REEVES, MARNIE ANN vs RENNER, JEREMY LEE

KFH or KFHP that constitutes malice, oppression, or fraud. For the reasons stated under Issue No. 15, summary adjudication of this issue is DENIED.

ISSUE NO. 18: Plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages also fails as a matter of law because plaintiff cannot meet her burden under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b), by producing clear and convincing evidence that any conduct that could give rise to punitive damages liability was committed, authorized, or ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of defendants. Summary adjudication is GRANTED.

UMF Nos. 71-73 indicate that Tony Jackson, Debbie Sapin, and Wilmer Perez--i.e., the chief actors in this controversy--were not officers, directors, or managing agents of KFH and were not involved in policymaking. The connections to Adao and Newkirk are speculative and OMF 15, 56, and 63 are substantially below the standard required to make this showing. Defendant to prepare an order consistent with this ruling.

CV-24-010016 - REEVES, MARNIE ANN vs RENNER, JEREMY LEE - Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the First Amended Complaint, in its Entirety, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of the First, Second and Third Causes of Action of the First Amended Complaint - GRANTED in full.

Objections to the Reeves Declaration: 1-18: All objections are OVERRULED. The declaration is accepted only for the specific facts and not the conclusions from those facts. The hearsay objections as to things Renner is alleged to have said are not well taken, as they are either not hearsay, an alleged statement by the party opponent, or both.

19-35, 38-42: OVERRULED, except as to assertions that Meta AI or Truthfinder are accurate statements of whether a person is Renner-associated. Reeves describes the items and provided signed declarations under penalty of perjury; I disbelieve any technical deficiencies are sufficient to not consider the declarations. (I note that Reeves substantially followed the rules governing this motion, which are not intuitive, and Renner very promptly repaired a technical deficiency in his filing when the Court called attention to it.)

36-37: SUSTAINED.

Factual Summary

Marnie Reeves, the Plaintiff, engaged with multiple people claiming to be the actor Jeremy Renner, related to Jeremy Renner, or Jeremy Renner's management team over a period of time both before and after filing this lawsuit. Various Renners would tell her that the other Renners were scammers, but he was the real Jeremy Renner. Reeves sent money to many people, including people in Colorado, France, and to unknown bitcoin wallets.

The text messages (see, for instance, Exhibit 40) regularly have a person identifying as Renner professing a desire to maintain a romantic relationship with Reeves, and asking for money. Accounts like "PrivateJeremmyR" contacted her and she engaged these accounts. She paid for a meet and greet at the Hotel Per La in Los Angeles. This was arranged via a "Lasse Larsson," who gave strict instructions to lie to the bank about the wire transfer and to assert it was for family. The money was wired to a "Jen Joiner."

The letter she received from (ostensibly) the hotel said her confirmation number was 7, that she was in room 7, and spelled "Address" incorrectly. The letter is not on any specialized stationery and appears to be a Word document with uneven capitalization. Reeves believes a song by Renner, "Wait," is Renner singing about her. Reeves eventually had at least seven emails for Renner, and additionally believed multiple other people were working with Renner, including an account from "J. Renner Inc." Reeves asserts that Renner changed the contact information to a person who wasn't him. The registered owner of the company is "James Arnol Renner." (I note here that, like all claims in this case from social media accounts, the actual source of the J. Renner Inc. account is unknown.)

Reeves purchased a "fan card" which misspells her name and has some irregular capitalization. Reeves spoke to an account ostensibly run by Renner's mother who said the other Jeremy Renner(s) were frauds but that her son wanted to talk to Reeves.

Reeves asserts that she had a video call with Jeremy Renner on August 28, 2023. The specific claim is, "Defendant was in his car driving to the store per the Plaintiff and Defendant's conversation, his phone was to the left of him, and he said, 'I just called to say hi and how are you doing today.' The video call was very clear and I could see him and a parking lot he was pulling into. He looked at me front view at least 3 times during the conversation. Plaintiff knew then she was safe to send the additional payments after August 2023."

Reeves engaged with a Renner as late as September 2025 and indicated she still wanted to pursue a relationship and alternatively that she was angry with him for his failures. She alleged to a Renner that he was fake because he did not know of this lawsuit. This case was filed on December 13, 2024, and a demurrer was filed by Renner in February, 2025.

Renner's Claims

Renner filed a declaration saying that he never had the phone number attributable to many of the contacts with Reeves, he did not ask for any money from her, he did not receive any money from her, he did not have anything to do with any of the many social media accounts and emails that contacted Reeves, and that he was entirely disconnected with Reeves except for one meeting at a Sweet Grass Vodka event in which they had no substantive conversation. Renner also provides evidence that he has attempted to deter fans from falling for romance scams. Renner asserts incorrectly that no celebrity would charge money for a meet and greet. (See, for instance, https://www.weirdal.com/vip-package-faqs/ (page accessed July 8, 2026.)) The Court also rejects Renner's conclusion that this was a single scammer or a single group of scammers.

Governing Law

A "party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact . . . ." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) "A prima facie showing is one sufficient to support the position of the party in question." (Id. at p. 851.) A defendant meets their burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party shows that "one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must show that "a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto." (Ibid.)

"Because of the drastic nature of the summary judgment procedure and the importance of safeguarding the adverse party's right to a trial, the moving party must make a strong showing. His affidavits are strictly construed and the opposing party's are liberally construed." (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038.) All doubts as to whether any material, triable issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment or adjudication. (Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.) Thus, evidence that is equivocal or from which conflicting inferences may be drawn is insufficient to meet the movant's burden. (Anderson v. Metalclad Insulation Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 297.)

In addition to moving for summary judgment, "[a] party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c(f)(1).) A motion for summary adjudication proceeds in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c(f)(2).

Analysis

Renner has met the first hurdle. His clear disclaiming of any of the social media contacts and of any ownership of the emails, phone numbers, or businesses is sufficient to shift the burden to Reeves to show that the people she sent money to were Renner or agents of Renner. Reeves clearly has competent evidence that she has made payments to multiple people and certainly has enough evidence that she intended to form a relationship with Renner. But Reeves' factual disputes are insufficient.

In UMF's 66-75, Renner disclaims any knowledge of the individuals Reeves sent money to - Julie Parsons, Mythe Thien Nguyen Dinh, Dorie Nichols, and Mle Michovska Mihaela. Reeves says Renner was aware of these people, but the basis for that is that Renner told her to send the money to these people, and in some cases there are tenuous connections to them via website or (assertedly) AI searches. The web searches are not evidence, and the remainder is entirely speculative.

Reeves assert that she was contacted via many different phone numbers on WhatsApp. She cites the following text from August 1, 2025: "I understand we talked before, then all of the sudden I could not access my telegram anymore, then by that time I gained full access to it, this whole stuff has already taken place, I was so confused. I do feel it's some one in my circle." Reeves analysis is: "This is not how imposters act or say." This analysis is not compelling. Celebrities are not immune from committing crimes of all sorts. Renner's celebrity status provides him no immunity from ordinary summary judgment analysis. Renner's celebrity status does provide motive for scammers to imitate him though, and the manner in which this was done does not reflect a well-oiled entertainment management organization as Reeves alleges.

The phone call Reeves asserts that she made a video phone call in which she saw the "front" of Renner three times in August, 2023. Under Code Civ. Proc. section 437c(e), the Court may not determine credibility unless the matter is so incredible as a matter of law as not to be believed. Inferences from facts however may be made. I assume that the phone call occurred. This was the linchpin allegation that brought this case past the demurrer stage. This was also the closest portion of this ruling, and I have carefully considered the allegation.

Reeves said Renner "looked" at her, implying but not directly asserting that she saw his face. But Reeves provides no evidence of control over the phone. The call, as described, has a driving "Renner" not viewable by Reeves except when he looked at the phone three times while driving. Even if she saw his face, the alleged ratification of prior contacts would very strongly indicate this was not the actual Jeremy Renner; I have tried to give the flavor of the contacts, and there are no remaining signs that the actual person Jeremy Renner had anything to do with any of this.

Reeves also expressed doubts before and after the phone call, including months after Renner had appeared in this case. Reeves herself seems unpersuaded that this evidence was dispositive.

