PHILLIPS vs HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., AN OKLAHOMA STOCK CORPORATION, et al.

25CV031549: PHILLIPS vs HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., AN OKLAHOMA STOCK CORPORATION, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

Tentative Ruling

Defendants Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Efren Guzman’s (“Defendants”) motion to compel arbitration and to stay the litigation is GRANTED.

I. Overview

This is an FEHA employment action. Plaintiff Victoria Phillips (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendants discriminated against her due to her disability, failed to accommodate, retaliated against her, failed to prevent harassment, discrimination and retaliation, failed to engage in the interactive process, and wrongfully terminated her in violation of public policy. Plaintiff also alleges causes of action for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring and supervision, hostile work environment, failure to pay overtime and minimum wages, waiting time penalties, and unfair competition.

Defendants move to compel the action to arbitration pursuant to the Mutual Arbitration Agreement (“MAA”) that Plaintiff purportedly signed on October 9, 2024[1]. The MAA provides, in pertinent part:

1. Agreement to Arbitrate. Except as provided below, in this Mutual Arbitration Agreement (the “Agreement”), you and the Company[] agree binding arbitration is the sole and exclusive means to resolve all disputes, to the maximum extent allowed by law, that may arise out of, or be related to, your employment with the Company and/or applications for employment with the Company that arise before or after you sign this Agreement. Except as provided below, you and the Company each specifically waive and relinquish the respective right to sue each other in court and this waiver shall be equally binding on any person who represents or seeks to represent you or the Company in a lawsuit against the other in Court.

2. Covered Laws and Disputes. Subject to limitations set forth in Sections 3 and 8 below and to the maximum extent allowed by law, this Agreement to arbitrate applies to any dispute, demand, claim, complaint controversy, cause of action, or suit (“Dispute”) arising under or involving any federal, state, or local law, statute, regulation, code, ordinance, rule, common law, or public policy (as applicable, a “Law”), including but not limited to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1991,

25CV031549: PHILLIPS vs HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., AN OKLAHOMA STOCK CORPORATION, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Equal Pay Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and/or, similar state and local statutory or common laws relating to the employment relationship, all as amended, that in any way governs, regulates, or relates to your (i) application for employment; (ii) employment with the Company; (iii) compensation; or (iv) termination of employment with the Company. Covered Laws and Disputes include, but are not limited to, those involving hiring or not hiring, wrongful termination, wages, compensation, work hours, invasion of privacy, false imprisonment, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, defamation, negligence, intentional torts, personal injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of consortium, breach of fiduciary duty, harassment and/or discrimination based on any class protected by law, retaliation, interference and/or opposition of discrimination or harassment, and/or any other employment-related Laws and Disputes based in tort, contract, or any other nature or theory.

6. Arbitrator Selection Rules and Location. Within 30 days of service of a notice of the Dispute or an arbitration demand, the Parties shall select a mutually agreeable, impartial arbitrator preferably experienced with employment law and preferably licensed to practice law in the state in which you last applied for employment, and/or if hired, are or were employed by the Company. . . .

7. Arbitrator Authority. Except as otherwise provided in Section 8, you and the Company agree the arbitrator–not a court or agency–shall have exclusive authority to resolve disputes or issues relating to the formation, interpretation, applicability, implementation, and enforceability of this Agreement. Except as noted in the following paragraph, the Parties voluntarily waive the right to have a court determine the enforceability of this Agreement. The arbitrator’s authority and jurisdiction shall be limited to determining the matter in Dispute consistent with controlling Law in accordance with this Agreement.

Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, the arbitrator shall apply and shall not deviate from, as applicable, the substantive Law of the state in which the claim(s) arose and/or federal Law. The arbitrator shall not have the authority to hear disputes not recognized by existing Law and shall dismiss or grant summary judgment in such disputes upon motion by either party. Similarly, the arbitrator shall not have the authority to order a remedy a court is not authorized to order. Rather, except as provided in the following paragraph, the arbitrator shall have the power to award all legal and equitable relief available in court under applicable Law, and to issue subpoenas for the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031549: PHILLIPS vs HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., AN OKLAHOMA STOCK CORPORATION, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

production of documents and the attendance of witnesses upon the reasonable request of either party. The arbitrator shall make reasonable efforts to conduct the arbitration hearing within six months of his/her appointment but may extend this timeline upon showing good cause and or as needed for fair adjudication of the Dispute. If any party wants the arbitration proceeding stenographically reported, the party or parties requesting the reporting shall pay for the cost. The arbitrator shall render a written award setting forth a reasoned factual and legal analysis for the award within 30 days of the conclusion of the hearing.

