CALTRANS’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint
Case No. CU25-05707
CALTRANS’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint
Defendant STATE OF CALIFORNIA BY AND THROUGH THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (“CALTRANS”) demurs to Plaintiff CARISSA TIMBALL’s first amended complaint (“1AC”) alleging a dangerous condition of public property.
Legal Standard on Demurrer. “The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of law.” (Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1420.) A complaint is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts, but the plaintiff must set forth the essential facts of his or her case “with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint [the] defendant with the nature, source and extent” of the plaintiff’s claim. (Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Assn., Inc. v.
Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1099.) Legal conclusions are insufficient. (Id. at 1098–1099; Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 551, fn. 5 [ultimate facts sufficient].) The court “assume[s] the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but do[es] not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.) The court also assumes the truth of facts appearing in exhibits attached to the complaint. (Mead v.
Sanwa Bank California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 561, 567-568.) If the facts appearing in attached exhibits expressly contradict allegations of the complaint, the facts in the exhibit take precedence. (Ibid.)
Dangerous Condition of Public Property. Government Code section 835 generally provides that a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if a plaintiff proves that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of injury and either that (a) the wrongful or negligent act(s) of the public entity’s employee(s) within the scope of their employment created the condition or (b) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition sufficiently in advance to have protected against it. (
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The 1AC alleges that “a dangerous condition of public property existed in that a fallen and/or cut down tree obstructed Plaintiff’s lane of travel in a poorly lit and/or illuminated area” along I-780. (1AC at p. 7.) It states that there was a tree on the road and that constituted a dangerous condition, which fits common sense. The 1AC does not solely allege dangerously insufficient lighting. The lighting was a factor contributing to the allegedly exceptionally high level of danger present due to the tree; the allegations of a tree in the road alone would suffice to state a dangerous condition of public property, as a tree in the road creates a substantial risk of injury when the road is used with due care in a reasonably foreseeable manner.
The 1AC alleges that CALTRANS had actual or constructive notice of the tree sufficiently in advance to have protected against it by removing it or erecting barriers or warnings. (Ibid.) The 1AC sufficiently alleges a dangerous condition of public property.
Government Code 815.2. The 1AC states that its cause of action for dangerous condition of public property is “brought pursuant to Government Code Section [sic] 835 and 815.2.” (1AC at p. 7.) Government Code section 815.2 is not applicable to a claim for dangerous condition of public property. Government Code section 835 sets out the
exclusive conditions under which a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public property. (Brown v. Poway Unified School District (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 829; Longfellow v. County of San Luis Obispo (1983) 144 Cal.App.4th 379, 383.) The errant reference to an inapplicable statute in the 1AC is a trivial defect in the pleading. The 1AC states a proper cause of action against CALTRANS via section 835. The superfluous reference to the other statute is not grounds for demurrer.
Conclusion. CALTRANS’s demurrer is overruled.
SHONNA LEIGH RIVES, SUI JURIS vs. FPI MANAGEMENT; ET AL.