Demurrer to First Amended Complaint; Request to deem admissions admitted
Plaintiffs also argue that this action arose from the Encroachment Permit, which allowed the City to add gravel to its driveway. Plaintiffs appear to argue that the Encroachment Permit does not reference the City’s right to use of the driveway. Plaintiffs provide no authority that this is somehow required. Nor, again, does the SAC state a viable claim to dispute that the City owns rights to Lafferty Ranch and access to it.
10. Increased use of Lafferty Ranch Plaintiffs argue that even if the City does have access rights to Lafferty Ranch, “Plaintiffs’ claims remain viable if the City exceeded the scope of that right by installing improvements, expanding public recreational use, facilitating group hikes, altering land, creating wildfire and insurance risks, clouding title, or burdening Plaintiffs’ Properties beyond any lawful access right.” (Oppo., 5:10-13.) Plaintiffs’ argument appears to be that the City may not develop Lafferty Ranch in a way that increases public use of it. Plaintiffs fail to identify which cause of action would support this argument.
11. Conclusion and Order Plaintiffs appear to argue that because the City applied for the Encroachment Permit to add gravel to their road, Plaintiffs may now question whether the City has a right to access its property. However, Plaintiffs do not allege any facts which would support an allegation of a lack of right to access Lafferty Ranch. Rather, they attempt to turn the tables on the City and argue the City must now prove it owns an easement over the public access road in order to add gravel to it and allow members of the public to continue to travel over it.
Plaintiffs’ attempt to hinder public access to Lafferty Ranch based upon conduct by City employees fails. Plaintiffs have not alleged any viable cause of action against the City or its employees. In addition, Plaintiffs have not shown how they could possibly amend the SAC to allege a valid cause of action. The allegations in the SAC remain unacceptably vague. Even in opposition, Plaintiffs vaguely argue that the City has accessed Plaintiffs’ properties. Despite being Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, they have not alleged which of their properties has been damaged by improvements or activity by a City employee; thus, it seems Plaintiffs are unable to justifiably assert these allegations.
Accordingly, the demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. The City’s counsel is directed to submit a written order to the court consistent with this ruling and in compliance with Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.
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I. Demurrer This matter is on calendar for the demurrer of Defendant John W. Hopen (“Defendant” or “Hopen”) to the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed by Plaintiff Nicole Wolff (“Plaintiff”). Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for Quantum Meruit on the grounds it is barred by the two-year statute of limitations, for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and as valid and enforceable agreements existed between the parties; to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for Forced Labor on the grounds that Plaintiff lacks standing; to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for Fraud on the grounds of failure to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action, lack of standing, and failure to plead with specificity.
1. FAC The FAC alleges that for five and a half years, from January 2017 through May 31, 2022, Nishlon Watson (“Watson”) provided seventeen hours of services per day, six days a week, at the request of Defendant, who only compensated her with $500 per week. It alleges Watson was recruited to work as a live-in part-time Estate Manager and then coerced into working more than 10 had been agreed upon by using Watson’s fear of becoming homeless against her. Plaintiff alleges that when Watson finally left in May of 2022, after Defendant informed Plaintiff her services were no longer needed, Defendant threatened Watson with fabricated criminal prosecution to induce her to sign a settlement agreement and coerced her into believing she had no other options.
2. CCP section 430.60 In opposition, Plaintiff argues Defendant’s demurrer should be discarded pursuant to CCP section 430.60, which provides: “A demurrer shall distinctly specify the grounds upon which any of the objections to the complaint, cross-complaint, or answer are taken. Unless it does so, it may be disregarded.” As noted above, Defendant’s demurrer specifies the grounds upon which it is made.
3. Contractual Rights – Settlement Agreement - Rescission Plaintiff’s contract with Watson assigns Watson’s rights against the Defendant to Plaintiff. Defendant argues Watson already settled her claims with Defendant such as there was nothing left to assign. Watson and Defendant’s settlement agreement (“Settlement Agreement”) is attached to the FAC as Exhibit G-2. Watson and Defendant signed the Settlement Agreement on May 4, 2022. The terms provide that Defendant would pay Watson $22,000 to settle “all of Watson’s claims against Hopen.” (Agreement, ¶D.)
Paragraph 6 states: “Complete General Release. In consideration for the promises set forth in this Agreement, Watson does hereby — for herself and for her heirs, representatives, attorneys, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns — release, acquit, remise, and forever discharge Hopen, Love Conquered Records and Wild Turkey Records, LLC and each of their respective current and/or former owners, shareholders, members, officers, employees, independent contractors, representatives, and attorneys, past or present, and all persons acting under, by, through, or in concert with any of them (collectively, the “Releasees”), from any and all actions, causes of action, obligations, costs, expenses, damages, losses, claims, liabilities, suits, debts, demands, and benefits (including attorneys’ fees and costs), of whatever character, in law or in equity, known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, of any kind or nature whatsoever, now existing or arising in the future, based on any act, omission, event, occurrence, or nonoccurrence from the beginning of time to the date of execution hereof, including but not limited to any claims or causes of action arising out of or in any way relating to Watson’s provision of services at the Hopen Property, occupancy of the Hopen Property, or which she might otherwise seek to raise against Hopen.”
Watson’s assignment to Plaintiff is dated and made effective February 3, 2025. (FAC, Exhibit E.) Assuming no breach of the contract; i.e., that Defendant paid Watson, Watson already settled with Defendant such that she had nothing left to assign. In opposition, Plaintiff argues a determination on the above issue is an evidentiary matter that cannot be made on a demurrer. However, Plaintiff has attached the Settlement Agreement to the FAC. On a demurrer, the court accepts the truth of material facts properly pleaded in the operative complaint, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Nealy v.
County of Orange (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 594, 596.) The court may also look to exhibits attached to the complaint for operative facts. (Id., at p. 596-597.) And because the “allegations that we accept as true necessarily include the contents of any exhibits attached to the complaint, ... in the event of a conflict between the pleading and an exhibit, the facts contained in the exhibit take precedence over and supersede any inconsistent or contrary allegations in the pleading.” (Id., at p. 597.) Plaintiff also acknowledges the Settlement Agreement was entered into between Watson and Defendant but alleges that Watson was forcibly induced to settle her claims under the threat of criminal prosecution. 11
While rescission of a contract is allowable under Civil Code section 1689 based upon duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, recovery here first requires Watson to rescind the Settlement Agreement. Plaintiff cannot do that on Watson’s behalf as nothing was assigned to Plaintiff as all disputes between Watson and Defendant were settled and Watson has not rescinded the Settlement Agreement. Civil Code section 1689 requires a “party to the contract” to rescind the agreement. Therefore, Plaintiff’s argument that Watson was fraudulently induced into accepting settlement need not be decided.
4. Additional Arguments As the above issue disposes of Plaintiff’s right to bring this suit, the court need not address the remainder of the issues.
5. Conclusion and Order Based upon the foregoing, the demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend to add Watson as a party. Otherwise, the demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Defendant is directed to submit a written order to the court consistent with this ruling and in compliance with Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.
II. Request to Deem Admissions Admitted Plaintiff Nicole Wolff (“Plaintiff”) moves pursuant to CCP sections 2023.010 et seq., and 2033.280 that the truth of the matters, and the genuineness of all specified documents, in her Request for Admissions, Set A-1 (“RFAs”), served on Defendant John W. Hopen (“Defendant”) on February 2, 2026, be deemed admitted. Plaintiff requests sanctions in the amount of $675 against Defendant and his attorney of record. Based upon the ruling on the demurrer, this issue is MOOT.
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