8. No Class or Collective Claims. To the fullest extent allowed by law, no Party will have a right to file and/or participate in any class, collective, and/or representative action or lawsuit against the other Party in court, to the extent the action or lawsuit involves a covered Dispute.

To the fullest extent allowed by law, neither you nor the Company will have a right to initiate or participate in an arbitration of any covered Dispute on (a) a class or collective basis, or (b) any other representative basis to the extent the claim is brought, in whole or in part, on behalf of natural persons not a Party under this Agreement. Neither the arbitrator nor the Parties will have a right to join, aggregate, or consolidate any claim(s) brought by any other natural person in an arbitration against you or the Company, with any claim in arbitration between the Parties, unless agreed to in writing by all parties to all claims, including the Parties.

The arbitrator will have no right or authority to preside over any form of a class, collective, or representative proceeding brought by a Party to the extent it involves any claim brought by the Party on behalf of any other natural person.

Any question or dispute about the scope or validity of this Section shall be decided by a court of competent jurisdiction and not the arbitrator. Additionally, the Parties agree if a party brings an action that includes both claims subject to arbitration under this Agreement and claims that by Law are not subject to arbitration, all claims that by Law are not subject to arbitration shall be stayed until the claims subject to arbitration under this Agreement are fully arbitrated. Nothing in this Agreement requires or prohibits any Party from filing a motion and/or application in a court of competent jurisdiction seeking a stay of non-arbitrable claim(s) under U.S.C. § 3 and/or any similar statutes, which provide an independent basis to stay non-arbitrable claim(s) pending arbitration of covered Disputes.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031549: PHILLIPS vs HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., AN OKLAHOMA STOCK CORPORATION, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

...

12. Federal Arbitration Act. You acknowledge and agree the Company (i) is engaged in transactions involving interstate commerce; (ii) this Agreement evidences a transaction involving commerce; and (iii) this Agreement is subject to the FAA.

...

15. Condition of Employment. Each applicant for employment with, and/or employee of, the Company must have signed and returned to the hiring representative or Company supervisor this Agreement to be eligible for prospective or continued employment with the Company. Your submitting your application, accepting employment, or continuing your employment after being presented with this Agreement are also considered acceptance of this Agreement.

...

17. Knowledge and Consent. BY THEIR SIGNATURES BELOW, SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS ABOVE, BOTH PARTIES ACKNOWLEDGE THEY HAVE READ THIS ENTIRE AGREEMENT, CONSISTING OF FOUR PAGES, ARE GIVING UP ANY RIGHT THEY MIGHT HAVE AT ANY POINT TO SUE THE OTHER IN COURT, ARE WAIVING ANY RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL FOR COVERED DISPUTE, AND ARE KNOWINGLY CONSENTING TO ALL TERMS AND CONDITIONS SET FORTH IN THIS AGREEMENT.

(Declaration of Mark Bartleson (“Bartleson Decl.”), Exhibit E.)

Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing the MAA is procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Plaintiff also requests a continuance to conduct discovery regarding the conscionability of the MAA.

II.

Legal Standard

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031549: PHILLIPS vs HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., AN OKLAHOMA STOCK CORPORATION, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides:

A written provision in any contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

California law is similar. On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the matter if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) the right to compel arbitration was waived by the petitioner; (b) grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement; or, (c) a party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 1281.2.) Stated differently, an arbitration must be compelled where there is a valid, binding arbitration agreement unless the opposing party proves the agreement is unenforceable on unconscionability or other grounds. (See, e.g., Armendariz v. Foundation Health (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 96-100, 114; Gatton v. T- Mobile USA (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 571, 579.)

“Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.” (Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child and Family Svcs. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.) “Absent a clear agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, courts will not infer that the right to a jury trial has been waived.” (Id. at p. 1518.) “A party seeking to compel arbitration has the burden of proving the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate.” (Ibid.) “Once that burden is satisfied, the party opposing arbitration must prove by a preponderance of the evidence any defense to the petition.” (Ibid.)

