Kristin Gordon vs. Mendocino Area Parks Association

34-2022-00322703-CU-OE-GDS: Kristin Gordon vs. Mendocino Area Parks Association, a California non-profit corporation 06/02/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Sharon Comas to Answer Deposition Questions and Produce Documents in Department 53

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TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff Kristin Gordon’s (“Plaintiff”) motion to compel Sharon Comas to answer deposition questions and produce documents and request for monetary sanctions is ruled upon as follows.

Background

This is an employment action. Plaintiff asserts causes of action against the California Department of Parks and Recreation (“Defendant”) for discrimination, harassment, and retaliation based on Plaintiff’s disability, age and gender. Plaintiff alleges her supervisor, Bill Maslach, was biased against older women and used Plaintiff’s medical leave as an opportunity to replace her with a younger female. Plaintiff further alleges she was moved to a different position after her leave, and her attempts to promote were sabotaged by Maslach.

According to the moving papers, Plaintiff deposed EEO Manager Sharon Comas on September 19, 2024. Defendant’s counsel instructed Comas not to answer questions regarding CDCR’s investigations of other complaints accusing Maslach of discrimination, harassment or retaliation. Prior to the deposition, Defendant objected to a number of document requests contained in the notice and refused to produce responsive documents. On February 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking to compel Defendant to produce “1) emails to, from, or referencing Plaintiff (aka ‘email dump’), 2) documents reflecting praise, discipline and/or criticisms of Maslach’s job performance at CDPR for the period of January 2018 to present; 3) all unproduced portions CDPR’s investigation records pertaining to Plaintiff’s complaints, including missing audiotapes, interview summaries, signed investigation reports, emails to witnesses etc.; 4) all complaints of discrimination, retaliation and/or harassment brought against Maslach within the last ten years; and 5) CDPR’s communications with the California Civil Rights Division or federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regarding Plaintiff.” (Id., 2:23-3:2.)

Plaintiff moves

34-2022-00322703-CU-OE-GDS: Kristin Gordon vs. Mendocino Area Parks Association, a California non-profit corporation 06/02/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Sharon Comas to Answer Deposition Questions and Produce Documents in Department 53

for relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480, subd. (a). Defendant opposes on the basis that Plaintiff’s counsel failed to meet and confer in good faith prior to filing the instant motion and that Defendant’s objections are made in good faith. The Court continued the matter to June 2, 2025, and ordered the parties to continue to meet and confer. The parties were directed to file a joint statement outlining any remaining issues for the Court’s consideration. On May 12, 2025, the parties submitted a joint statement indicating document request nos. 17, 18, 22, and 23 remain unresolved. The Court addresses these requests below.

Legal Standard

Any party may obtain discovery by taking in California the oral deposition of any person, including any party to the action. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.010.) A party desiring to take an oral deposition of a person who is under the jurisdiction of the court shall give written notice of the deposition. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.220, subd. (a).) “If a deponent fails to answer any question . . ., the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer . . . .” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (a).) In addition, a party seeking to take the deposition of a party may also request that the deponent produce documents at the deposition by including in the notice of deposition a “specification with reasonable particularity of any materials or category of materials, including any electronically stored information, to be produced by the deponent.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.220, subd. (a)(4).) “If a deponent fails . . . to produce any document or tangible thing under the deponent’s control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling . . . production.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (a).) Further, a motion seeking to compel production of documents identified in the deposition notice must set forth facts showing good cause justifying the production of the documents sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(1).) In order to show “good cause,” the burden is on the moving party to make a “fact specific showing of relevance.” (Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) In other words, the party requesting the discovery “must identify a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and explain how the discovery sought will tend in reason to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00322703-CU-OE-GDS: Kristin Gordon vs. Mendocino Area Parks Association, a California non-profit corporation 06/02/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Sharon Comas to Answer Deposition Questions and Produce Documents in Department 53

prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.” (Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216, 224, disapproved on other grounds, Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557 fn.8.) “In the context of discovery, evidence is ‘relevant’ if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible evidence.” (Glenfed Develop. Corp., supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 1117.)

Discussion

Request No. 17: “All DOCUMENTS reflecting any communications to, from or regarding GORDON from January 1, 2018 to present, including but not limited to interoffice email transmissions (i.e., “email dump”), letters, memoranda, and the like.” Defendant objects on the grounds that the request is vague, ambiguous and overbroad, calls for attorney-client privilege and confidential third-party information, and unduly burdensome to Defendant. Defendant noted it would be “producing responsive communications in response to other requests.

