DOE vs Rialto Unified School District

TENTATIVE RULING(S) FOR JULY 9, 2026 Department S37 – Judge Winston Keh This court follows California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(b) for tentative rulings. (See San Bernardino Superior Court Local Emergency Rule 8.) Tentative rulings for each law & motion will be posted on the internet (https://www.sb-court.org) by 3:00 p.m. on the court day immediately before the hearing.

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UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, THE PREVAILING PARTY IS TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE

RULING.

DOE vs Rialto Unified School District

__________________________________________________________________________

TENTATIVE RULING(S):

On November 26, 2025, Defendant Rialto Unified School District (RUSD) filed this present

demurrer to the fourth cause of action for failure to warn, train or educate; the seventh cause of

action for IIED; and the ninth and tenth causes of action. RUSD also moved to strike certain

allegations. An amended notice was filed on December 3, 2025. The Plaintiff also dismissed

Defendant Carlos Torres without prejudice on December 3, 2025.

On April 22, 2026, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the demurrer and motion to strike together with

the declaration of Christina J. Nolan, Esq. A second declaration was filed by Ms. Nolan on April

23, 2026, attaching the complaint.

On April 27, 2026, RUSD filed a reply.

Analysis

General Requirements for Public Entity Claim. A public entity is liable only to the extent

expressly provided by statute. (Guzman v. County of Monterrey (2009) 46 Cal.4th 887, 897.) The

statutory law outlining potential liability of public entities is set forth in Government Code §§ 815

through 818.9. The statutory law outlining potential liability of public employees is set forth in

Government Code, §§ 820-823. These provisions are all part of the Government Tort Claims

Act.

The Tort Claims Act was enacted in 1963 following the California Supreme Court decision of

Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211:

“which abolished the doctrine of governmental tort immunity. Government Code section 815

restores sovereign immunity in California except as provided in the Tort Claims Act, or other

statute. Thus the intent of the act is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against

governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated

circumstances: immunity is waived only if the various requirements of the act are

satisfied.” (Williams v Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 838.)

Government Code, § 815 states:

Except as otherwise provided by statute:

(a) A public entity is not liable for an injury whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of

the public entity or a public employee or any other person.

(b) The liability of a public entity is subject to any immunity of the public entity provided by statute

and is subject to any defenses that would be available to the public entity if it were a private

person.

The Legislative Committee Comment to 815 and decisions of the California Supreme Court both

confirm that Section 815 abolishes common law tort liability for public entities. (Miklosy v

Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899.) The language of Section 815

makes clear “the intent of the Tort Claims Act is to confine potential governmental liability not,

expand it” (Eastburn v Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179) and “to

confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances...” (Zelig v County of

Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127.) A cause of action against a public entity must

identify the grounds for statutory liability against the public entity. (See California Government

Tort Liability Practice (4th ed. Cal CEB), § 8.43.)

Fourth Causes of Action for Failure to Warn, Train or Educate. This cause of action is listed in

the Complaint at ¶¶ 107-111. After asserting causes of action for negligent hiring and retention,

Plaintiff asserts this cause of action for failure to warn, train or educate, asserting that

Defendants owned Plaintiff a duty to take reasonable, protective measures to protect Plaintiff

and other minor students from the risk of childhood sexual harassment, molestation and abuse

by properly training and educating students as to the risk.

RUSD argues there is no statutory enactment that creates Gov. Code, §815.6 direct liability.

Section 815.6 provides in full: “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an

enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public

entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty

unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.”

(Gov. Code, § 815.6.) The Complaint states no mandatory duty to warn, train or educate which

would allow direct liability. The demurrer and reply indicate there is a new bill that went into

effect this year requiring the State Department of Education to start working on a plan to

eventually train student regarding sexual abuse. (See Dem. at p. 7:15-17; Rely at p. 2:9-11.)

As for Government Code section 815.2, there is no allegation as to who at the District violated

the standard of care, and the standard of care under common law is that there is no duty. (See

Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Assn., Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1139 (“U.S. Youth

Soccer”.) In U.S. Youth Soccer, the plaintiff was a minor who was sexually abused by her

coach, and the defendants included the national youth soccer organization (US Youth), with

which the plaintiff's team was affiliated through its local league and state association. (U.S.

Youth Soccer, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 1122.) The plaintiff in U.S. Youth Soccer claimed that the

defendants had a duty to protect her by “‘warn[ing], train[ing], or educat[ing] her (either directly or

through her parent or adult employees or team volunteers) about the risk of sex abuse in their

programs from their coaches and of its guidelines to protect her and best practices for youth to

avoid abuse.” (Id., at p. 1138.) The Court of Appeal found that implementing such a program

would be “extraordinarily burdensome” on the defendants. (Id. at p. 1139.) Balancing that burden

against the level of foreseeability of sexual abuse, it found the scope of the defendants’ duty to

protect the plaintiff did not include creating and implementing a sexual abuse education program.