On a petition to compel arbitration, the trial court must first determine whether an “agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) “Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.) The party seeking arbitration can meet its initial burden by attaching to the petition a copy of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031549: PHILLIPS vs HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., AN OKLAHOMA STOCK CORPORATION, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the respondent’s signature.

(Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 543–544; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)

“The burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164.) “However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process.” (Id., at p. 165.) The moving party meets the initial burden by attaching to the moving papers a copy of the alleged arbitration agreement or setting forth its terms verbatim. (Ibid.; Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1330.) “For this step, ‘it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.’” (Ibid. [quoting Condee v.

Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219].) Once the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement. (Ibid.) If the opposing party meets its burden, the moving party must then offer admissible evidence to demonstrate that the arbitration agreement is valid. (Ibid.) Notably, in a recently published opinion that constitutes binding precedent in this jurisdiction, the Third District Court of Appeal followed the analytical framework set forth in Gamboa. (See, Brockman v.

Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 569, 586- 588 [citing Gamboa].)

III. Existence of a Valid Arbitration Agreement

As noted above, the party seeking arbitration can meet its initial burden by attaching to the petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the respondent’s signature. (Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at 543–544; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.) Defendants have satisfied their initial burden by submitting a copy of the MAA purportedly bearing Plaintiff’s signature. (Bartleson Decl., Ex. E.)

Plaintiff does not argue in her opposition that she did not sign the MAA. Plaintiff instead avers that “I do not recall ever being presented with an arbitration agreement,” and “I do not recall ever signing an arbitration agreement.” (Declaration of Victoria Phillips, ¶ 22, 23.) Although Plaintiff does not appear to challenge the validity of her signature, the Court notes that because the signature on the MAA is handwritten, as opposed to an electronic signature, Plaintiff’s proffered evidence is insufficient to challenge the validity of her signature.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031549: PHILLIPS vs HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., AN OKLAHOMA STOCK CORPORATION, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

In Ramirez, the court recognized the split in authority regarding whether a party opposing a motion to compel arbitration could meet its burden to contest the validity of the agreement bearing a handwritten (as opposed to electronic) signature by providing evidence that they did not recall signing or seeing the agreement. (Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 833-837.) In Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th, 163, an employee opposed an employer’s motion to compel arbitration with a declaration, which stated (1) she had reviewed the arbitration agreement included in the employer's moving papers, (2) she did “ ‘not remember these documents at all,’ ” (3) no one had ever told her about an arbitration agreement or explained it until after her lawsuit began, and (4) “ ‘[h]ad I been made aware of the existence of an arbitration agreement, and been explained its provisions, I would not have signed any such documents.’ ” The Second District affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion, stating, “we need not decide whether Gamboa challenged the authenticity of her purported signature on the arbitration agreement.

It was enough that she challenged the authenticity of the agreement by saying under penalty of perjury that she did not remember it.” (Id. at p. 168.)

Conversely, in Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, the First District found that “[i]f a party confronted with his or her handwritten signature on an arbitration agreement is unable to allege that the signature is inauthentic or forged, the fact that that person does not recall signing the agreement neither creates a factual dispute as to the signature's authenticity nor affords an independent basis to find that a contract was not formed.” (Id. at p. 758; Ramirez, supra, at p. 834.)

The Iyere court explained that it reached the opposite conclusion as the Gamboa court because, “[w]hile handwritten and electronic signatures once authenticated have the same legal effect, there is a considerable difference between the evidence needed to authenticate the two.” (Iyere, supra, at p. 758.) “An individual cannot affirm or disavow an electronic signature from the face of a computer printout, but an individual normally can recognize or disavow a handwritten signature that purports to be his or her own.” (Ibid.)

The Ramirez court agreed with the conclusion and underlying rationale articulated in Iyere. (Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 835.)

Here, the Court finds the reasoning set forth in Iyere and Ramirez persuasive, and thus concludes that Plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence to challenge the authenticity of her signature on the MAA. Based on the Court’s review of the signature page, it is clear that it is a handwritten signature rather than an electronic signature. “[T]he inability to recall signing a document does not ‘afford[] an independent basis to find that a contract was not formed.’” (Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 837 [citing Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 756-757.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031549: PHILLIPS vs HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., AN OKLAHOMA STOCK CORPORATION, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

Because Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence to challenge the authenticity of the Agreement, the burden does not shift back the Defendants to prove the existence of the Agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, the Court concludes that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists.