See responses to Requests for Demand Nos. 13, 14, 16, 21 and 29.” After conducting further meet and confer efforts, only the objections regarding scope and relevance remain at issue in the joint statement submitted by the parties. Plaintiff argues “Emails to, from or referencing Plaintiff (commonly known as an “email dump”) may contain relevant information concerning the events leading to her forced resignation from CDPR and wrongful termination from the associated non-profit. The emails also may contain admissions by CDPR, such as its knowledge of Plaintiff’s internal complaints, her supervisor’s falsification of her alleged performance deficiencies or undercut defense witnesses’ credibility.

Moreover, the “email dump” is within CDPR’s possession, custody and/or control in that all sought-after emails are maintained on State of California server accessible by its IT personnel. Therefore, the Court should order CDPR to produce the email dump. The authority relied upon by Plaintiff is that Evidence Code section 352 “permits evidence that leads or may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Joint Statement, 3:4-5.) Defendant represents that it has produced over 1,200 documents in this case, including more than 500 email communications to, from, and regarding Gordon during the course of this litigation. (Declaration of Ofelia Olmedo, ¶3.)

Defendant’s additional blanket

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00322703-CU-OE-GDS: Kristin Gordon vs. Mendocino Area Parks Association, a California non-profit corporation 06/02/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Sharon Comas to Answer Deposition Questions and Produce Documents in Department 53

search for communications as phrased by Plaintiff yields 12,200 email communications, which will take an excess of 400 estimated hours to review prior to production.[1] The Court has discretion to weigh the burden of compliance (such as cost, time, expense and disruption of normal business) against the likelihood of producing helpful information to avoid duplicative production and to narrow demands. (Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1497.) Here, the Court concludes that Defendant’s objection as to undue burden is sustained.

Defendant represents its search for communications as phrased by Plaintiff yields 12,200 email communications, which will take an excess of 400 estimated hours to review prior to production. Defendant’s calculation assumes 2 minutes spent review each email. The Court finds Defendant’s 2-minute estimate is excessive and finds 1 minute per email to be more reasonable. Even so, 12,200 minutes amounts to 203 hours of time to review, not accounting for any time required to redact any privileged information prior to production.

Moreover, the Court finds Plaintiff has not established good cause for an order compelling compliance with the request as phrased, considering the undue burden demonstrated by Defendant and the documents already produced in this case. Plaintiff makes no argument as to any specific documents she believes have been wrongfully withheld from production, further explanation as to how Defendant previous production has been insufficient to provide the information Plaintiff seeks, or facts otherwise demonstrating that good cause exists to compel production of the documents sought by this request.

Nor does Plaintiff contend she is unable to obtain the documents sought from any other source, such as through depositions. Having found no good cause to compel production, the motion as to request no. 17 is DENIED. Request no. 18: All DOCUMENTS referring or relating to any praise, discipline and/or criticisms of Bill Maslach’s job performance at CDPR for the period of January 2018 to present, including but not limited to performance evaluations, counselings, promotions, disciplines, and the like.

Defendant objects to the request as vague, ambiguous, over broad in scope, unduly burdensome, not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, and that the request invades third-party privacy as well as that the requests are overly broad and unduly burdensome. The joint statement limits the issues to the third party privacy objection.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00322703-CU-OE-GDS: Kristin Gordon vs. Mendocino Area Parks Association, a California non-profit corporation 06/02/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Sharon Comas to Answer Deposition Questions and Produce Documents in Department 53

Defendant argues Maslach is not a named defendant in this case, and as the custodian of Maslach’s private information, Defendant may not waive Maslach’s privacy rights regarding documents in his personnel file on his behalf. There is a constitutionally protected zone of privacy set forth under Article I, Section 1 of California's Constitution. (Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 526, 528-529, overruled in part by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557.)

The California Supreme Court has decided the analytical framework for assessing a privacy claim: (1) there must be a specific legally, protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy must exist; and (3) the invasion of the privacy interest must be serious. (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 39-40.) It is well established that personnel records and employment history are within the privacy protection afforded by the state and federal Constitutions. (San Diego Trolley, Inc. v.

Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1097.) Courts must place the burden on the party asserting the privacy interest to establish its extent and the seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interest the opposing party identifies. (See Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 557.) While Maslach is central to Plaintiff’s allegations, he is not named as a defendant to this action. Plaintiff argues the documents sought from Maslach’s personnel file are likely to contain “me too” evidence of Maslach’s discrimination of women, which is relevant to Plaintiff’s ability to establish that Maslach engaged in a pattern of discrimination and harassment against older women such as Plaintiff.

