then allege that after executing the Settlement Agreement, “[Defendants] and their guests again began parking on the common area driveway in a manner that violated the Settlement Agreement and Exhibit A thereto.” (Complaint, ¶ 8.)

Under the breach of contract cause of action, Plaintiffs allege, “Defendants’ have materially breached the Settlement Agreement by failing to park theirs and the guests’ vehicles in accord with the requirements of the Settlement Agreement.” (Complaint, ¶ 12.) Defendants contend that the photographs produced by Plaintiffs during discovery as well as the March 12, 2024 video taken by Defendants show that Defendants have not impeded Plaintiffs’ access to and from their property. However, Plaintiffs’ breach allegations are not limited to impeding ingress and egress; instead, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached by “parking on the common area driveway in a manner that violated the Settlement Agreement.” (Complaint, ¶ 8.)

Plaintiffs also allege that under the Settlement Agreement, Defendants “agreed not to park in specified areas of the common area driveway.” (Complaint, ¶ 7.) = While the Settlement Agreement addresses Plaintiffs’ ability to access their property, it also obligates Defendants to not “otherwise park in the common area Driveways depicted in Exhibit A,” and specifies that “[t]he Driveways, for 40’ north of the terminus of the public roadway shall be for passage only and no parking.” (Defendants’ Exh.

A, ¶ 1.) Even assuming that the photographs produced by Plaintiffs show that Plaintiffs do not have and cannot reasonably obtain evidence that Defendants have blocked access to and from their property, they do not show that Defendants and their invitees have not parked “in the common area Driveway depicted in Exhibit A” of the Settlement Agreement, or in the area of the Driveway “for 40’ north of the terminus of the public roadway.” (Defendants’ Exh. A, ¶ 1.) Indeed, Defendants have not explained the meaning of the phrase “the common area Driveway depicted in Exhibit A” or delineated the “40’ north of the terminus of the public roadway” in relation to the photographs produced by Plaintiffs. (See Defendants’ Exh.

K.)

Moreover, although many of the photographs Plaintiff produced show vehicles parked in such a manner that would not appear to impede ingress and egress, some of the photographs are less clear. (See Defendants’ Exh. K at pp. MOORE00017 (photo no. 33), MOORE00026, MOORE00030, MOORE00036-MOORE00038, and MOORE00051.) Thus, even if the Settlement Agreement and the Complaint were limited solely to ingress and egress, Defendants would not have met their burden.

Defendants also contend that “Plaintiffs have not proffered any evidence to support any claim for damages under the fourth element of the breach of contract cause of action much less a claim for damages in the amount of $100,000 [as alleged in the Complaint].” (Mot. MPA, p. 7:23-26.) Defendants’ evidence for this argument appears to be Plaintiffs’ response to Form Interrogatory

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV004242: MOORE, et al. vs HAVILAND, et al. 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

No. 9.1, where they described the nature of their damages as “Loss of use of the access to and from our residence due to Defendants and their friends blocking the driveway,” and the amount of their damages as $100,000. (See Defendants’ UMF No. 11.) In response to Form Interrogatory No. 9.2, Plaintiffs identified “[p]hotos and videos of blocked Driveway in violation of the Settlement Agreement.” (See Defendants’ UMF No. 12.) As discussed above, the photos produced by Plaintiffs do not establish that Plaintiffs do not have evidence of Defendants’ breach. Defendants do not explain how Plaintiffs’ responses to Form Interrogatory Nos. 9.1 and 9.2 establish that Plaintiffs do not have and cannot reasonably obtain evidence of damage. A plaintiff may recover contractual damages for loss of use. (Coughlin v. Blair (1953) 41 Cal.2d 587, 603-604.)

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication on Plaintiffs’ first cause of action for breach of contract is DENIED.

Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing – Second Cause of Action

Although Defendants’ separate statement includes the same 19 UMFs under the second cause of action that are included under the first cause of action, Defendants’ memorandum attacks the second cause of action on pleading grounds. (See American Airlines, Inc. v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1110 [motion for summary judgment that tests the sufficiency of the complaint may be treated as a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings, with the allegations of the complaint accepted as true].)

Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to include allegations supporting their second cause of action that are beyond a mere breach of contract. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs incorporate all prior allegations under their second cause of action. (Complaint, ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs then allege, “Implied in every contract is a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Defendants’ repeated blatant and egregious breaches of the Settlement Agreement constitute a material breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” (Complaint, ¶ 14.)

