James Bodwin v. Persimmons, Inc.; Valerie Chan; Eugene Feinberg

161 North First Street, San Jose, Ca 95113 408.882.2330 Department21@scscourt.org http://www.scscourt.org (For Clerk's Use Only)

Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian is covering for Judge Eunice Lee on 30 June and on 02 July 2026

Case No.: James Bodwin v. Persimmons, Inc.; Valerie Chan; Eugene Feinberg

Date: 02 July 2026 9:00 am Line Number: 02 ----oooOooo---

Motion of Defendant and Cross-Complainants Persimmons, Inc., Valerie Chan, and Eugene Feinberg for Summary Judgment.

I. Introduction.

Defendants Persimmons, Inc., Valerie Chan, and Eugene Feinberg’s motion for summary adjudication came on for hearing before the Honorable Socrates P. Manoukian on July 2, 2026 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 1. The matter having been submitted, the court orders as follows:

II. Statement of Facts On May 9, 2024, plaintiff James Bodwin (“Plaintiff”) filed the operative Complaint alleging the following causes of action against defendants Persimmons, Inc. (“Persimmons”), Valerie Chan (“Chan”), and Eugene Feinberg (“Feinberg”, collectively, “Defendants”): (1) breach of contract; (2) fraudulent inducement; (3) wrongful termination; (4) retaliation and wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (5) negligent misrepresentation; (6) breach of fiduciary duty; (7) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty; (8) breach of loyalty; (9) unjust enrichment; (10) accounting; (11) fraud; (12) unfair business practice; and (13) declaratory and injunctive relief.

In June 2023, Plaintiff, Chan, and Feinberg co-founded Persimmons and formed its Board of Directors (the “Board”). (Complaint, ¶ 2.) Persimmons was formed to make products to implement and monetize the cutting-edge and valuable intellectual property that Plaintiff created and developed before forming Persimmons (the “IP”). (Ibid.) Persimmons was also formed with the understanding that Plaintiff would contribute his IP and know-how, Feinberg would contribute technical know-how to develop hardware to support Plaintiff’s IP, and Chan would provide business expertise and generate the necessary funding to establish and grow the business. (Id. at ¶ 3.)

On June 30, 2023, Plaintiff agreed to assign his IP to Persimmons in exchange for three million shares of Persimmons (the “Assignment Shares”) pursuant to the executed Assignment of Technology Agreement (the “Assignment Agreement”). (Complaint, ¶ 12, Ex. A.) Plaintiff also agreed to be employed by Persimmons in exchange for another three million shares of Persimmons (the “Founder Shares”) that would vest over four years pursuant to the executed Founder’s Restricted Stock Purchase Agreement (the “RSPA”). (Ibid., Ex. B.)

While Plaintiff delivered on his promises, Chan and Feinberg failed to meet their corresponding obligations, resulting in Persimmons’ loss of crucial market opportunities and Plaintiff’s deferment of his $200,000 annual salary at Chan’s request. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Shortly after the formation of Persimmons and Plaintiff assigned his IP, Chan and Feinberg began threatening to shut down Persimmons, and Plaintiff sought to reclaim his IP rights. (Complaint, ¶ 16.) Plaintiff’s relationship with Chan and Feinberg subsequently deteriorated, culminating in his removal from the Board and termination from Persimmons. (Id. at ¶ 19.)

Defendants now claim Persimmons owns Plaintiff’s IP and that Plaintiff is only entitled to five hundred thousand shares of the Founder Shares during his 8-month tenure. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Plaintiff never received any portion of his annual salary or Assignment Shares. (Ibid.)

On April 10, 2026, Defendants filed the present motion for summary adjudication, which was originally set to be heard on December 8, 2026. On April 21, 2026, this Court granted Defendants’ ex parte application to advance the hearing to July 2, 2026. Plaintiff filed timely written opposition, and Defendants filed timely written reply.

III. Summary Judgment Motions in General. A motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code of Civil Procedure, § 437c, subd. (c).)

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).)

Similarly, “[a] party may seek summary adjudication on whether a cause of action, affirmative defense, or punitive damages claim has merit or whether a defendant owed a duty to a plaintiff. [Citation.] ‘A motion for summary adjudication...shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.’ [Citation.]” (California Bank & Trust v. Lawlor (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 625, 630 (California Bank).)

“There is a genuine issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 845, fn. omitted.)

Throughout the process, the trial court “must consider all of the evidence and all of the inferences drawn therefrom” and view the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Id. at p. 844.)

