Motion for Preliminary Injunction
25CV031219: TORRES ALCALA vs SELENE FINANCE LP, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 16C
Tentative Ruling
Plaintiff Carlos A. Torres Alcalas (Plaintiff) motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED.
This is a nonjudicial foreclosure action regarding real property located at 223 Bay Drive, Sacramento, California 95815 (the Property). Plaintiff filed the Complaint on December 26, 2025, alleging violations of the Homeowners Bill of Rights (the HBOR), unfair business practices, and wrongful foreclosure.
On February 5, 2026, Plaintiff sought and obtained a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and an Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction (OSC) restraining and enjoining defendants Selene Finance LP and US Bank Trust NA not in its individual capacity, but solely as the owner trustee for RCAF Acquisition Trust (collectively, Defendants) from proceeding with the trustees sale scheduled for February 10, 2026.
The OSC was originally set for April 28, 2026, but continued on the Courts own motion to todays date after the Court granted Defendants ex parte application for leave to file a late opposition on April 27, 2026.
Defendants filed an untimely opposition one day late on June 26, 2026, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 1005. The Court has reluctantly considered the untimely opposition, but cautions Defendants that any further disregard for filing deadlines may led to untimely papers being disregarded.
Plaintiff contends that if the sale occurs, he will lose his home. He contends that he has demonstrated that he was engaged in a loan reinstatement and wired the requested amount, but the Defendants failed to comply with the HBOR. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants will experience minimal hardship if the preliminary injunction is granted.
Discussion
As its name suggests, a preliminary injunction is an order that is sought by a plaintiff prior to a full adjudication of the merits of its claim[s]. [Citation.] (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554.) The purpose of such an order is to preserve the status quo. It does not constitute a final adjudication of the controversy. [Citation.] (Costa Mesa City Employees Assn v. City of Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 305.) The discretion of the trial judge to grant a
25CV031219: TORRES ALCALA vs SELENE FINANCE LP, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 16C
provisional injunction is, of course, as broad as the discretion to deny it.
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ordinarily is required to present evidence of the irreparable injury or interim harm that it will suffer if an injunction is not issued pending an adjudication of the merits. (White, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 554; see generally Code Civ. Proc. § 426, subd. (a)(2) [a preliminary injunction may be granted [w]hen it appears that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce great or irreparable injury to a party to the action].)
[T]he extraordinary remedy of injunction cannot be invoked without showing the likelihood of irreparable harm. [Citation.] (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1352.) The threat of irreparable harm must be imminent. An injunction cannot issue in a vacuum based on the proponents fears about something that may happen in the future.[..i]t must be supported by actual evidence that there is a realistic prospect that the party enjoined intends to engage in the prohibited activity. (Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. California Presbytery (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1084.)
If the threshold requirement of irreparable injury is established, then [the court] must examine two interrelated factors to determine whether a preliminary injunction should be [issued]: (1) the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately prevail on the merits and (2) the relative interim harm to the parties from issuance or non-issuance of the injunction. [Citation.] (Costa Mesa City Employees Assn., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 306.) The greater the showing on one factor, the lesser the showing must be on the other. (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.) However, a preliminary injunction may not be granted, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless it is reasonably probable that the moving party will prevail on the merits. (San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 438, 442.)
The party seeking injunctive relief bears the burden of showing all elements necessary to support issuance of a preliminary injunction. (OConnell v. Super. Ct. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.) If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either or both of the two prerequisites (interim harm and likelihood of success on the merits), a trial judge's denial of the request for a preliminary judgment will be upheld. (Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 287; see King v. Meese (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1217, 1228, 1235 [balance of harms favored defendants and plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on merits]; Scates v. Rydingsword (1991) 229 Cal. App.3d 1085, 1094.)
The ultimate goal of any test to be used in deciding whether a preliminary injunction should
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
25CV031219: TORRES ALCALA vs SELENE FINANCE LP, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 16C
issue is to minimize the harm which an erroneous interim decision may cause. (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 73.)
Irreparable Injury
Plaintiff argues the loss of his home through a foreclosure sale would result in irreparable injury because he and his family will be literally made homeless and their lives will be at issue because they will have nowhere to turn. (Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application at 7:1-3.) Defendants argue in opposition that Plaintiffs harm is speculative and the HBOR expressly provides tailored remedies for the violations alleged.
The Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently established irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted. Losing ones home through foreclosure is an irreparable injury. (Wrobel v. S.L. Pope & Associates, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59779, 2007 WL 2345036 at *1 (S.D. Cal. August 15, 2007).) Accordingly, the Court must now weigh the two interrelated factors of balancing of the harm and likelihood of success.
Balancing of the Harm
Plaintiff contends that in balancing the harm, it weighs in his favor because it would result in the catastrophic loss of his home, while a continuation of Defendants foreclosure would not cause substantial harm.
The Court agrees with Plaintiff. The comparative harm to Plaintiff is greater than that to Defendants. Whereas Plaintiff stands to lose his home, Defendants only stand to lose immediate use of the security under the note and deed of trust. Any harm to Defendants, if it is later found that the injunction was improvidently granted, is purely financial.