(Ibid.) Thus, there is no common law duty applicable to RUSD, particularly back in the 1990s. In

short, this particular claim is not based on a school administrator’s failure to adequately

supervise or control Torres (as required by C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist.

(2012) 53 Cal.4th 861 (“C.A.”)), but rather on some requirement that an unnamed Doe employee

of the RUSD should have taught elementary school students how to avoid sexual abuse. While

Government Code §815.2, subdivision (a) provides that “[a] public entity is liable for injury

proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of

his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause

of action against that employee or his personal representative” (thereby laying the statutory

framework for liability against the District based on negligent supervision and retention—claims

which are not challenged in this demurrer), there is no direct statute that imposes any duty on an

administrator to teach students to avoid sexual abuse, at least as in 1997 to 1999, that RUSD

was required to follow.

Plaintiff argues that the case law such as C.A., supra, and M.W. v Panama Buena Vista Union

School Dist. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 508, provide a general duty to supervise students. (Opp., at

p. 12.) But neither of those cases states that school districts must train, warn, and educate

students from the late 1990s/early 2000s regarding potential dangers of its own employees or

even third parties. There can be no separate cause of action without a statute. Therefore, the

Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the fourth cause of action for failure to warn, train or educate

with 20 days leave to amend. Because of the strong liberal policy of amendment, it is appropriate

to give Plaintiffs one more opportunity to amend to identify the specific statutes or enactments

that may impose legal duties upon the District.

9th and 10th Causes of Action. These causes of action are listed in the Complaint at ¶¶ 141-152.

The Sexual Harassment and Abuse in Educational Setting alleges that Plaintiff was harmed by

being subject to harassment at BES and within RUSD and Defendants are responsible for the

harm. Torres perpetuated the abuse and Defendants had actual knowledge that sexual abuse

was occurring and acted with deliberate indifference to the alarms. The failure to perform

mandatory duties cause of action argues Defendants failed to follow the statute.

Education Code section 200 states the policy of the State is to provide equal rights and

opportunities in educational institutes, and the purpose of the chapter is to prohibit acts contrary

to that policy. Education Code section 201 declares the legislature’s intent. These provisions

note the purpose and intent to ensure discriminatory and harassment-free public schools.

Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §1681(a), prohibits based on one’s sex from being excluded from participation

in, the denial of benefits, or subject to discrimination under any education program or activity

receiving federal funds. (See also Roe v. Hesperia, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 32.) One injured

by sexual discrimination under this provision may bring a civil action for monetary damages.

(Ibid.) In particular, a student subject to sexual harassment by a teacher may sue the school

district for damages. (Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public School (1992) 503 U.S. 60, 75; Roe v.

Hesperia, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 32.)

Education Code section 220 prohibits a student from being subjected to discrimination based on

various protective classifications, including gender, in any program conducted by an educational

institution that receives or benefits from state financial assistance or enrolls students who

receive state financial aid. The anti-discrimination provisions in the Education Code are like Title

IX, i.e., they both are designed primarily to prevent recipients of state funding from using funds in

a discriminatory manner. (Donovan v. Poway Unified School Dist. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 567,

603.) Thus, Education Code section 220 is analogous to Title IX. (Ibid.)

The District argues the limitation period in section 340.1 does not apply whereby Government

Code section 905, submission (m) does not apply. Code Civ. Proc., §340.1, subdivision (a)(2), is

broad in covering all actions on an entity owing a duty whose wrongful or negligent act had the

effect of legally causing childhood sexual abuse that led to the plaintiff’s injuries. Childhood

sexual assault is defined under the provision of the Penal Code, i.e., (i) procuring a child under

16 for lewd or lascivious acts [Pen. Code, §266j], (ii) incest [Pen. Code, §285], (iii) sodomy [Pen.

Code, §§286, subds. (b)(1)-(2), (c), 311.4, subd. (d)(1)], (iv) lewd or lascivious acts with minors

under 14 years of age with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the sexual desires of

that person [Pen. Code, §§288, subds. (a)-(b), 311.4, subd. (d)(1)], (v) the sexual intercourse

[Pen. Code, §§289, subds. (h)-(j), 311.4, subd. (d)(1)], and (vi) molestation [Pen. Code, §647.6].

(Code Civ. Proc., §340.1, subd. (d) [2023].)

