Niloufar Nouri et al. v. Tesla Insurance Services, Inc. et al.

SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 10 Honorable Jeffrey B. El-Hajj Blanca Than, Courtroom Clerk 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 Telephone: 408-882-2210

DATE: July 2, 2026 TIME: 9:00 A.M. / 9:01 A.M. To contest the ruling, call (408) 808-6856 before 4:00 P.M. Make sure to let the other side know before 4:00 P.M. that you plan to contest the ruling. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1); Local Rule 8.D.)

**Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel**

Line 3 24CV452905 Mayra Perez Campos Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.’s (Honda) motion to et al. v. American compel deposition of plaintiff Mayra E. Perez Campos. Notice is Honda Motor Co., Inc. proper and the motion is opposed by plaintiffs. “If, after service of a et al. deposition notice, a party to the action ... without having served a valid objection under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 2025.450.) Plaintiff Mayra Campos failed to appear for a properly noticed deposition. Plaintiffs argue the motion is moot because plaintiffs’ counsel contacted Honda’s counsel on June 18, 2026 (i.e., the same day the opposition to this motion was due, and six months after the motion was filed) to inquire about other deposition dates. The motion is not moot, as the deposition has not occurred. And plaintiffs provide no substantial justification for waiting until the opposition in this matter was due before attempting to reschedule the deposition.

The motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff Mayra Campos must sit for a deposition (and produce any requested documents) no later than July 31, 2026. Honda’s request for sanctions is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiffs and their counsel of record must pay Honda sanctions in the amount of $600 (two hours at $300/hour), no later than July 31, 2026. The court will prepare the court. Line 4 25CV458886 Niloufar Nouri et al. v. Click LINE 4 or scroll down for ruling. Tesla Insurance Services, Inc. et al.

SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 10 Honorable Jeffrey B. El-Hajj Blanca Than, Courtroom Clerk 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 Telephone: 408-882-2210

DATE: July 2, 2026 TIME: 9:00 A.M. / 9:01 A.M. To contest the ruling, call (408) 808-6856 before 4:00 P.M. Make sure to let the other side know before 4:00 P.M. that you plan to contest the ruling. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1); Local Rule 8.D.)

**Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel**

Line 5 25CV458886 Niloufar Nouri et al. v. Click LINE 4 or scroll down for ruling. Tesla Insurance Services, Inc. et al. Line 6 25CV465668 Jackie Mikaio, an Click LINE 6 or scroll down for ruling. individual v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., a California corporation et al. Line 7 25CV465668 Jackie Mikaio, an Click LINE 6 or scroll down for ruling. individual v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., a California corporation et al. Line 8 25CV472464 Wells Fargo Bank, Plaintiff’s motion to deem admitted requests for admission, set one.

N.A. v. Yuliya (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280.) Notice is proper and the motion is Panchenko unopposed. Defendant did not respond to the requests for admission. On good cause shown, the motion is GRANTED and the requests for admission are deemed admitted. The case is set for a further case management conference on September 15, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. in Department 10. Plaintiff is ordered to provide defendant notice of the case management conference. Plaintiff is further ordered to submit a proposed order listing verbatim the admissions to be admitted.

Line 9 25CV482856 Navy Federal Credit Click LINE 9 or scroll down for ruling. Union v. Mario Escorpiso, Jr.

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Calendar Lines 4 and 5 Case Name: Niloufar Nouri et al. v. Tesla Insurance Services, Inc. et al. Case No.: 25CV458886

This is an action brought by plaintiffs Niloufar Nouri and Seyed Sadroldin Zahiroleslamzadeh (Plaintiffs) against defendants Tesla Insurance Services, Inc. (TIS) and Tesla Motors, Inc. (Tesla). The case involves a dispute about insurance coverage for a car Plaintiffs leased from Tesla. Plaintiffs allege that insurance obtained for a 2021 Tesla they leased from Tesla also covered a 2024 Tesla Plaintiffs leased upon trading in the older car. Plaintiffs’ original complaint was filed in February 2025. It alleged three causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) insurance bad faith; and (3) violations of the unfair competition law (UCL). All three causes of action were brought against both defendants. A copy of the insurance policy was attached to the complaint as exhibit 1.