“A ‘breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing involves something beyond breach of the contractual duty itself’ and it has been held that ‘[b]ad faith implies unfair dealing rather than mistaken judgment.’” (Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1394 (Careau).) Where a breach of the implied covenant cause of action is based on the same allegations as a breach of contract cause of action, the breach of the implied covenant cause of action may be disregarded as duplicative. (Id. at p. 1395; Bionghi v. Metro. Water Dist. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1370.)

To establish a breach of the implied covenant, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct, “whether or not it also constitutes a breach of a consensual contract term, demonstrates a failure or refusal to discharge contractual responsibilities, prompted not by an honest mistake, bad

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV004242: MOORE, et al. vs HAVILAND, et al. 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

judgment or negligence but rather by a conscious and deliberate act, which unfairly frustrates the agreed common purposes and disappoints the reasonable expectations of the other party thereby depriving that party of the benefits of the agreement.” (Careau, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1395.)

The Court finds Plaintiffs have adequately pled a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ improper parking on the shared driveway began in November of 2022, that Defendants’ refused to alter their parking habits despite Plaintiffs’ demands, that the parties mediated their dispute in November of 2023, resulting in the Settlement Agreement, that immediately after executing the Settlement Agreement, Defendants continued parking in the shared area in violation of the Settlement Agreement, that Defendants refused to alter their parking habits despite Plaintiffs’ additional demands, and that Defendants’ conduct has interfered with Plaintiffs’ ingress and egress. (Complaint, ¶¶ 5-9.)

These allegations are sufficient to establish Defendants’ conscious and deliberate breach of the Settlement Agreement in a manner that frustrates the purpose of the Settlement Agreement and deprives Plaintiffs the benefits therein. Defendants do not provide any reasoned argument otherwise, but instead simply cite to the applicable jury instruction for this claim and the Careau case while pointing to the fact that Plaintiffs incorporate their prior allegations within their second cause of action. (See Mot.

MPa, p. 8:4-21.) The Court is not persuaded that this entitles Defendants to summary adjudication or judgment on the pleadings on this cause of action.

To the extent Defendants’ motion on this cause of action can be construed as an evidentiary motion, the motion fails for the same reasons as the breach of contract cause of action, since Defendants rely on the same evidence and UMFs. Moreover, none of the evidence relates to the issues of conscious and deliberate act, frustration of purpose, and deprivation of benefits of the agreement.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication on Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is DENIED.

Declaratory Relief – Third Cause of Action

Under this cause of action, Plaintiffs seek “a declaratory judgment that Defendants breached the Settlement Agreement and that [Plaintiffs] are entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief barring future breaches.” (Complaint, ¶ 18.) Defendants rely on the same 19 UMFs in seeking summary adjudication of this cause of action. In their memorandum, Defendants essentially argue that Plaintiffs’ declaratory relief claim fails because their underlying breach of contract action fails. Defendants also appear to argue that declaratory relief is not proper Plaintiff have also pled a breach of contract cause of action in which they seek damages. (See Mot. MPA, p. 9:7-8 [“Here, a breach of contract claim would be the proper remedy, not a request for a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV004242: MOORE, et al. vs HAVILAND, et al. 07/13/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8C

declaration of rights”].)

“It is well established a court may grant damages for breach of contract and declaratory relief in the same action.” (Fineberg v. Niekerk (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 935, 940.) “The interpretation of a contract is clearly a proper subject of declaratory relief.” (Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 839, 846.) Additionally, “[t]he fact the same issue of contract interpretation is also raised in other causes of action does not in itself bar declaratory relief or summary adjudication [for the plaintiff] on that cause of action.” (Id. at p. 847.)

Declaratory relief is cumulative of other remedies. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1062.) Thus, the fact that Plaintiffs also seek damages through a breach of contract cause of action does not preclude them from seeking declaratory relief as to whether the contract has been breached. On the merits, Defendants’ motion fails for the same reasons as the breach of contract cause of action.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication on Plaintiffs’ third cause of action for declaratory relief is DENIED.

Disposition

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication is DENIED in its entirety.

Plaintiffs are directed to prepare a formal order complying with Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(g) and California Rules of Court rule 3.1312.