III. Procedural Issues. A. Improper Separate Statement. Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ separate statement includes evidentiary objections that the court will not consider as they are not presented in the format required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354. (See Vineyard Spring Estates v. Superior Court (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 633, 642-643.)1

B. Plaintiff’s Request for Leave to Amend. Plaintiff’s opposition requests for leave to amend to add claims or allegations to the Complaint. Plaintiff’s request is denied without prejudice. Plaintiff has not made the requisite showing that Plaintiff has not been dilatory in seeking amendment or that Defendants would not be prejudiced by the amendment. The importance of this showing is further underscored by the fact that trial is set for August 3, 2026. (See Hughes v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 73, 87 [noting liberal policy of allowing amendment only where no prejudice is shown to adverse party]; see also Magpali v. Farmers Group (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486 [denying request for leave to amend made on eve of trial without explanation for delay when action was commenced two years ago].)

IV. Analysis. A. First Cause of Action: Breach of Contract. Plaintiff’s first cause of action for breach of contract is premised on Persimmons’ failure to compensate Plaintiff with the Assignment Shares in exchange for Plaintiff’s assignment of his IP to Persimmons pursuant to the Assignment Agreement. (Complaint, ¶ 23.)

In moving for summary adjudication on the first cause of action for breach of contract, Defendants assert that Persimmons only contracted to provide Plaintiff with three million shares under the plain language of the RSPA, and the Assignment Agreement—which serves as partial consideration for the RSPA—did not provide for an additional three million shares. (Motion, pp. 14:14-18, 15:7-10.)

In opposition, Plaintiff maintains that the plain language of the RSPA and Assignment Agreement provides a total of six million shares, and the Assignment Agreement would be otherwise unenforceable for lack of consideration under Defendants’ interpretation. (Opposition, p. 17:4-7.)

Accordingly, the Court is faced with an issue of contract interpretation. (See Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1125-1126 (Wolf) [“The interpretation of a contract is a judicial function.”]) “Under statutory rules of contract interpretation, the mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract is formed governs interpretation. Such intent is to be inferred, if possible, solely from the written provisions of the contract.” (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 608.)

1 “In light of the foregoing statutory requirements, it has been correctly held that, when evidentiary objections are in a proper form, a trial court must rule on the objections. [¶] It is imperative that a trial court rule on evidentiary objections regardless of whether the motion is denied or granted. A trial court cannot decide whether a motion should be denied or granted until it has first determined what admissible evidence is in play on the motion. Moreover, when a trial court fails to rule on summary judgment evidentiary objections, the objections are ordinarily deemed waived on appeal, and the appellate court will consider the objected to evidence in reviewing the ruling on the motion.” (internal citations omitted) (Vineyard Springs Estates v. Superior Court (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 633, 642-643.)

The Assignment Agreement provides, in relevant part: A. Assignor is an author or inventor and owner of the Technology (as defined below), and Assignor desires to assign and transfer to the Company all of Assignor’s right, title and interest in and to the Technology and other related rights in full or partial exchange for the Company’s issuance to Assignor of 3,000,000 shares of the Company’s Common Stock (the “Shares”). B. The parties are entering into this Agreement pursuant to that certain Founder’s Restricted Stock Purchase Agreement by and between the Company and Assignor dated of even date herewith (the “Stock Purchase Agreement”). ...

5. Indemnity. ...Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, Assignor’s entire liability under this Agreement shall be limited to $15.00. 6.7 Entire Agreement. This Agreement and the documents referred to herein, including but not limited to the Stock Purchase Agreement, constitute the entire agreement and understanding of the parties with respect to the subject matter of this Agreement, and supersede all prior and contemporaneous understandings and agreements, whether oral or written, between or among the parties hereto with respect to the specific subject matter hereof. (Declaration of John D. Pernick [“Pernick Decl.”], Ex. 2, emphases original.)

The RSPA provides, in relevant part: 1. PURCHASE OF SHARES. On the Effective Date and subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, Purchaser hereby purchases from the Company, and Company hereby sells to Purchaser, an aggregate of Three Million (3,000,000) shares of the Company’s Common Stock, $0.00001 par value per share (the “Shares”), at an aggregate purchase price of Thirty Dollars and No Cents ($30.00) (the “Purchase Price”) or $0.00001 per Share (the “Purchase Price Per Share”)... ... 2.1 Deliveries by Purchaser.

