Navy Federal Credit Union v. Mario Escorpiso, Jr.

This is a limited civil collection action brought by plaintiff Navy Federal Credit Union (NFCU) against self-represented defendant Mario Escorpiso, Jr. (Escorpiso). The original and still operative complaint, a form complaint, was filed in December 2025. It alleges two causes of action for breach of contract. A proof of service for the complaint was filed in January 2026 indicating that Escorpiso was served via substituted service at 3130 Orthello Way, Santa Clara, CA 95051.

At issue is a motion to quash service brought by Escorpiso. No proof of service for the motion was filed with the court. NFCU nonetheless timely opposed.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE

Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1), authorizes a defendant to move to quash service of summons “on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).) “[A] motion to quash under section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1), is a limited procedural tool to contest personal jurisdiction over the defendant where the statutory requirements for service of process are not fulfilled.” (Stancil v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 381, 390.) New evidence is not permitted with reply papers unless it is “strictly responsive” to arguments made for the first time in the opposition. (See Golden Door Properties, LLC v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 733, 774.)

In California, “ ‘the original service of process, which confers jurisdiction, must conform to statutory requirements or all that follows is void.’ ” (Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 809.) “Until statutory requirements are satisfied, the court lacks jurisdiction over a defendant.” (Id. at p. 808.) “When a defendant challenges the court’s personal jurisdiction on the ground of improper service of summons the burden is on the plaintiff to prove . . . the facts requisite to an effective service.” (Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413, internal quotations omitted; see also Lebel v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1160.)

A plaintiff’s filing of a statutorily compliant proof of service of summons by a registered process server creates a rebuttable presumption that service was proper. (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1441-1442; see also American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390 (Zara) [“Evidence Code section 647 provides that a registered process server’s declaration of service establishes a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence of the facts stated in the declaration.”].)

DISCUSSION

The proof of service of summons and complaint filed on January 8, 2026 includes a declaration from a registered process server stating that substituted service was made on January 7, 2026 on a “John Doe” who “refused to give their name who identified themselves as the co-resident.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20, subdivision (b), permits substituted service when “a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served.” Reasonable diligence is satisfied where a plaintiff makes two or more attempts to serve a defendant personally. (Zara, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 389.)

The proof of service of summons includes a declaration of diligence stating that the process server made four prior attempts at service at the address, from January 2 through January 7, 2026. That sufficiently demonstrates reasonable diligence. The substituted service on Escorpiso on January 7 was therefore presumptively proper. Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20, subdivision (b), permits substituted service on a “person’s dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business . . . in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business.”

Escorpiso filed a declaration with the motion in which he declares that he no longer lived at 3130 Orthello Way, Santa Clara, CA 95051 at the time service was made. However, the declaration does not provide any date for the time his residency at the location ended, nor does it describe the length of time he resided at the property. The declaration also acknowledges Escorpiso “may have continued to receive some mail associated with that address.” (Escorpiso Decl. at ¶ 6.) The declaration is inadequate to rebut the presumption of proper service established by the proof of service of summons filed with the court.

CONCLUSION

Defendant Escorpiso’s motion to quash service of summons based on improper service is denied. Defendant is ordered to file a responsive pleading no later than August 3, 2026. The court will hold a case management conference on September 15, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. in Department 10.

The court will prepare the order.

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