Tesla did not challenge the complaint. TIS demurred to all three causes of action, which was heard by the court (Judge Chung) in September 2025. On the first cause of action, the court expressly found that Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the ambiguous contract was reasonable. (See Sept. 11, 2025 order at pp. 6:22-7:24.) The court sustained the demurrer to the first cause of action with leave to amend because there were no allegations about the policy in effect on February 28, 2024. (Id. at p. 8:7-13 and fn. 1.)

The court sustained the demurrer to the second cause of action with leave to amend because it was dependent upon the first. (Id. at p. 9:1-4.) The court found that the third cause of action was not, as TIS claimed, expressly based on Insurance Code section 790.03. (Id. at p. 10:3-15.) The demurrer to the third cause of action was sustained with leave to amend because it did not allege that any violations of California’s Financial Responsibility Laws had actually occurred, and because the breach of contract claim could not serve as the predicate for the UCL claim for which the demurrer to the first cause of action had been sustained. (Id. at pp. 11:11-14:18.)

The court takes judicial notice of the September 11, 2025 order on its own motion. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

Plaintiffs filed the operative first amended complaint (FAC) in September 2025. It alleges the same three causes of action. A copy of the insurance policy is again attached as exhibit 1.

At issue is a demurrer to the FAC by TIS and a motion for judgment on the pleadings brought by Tesla. Plaintiffs oppose.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR DEMURRER

In ruling on a demurrer, the court accepts as true all properly pleaded material factual allegations but does not accept as true contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Valero v. Spread Your Wings, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 243, 253.) Code of Civil Procedure section 430.60 states that “[a] demurrer shall distinctly specify the grounds upon which any of the objections to the complaint, cross-complaint, or answer are taken. Unless it does so, it may be disregarded.” The California Rules of Court also require that the demurrer itself (distinct from a supporting memorandum) specify the target of any objection and the grounds. (See Cal.

Rules of Court, rules 3.1103(c), 3.1112(a), 3.1320(a) [“Each ground of demurrer must be in a separate paragraph and must state whether it applies to the entire complaint, cross-complaint, or answer, or to specified causes of action or defenses.”].)

Where a demurrer is to an amended complaint or cross-complaint, the court “may consider the factual allegations of prior complaints, which a plaintiff may not discard or avoid by making contradictory averments, in a superseding, amended pleading.” (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1034, internal quotations omitted (Berg & Berg); see also Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Assoc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1122.) “[A] general demurrer may not be sustained, nor a motion for judgment on the pleadings granted, as to a portion of a cause of action.” (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1167, disapproved in part on other grounds by Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905.)

The court cannot consider extrinsic evidence when ruling on a demurrer. The court has considered the declaration of TIS counsel Min King only to the extent it discusses the meet and confer efforts required by statute. The court has not considered any of the attached exhibits. The court has not considered the declaration from legal secretary Lesa Lewis or any of the attached exhibits. The court has also not considered the declaration from Plaintiffs’ counsel Joshua Markowitz submitted with the opposition or any of the attached exhibits. Finally, “points raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown for failure to present them before.” (Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1273.)

DISCUSSION

TIS demurs to all three causes of action in the FAC on the ground that they fail to state sufficient facts. (See Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer.) Given Judge Chung’s prior determinations regarding the sufficiency of some of the allegations in the original complaint, the court’s present task does not include revisiting or reconsidering whether prior determinations regarding allegations in the complaint were correct.

First Cause of Action

To state a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must allege: 1) the existence of a (valid) contract; 2) Plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance; 3) Defendant’s breach, and; 4) damage to Plaintiff resulting from that breach. (Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 228 (Rutherford Holdings).) The FAC alleges that based on the express terms of the policy, the coverage for the new replacement vehicle was the same as that for the prior vehicle.

