MARTINEZ vs BRISTOL WEST INSURANCE SERVICES OF CALIFORNIA, INC

Following the investigation, CNIC advised Juarez and Martinez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) that there was no insurance coverage under the policy for the incident, and Plaintiff’s statements of the incident were inconsistent with the damages. (UMF 44.) CNIC’s insurance policy required the insured to provide accurate and complete information, and the policy could be voided if the insured misrepresented any material fact or circumstances, or engaged in fraudulent conduct. (UMF 44, 61.) The insurance policy excludes property damage or injury intentionally caused by the insured. (UMF 62.) CNIC stated that the damage to the Vehicle was not the result of an “accident” as the term is defined in the insurance policy. (UMF 48, 50.)

Plaintiffs initiated this action on December 19, 2024. The operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed on April 17, 2025 alleges (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Bad Faith Insurance Practices; (3) Negligence; (4) Conversion; and (5) Unfair Business Practices. Plaintiffs generally allege that CNIC wrongfully denied the total loss insurance claim for the Vehicle. (FAC ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs further allege that at CNIC’s direction, Plaintiffs delivered the vehicle to Copart and surrendered the original title to Copart. (FAC ¶ 21(a)-(c).) When Plaintiffs sought clarification regarding the denial of the claim and sought to retrieve the Vehicle from Copart, Plaintiffs could not obtain the original title. (FAC ¶¶ 22-24.)

Plaintiffs allege that CNIC wrongfully exercised control over the Vehicle and its title without just cause and by failing to facilitate the return or salvage of the Vehicle after denial of the claim. (FAC ¶¶ 49-51.) Plaintiffs allege that as a result of CNIC’s conduct, they incurred damages including financial losses, storage and administrative fees, loss of the Vehicle and its value, emotional distress, and legal costs. (FAC ¶¶ 52-54.)

LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 850.) “That is because of the general principle that a party who seeks a court’s action in his favor bears the burden of persuasion thereon.” (Id.) Further, “the party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Id.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Id.)

A defendant moving for summary judgment may demonstrate that the plaintiff’s cause of action has no merit by showing that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV103906: MARTINEZ vs BRISTOL WEST INSURANCE SERVICES OF CALIFORNIA, INC 07/02/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment CRS# 873849981565 in Department 517 (McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 564.)

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

“In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion. Objections to evidence that are not ruled on for purposes of the motion shall be preserved for appellate review.” (C.C.P. § 437c(q).)

The Court declines to rule on Defendant’s evidentiary objections except for those discussed further below, as they are not considered pertinent to the disposition of the motion. (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 532.)

DISCUSSION

Procedural Issues

As a procedural matter, Plaintiffs’ response to Defendant’s separate statement fails to comply with Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d) and (f)(2), as Plaintiffs fails to unequivocally state whether CNIC fact is disputed or undisputed. Plaintiffs’ disputed facts are not followed by a reference to supporting evidence. (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 875.) (E.g., UMF 17, 19-22, 25, 27, 31, 34, 36, 38, 41-43, 46, 49, 53-57, 63.)

The trial court has the right to refuse to proceed with a summary judgment motion in the absence of an adequate separate statement from the opposing party. (Collins v. Hertz Corp. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 64, 74.) However, the separate statement is defective as to matters that have been otherwise conceded by Plaintiffs; therefore, the errors are not pertinent to the resolution of the instant motion. As such, the Court shall proceed notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ procedural defects.

Plaintiffs Concede Summary Adjudication of the First, Second, Third, and Fifth Causes of Action

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs concede the motion for summary adjudication as to the First, Second, Third, and Fifth Causes of Action. (Opp. Br. at p. 3.) As such, those claims are no longer at issue against CNIC, except for the conversion claim.

Pursuant to the foregoing, summary adjudication is GRANTED as to the First, Second, Third, and Fifth Causes of Action.

Conversion – Fourth Cause of Action

The elements for a claim of conversion are (1) plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV103906: MARTINEZ vs BRISTOL WEST INSURANCE SERVICES OF CALIFORNIA, INC 07/02/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment CRS# 873849981565 in Department 517 property; (2) defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages. (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240.)

CNIC contends that the FAC contains judicial admissions demonstrating that Plaintiffs cannot prove the necessary elements for their claim of conversion, as Plaintiffs allege that Copart, a third-party entity, took possession of the Vehicle and title, and refused Plaintiffs’ access to the Vehicle and refused to return title. CNIC contends that Plaintiffs do not allege that CNIC possessed the Vehicle or title, or otherwise destroyed them, refused to return them, or prevented Plaintiffs’ access. CNIC argues that because it was Copart, and not CNIC, that took possession of the Vehicle and title, CNIC cannot be held liable for conversion.

Plaintiffs allege that CNIC directed Plaintiffs to deliver the Vehicle to Copart and to surrender title and physical possession of the Vehicle. (FAC ¶ 21(a), (c).) Plaintiffs further allege that CNIC directed Plaintiffs to retrieve the vehicle from Copart. (FAC ¶ 24.)

The admission of fact in a pleading is a judicial admission. (Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 187.) A judicial admission in a pleading is a conclusive concession of the truth of the matter. (Id.) A judicial admission is ordinarily a factual allegation by a party that is admitted by the opposing party. (Barsegian v. Kessler & Kessler (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.) A judicial admission is conclusive as to both sides, and neither party may attempt to contradict it. (Id.) “A defendant moving for summary judgment may rely on the allegations contained in the plaintiff’s complaint, which constitute judicial admissions.” (Uram v. Abex Corp. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1425, 1433.)

CNIC does not provide the full context of the allegations of Plaintiffs’ conversion claim. While it is accurate that Plaintiffs allege that Copart was the entity that possessed the Vehicle and title, Plaintiffs also allege that this was done at the direction of CNIC.

The basis of a conversion claim rests upon the unwarranted interference by defendant with the dominion over the property of plaintiff, from which injury to plaintiff results. (Welco Electronics, Inc. v. Mora (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 202, 208.) As such, it remains a disputed question of fact whether CNIC’s direction to Plaintiffs to deliver the Vehicle and title to Copart constitutes an unwarranted interference by CNIC as to Plaintiffs’ possession of the Vehicle and title.

CNIC does not meet its initial burden of proof to establish that Plaintiffs cannot establish their claim for conversion.

Summary adjudication of the Fourth Cause of Action is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV103906: MARTINEZ vs BRISTOL WEST INSURANCE SERVICES OF CALIFORNIA, INC 07/02/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment CRS# 873849981565 in Department 517 Defendant Coast National Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Defendant Coast National Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED as to the First, Second, Third and Fifth Causes of Action and DENIED as to the Fourth Cause of Action.

PLEASE NOTE - Any contest to the tentative ruling will be heard on Thursday, July 2, 2026.