Purchaser hereby delivers to the Company: (a) a duly executed copy of this Agreement...(d) payment of the Purchase Price by Purchaser’s assignment to the Company of certain technology and related rights owned by Purchaser by delivery to the Company of an Assignment of Technology Agreement with a value of $15.00, and by check in the amount of $15.00... 12.6 Entire Agreement. This Agreement and the documents referred to herein constitute the entire agreement and understanding of the parties with respect to the subject matter of this Agreement, and supersede all prior and contemporaneous understandings and agreements, whether oral or written, between or among the parties hereto with respect to the specific subject matter hereof. (Id., Ex. 3, emphasis original.)

Given the foregoing, Defendants maintain that the RSPA and Assignment Agreement, read together, memorialize a grant of three million shares in Persimmons. Specifically, the RSPA provides that Persimmon would sell three million shares of its stock at $0.00001 per share (i.e., $30.00), and Plaintiff would pay that price by assigning the IP by delivering the Assignment Agreement with a value of $15.00 and by a $15.00 check for a total of $30.00. Comparing the RSPA and Assignment Agreement, Defendants point out that only the RSPA contains language governing the issuance of shares, and furthermore, the value of the Assignment Agreement is supported by its indemnity provision, which expressly limits Plaintiff’s entire liability to $15.00. (Defendants’ Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [UMF], No. 26.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Assignment Agreement expressly states that Plaintiff would receive three million shares not subject to vesting. However, Plaintiff does not identify, and this Court could not find, the specific provision in the Assignment Agreement. While Plaintiff also contends that the Assignment Agreement is a deliverable and agreement separate from the RSPA, the court notes that this contention ignores the express integration clauses in the RSPA and the Assignment Agreement. (See Pernick Decl., Ex. 2, § 6.7; id., Ex. 3, § 12.6; see also Code of Civil Procedure, § 1856, subd. (a) [“Terms set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to the terms included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of a prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement.”])

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s attempt to characterize the Assignment Agreement as a “deliverable”, rather than consideration, is unconvincing given the plain language of section 2.1 of the RSPA and that the “deliverable” is not a defined term under the RSPA. (See Civil Code, § 1604 [defining good consideration as either a benefit conferred or agreed to be conferred upon the promisor or a detriment suffered or agreed to be suffered by the promisee]; see also Pernick Decl., Ex. 2, § 12.3 [noting titles and headings of the RSPA “will be disregarded in interpreting or construing this Agreement].)

This Court concludes that the RSPA and Assignment Agreement, as an integrated contract, is unambiguous in providing only three million shares of Persimmons stock to Plaintiff. Accordingly, this Court need not consider Plaintiff’s extrinsic evidence in interpreting the contract. (See Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th C. 1159, 1165 [“parol evidence is properly admitted to construe a written instrument when its language is ambiguous.”])

Plaintiff also argues that Defendants’ interpretation of the Assignment Agreement would render that contract void for lack of consideration. The court rejects this argument as it is unsupported by evidence or legal authority. (Public Employment Relations Bd. v. Bellflower Unified School Dist. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 927, 939 [“The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contention as waived.”])

Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that because (1) the RSPA valued the paperwork, rather than the underlying IP assigned, as $15.00; and (2) Plaintiff would not have valued his “intellectual labor and inventive spirit at $15 nor would he have sold the rights to his intellectual property for such a paltry sum,” the consideration for the Assignment Agreement would be illusory. (Opposition, p. 19:4-9.) Plaintiff cites no evidence that supports his interpretation of the RSPA, nor does he provide evidence stating the valuation of his IP and inventive spirit.

Instead, Plaintiff surmises that it would be impossible that “Chan’s assignment of nothing” is of equal value as Plaintiff’s “bedrock intellectual property”. (Id. at p. 19:6-7.) This is insufficient to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact. (See Cox v. Griffin (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 440, 451 [“It is axiomatic that argument is not evidence.”].)

In any event, as Defendants point out in their reply, the consideration could not be considered as illusory because Plaintiff immediately received 62,500 vested shares upon the execution of the RSPA. (See Reply, pp. 6:26-7:6 [citing Complaint, Ex. A [“RSPA”], § 6.2.1]; Plaintiff also contends that because the nominal $30.00 consideration is equal with the immediate, restricted value of the vested shares conditioned on continued employment under the RSPA, the Assignment Agreement, which does not have a vesting schedule and provides an immediate, permanent benefit via the IP, must necessarily require “meaningful consideration” (i.e., three million additional shares).