TIS contends that the insurance policy attached to the FAC and complaint can only be interpreted as covering Plaintiffs’ 2021 Tesla, and not their replacement 2024 Tesla. TIS argues there is no coverage because Plaintiffs have not alleged “that they ever actually asked their insurance carrier, TIS, to add the new 2024 Tesla to the policy as required by the policy’s terms.” (See memorandum at p. 4:21-25.) This is an improper attempt to reargue a determination already made by Judge Chung. The prior demurrer order expressly determined that the insurance policy was ambiguous; that the ambiguous language should be construed against TIS; and that Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the policy as covering their replacement Tesla was reasonable and controlled over the interpretation urged by TIS. (Sept. 11, 2025 Order at pp. 6:10-7:24; Rutherford Holdings, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at 229-230 [A plaintiff’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous contract is accepted as true on demurrer].)

The court will not reconsider Judge Chung’s legal determination. “[T]he interpretation of an insurance policy is a legal rather than a factual determination.” (Chatton v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 846, 865, citations omitted.) “In general, interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law that is decided under settled rules of contract interpretation.” (State of California v. Continental Ins. Co. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 186, 194 (Continental).) If policy language is clear and explicit, it governs. (Ibid.) But a policy provision will be considered ambiguous “‘when it is capable of two or more constructions, both of which are reasonable.’” (Id., quoting Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 18.)

The court has not considered arguments made for the first time in TIS’s reply. The demurrer to the first cause of action is overruled.

Second Cause of Action

Insurance bad faith is a term used to describe causes of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the insurance context. An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implicit in an insurance contract. (See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 683.) “Before an insurer can be found to have acted in bad faith for its delay or denial in the payment of policy benefits, it must be shown that the insurer acted unreasonably or without proper cause.” (Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1072 (Jordan); see also Tilbury Constructors, Inc. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 466, 475 [citing Love v. Fire Insurance Exchange (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1151].)

TIS argues that the second cause of action “fails because plaintiffs cannot allege a breach of a written contract on the part of TIS, a necessary component of this cause of action.” TIS contends that it “could not have breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing pursuant to an insurance policy that simply did not provide coverage for a vehicle that was never listed in the policy.” (Memorandum at p. 5:6-18.) Again, this interpretation of the policy was already rejected by Judge Chung.

Because the demurrer to the first cause of action has been overruled, the demurrer to the second cause of action as alleged in the FAC is also overruled.

Third Cause of Action

“Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. prohibits unfair competition, including unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business acts. The UCL covers a wide range of conduct. It embraces anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1143 (Korea).) “Unlawful business acts or practices within the meaning of the UCL include anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1474 (McKell) [citations and quotation marks omitted].) “A practice is forbidden by law if it violates any law, civil, or criminal, statutory or judicially made, federal, state, or local.” (Ibid., internal citations omitted.)

Because the demurrer to the first cause of action has been overruled, it can now provide support for the third cause of action. The allegations of the first cause of action are incorporated into the third by reference, and a demurrer does not lie to only part of a cause of action. (See FAC at ¶¶ 30-33; Daniels, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at 1167.) The demurrer can be overruled on this basis alone. TIS’s argument that a UCL claim must be based on a specific statutory violation is incorrect.

TIS repeats an argument already rejected by Judge Chung; TIS contends the third cause of action is based on Insurance Code section 790.03. (9/11/25 order at 9:6-10:15.) As alleged in the FAC, the third cause of action is not based on this code section or conduct amounting to a violation of this code section. (See memorandum at pp. 6:1-8:12.)

TIS’s argument that the third cause of action is barred because adequate remedies are available at law is incorrect. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17205 [“Unless otherwise expressly provided, the remedies or penalties provided by this chapter are cumulative to each other and to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.”].) While the court agrees that the third cause of action does not allege a violation of Vehicle Code section 16000 et seq. (and is not a substitute for a cause of action specifically alleging such a claim), such an allegation is not necessary for Plaintiffs to seek the only relief specifically sought in the third cause of action, an injunction “requiring Defendants to timely update insurance policies when vehicles are replaced.” (FAC at ¶ 33.)

The court has not considered arguments made for the first time in TIS’s reply brief.

