Request for Order re Child Custody, Child Support, Spousal Support, Attorney Fees, Personal Property, and Conduct-based Sanctions
THERE ARE NO TENTATIVES. The following are the tentative ruling cases calendared before Judge J. Richard Distaso in Department #13:
FL-25-003281 - MARTINEZ VS MARTINEZ Petitioner's Request for Order re Child Custody, etc.-- HEARING REQUIRED. The child custody and visitation modification request was set for mediation and the date of mediation has been rescheduled pursuant to the parties' Stipulation and Order of June 25, 2026. Accordingly, that matter is not included in this hearing and the Court does not intend to entertain argument or evidence about it until following completion of mediation absent exigent circumstances.
The requests for need-based spousal support, child support and attorney's fees and costs are not eligible for tentative ruling and require a hearing.
The Court granted temporary emergency orders with respect to the personal property requests and, absent an issue with compliance or otherwise, it is anticipated that they are resolved and/or moot.
Regarding property control, based on the Responsive Declaration filed by Respondent, it appears that escrow is scheduled to close as to the subject residence on Monday, July 13, 2026. Accordingly, the Court anticipates that this request is either presently moot and/or withdrawn by Petitioner.
This leaves only Petitioner's request for conduct-based sanctions pursuant to Family Code section 271. Respondent disputes the factual basis for the alleged misconduct, which would ordinarily require the Court to make findings, but given that the only conduct targeted by Petitioner is Respondent's alleged retention of Petitioner's personal property, that Petitioner concedes Respondent's counsel met and conferred in good faith on these matters, and that the amount sought is $1,000.00, the Court is inclined to deny this request without prejudice and to reserve jurisdiction over the question of conduct-based sanctions as to both parties until trial or at least until the presently highly disputed matters have been resolved. (See, i.e., Marriage of Freeman (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1, 6 [section 271 "contemplates that sanctions may be assessed at the end of the lawsuit, when the extent and severity of the party's bad conduct can be judged," cit. omit.]; Hogoboom & King, Cal.
Prac. Guide Family L. (TRG 2026) Ch. 14-A, Sec. 14:265b.)
FL-25-000107 - FELL VS FELL Respondent's Request for Order re Set Aside Default Judgment-- DENIED. The default judgment in this matter was entered on November 5, 2025, and Notice of Entry was filed and served on even date. Respondent's Request for Order seeking set aside pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) was filed on May 13, 2026. Respondent's Proof of Service avers mail service of the order request on May 26, 2026.
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Accordingly, the six-month outside limit on motions seeking discretionary set aside expired on May 4, 2026, and the Court is compelled to deny the order request as untimely. The express language of section 473(b) states that the application for discretionary relief must be made "within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken." (Id.)
It is settled law that the application must be both filed and served within the six month outside time limit. (Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 341-342 [473(b) motion untimely where filed within 6-month deadline but not served within that time].) As noted by a leading practice guide, "The outside six-month limit on seeking CCP Sec. 473(b) relief is jurisdictional. Unless the motion is both filed and served during the six-month period, the court has no authority to grant the requested relief ... regardless of the underlying merits and whether or not there is a reasonable excuse for the delay." (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Prac. Guide Family L. (TRG 2026) Ch. 16-A, Sec. 16:56, citing Arambula, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at 342 fn. 8; Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980.)
Moreover, if the 6-month time limit were computed based on the entry of the underlying default, which in this case occurred even earlier on March 14, 2025, then there can be no argument that the motion is not untimely. And in default cases, like the case at bar, it is also now settled law that the date of entry of default starts the countdown on 473(b) relief because if relief were only granted as to the entry of judgment without relief from default then the default would remain intact and the respondent would still be "out of court" and without the right