Again, Plaintiff cites no authority in support of this argument, nor does Plaintiff provide evidence supporting the valuation of his IP or the theory as the parties’ understanding of the RSPA and Assignment Agreement. (See Cole v. Town of Los Gatos (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 749, 767, fn. 8 [“It goes without saying that statements in a memorandum of points and authorities are not evidence.”])

Finally, as Defendants point out in their reply, “‘It is not for the court to second guess the sufficiency of...consideration.’” (Reply, at p. 6:25 [quoting Chen v. PayPal, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 559, 577].) Given the foregoing, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the First Cause Of Action.

B. Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Causes of Action: Fraud Claims

Plaintiff’s second cause of action for fraudulent inducement, fifth cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, and eleventh cause of action for fraud (collectively, the “fraud claims”) allege Defendants made the following misrepresentations to induce Plaintiff into assigning his IP to Persimmons: (1) Persimmons’ repeated representations to Plaintiff that he would receive Assignment Shares if he assigned the IP to Persimmons and that he would receive an annual salary of $200,000 and Founder Shares vesting over four years; (2) Chan’s repeated representations that she would secure funding to pay Plaintiff’s annual salary and make Persimmons successful; and (3) Feinberg’s repeated representations to Plaintiff that he would timely develop and release hardware implementing the IP for monetization. (Complaint, ¶¶ 55-57.)

“The elements of fraud are (1) the defendant made a false representation as to a past or existing material fact; (2) the defendant knew the representation was false at the time it was made; (3) in making the representation, the defendant intended to deceive the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the representation; and (5) the plaintiff suffered resulting damages.” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 792 [citation omitted].) The elements of a negligent misrepresentation claim are similar except that the defendant made the misrepresentation without reasonable ground for believing it to be true. (Ragland v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 196.)

In moving for summary adjudication of the fraud claims, Defendants aver that (1) neither Chan nor Feinberg knowingly made a false representation to Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff did not rely on Chan or Feinberg’s false representations; and (3) any reliance on Plaintiff’s part would not be justifiable as a matter of law. (Motion, p. 17:8- 12.)

As an initial matter, the Court observes that while Defendants assert that neither Chan nor Feinberg knowingly made a false representation, Defendants are in fact arguing that Defendants made no misrepresentations at all. (Compare, Motion, p. 17:9-10 with id. at p. 19:3-5 [“there were no false representations made to Bodwin, whether knowingly or otherwise.”]) In advancing this argument, Defendants assert that Chan and Feinberg’s promises to secure sufficient funding and develop hardware to support the IP in the future—without evidence of an intent not to perform—does not constitute actionable fraud under Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 30 (Tenzer).

In Tenzer, the California Supreme Court disapproved a line of cases holding that a subsequent failure to perform warrants the inference that a defendant did not intend to perform when making the promise and noted that fraudulent intent may be established through circumstantial evidence instead. (Ibid.) Defendants’ undisputed material facts in support of this issue do not address intent much less establish a lack of evidence of intent to deceive. (See Parsons v. Estenson Logistics, LLC (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1260, 1265, fn. 5 [“[A]ll material facts must be set forth in the separate statement. ‘This is the Golden Rule of Summary Adjudication: if it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.’”]) Accordingly, summary adjudication cannot be granted on this argument.

Turning to the element of justifiable reliance, Defendants first assert that Plaintiff did not rely on any representations by the Defendants, and even if he had, the reliance would not be justifiable. The Court notes, however, that Defendants fail to address all allegations of misrepresentations upon which Plaintiff relied. Specifically, Defendants fail to address the allegation that Persimmons also misrepresented that Plaintiff received $200,000 and Founder Shares vesting over four years. (See e.g., Complaint, ¶ 87.) Defendants’ failure to address all misrepresentations is a basis for denial as “[a] motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action...” (Code of Civil Procedure, § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)

Given the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the second, fifth, and eleventh causes of action.

C. Thirteenth Cause of Action: Declaratory Relief.

Defendants argue, and Plaintiff agrees, that the declaratory relief claim, which seeks a determination that Plaintiff exclusively owns the IP, is dependent on the breach of contract and fraud claims. Because the court has denied the motion as to the fraud claims, Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the thirteenth cause of action is DENIED.

