Demurrer to First Amended Complaint
Courts apply a lodestar method to calculate reasonable attorneys’ fees. (Meister v. U.C. Regents (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 448-49.) The court determines a lodestar figure based on a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48-49.)
Here, Ipsen Defendants are clearly the prevailing party as the Court entered judgment for Defendants and against plaintiff Jay Arrash Salemi (Plaintiff) on each and every cause of action. (See ROA 229.) The contract upon which Plaintiff’s claims are based contains a broad attorneys’ fees clause which encompasses all causes of action asserted against Ipsen Defendants in this matter. (See Complaint, Ex. A [California Residential Purchase Agreement and Joint Escrow Instructions, ¶ 25].) As such, Ipsen Defendants are entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees based on the above provision of the contract for both the contract and tort claims. (Santisas, supra, 17 Cal.4th at 608.)
The Court finds the claimed hourly rates reasonable and adequately supported by counsels’ declarations. (See Martinez Decl., ¶¶ 4, 6; Morasse Decl., ¶ 4; see also, Baer v. Tedder (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1160-1161—prevailing attorneys’ declarations attesting based on their years of experience practicing law in the area, their standard billing rates were reasonable, were sufficient to support a finding that hourly rates were reasonable.)
The Court has reviewed counsels’ declarations and the billing records for Fox Rothschild LLP and Morasse Collins & Clark and determines the time expended by both firms to be generally reasonable with no obvious duplication or padding. While the total amount of fees sought is substantial, the amount of time incurred is supported by counsels’ declarations and the detailed billing records. Plaintiff filed no opposition and thus has raised no argument to dispute the reasonableness of the fees claimed.
Based on the foregoing, the motion is GRANTED.
Ipsen Defendants are awarded attorneys’ fees against Plaintiff in the requested sum of $80,173.59, which is comprised of $20,385.84 for Fox Rothschild LLP and $59,787.75 for Morasse Collins & Clark.
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Counsel for Ipsen Defendants shall submit a proposed order and shall give notice of this ruling. 8 Freeman v. O/C Primoris Services Corp. 9 Ahmadi v. TI Before the Court is the Demurrer to First Amended Complaint filed Properties, on 4/3/26 by Defendant Tulio Illiano (“Illiano”), as to the First Inc. et al Amended Complaint filed on 3/23/26 by Plaintiff Zaki Ahmadi (“Plaintiff”). This Demurrer, which is directed to the First, Second, Third and Fourth causes of action (each a “COA”) in the FAC, is SUSTAINED as to each of those COAs.
For COA 1, alter-ego is sufficiently alleged. (FAC ¶¶ 8, 11.) For pleading purposes on an alter-ego claim, it is sufficient to allege only ultimate rather than evidentiary facts. (Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 236.) However, the FAC fails to state how the contract at issue was allegedly breached. The assertions in the FAC at ¶¶ 29-32 do not identify any contractual obligation that any defendant failed to fulfill. In addition, as the Opposition concedes, although the FAC states that the contract at issue is attached, the FAC does not attach it. The Demurrer as to COA 1 is therefore SUSTAINED.
For COAs 2-4, the FAC again fails to state any cognizable claim. For a fraud claim, every element must be alleged in full, factually and specifically: the policy of liberal construction of pleading will not be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect. (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.) The particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts that show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered. (Id.)
For a negligent misrepresentation claim, the defendant need not have knowledge of the falseness of the representation or the intent to defraud. But a negligent misrepresentation must ordinarily be as to past or existing material facts: predictions as to future events, or statements as to future action by some third party, are deemed opinions, and not actionable fraud. (Tarmann, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at 158.)
Here, Plaintiff has again just made assertions as to multiple defendants, without adequate specificity. Plaintiff must allege what specifically was said, by whom, to whom, when and where that occurred, and whether it was oral or written. Plaintiff also appears to have based these claims entirely on predictions as to future events, or statements as to future action by some third party, which are deemed opinions, and not actionable fraud. (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 158.) Greater specificity is also required for the other elements of each of these claims, including the basis for any claim of reasonable reliance. The Demurrer is therefore SUSTAINED as to COAs 2-4.
Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend. However, Plaintiff should carefully consider any further amendment and fully plead all facts to support these claims, as further leave to amend should not be assumed.
The clerk is to give notice of this ruling. 10 Eymert v. Bok The motion of plaintiffs Peter Eymert, by and through his successor- Senior Hotel, in-interest Karl Eymert; Karl Eymert; and Petra Eymert (collectively, et al. Plaintiffs) for an order granting Plaintiffs’ application for separate judgment against defaulted defendant La Habra Villa LLC (La Habra Villa) is DENIED.
“In an action against several defendants, the Court may, in its discretion, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others, whenever a several judgment is proper.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 579.)