Sais vs. Cubesmart

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# Case Name Tentative

Sais vs. Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication Cubesmart Defendant Cubesmart L.P. motion for summary judgment on plaintiff Kathleen Sais’ complaint is denied. [ROA #33.]

The court exercises its discretion to consider any opposition papers that were served one day late. CRC 3.1300(d). The court notes that Defendant responded substantively and has not shown prejudice. Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697–698.

The court did not consider new evidence submitted on reply. Code Civ. Proc. §437c(b)(4).

Facts This case surrounds alleged injuries suffered by Plaintiff when the door of a storage unit she rented from Defendant fell on her.

On 9/30/23, Plaintiff visited her unit to remove items. [UMF (ROA #41), no. 10; Deposition of Plaintiff, Kathleen Sais, at pg. 22 lines 2 – 17 (Defendant’s COE, ROA #29, Ex. F.] After opening the door

without any issues, Plaintiff and her family then accessed the unit and proceeded to remove items from it for approximately 10 to 15 minutes. [UMF no. 13; Deposition of Plaintiff, Kathleen Sais, at pg. 25 lines 16 – 24; pg. 26 lines 24 -25; and pg. 27 lines 1 – 4.]

After those 10 to 15 minutes, Plaintiff heard a loud noise and saw the unit door coming down; it came down on Plaintiff, knocking her to the ground. [UMF nos. 14, 15; Plaintiff’s Depo. at 27:18-19, 29:13-19, 30:5-9.]

When Defendant’s site manager inspected the door (albeit about three months later in 12/23 when Plaintiff moved out) she observed the spring for the door was broken. [AMF (ROA #54) no. 6; VanderSchuur Depo. (Defendant’s COE, Ex. C) at 44:9-16., lines 9 16; p 44, 21-25, 45:1-4.]

Defendant purchased the storage facility from Storage West sometime in or around December 2021. [UMF no.2; Haynes Depo. (Defendant’s COE, Ex. B) at 8:12-16; VandereSchuur Depo. (Defendant’s COE Ex. C) at 43:23-25, 44: 1-2.] Plaintiff was a preexisting renter of the storage unit at that time. [UMF no. 3; Defendant’s COE. Ex. D (lease agreement; Andrew Sais Depo (Defendant’s COE Ex. E) at 15:8-21; Haynes Depo. at 16:21-25.]

In the two years of Defendant’s ownership prior to the incident, Defendant did not inspect the mechanics of the door but only the lock and the outside. [AMF (ROA #54) nos.2, 3; Haynes Depo. at 16:10-25; Husen Decl. (ROA #49), Ex. H (Policies and Procedures Manual) at §§ 6.3, 7.9.]

At deposition, Defendant’s PMK took the position that Defendant could not inspect the workings of the door. [Haynes Depo. at 29.]

Plaintiff entered into a storage rental agreement with Defendant on 8/8/22. That agreement provides: “Owner may access the Cube for inspections, repairs, or maintenance. Except in an emergency, I will receive advance notice of Owner’s intent to access the Cube and, if I do not provide access within 5 days, Owner may remove the lock and access the Cube even if Owner enters the Cube or denies Me access to the Cube.” [Defendant’s COE, Ex. D (Rental Agreement) at §B(a); Rosales-Calixto Decl. (ROA #31), ¶ 6; Plaintiff Depo. at 19:16-17 and 21-25, 20:17-22, 21:3-17.]

Legal Standard

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 437, a party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that

the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff. Code Civ. Proc. §437c(f)(1).

A “party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact . . . .” Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850. “A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” Id. at 851. A defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies his or her initial burden by showing that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2).

A cause of action “cannot be established” if the undisputed facts presented by the defendant prove the contrary of the plaintiff’s allegations as a matter of law. Brantley v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1597. Alternatively, a moving defendant can show that a cause of action “cannot be established” by submitting evidence – such as discovery admissions and responses – that the plaintiff does not have and cannot reasonably obtain evidence to establish an essential element of his cause of action.

Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 25 Cal.4th at 854-55. See also Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 590 (finding moving defendant may show plaintiff’s lack of evidence by factually devoid discovery responses after plaintiff has had adequate opportunity for discovery); Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Const. Co.(1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 80-81 (finding Union Bank rule only applies where discovery requests are broad enough to elicit all such information); Weber v. John Crane, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1441-1442 (same).

Once the defendant’s burden is met, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action. Villacres v. ABM Industries, Inc. (2010) 189 Cal. App. 4th 562, 575. To meet this burden, the plaintiff must present substantial and admissible evidence creating a triable issue. Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163. Theoretical, imaginative, or speculative submissions are insufficient to stave off summary judgment. Doe v. Salesian Society (2008) 159 Cal. App.4th 474, 481; Bushling v. Fremont Med. Center (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 493, 510.

Discussion

Negligence

The elements of negligence are: (1) defendant’s legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct to protect the plaintiff; (2) defendant failed to meet this standard of conduct; (3) causation; (4) damages. Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.

Premises Liability The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are: (1) the defendant owned, leased, or occupied the property; (2) the defendant was negligent in the use or maintenance of the property; (3) the plaintiff was harmed, and (4) the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s harm. CACI 1000.

A person who owns or controls property is negligent if he or she fails to use reasonable care to keep the property in a reasonably safe condition. CACI 1001.