IV. Delegation to Arbitrator

Defendants argue the MAA unequivocally delegates to the arbitrator the exclusive authority to determine whether the MAA is enforceable.

The delegation clause, located at section 7 of the MAA, states:

7. Except as otherwise provided in Section 8[2], you and the Company agree the arbitrator–not a court or agency–shall have exclusive authority to resolve disputes or issues relating to the formation, interpretation, applicability, implementation, and enforceability of this Agreement. Except as noted in the following paragraph, the Parties voluntarily waive the right to have a court determine the enforceability of this Agreement. ...

(Bartleson Decl., Ex. E.)

Plaintiff “specifically challenges Section 7 as unconscionable.” (Oppo. at 4:12.) Plaintiff argues the delegation clause is unconscionable because “[t]he clause is embedded in an adhesive employment agreement imposed as a condition of continued employment, was presented under the same coercive circumstances described herein, and operates within an agreement containing multiple one-sided provisions favoring Defendants.” (Oppo. at 4:12-15.)

In reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to make any argument that the delegation clause itself is substantively unconscionable, as is required to show that the delegation clause is unenforceable.

“Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), Title 9 U.S.C. sec. 1-16–16, the enforceability of an

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031549: PHILLIPS vs HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., AN OKLAHOMA STOCK CORPORATION, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

arbitration agreement is ordinarily to be determined by the court.” (Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, 781.) However, “parties can agree to arbitrate ‘gateway’ questions of ‘arbitrability,’ such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy.” (Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 68- 69.) “There are two prerequisites for a delegation clause to be effective. First, the language of the clause must be clear and unmistakable. [Citation.] Second, the delegation must not be revocable under state contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.” (Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 231, 242.)

A delegation clause is “viewed as an independent (‘severable’) contract.” (Nielsen Contracting, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1108; Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S. at pp. 70-71.) “If a party challenges the validity ... of the precise agreement to arbitrate at issue, the ... court must consider the challenge before ordering compliance with that agreement....” (Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S. at p. 71, 74; see also Tiri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 241, fn. 4; Malone v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1560 [“if the party is making a specific challenge to the delegation clause, the court must determine whether the delegation clause itself may be enforced (and can only delegate the general issue of enforceability to the arbitrator if it first determines the delegation clause is enforceable)”].)

The Court finds that the delegation clause expresses a clear intent to delegate the issue of the enforceability of the MAA to the arbitrator. However, Plaintiff “specifically challenges” whether the delegation clause is enforceable. Thus, the Court evaluates whether the clause itself is unconscionable.

A. Unconscionability

An arbitration agreement may be revoked on “such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.” (Civ. Code, § 1281.) The Court may refuse to enforce any contract or any provision of a contract determined to be unconscionable. (Civ. Code, § 1670.5.)

“Unconscionability has both a ‘procedural’ and a ‘substantive’ element, the former focusing on ‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on ‘overly harsh’ or ‘onesided’ results. The prevailing view is that [procedural and substantive unconscionability] must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability. But they need not be present in the same

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031549: PHILLIPS vs HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., AN OKLAHOMA STOCK CORPORATION, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

degree. [T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Peng v. First Republic Bank (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469 [internal citations and quotations omitted.].)

The core concern of the unconscionability doctrine is the “absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” The unconscionability doctrine ensures that contracts, particularly contracts of adhesion, do not impose terms that have been variously described as “overly harsh”, “unduly oppressive”, “so one-sided as to shock the conscience” or “unfairly one-sided” All of these formulations point to the central idea that the unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with “a simple old-fashioned bad bargain” but with terms that are “unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party.

(Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal. 4th 1109, 1145 [internal citations and quotations omitted.].)

1. Procedural Unconscionability

“[T]he initial question regarding procedural unconscionability is whether the contract was one of adhesion, namely, a ‘standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.’” (Dougherty v. Roseville Heritage Partners (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 93, 103.) “‘Procedural unconscionability’ concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties at that time. [Citation.]

It focuses on factors of oppression and surprise. [Citation.] The oppression component arises from an inequality of bargaining power of the parties to the contract and an absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party.” (Kinney v. United HealthCare Services, Inc. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1329.) “The second component of procedural unconscionability encompasses an aspect of surprise, with the terms to which the party supposedly agreed being hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce them.” (Ibid.)