TIS’s demurrer to the third cause of action in the FAC is overruled.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

A motion for judgment on the pleadings “is equivalent to a belated general demurrer.” (Sprague v. County of San Diego (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 119, 127.) It has the same function as a general demurrer, but it is made after the time for demurrer has expired. Except as provided by statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 438), the rules governing demurrers apply. As with a demurrer, in ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings the court accepts as true all properly pleaded material factual allegations, but does not accept as true contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (See Valero, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at 253.) Extrinsic evidence cannot be considered. As with a demurrer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings cannot be granted as to only part of a cause of action. (See Daniels, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at 1167.)

The court has considered the declaration from Tesla counsel Eleonora Antonyan only to the extent it discusses the required meet and confer efforts. The court has not considered the attached exhibit.

DISCUSSION

Tesla’s motion is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 438 and is directed at the entire FAC on the basis that it “fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Tesla Motors.” (Notice of Motion at p. 2:5-7.) As with a demurrer directed

to an entire pleading, a motion for judgment on the pleadings directed at an entire pleading fails if any one cause of action states sufficient facts.

Tesla notes that the entire FAC is based on Plaintiffs’ insurance policy with TIS. That policy, attached as exhibit 1 to the FAC, establishes that Tesla is not a party to the contract. (See Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 (“[T]o the extent the factual allegations conflict with the content of the exhibits to the complaint, we rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits.”].)

Most allegations in the FAC refer to TIS and Tesla collectively as “Defendants.” (See FAC at ¶ 9.) The three causes of action do not make any distinction between the two. Nor does the FAC allege actions by Tesla specifically that constitute a breach of contract, insurance bad faith, or unfair business practices. Tesla argues that the generic allegations of a joint venture or agency are insufficient to support any of the FAC’s causes of action as alleged against it.

The general allegation of a joint venture in paragraph 5 of the FAC is inadequate and cannot support any cause of action as alleged against Tesla. A joint venture is defined as an undertaking by two or more persons jointly to carry out a single business enterprise for profit. (Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of University of California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 370.) The elements of a joint venture include: (1) the members must have joint control over the venture (even though they may delegate it); (2) they must share the profits of the undertaking; and (3) the members must each have an ownership interest in the enterprise. (Ibid.)

Whether a joint venture actually exists depends on the intention of the parties. And where the evidence is in dispute, the existence or nonexistence of a joint venture is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. (Ibid.) The FAC fails to adequately allege a joint venture by Tesla and TIS.

The boilerplate agency and ratification allegations in paragraphs 7 and 8 are legal conclusions that the court does not accept as true for purposes of this motion for judgment on the pleadings. They do not support any cause of action as alleged against Tesla. Where, as here, the operative pleading “does not allege any conduct on [the defendant’s] part caused any harm, loss or damage” on the plaintiff’s part, the inclusion of boilerplate agency allegations does “not result in the complaint stating a cause of action against” the defendant. (Falahati v. Kondo (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823, 829.)

Tesla’s motion for judgment on the pleadings directed at the entire FAC is therefore granted.

As with a demurrer, a plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that an amendment could cure the identified defect. The opposition fails to meet this burden. It argues the motion should be denied, and requests leave to amend the joint venture allegations only if the court finds those allegations insufficient. The opposition does not discuss the boilerplate agency allegations, despite Tesla challenging them as well. (See Tesla’s memorandum at p. 8:8-28.)

Because Tesla made a tactical decision not to bring any challenge to the original complaint, and this issue is raised for the first time in a challenge to the FAC, the court will grant leave to amend the general agency and joint venture allegations in paragraphs 5, 7, and 8 9

of the FAC. The court does not grant leave for Plaintiffs to make any other amendments, including any amendments to any of the three causes of action. The court does not grant leave to add new causes of action or parties.

CONCLUSION

Defendant TIS’s demurrer to the FAC is overruled in its entirety.

Defendant Tesla’s motion for judgment on the pleadings directed at the entire FAC is granted with leave to amend. Any amended pleading must be filed and served no later than August 3, 2026.

The court will prepare the order.

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