Plaintiff cites to El Dorado Savings & Loan Assn. v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 342 for the proposition that the contents of a non-party’s personnel file relevant to the plaintiff’s discrimination claim may be compelled if the privacy rights are outweighed. (See El Dorado Savings & Loan Assn. v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 342, disapproved by Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 557, fn.8.) However, in El Dorado Savings, the court found the record was inadequate to support disclosure of the entire personnel file. (El Dorado Savings, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at 346.)

Similarly here, the documents Plaintiff seeks are akin to seeking Maslach’s personnel file, including personal information that would not reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Even being produced under the auspices of a protective order, Maslach’s private information would still be disseminated to individuals beyond those whom he would normally expect to have access and therefore is subject to a right of privacy. In balancing Plaintiff’s countervailing interest of discovering “me too” evidence, the request is not narrowly tailed to seek only documents that are reasonably likely to contain such information.

To

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00322703-CU-OE-GDS: Kristin Gordon vs. Mendocino Area Parks Association, a California non-profit corporation 06/02/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Sharon Comas to Answer Deposition Questions and Produce Documents in Department 53

the extent Plaintiff believes the requested documents would reveal that Maslach discriminated against other older women, Plaintiff could obtain the information through less intrusive means such as deposition of Maslach or a deposition of Defendant’s PMK. In fact, Defendant represents that the parties have agreed Maslach will testify as to his past discipline and job performance. On balance, the Court finds Plaintiff’s need for the information sought does not outweigh the non-party privacy interest here.

The privacy objection is SUSTAINED. The motion as to request no. 18 is DENIED. Request no. 22: All DOCUMENTS regarding CDPR having knowledge of any complaints of discrimination, retaliation and/or harassment brought against Bill Maslach at CDPR within the last ten (10) years. Request no. 23: All DOCUMENTS regarding any investigation by CDPR into complaints of discrimination, retaliation and/or harassment involving Bill Maslach at CDPR within the last ten (10) years. Defendant objects to the request as vague, ambiguous, over broad in scope, unduly burdensome, not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, invading attorney-client privilege and third-party privacy, as well as that the requests are overly broad and unduly burdensome.

The joint statement limits the issues to the overly broad objection. Defendant argues Plaintiff alleges she was subject to discrimination by Maslach from 2018 until she resigned in January 2019. Defendant also argues that the request is overly broad because it seeks documents created five years after Plaintiff’s employment ended with CDPR. Defendant further argues the request is too broad to constitute “me too” evidence because complaints of discrimination, retaliation, and/or harassment based on protected classes other than Plaintiff’s are not admissible at trial. (See Hatai v.

Dept. of Transportation (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1297-98.) As part of the meet and confer efforts, Plaintiff agrees to limit Demand 22 (and presumably Demand 23 based on the representations in the Joint Statement) to the same type of complaints raised by Plaintiff (medical condition, gender, or age), except any complaint of retaliation should be produced. While other complaints against Maslach may not ultimately be admissible at trial as “me too” evidence, depending on the nature of the complaints, the information must only be reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. (Glenfed Develop.

Corp., supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 1117.) Therefore, the Court is not inclined to narrow the scope of the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00322703-CU-OE-GDS: Kristin Gordon vs. Mendocino Area Parks Association, a California non-profit corporation 06/02/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Sharon Comas to Answer Deposition Questions and Produce Documents in Department 53

request to complaints by individuals in the same protected classes as Plaintiff, beyond the limits that Plaintiff has agreed upon as set forth in the Joint Statement. The Court agrees with Defendant, however, that the time period identified in the request is overly broad in that it seeks complaints that occurred well after Plaintiff left her employment with CDPR. The Court finds narrowing the scope of the request to complaints brought against Maslach at CDPR between January 2015 and February 2022 or that relate to alleged conduct during that period is appropriate here.

To the extent Defendant has in its possession, custody, or control, documents responsive to this request that contain attorney-client privilege or attorney-work product, Defendant is to properly detail these documents in a privilege log. All names of third parties must be redacted prior to production. The motion as to request nos. 22 and 23 is GRANTED, as narrowed in scope by Plaintiff and the Court above. Sanctions Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is denied as Plaintiff’s motion is granted only in part and Defendant’s opposition was not without substantial justification.

Disposition

The motion as to request nos. 17 and 18 is DENIED. The motion as to request nos. 22 and 23 is GRANTED in part, as narrowed by the Court’s ruling. The request for sanctions is DENIED. The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.

[1] Defendant’s calculation assumes 2 minutes spent review each email. The Court finds this excessive and finds 1

minute per email is a more reasonable estimation. Even so, 12,200 minutes amounts to 203 hours of time to review. Assuming Defendant’s counsel is billing a rate of $200/hour, the search would cost Defendant approximately $40,000.