Now, the gravamen of Education Code sections 200, 201, and 220 and Title IX claims is to hold

a school district liable for excluding a student from participating or receiving the benefits of

school programs or activities because of his sex/gender. However, the gravamen of a section

§340.1 type cause of action is holding a school district liable for its negligent behavior causing a

child to be sexually molested, assaulted, sodomized, raped, etc. Thus, the predicated basis of

liability under Education Code sections 200, 201, and 220 and Title IX are not founded within

section 340.1. That means the limitation period does not apply. Furthermore, Education Code

sections 200, 201, and 220 claim would require compliance with the Act. (Fitzgerald v.

Barnstable School Committee (2009) 555 U.S. 246, 255 [noting a Title IX claim does not impose

an administrative exhaustion requirement].)

A Title IX predicate theory borrows the limitation period for personal injury, which in 1997 (when

the injury occurred) was 1 year. (Stanley v. Trustees of California State University (9th Cir.

2006) 433 F.3d 1129, 1134 [noting Title IX borrows the state’s personal injury statute of

limitations]; Taylor v. Regents of University of California (9th Cir. 1993) 993 F.2d 710, 711-12

[noting California’s personal injury statute of limitation is 1 year].) Education Code sections 200,

201, and 220 are statutory claims, so they could be governed by section 338, subdivision (a),

i.e., a 3-year limitation period, but if the liability they impose is founded in common law, then they

are governed by the personal injury limitation period. (West Shield Investigations and Sec.

Consultants v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 935, 952-53 [in addressing the Unruh Act

stated, “Our analysis begins with a review of common law, because ‘[a] cause of action is based

upon a liability created by statute “only where the liability is embodied in a statutory provision

and was of a type which did not exist at common law.”’ [Citaiton.] Thus, where a cause of action

is based upon a statute which did not ‘create a new form of liability ... but merely codified and

refined existing law,’ the section 338 three-year limitations period for actions based upon

statutory liability does not apply. [Citation.]”].)

Furthermore, DOE was a minor in 1997, the statute of limitations would be tolled until he reached

the age of majority. (Code Civ. Proc., §352, subd. (a).) Here, DOE was born in August 1989 (¶1)

so he turned 18 in August 2007. Applying a 1 and 3-year limitation period, DOE needed to file

his Education Code section 220 claim and breach of mandatory duty claims under Education

Code sections 200-201 and Title IX on or before August 2008 and August 2010. The Complaint

was filed 15 years later. Therefore, the Court finds the 9th and 10th causes of action to be time-

barred and SUSTAINS the Demurrer without leave to amend.

Seventh Cause of Action for IIED. As opposed to the claims above, this claim would seem to go

hand and hand with a sexual abuse claim under Code Civ. Proc., §340.1. (See Coats v. New

Haven Unified School Dist. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415.) This cause of action is listed in the

Complaint at ¶¶ 127-135. To state an IIED claim, one must plead, (1) outrageous conduct by the

defendant, (2) intentional or reckless causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional distress,

and (4) causation. (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc.

(2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259.) Outrageous conduct is conduct that is beyond all possible

bounds of decency and is regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.

(Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-51; Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th

488, 496.) The intentional or reckless cause concerns conduct intended to inflict emotional injury

or conduct engaged in with the realization that injury will result. (Christensen v. Superior Court

(Pasadena Crematorium of Altadena) (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.) Furthermore, the intentional

or reckless conduct must be directed at the plaintiff or occur in the presence of the plaintiff.

(Ibid.)

Here, Defendant District argues the IIED cause of action is improper because no

statutory basis provided for it to be asserted against it. It is correct. When pleading a claim

against a government entity, the statute or enactment that is claimed to establish the public

entity’s duty must be identified. (Searcy v. Hemet Unified School District (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d

792, 802.) No statute is identified here.

Per the Opposition, Plaintiff seeks to impose IIED liability under a vicarious liability theory. Per

Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a), a government employer may be vicariously

liable for the acts and omissions of its employees who acted in the course and scope of his

employment. (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 868 [“C.A.”].)

However, a teacher engaging in sexual harassment or abuse of a student is not a matter falling

within the teacher’s scope of employment to hold the employer vicariously liable for the teacher’s

misconduct. (John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 447-53 [“John R.”];

Steven F. v. Anaheim Union High School Dist. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 904, 908-09 [“Steven

F.”].) Nonetheless, a school district can be vicariously liable for the acts of supervisory and

administrative employees who negligently hired, retained, and/or supervised another

teacher/employee. (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 865-66, 868-71.)