Premises liability is a form of negligence; it is described as follows: The owner of premises is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of such premises in order to avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm. A failure to fulfill this duty is negligence. Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619. A person who owns or controls property is negligent if he or she fails to use reasonable care to keep the property in a reasonably safe condition.

CACI 1001. “To comply with this duty, a person who controls property must inspect the premises or take other proper means to ascertain their condition and, if a dangerous condition exists that would have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable care, has a duty to give adequate warning of or remedy it.” Staats v. Vintner’s Golf Club, LLC (2018) 25 Cal. App. 5th 826, 833 (internal quote marks and citations omitted).

Additionally, in order to establish a claim for premises liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a condition on the property created an unreasonable risk of harm; (2) the defendant knew or, through the exercise of reasonable care, should have known about it; and (3) the defendant failed to repair the condition, protect against harm from the condition, or give adequate warning of the condition. CACI 1003. The property owner may be charged with constructive notice where, under all the circumstances, the condition was of such a nature and existed long enough that he had sufficient time to discover it and could have repaired or protected against the condition. CACI 1011.

A landlord must conduct reasonable periodic inspections of rental property whenever the landlord has the legal right of possession. Before giving possession of leased property to a tenant [or on renewal of a lease] [or after

retaking possession from a tenant], a landlord must conduct a reasonable inspection of the property for unsafe conditions and must take reasonable precautions to prevent injury due to the conditions that were or reasonably should have been discovered in the process. The inspection must include common areas under the landlord’s control.

After a tenant has taken possession, a landlord must take reasonable precautions to prevent injury due to any unsafe condition in an area of the premises under the landlord’s control if the landlord knows or reasonably should have known about it.

[CACI 1006.]

Landlords are subject to negligence liability for injuries resulting from defects and dangerous conditions that could have been discovered through a reasonable inspection at the time the lease was executed. Swanberg v. O’Mectin (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 325, 330. “A landlord at time of letting may be expected to inspect an apartment to determine whether it is safe, and will be subject to liability for those matters which would have been disclosed by a reasonable inspection.” Brantley v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1606 (citations and internal quote marks omitted).

Burroughs v. Ben’s Auto Park, Inc. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 449, 453-454, 164 P.2d 897 (“An agreement to renew a lease or relet the premises does not deprive the lessor of the right of reentry on the expiration of the old term and consequently cannot relieve the lessor of his duty to see that the premises are reasonably safe at that time”).

In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “knew or should have known” about the dangerous condition of the door. [Complaint, ¶GN-1, Prem.L – 1.] For summary judgment purposes, this is sufficient to require Defendant to negate the allegation that it had knowledge – that is, make a prima facie showing that it did not have knowledge – in order to obtain summary judgment.

Defendant has not made this showing. Defendant points to the testimony of Todd Hayes, who testified as Defendant’s PMK, and of Lynn VanderSchuur, its on site manager. [Haynes Depo. (Defendant’s COE, Ex. B) at 16, 29; VandereSchuur Depo. (Defendant’s COE Ex. C) at 33.] But this testimony is simply that Defendant and its employees did not inspect the unit; it is not an unequivocal denial of knowledge.

Accordingly, Defendant has failed to make a prima facie showing that it did not know of the dangerous condition of the door.

Defendant relies heavily on the fact that it did not inspect the unit and the condition of the door (as opposed to a door check to make sure it was locked). [Haynes Depo. at 16, 29, VandereSchuur Depo at 33.] Haynes testified it could conduct such an inspection because Plaintiff was in possession already. [Haynes Depo. at 29.] But this is not factually correct, given the term of the lease agreement that provides for Defendant’s access to inspect the unit. [Defendant’s COE, Ex. D (Storage Rental Agreement) at §B(a); Rosales-Calixto Decl. (ROA #31), ¶ 6; Plaintiff Depo. at 19:16-17 and 21-25, 20:17- 22, 21:3-17.]

At least as important, this position is not correct as a matter of law. Defendant and Plaintiff entered into a renewal rental agreement in 2022, after Defendant acquired the premises. [Defendant’s COE Ex. D (Storage Rental Agreement); Plaintiff Depo. at 19:16-17 and 21- 25, 20:17-22, 21:3-17.]

As set forth above, at that point Defendant had the right to re-enter and inspect the unit. Even more to the point, it had the duty to do so. Burroughs v. Ben’s Auto Park, Inc. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 449, 453- 454; CACI 1006.

Having failed to inspect the property upon renewal of Plaintiff ’s rental of the storage unit on 8/8/2022, Defendant is subject to liability for any dangerous condition it could have discovered then. Because Defendant has not made a prima facie showing that the condition of the door that resulting in it falling on Plaintiff could not have been detected by inspection in August of 2022, it has not made a prima facie showing that it did not have constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition.

Based on all of the above, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

2023-1363391 Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 1 is GRANTED IN PART and Baselyos vs. DENIED IN PART. Stumbaugh & The request to prohibit Defendant from presenting any evidence or Associates, Inc. argument concerning Plaintiff’s comparative negligence is DENIED. Whether Defendant ultimately proves comparative negligence is for the jury. Plaintiff’s motion improperly seeks to eliminate an affirmative defense through an evidentiary motion.

The motion is GRANTED to the extent Defendant, or any witness, may not argue or testify that Plaintiff was “on his phone” absent competent admissible evidence establishing that fact. Buchanan’s statement that Plaintiff’s head was “down like he was on a phone” is