The Court agrees the delegation clause has at least some degree of procedural unconscionability since it was a contract of adhesion and was required for Plaintiff’s continued employment. Plaintiff also presents evidence that she did not have sufficient time to review the agreement, that it was not explained to her, and that it was presented to her in an aggressive

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031549: PHILLIPS vs HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., AN OKLAHOMA STOCK CORPORATION, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

manner. (Phillips Decl., ¶¶ 7-16.) However, this alone is not sufficient to invalidate the contract. Given that there is at least some level of procedural unconscionability, there must be a showing of substantive unconscionability.

2. Substantive Unconscionability

“Substantive unconscionability focuses on the actual terms of the agreement and evaluates whether they create overly harsh or one-sided results [citations], that is, whether contractual provisions reallocate risks in an objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner. [Citation.]” (Roman v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469-1470 [internal quotation marks omitted].)

Plaintiff does not specifically address whether the delegation clause is substantively unconscionable. Instead, Plaintiff argues that the delegation clause is unconscionable because it operates with an agreement containing multiple one-sided provisions favoring Defendants. (Opposition at p. 4:14-15.) “Any claim of unconscionability [of a delegation clause] must be specific to the delegation clause.” (Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S. at p. 73.) Although Plaintiff attempts to frame her argument as a “specific challenge” to the delegation clause, in actuality her arguments concern the entirety of the Arbitration Agreement. Plaintiff fails to provide any cogent analysis regarding why the delegation clause, itself, is unconscionable.

The delegation clause here is similar to the one addressed in Tiri, which stated:

“[t]he Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have the exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or formation of this Agreement. ”

(Tiri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 242.) Here, the delegation clause in the MAA, like the one in Tiri, “does not lack mutuality” because Plaintiff and Defendants are “bound by it equally.” (Id. at p. 247.) Further, like Tiri, Plaintiff’s argument that certain provisions of the MAA are substantively unconscionable, “are not specific to the delegation clause as required under Rent- A-Center,” and Plaintiff does not assert or demonstrate that any of the challenged provisions “as applied to the delegation clause renders that clause unconscionable by impeding her ability to arbitrate whether the arbitration agreement as a whole is unconscionable.” (Id. at pp. 247-248 [italics in original].) Thus, even if the delegation clause is procedurally unconscionable, Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031549: PHILLIPS vs HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., AN OKLAHOMA STOCK CORPORATION, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

fails to show that the delegation clause is substantively unconscionable.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of showing both procedural and substantive unconscionability. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the delegation is not unconscionable and is valid. As a result, the Court finds that the issue of the MAA’s enforceability has been clearly and unmistakably delegated to the arbitrator. Thus, Plaintiff must raise her arguments regarding the unconscionability of the agreement with the arbitrator.

B. Additional Discovery

Plaintiff’s request for a continuance to conduct arbitration-related discovery is denied. Plaintiff’s opposition indicates that Plaintiff seeks discovery to develop its procedural unconscionability analysis. (Oppo. at 14:24-25.) However, as discussed above, the Court found some procedural unconscionability with respect to the delegation clause, but the motion is, nevertheless, denied. As a result, the Court concludes that the additional discovery would have no effect on the outcome of the instant motion,

V.

Disposition

Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. The action is STAYED pending arbitration pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.

[1] The Court notes Defendants indicate that Plaintiff signed a Mutual Arbitration Agreement on

September 1, 2022 as part of her application for employment. (Declaration of Mark Bartleson, Ex. A.) Plaintiff also signed Employee Handbook Acknowledgements, which included a “Submissions of Disputes to Binding Arbitration,” on September 7, 2022 and March 12, 2024. (Id., Ex. B and C.) [2] Section 8 pertains to class actions and states, in relevant part, “To the fullest extent allowed

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031549: PHILLIPS vs HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., AN OKLAHOMA STOCK CORPORATION, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

by law, no Party will have a right to file and/or participate in any class, collective, and/or representative action or lawsuit against the other Party in court, to the extent the action or lawsuit involves a covered Dispute. . . . Any question or dispute about the scope or validity of this Section shall be decided by a court of competent jurisdiction and not the arbitrator.” (Bartleson Decl., Ex. E.) Since the instant dispute does not include class action claims, this provision does not appear to be applicable.

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16C Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-1475 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-cagov.zoomgov.com/j/16030877014 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 160 3087 7014. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031549: PHILLIPS vs HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., AN OKLAHOMA STOCK CORPORATION, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-servicestranscripts. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 54 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ***