Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
malice, oppression, or fraud, and defining such terms.) For example, the Complaint alleges that Abinante engaged in self-dealing against a business parter by, among other things, stealing or siphoning money from the business at Plaintiff’s detriment.
In sum, the motion to strike is DENIED in its entirety.
Moving Defendant to give notice.
12 Salaiz vs. Ford Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Motor Company The court GRANTS Defendant FORD MOTOR COMPANY’s (“Ford”) motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the sixth cause of action for fraudulent inducement – with 20 days’ leave to amend.
As an initial matter, the court notes Ford did not satisfy Code of Civil Procedure section 439(a), which requires the parties to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (See Park Decl., ¶¶ 2-4.) Despite this deficiency, the court exercises its discretion to reach the merits of the motion at this time.
6th C/A (fraudulent inducement – concealment)
The elements of a cause of action for fraudulent concealment are: (i) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (ii) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (iii) defendant’s intent to defraud plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (iv) plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (v) as a result, the plaintiff sustained damage. (Hambrick v. Healthcare Partners Medical Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 124, 162; see also Civ. Code, § 1573.)
“A duty to disclose a material fact can arise if (1) it is imposed by statute; (2) the defendant is acting as plaintiff's fiduciary or is in some other confidential relationship with plaintiff that imposes a disclosure duty under the circumstances; (3) the material facts are known or accessible only to defendant, and defendant knows those facts are not known or reasonably discoverable by plaintiff (i.e., exclusive knowledge); (4) the defendant makes representations but fails to disclose other facts that materially qualify the facts disclosed or render the disclosure misleading (i.e., partial concealment); or (5) defendant actively conceals discovery of material fact from plaintiff (i.e., active concealment)...Circumstances (3), (4), and (5) presuppose a preexisting relationship between the parties, such as ‘between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement. [Citation.]
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All of these relationships are created by transactions between parties from which a duty to disclose facts material to the transaction arises under certain circumstances.’...’Such a transaction must necessarily arise from direct dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant; it cannot arise between the defendant and the public at large.’” (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 40-41; see, Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 867 [“A duty to speak may arise in four ways: it may be directly imposed by statute or other prescriptive law; it may be voluntarily assumed by contractual undertaking; it may arise as an incident of a relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff; and it may arise as a result of other conduct by the defendant that makes it wrongful for him to remain silent.”].)
“There are ‘four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. [Citation.]’” (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336, citing Heliotis v. Schuman (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 646, 651.)
“Suppression of a material fact is actionable when there is a duty of disclosure, which may arise from a relationship between the parties, such as a buyer-seller relationship.” (Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 843.)
Importantly, every element of fraud must be pleaded with specificity. The particularity requirement for fraud requires the pleading of facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made. (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73.) This is to provide the defendant with notice and to give the court enough information to assess whether there is a foundation for the charge of fraud. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216.)
The requirement of specificity in a fraud action against a corporation requires the plaintiff to allege the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written. (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.) However, “[l]ess specificity is required when it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy.” (Committee on Children’s Television v.
General Foods Corp., 35 Cal.3d at 216 [citation and internal quote marks omitted].)
“California courts apply the same specificity standard to evaluate the factual underpinnings of a fraudulent concealment claim at the pleading stage, even though the focus of inquiry shifts to the unique elements of the claim...For instance, in a case such as this, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a sufficient factual basis for establishing a duty of disclosure on the part of the defendant independent of the parties’ contract. If the duty allegedly arose by virtue of the parties’ relationship and defendant’s exclusive knowledge or access to certain facts, ... the complaint must also include specific allegations establishing all the required elements, including (1) the content of the omitted facts, (2) defendant’s awareness of the materiality of those facts, (3) the inaccessibility of the facts to plaintiff, (4) the general point at which the omitted facts should or could have been revealed, and (5) justifiable and actual reliance, either through action or forbearance, based on the defendant’s omission.” (Rattagan v.
Uber Technologies, Inc., 17 Cal.5th at 43-44.)
In Dhital, the fraudulent concealment claim was sufficiently pleaded where the plaintiffs alleged they bought the vehicle from a Nissan dealership, Nissan backed the vehicle with an express warranty, and Nissan’s authorized dealerships acted as its agents for purposes of selling Nissan vehicles to consumers. The alleged defect was sufficiently specific because plaintiffs alleged the CVT transmissions caused hesitation, shaking, jerking, and failure to function, and that Nissan knew of the defect through premarket testing and consumer complaints made to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Nissan, and Nissan’s dealers. (Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc., 84 Cal.App.5th at 844.)
Here, the Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts establishing that Ford owed Plaintiff a duty to disclose the alleged engine defect before purchase.
The Complaint does not allege Ford sold the subject vehicle to Plaintiff. Instead, Plaintiff alleges only that he entered into a warranty contract with Ford regarding the subject vehicle, which Ford manufactured and/or distributed. (Compl, ¶ 7.) Nor does the Complaint identify the seller or allege Plaintiff purchased the vehicle from Ford or from a Ford-authorized dealership acting as Ford’s sales agent. The Complaint identifies Fullerton Ford as a business engaged in selling, servicing, and repairing automobiles, and alleges Plaintiff delivered the subject vehicle to Fullerton Ford for repair. (Compl., ¶¶ 5, 47.)
The Complaint does not allege Fullerton Ford sold the vehicle to Plaintiff or acted as Ford’s agent for purposes of the sale. (Ibid.) Although the Complaint alleges Ford’s dealers are agents for vehicle repairs, it does not allege they are agents for vehicle sales, as in Dhital. (Compl., ¶ 57.)
Here, the Complaint also alleges Ford represented that vehicles equipped with the 2.0L engine were high quality and concealed the defect in marketing materials on which Plaintiff relied. (Compl., ¶ 72.) The Complaint however does not identify the specific marketing materials, when Plaintiff saw them, what representation he relied on, or how the alleged omission was communicated to him before purchase. Plaintiff’s post-sale repair allegations likewise do not establish pre-sale fraudulent inducement. (Compl., ¶ 78.)
Thus, the Complaint does not plead sufficient facts showing a duty to disclose arising from direct dealings, a sales-agency relationship, or another transaction or relationship sufficient to impose a pre-sale duty to disclose. Unlike Dhital, Plaintiff does not allege facts showing that he bought the vehicle from a Fordauthorized dealership acting as Ford’s sales agent. The Complaint also does not plead sufficiently specific pre-sale concealment or reliance, nor does it plead sufficient facts showing Ford’s intent to defraud Plaintiff at the time of purchase.
Because these pleading defects are dispositive, the court need not separately address Ford’s remaining arguments, including whether the economic loss rule applies.
In sum, the motion is granted with 20 days’ leave to amend.
Moving Defendant to give notice.
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