Under the above law, Defendant District cannot be held vicariously liable for any emotional

distress damages allegedly caused by Torres sexually abusing DOE. Yet, arguably, it could be

liable for any intentional, outrageous conduct directed toward DOE by a supervisory or

administrative employee. The problem is the Complaint’s allegations only plead intentional and

outrageous conduct by Torres. The purported intentional and outrageous conduct by District

supervisors or administrators is not directed toward DOE, but to purportedly other victims, or in

engaging in a cover-up activity that is not demonstrated done in DOE’s presence (Comp., ¶

128). Thus, no factual predicate basis of intentional and outrageous conduct is pled by a

supervisor or administrative District employee. As this is the first review, Plaintiff may be able to

cure. Therefore, the Court SUSTAINS the Demurrer to the Seventh cause of action with 20 days

leave to amend.

MOTION TO STRIKE

RUSD seeks to strike the allegations that Torres was acting within the course and scope of his

employment and are contrary to John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438,

452 which found that a teacher’s sexual assault on a student is not within teacher’s course and

scope of employment. As such, RUSD moves to strike the following lines and/or paragraphs in

the Complaint without leave to amend:

Request 1: Specifically, Pg. 3, ¶ 9, lines 18-21: states “TORRES was an teacher at BES

employed, supervised, and overseen by RUSD and BES, and was under their complete control

and/or active supervision.”

Request 2: At page 4, ¶ 12, lines 5-12, Plaintiff alleges: “...At all times mentioned herein, there

existed a unity of interest and ownership among Defendants and each of them, such that any

individuality and separateness between Defendants ceased to exist. Defendants, and each of

them, in-interest and/or alter egos of one another, in that they purchased, controlled, dominated

and operated one another without any separate identity, observation of formalities, or other

manner of division. To continue maintaining the facade of a separate and individual existence

between and among Defendants, and each of them, would serve to perpetrate a fraud and an

injustice.”

Request 3: At page 4, ¶ 13, lines 14-16 states: “TORRES was an adult teacher, mentor, and

advisor employee and/or agent of RUSD and BES, acting as an employee, agent, and/or servant

of such and/or was under their complete control and/or supervision, as well as the complete

control of the Board, Superintendent, and Assistant Superintendent of RUSD.”

Request 4: At page 5 ¶ 19, lines 23-26 states: “In doing the things hereinafter alleged,

Defendants and each of them, and TORRES, were acting within the course and scope of said

alternative personality, capacity, identity, agency, representation, and/or employment and were

within the scope of their authority, whether actual or apparent.”

Request 5: At page 5-6 ¶ 20, lines 27-5 states: “Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that

basis alleges, that at all times mentioned herein, Defendants and each of them, and TORRES,

were the trustees, partners, servants, joint venturers, shareholders, contractors, and/or

employees of each and every other Defendant, and the acts and omissions herein alleged were

done by them, acting individually, through such capacity and within the scope of their authority,

and with the permission and consent of each and every other Defendant and that said conduct

was thereafter ratified by each and every other Defendant, and that each of them is jointly and

severally liable to Plaintiff.”

Request 6: At page 6-7, ¶ 27, lines 26-1: “TORRES . . . retained the power and control entrusted

to him by BES and RUSD. In these roles, TORRES was under the direct supervision, employ,

agency, and control of the RUSD, BES, and DOES 1-100...”

Request 7: At page 9, ¶ 37, subpart (a) states: “TORRES engaged in such activities with

Plaintiff while acting in the course and scope of employment, agency, duties, and responsibilities

with Defendants. . . TORRES engaged with Plaintiff in the course and scope of his duties as an

(sic) teacher, advisor, and mentor.”

The main argument is the decision of John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d

438, 450-452 which states:

But although the facts of this case can be made to fit a version of the respondeat superior

doctrine, we are unpersuaded that they should be or that the doctrine is appropriately invoked

here. We draw our decision not from the various factual scenarios in which vicarious liability has

or has not been imposed on employers for the torts of their employees, but instead from the

underlying rationale for the respondeat superior doctrine. 9

"The principal justification for the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior in any case is

the fact that the employer may spread the risk through insurance and carry the cost thereof as

part of his costs of doing business." (Johnston v. Long (1947) 30 Cal.2d 54, 64 [181 P.2d 645].)

"Although earlier authorities sought to justify the respondeat superior doctrine on such theories

as 'control' by the master of the servant, the master's 'privilege' in being permitted to employ

another, the third party's innocence in comparison to the master's selection of the servant, or the

master's 'deep pocket' to pay for the loss, 'the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule

of policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as

a practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of the employer's enterprise, are placed upon

that enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing business.'" (Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co.