Further, in People v. Schlimbach (2011) 193 Cal.App.4 th 1132, fn6, an appellate court found that the Court may determine as a matter of law that a factual assertion is not credible under unusual circumstances. In that case, the assertion that a person with a 0.24% blood alcohol might appear to be intoxicated when he was not, and that another had a speech impediment which the officer mistook for being under the influence. This obviously is not impossible, but was of sufficiently remote probability that the appellate court found it to be facially incredible and that a trial court would be within its rights to ignore it.

Conclusion

There is virtually no evidence that Renner got the money or asked for the money, and the evidence is insufficient to tie him to the phone call. If this were a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, Renner is not liable beyond a reasonable doubt, and probably by the higher standard of criminal factual innocence.

I note here that this case has used substantial resources of the court and counsel. I would caution the legislature not to impose a cure worse than the problem; this case has doubtless been vexing to Renner (and surely to Reeves, who appears to still believe the actor stole her money). Lawsuits against people who did nothing wrong are expensive and taxing; California's efforts to reduce them - as by anti-SLAPP rules - have been laudable. The Court will sign the proposed order. Defendant is to prepare a judgment consistent with this ruling.

CV-25-007268 - CRUZ, VANESSA vs COVENANT CARE CALIFORNIA LLC - Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration - DENIED.

Governing Law

Under both federal and state law, it is the Court's responsibility to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute. (See 9 U.S.C. Sec. 4 ["If the making of the arbitration agreement ... be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof"]; Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1281.2 [If the court "determines that [a written] agreement to arbitrate a controversy exists ... [it may order enforcement]."]; Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 569, 585, reh'g denied (Oct. 16, 2025), review denied (Dec. 17, 2025) ["[A] court, before granting a petition to compel arbitration, ' " must determine the factual issue of 'the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.' " ' [Citations.]"] [emphasis in original].)

State law applicable to contracts generally governs whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists. (See Perry v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483, 492; Stutler v. T.K. Constructors Inc. (6th Cir. 2006) 448 F.3d 343, 347; Metters v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 696, 701 ["Federal policy in favor of arbitration does not come into play ... until a court has found the parties entered into a valid contract under state law."].) Once the existence of the agreement is established, the burden of establishing grounds that prevent its enforcement is on Plaintiffs as the challengers. (See Mission Viejo Emergency Medical Associates’v. Beta Healthcare Group (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1153-1154.)

While the Court recognizes that the purported arbitration agreement contains a delegation clause, this dispute raises foundational issues, including whether Ms. Lopez possessed ostensible authority to agree to the arbitration provisions on behalf of her father. The law dictates that, regardless of the inclusion of a delegation clause in the subject agreement, these types of foundational issues ought to be determined by the Court. (Bruni v. Didion (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1285.)

Discussion

In contending that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, Defendants mainly rely on the declaration of Jennifer Warkentin, a former Executive Director at the facility. Ms. Warkentin asserts that she was present when Valerie Lopez signed the arbitration agreement on behalf of the decedent, Juan Cruz. Ms. Warkentin states that, before Ms. Lopez signed the paperwork, Ms. Warkentin spoke with Mr. Cruz to ask him if Ms. Lopez was authorized to sign on his behalf, and he stated that she was so authorized. Ms. Warkentin further asserts that she explained to both Mr. Cruz and Ms. Lopez that the arbitration agreement was not a condition of residency. The Warkentin declaration does not contain a description of in what manner she asked Mr. Cruz about the arbitration agreement.

Ms. Warkentin's declaration appears contradicted by the declaration of Valerie Lopez. Ms. Lopez asserts that, at the time she signed the admission paperwork, she had no legal authority to act on behalf of her father. While Mr. Cruz did ultimately execute a power of attorney agreement naming Ms. Lopez as his attorney-in-fact, that did not occur until several months after the admission paperwork was completed. Ms. Lopez also states that her father was not present with her when she completed the paperwork (as he was still in the hospital that day), she does not recall anyone explaining the arbitration agreement to her, she does not recall Ms. Warkentin asking her if she was authorized to sign the arbitration agreement and the residency papers on her father's behalf, and her father never spoke with Ms. Warkentin or any other staff at the facility until after his admission.

Lack of recollection is typically insufficient to overcome a direct assertion, but here the failure to describe the means by which Mr. Cruz was contacted leaves a substantial gap in the testimony presented. Defendant appears to concede that ratification was likely required. The evidence before the Court that