Motion to Quash Service of Summons
leave to file a proposed cross-complaint against Plaintiff DIANE STERN and THE LAWRENCE AND DIANE STERN FAMILY TRUST.
According to the moving papers: Defendants timely prepared a cross-complaint but the attempted filing on 3/3/26 was rejected by the Clerk’s Office because of a defect in the pleading caption. Defendants later corrected the caption defect but the resubmittal on 3/18/26 was again rejected by the Clerk’s Office, as the Cross-Complaint was not filed with Defendant’s Answer on 3/3/26.
The proposed cross-complaint appears to be compulsory and there is no apparent basis to find that Defendants have not acted in good faith to file the proposed Cross- Complaint.
Moving Parties SHALL separately file the proposed Cross- Complaint within 5 days and immediately serve the Cross- Complaint pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Trial (3-5 day jury) remains set for 11/15/27.
Moving Parties to give notice.
6 Real vs. Dhillon Motion to Quash Service of Summons Carrier, Inc. The court GRANTS Specially Appearing Defendant DHILLON CARRIER, INC’s (“Dhillon Carrier”) unopposed motion to quash service of summons.
Dhillon Carrier moves for an order quashing the service of the summons and complaint that was purportedly effectuated via substitute service on 10/14/25 and/or 12/15/25. (See Proofs of Service, filed 10/16/25 [ROA 10] and 12/22/25 [ROA 16].)
When a defendant challenges jurisdiction, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove “the facts requisite to an effective service.” (Dill v. Berquist Constr. Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1440. See also, Lebel v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1160 [“It was incumbent upon plaintiff, after the
filing of defendant's motion to quash, to present evidence discharging her burden to establish the requisites of valid service on defendant”].)
Effecting service on a corporation requires delivery of summons and complaint to an individual on behalf of the corporation. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 416.10.) Service may be made upon an agent for service of process, the president, chief executive officer, or other head of the corporation, a vice president, a secretary or assistant secretary, a treasurer or assistant treasurer, a controller or chief financial officer, a general manager, or a person authorized by the corporation to receive service of process. (Id. at subd. (a) & (b).)
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Corporations served within California may be served in the following manner: (1) personal delivery, (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.10); (2) “substitute service,” (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20); (3) mail and acknowledgement of receipt, (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.30); and, (4) by publication, (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.50). Summons may be served to a place outside California but within the U.S. by any of the four methods listed above; or by registered or certified mail with return-receipt-requested; or by any other method prescribed by the law of the place where the person is served. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 413.10(b).)
According to the proof of service filed on 10/16/25, Dhillon Carrier’s registered agent GURSIMRANJIT SINGH was served by substitute service on TAJINDER SANDHU as “Person in Charge, Authorized to Accept”. (ROA 10.)
Dhillon Carrier argues that substituted service on 10/14/25 was not proper because it was served on an individual that shares the same name as the Agent for Service of Process for Dhillon Carrier, but the individual served has no affiliation with Dhillon Carrier. Dhillon Carrier also notes that no declaration of diligence is attached to the proof of service.
Plaintiffs, who did not oppose the motion, have not shown that Tajinder Sandhu is a person closely connected with Gursimranjit Singh. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20, Editor’s Notes [“Section 415.20 authorizes substituted service, in
lieu of delivery of process to a defendant personally, to be made on a defendant by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to a person closely connected with him, usually at the defendant’s place of business, dwelling house, or usual place of above.”].)
Also, the 10/14/25 proof of service does not comply with Section 415.20(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which requires a showing that “the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served”. (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20(b). As defendant notes, no declaration of diligence accompanies the purported service.
After apparently discussing these defects with Plaintiff’s counsel, Plaintiffs filed a second proof of service on 12/22/25.
With regard to the second purported substitute service attempt on 12/15/25, the proof of service indicates that GURSIMRANJIT SINGH (agent for service of process for Defendant) was served via the “U.S. Marshal’s Service” while Defendant’s agent was in federal custody in McAllen, Texas. The proof of service does not identify any individual (with the U.S. Marshal’s Service or otherwise) who may have received service.
The court finds that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the relevant statutes to effectuate service.
As such, the motion is GRANTED.
Specially Appearing Defendant to give notice.
Re Upcoming Hearings
In light of the above ruling, the court DISCHARGES the Order to Show Cause (re requesting entry of default) set for 7/27/26.
Also, the court CONTINUES the Case Management Conference from 7/27/26 to 11/2/26 at 10:00 am. All appearing parties SHALL file and serve a timely case
management statement at least 15 calendar days prior to the continued hearing as required by the rules, including California Rules of Court rule 3.725 and Local Rule 369.
Plaintiff to give notice.
7 Pacific Castle Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment Portola, LLC vs. Ketabchi The court takes Defendant MONA KETABCHI’s motion to set aside default and default judgment OFF CALENDAR.
Procedural background: On 8/21/25, the IDC court struck Defendant’s Answer (filed on 4/29/24). Thereafter, judgment by default was entered on 11/14/25. Thereafter, on 12/12/25, Defendant filed a notice of appeal of the default judgment. (ROA 104.) Months thereafter, on 2/19/26, Defendant filed the instant motion to set aside default and default judgment.
The court is without jurisdiction to proceed at this time. The filing of a valid notice of appeal of a judgment generally divests the trial court of jurisdiction over anything affecting the judgment. Until the remittitur issues, the lower court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the order or judgment on appeal. This rule prevents the trial court from rendering an appeal futile by conducting proceedings that may affect or alter the judgment on appeal. (See Townsel v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1084, 1089.
See also, Code Civ. Proc., § 916 [“the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order”; “The purpose of the automatic stay ... is to protect the appellate court’s jurisdiction by preserving the status quo until the appeal is decided”].)
Accordingly, the motion is off calendar. If appropriate, after a remittitur issues, the appeal is dismissed, or this
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