Objective Standard Institute v. Barney et. al.

requested alternative dates by email, but no response was provided. Honda again renewed its request for alternative dates by email on April 16, 2026, but still no response was provided. A telephone call regarding the matter was also unreturned.

These sanctions are imposed against Plaintiff and his counsel of record, Quill & Arrow, LLP, jointly and severally, and are to be paid to Honda, through its counsel of record, within 20 days after service of notice of this ruling.

Counsel for Honda is to give notice. 4 City of Garden Before the Court at present is the “Motion to Reduce the Excessive Grove v. and Unconstitutional Administrative Fines Issued by the City of Weber Garden Grove,” filed on 6/8/26 by Bradley K. Weber (“Owner”).

The Motion is GRANTED IN PART, as to the $5,600 sum identified by the City of Garden Grove (“City”) for four citations issued prior to 2020, and for one $1,600 duplicate citation, but otherwise DENIED.

City has asserted in its Opposition that Owner failed to pursue the administrative remedies available to him regarding the citations he now challenges, so that the court is without jurisdiction to overturn the administrative fines he disputes here.

True, exhaustion of administrative remedies does not deprive a court of subject matter jurisdiction; the exhaustion requirement may be waived and is subject to a number of exceptions. In the present case, Owner does not dispute that he failed to pursue the administrative remedies available to him, arguing instead that doing so would have been futile. But Owner has failed to show that this was so.

Owner’s Request for Judicial Notice, filed as ROA 406, is GRANTED as to the existence of the records under Ev. Code §§ 452(c) and (d).

City is to give notice of this ruling. 5 Objective Plaintiff Objective Standard Institute move for an order sealing Standard confidential attorney-client privileged information contained in Institute v. portions of the motion to disqualify counsel, the supporting Barney et. al. declaration of Jason Haas and exhibits D, E, G and H attached thereto. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.

“[A] reasoned decision about sealing or unsealing records cannot be made without identifying and weighing the competing interests and concerns. Such a process is impossible without (1) identifying the specific information claimed to be entitled to such treatment; (2) identifying the nature of the harm threatened by disclosure; and (3) identifying and accounting for countervailing considerations. The burden of presenting information sufficient to accomplish the first two steps is logically placed upon the party seeking the sealing of the documents, who is presumptively in the best position to know what disclosures will harm him and how. This means at a minimum that the party seeking to seal documents, or maintain them under seal, must come forward with a specific enumeration of the facts

sought to be withheld and specific reasons for withholding them.” (H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 879, 894.)

Here, Plaintiff failed to meet its burden identifying any harm threatened by disclosure. The specific information sought to be sealed is already publicly available. Exhibits D, E and G have been filed in federal court, and Plaintiff concedes the information has also been disclosed in pleadings filed in this court, including in the declaration of Ann Sanz and OSI’s evidentiary objections to the Ann Sanz declaration. (ROA 46, 52; see Motion, p. 6.) There is no evidence Plaintiff ever filed a motion to seal those documents. As such, the Court finds no prejudice to Plaintiff if the records are not sealed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d)(3).) The motion is therefore DENIED.

Counsel for Plaintiff shall provide notice of this ruling. 6 Rojas v. Plaintiff Elizabeth Rojas’ unopposed motion to strike the answer of Alamirad defendant Alamarid Dental Corp. is GRANTED, with 30 days’ leave Dental Corp to amend.

Defendant Farzan Alamarid (Alamarid) filed the answer “individually and on behalf of Alamarid Dental Corp.” (ROA 51.) However, “a corporation must be represented in court by an attorney.” (Gutierrez v. G & M Oil Co., Inc. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 551, 564.) A corporate officer, shareholder, or employee who is not a licensed attorney may not file pleadings or otherwise appear for the corporation. (Merco Construction Engineers, Inc. v. Municipal Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 724, 729-731.) Alamirad did not file the answer as counsel of record for Alamirad Dental Corp. and instead filed the pleading in pro per. The motion to strike is therefore granted. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 435.) Defendant shall have 30 days’ leave to amend. (CLD Construction, Inc. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1152 [pleading filed by self-represented corporation is a curable defect].)

Counsel for Plaintiff shall give notice of this ruling. 7 Salemi v. The motion for attorneys’ fees filed by defendants Kemp Ipsen and Pappas Maria Elena Ipsen (collectively, Ipsen Defendants) is GRANTED.

In an action to enforce a contract authorizing an award of fees and costs to one party, the party “prevailing on the contract” is entitled to reasonable fees in accordance with Civil Code section 1717. (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 615–617; Exxess Electronixx v. Heger Realty Corp. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 698, 706– 707.) “[T]he party prevailing on the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract.” (Civ. Code § 1717(b)(1).)

“If a contractual attorney fee provision is phrased broadly enough...it may support an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action alleging both contract and tort claims[.]” (Santisas, supra, 17 Cal.4th at 608; see also, Thompson v. Miller (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 327, 336.)