D. Sixth, Seventh, And Eighth Causes Of Action: Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claims.

Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against Chan and Feinberg, seventh cause of action for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against Feinberg, and eighth cause of action for breach of loyalty (collectively, “breach of fiduciary duty claims”) against Chan and Feinberg are premised on Chan and Feinberg’s respective failures to fulfill their obligations as CEO, CTO, Board Members, and shareholders of Persimmons. (Complaint, ¶¶ 64-65, 73-74.) Chan and Feinberg are accused of, inter alia ̧ misappropriating or mismanaging corporate funds and preventing Plaintiff from accessing all corporate records and performing his duties as a Board Member. (Id. at ¶¶ 64- 65.)

Chan and Feinberg owed Persimmons fiduciary obligations of fidelity, trust, loyalty, and due care, in addition to the fiduciary duty to refrain from using their position and trust for personal advantage in detriment to Persimmons. (Id. at ¶¶ 66, 75.)

In moving for summary adjudication of these claims, Defendants assert that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue these claims because they are derivative claims, and Plaintiff has not complied with the standing requirements for such an action pursuant to Corporations Code section 800. (Motion, p. 20:18-23.)

“In determining whether an individual action as opposed to a derivative action lies, a court looks at the gravamen of the wrong alleged in the pleadings.” (Holistic Supplements, LLC v. Stark (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 530, 542, citation and quotations removed.) An action is derivative, or in the corporate right, “if the gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corporation, or to the whole body of its stock and property without any severance or distribution among individual holders, or it seeks to recover assets for the corporation or to prevent the dissipation of its assets.” (Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co. (1969) 1 Cal.3d 93, 106 (Jones), citation and quotations removed.)

Here, the Complaint alleges damages that are merely incidental to the damages suffered by Persimmons, therefore, the breach of fiduciary duty claims are derivative claims. (See Jones, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 107 [holding individual, rather than derivative action, exists only if damage to shareholders is not incidental to the corporation’s damage].) Specifically, the Complaint only alleges, “Plaintiff, as a shareholder of Persimmons, has sustained, and will continue to sustain, damages for which Plaintiff should be compensated and made whole.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 67, 76; see id. at ¶ 71.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the breaches caused Plaintiff to be stripped of 2.5 million shares of stock. (Opposition, p. 24:4-9.) The Court rejects this argument as “[a] party may not oppose a summary judgment motion based on a claim, theory, or defense that is not alleged in the pleadings[.]” (California Bank, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 637, fn. 3.) Moreover, Plaintiff’s reliance on Jara v. Suprema Meats, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1238 (Jara) is unavailing, as Jara concerned a minority shareholder who sued the corporation and two other shareholders, expressly alleging that the majority shareholders breached a fiduciary duty to him by paying themselves excessive compensation and denying him a fair share of the corporate profits. (Id. at pp. 1257-1260.)

The Complaint does not allege any specific injury to Plaintiff, nor does it allege that Chan and Feinberg breached a duty to Plaintiff.

Furthermore, the Complaint fails to comply with Corporations Code, § 800, subdivision (b)(2), which requires Plaintiff to allege “in the complaint with particularity plaintiff’s efforts to secure from the board such action as the plaintiff desires, or the reasons for not making such effort...” A plaintiff need not make this demand on the board “only when the plaintiff sufficiently alleges the demand would have been futile.” (Patrick v. Alacer Corp. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 995, 1004 (Patrick).) It is undisputed that the Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff made a demand to Persimmons’ Board before commencing this action and alleging the breach of fiduciary duty claims. (UMF, No. 83.)

It is further undisputed that Plaintiff testified that he did not make a formal demand on the Board of Persimmons. (UMF, No. 84.) In opposition, Plaintiff urges this Court to consider Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication as a motion for judgment on the pleadings and grant leave to amend pursuant to Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1663 (Bostrom). The Bostrom court noted that an opportunity to amend should be given where “it appears from the materials submitted in opposition to the motion that the plaintiff could state a cause of action.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff asserts that a demand on the Board would have been futile because the Defendants constitute a majority of the Board. Without more, this is insufficient for the court to conclude that Plaintiff’s demand would have been futile, and that Plaintiff could amend the complaint to allege as much. (Patrick, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1004; see Oakland Raiders v. NFL (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 572, 587 [noting “conclusory facts are insufficient” and “proof must be of ‘facts specific to each director from which [the trier of fact] can [find a reasonable doubt] that that particular director could or could not be expected to fairly evaluate the claims of the shareholder plaintiff.’”]) The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action.

V. Conclusion. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the first, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action. The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the second, fifth, eleventh, and thirteenth causes of action.

___________________________ ____________________________________________ DATED: HON. SOCRATES PETER MANOUKIAN Judge of the Superior Court County Of Santa Clara

---oooOooo---