Plaintiffs Likelihood of Success
Plaintiff has alleged the following causes of action: (1) violation of Civil Code section 2923.5 (failing to notify the homeowner about possible foreclosure and to wait 30 days after notice to record a notice of default), (2) violation of Civil Code section 2923.7 (failure to assign a single point of contact (SPOC)), (3) violation of Civil Code section 2924.9 (failure to provide
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
25CV031219: TORRES ALCALA vs SELENE FINANCE LP, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 16C
homeowner with foreclosure alternatives), (4) violation of Civil Code section 2923.6(c), (5) unfair business practices in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, and (6) wrongful foreclosure.
As to the first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants recorded a Notice of Default on June 24, 2025 and that he was living on the property and had possession when the Notice of Default was issued. However, he allegedly received no mail or messages. (Complaint, ¶ 18.)
In support of the second cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that on November 4, 2025, he submitted a complete loan modification request to Defendants and requested the appointment of a SPOC, but Defendants failed to assign one within a reasonable time because he was never assigned a SPOC. (Complaint, ¶¶ 22-23.)
With respect to the third cause of action, Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to notify him of all foreclosure prevention alternatives within five business days after the Notice of Default was recorded, as required by section 2924.9. (Complaint, ¶ 28.)
In the fourth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated section 2923.6(c) by failing to postpone the sale while a complete loan modification was under review. (Complaint, ¶ 36.)
Plaintiff asserts he is likely to prevail on the merits because he has amply demonstrated by the evidence submitted that [he] was engaged in a loan reinstatement and wired the requested amount. (Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application at 6:12-13.) The totality of Plaintiffs argument is conclusory and devoid of any explanation or citation to evidence that demonstrates how he has specifically shown a likelihood of success. (See Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application at 6:10-19.) Plaintiff points to no evidence whatsoever in his moving papers.
It is neither the Courts burden, nor responsibility to search for the evidence and reasons that might support Plaintiffs claims. This, in and of itself, is sufficient reason to deny the motion on the basis that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy his initial burden. The party seeking injunctive relief bears the burden of showing all elements necessary to support issuance of a preliminary injunction. (OConnell, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1481.)
Regardless, even if the Court evaluates the evidence submitted, the Court concludes Plaintiff has not established a likelihood of success. Plaintiff relies upon his brief declaration, wherein he attests:
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
25CV031219: TORRES ALCALA vs SELENE FINANCE LP, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 16C
I contacted the Defendants in November 2024 for assistance in stopping the foreclosure by a loan modification or other alternatives for the property known as 223 Bay Drive, Sacramento CA 95815. I was never appointed a SPOC person to assist me and to discuss a loan modification and alternatives.
From that time forward I have tried to contact Defendants but no informative response.
(Declaration of Carlos A. Torres Alcala, ¶¶ 2-3.)
The remainder of Plaintiffs declaration is not material or pertinent to establish a likelihood of success.
Even assuming the foregoing is sufficient to establish a likelihood of success that Defendants violated certain provisions of the HBOR, Defendants have presented substantial evidence in opposition that demonstrates they appointed a SPOC and duly contacted Plaintiff as soon as Defendants acquired the loan, which was already in default.
On December 17, 2025, Wells Fargo Bank assigned the loan to Defendants as the new mortgage servicer. (Complaint, ¶ 12, Ex. B.) On December 17, 2024, Defendants sent a letter to Plaintiff informing him that it was attempting to reach him and that his SPOC person was Joy Bullard. (Declaration of Bojana Rnjak (Rnjak Decl.), ¶¶ 3-4, Ex. A.)
About a month later, on January 21, 2025, Defendants sent another letter to Plaintiff informing him of alternative foreclosure options available to him. The letter lists Joy Bullard as his SPOC. (Rnjak Decl., ¶¶ 3-4, Ex. B.)
Defendant also presents evidence that it sent Plaintiff an email on June 10, 2025, regarding his request for loss mitigation assistance and related servicing correspondence. (Rnjak Decl., ¶¶ 3- 4, Ex. C.) On June 16, 2025, Defendants sent Plaintiff another letter detailing foreclosure prevention options and available alternatives. (Rnjak Decl., ¶¶ 3-4, Ex. E.) On August 20, 2025, Defendants sent Plaintiff correspondence notifying him that his loan modification application was incomplete and identifying missing documentation. (Rnjak Decl., ¶¶ 3-4. Ex. D.)
The foregoing directly contradicts Plaintiffs contentions that he was never appointed a SPOC
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
25CV031219: TORRES ALCALA vs SELENE FINANCE LP, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 16C
and was never provided with an informative response. Based on the record, the Court concludes Plaintiff has failed to establish he is likely to succeed on his claims. Therefore, Plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED.
The TRO issued on February 5, 2026, is dissolved, and the OSC issued on the same date is discharged.
This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.
NOTICE:
Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:
To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16C Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-1475 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.
Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.
The Department 16C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16030877014 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 160 3087 7014. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
25CV031219: TORRES ALCALA vs SELENE FINANCE LP, et al. 07/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 16C
Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-services-transcripts. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000.
A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Courts Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporters Office and an official reporter will be provided.
*** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL- SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 54 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ***
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