(1970) 2 Cal.3d 956, 959-960 [88 Cal.Rptr. 188, 471 P.2d 988], quoting Prosser, Law of Torts

(3d ed. 1964) p. 471.) "Three reasons have been suggested for imposing liability on an

enterprise for the risks incident to the enterprise: '(1) [It] tends to provide a spur toward accident

prevention; (2) it tends to provide greater assurance of compensation for accident victims[;] and

(3) at the same time it tends to provide reasonable assurance that, like other costs, accident

losses will be broadly and equitably distributed among the beneficiaries of the enterprises that

entail them.'" (Perez, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 967, quoting 5 Harper et al., The Law of Torts (2d

ed. 1986) § 26.5, p. 21, fns. omitted.)

The first of these three considerations just noted plays little role in the allocation of responsibility

for the sexual misconduct of employees generally, and with respect to the unique situation of

teachers, indicates that untoward consequences could flow from imposing vicarious liability on

school districts. Although it is unquestionably important to encourage both the careful selection

of these employees and the close monitoring of their conduct, such concerns are, we think,

better addressed by holding school districts to the exercise of due care in such matters and

subjecting them to liability only for their own direct negligence in that regard. Applying the

doctrine of respondeat superior to impose, in effect, strict liability in this context would be far too

likely to deter districts from encouraging, or even authorizing, extracurricular and/or one-on-one

contacts between teachers and students or to induce districts to impose such rigorous controls

on activities of this nature that the educational process would be negatively affected. 10

Nor is the second consideration -- the assurance of compensation for accident victims --

appropriately invoked here. The acts here differ from the normal range of risks for which costs

can be spread and insurance sought. (See Alma W., supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 144.) The

imposition of vicarious liability on school districts for the sexual torts of their employees would

tend to make insurance, already a scarce resource, even harder to obtain, and could lead to the

diversion of needed funds from the classroom to cover claims.

The only element of the analysis that might point in favor of vicarious liability here is the propriety

of spreading the risk of loss among the beneficiaries of the enterprise. School districts and the

community at large benefit from the authority placed in teachers to carry out the educational

mission, and it can be argued that the consequences of an abuse of that authority should be

shared on an equally broad basis. But the connection between the authority conferred on

teachers to carry out their instructional duties and the abuse of that authority to indulge in

personal, sexual misconduct is simply too attenuated to deem a sexual assault as falling within

the range of risks allocable to a teacher's employer. It is not a cost this particular enterprise

should bear, and the consequences of imposing liability are unacceptable.

In sum, we believe the Court of Appeal erred in looking mainly to the factual similarities between

this case and White, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d 566, and in failing to consider whether the

underlying justifications for the respondeat superior doctrine would be served by imposing

vicarious liability here. We need not and do not decide whether White itself was properly decided

or whether the job-created authority theory has any validity in evaluating vicarious liability for the

torts of police officers. It suffices here to note that the authority of a police officer over a motorist

-- bolstered most immediately by his uniform, badge and firearm, and only slightly less so by the

prospect of criminal sanctions for disobedience -- plainly surpasses that of a teacher over a

student. The teacher's authority is different in both degree and kind, and it is simply not great

enough to persuade us that vicarious liability should attach here for the teacher's tort.

Furthermore, invoking respondeat superior here would raise an entirely different specter of

untoward consequences, or interference with the purposes for which the authority was conferred

in the first place, than might result from the imposition of vicarious liability in the limited context of

a police officer's abuse of authority. We doubt that police departments would deprive their

officers of weapons or preclude them from enforcing the laws, but we see a significant and

unacceptable risk that school districts would be dissuaded from permitting teachers to interact

with their students on any but the most formal and supervised basis.

The law seems clear. Thus, the Court GRANTS the motion to strike in part as to requests # 2, 4,

5, 6 and 7. RUSD cannot be liable for Torres’ alleged conduct, but for the “negligence of

administrators or supervisors in hiring, supervising and retaining a school employee who

sexually harasses and abuses a student.” (CA v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012)

53 Cal.4th 861, 879.) The other requests just show that Torres was an employee of the

elementary school and District. There can be no liability but for the negligence of administrators

or supervisors in hiring, supervising, and retaining Torres.

RULING

For all the reasons set forth above, the Court:

1. FINDS a proper meet and confer;

2. SUSTAINS the demurrer to the fourth and seventh causes of action with 20 days

leave to amend;

3. SUSTAINS the demurrer to the ninth and tenth causes of action without leave to

amend;

4. GRANTS the motion to strike in part as to Requests #2, 4, 5, 6 and 7.