LUCERO vs REAL TIME STAFFING SERVICES, LLC, et al.

You and the Company further agree that the Company is engaged in transactions involving interstate commerce and this Agreement and any arbitration or other proceedings concerning arbitration under this Agreement are subject to and governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. .... Except as prohibited under applicable law, you and the Company expressly intend and agree that: (1) class action, collective action, and representative action procedures shall not be asserted, 25CV140500: LUCERO vs REAL TIME STAFFING SERVICES, LLC, et al. 07/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by REAL TIME STAFFING SERVICES, LLC (Defendant) CRS# 650365703742 in Department 17 nor will they apply, in any arbitration proceeding pursuant to this Agreement; (2) neither you nor the Company will assert any class action, collective action, or representative action claims (including, but not limited to, claims brought pursuant to the California Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA")) against each other in arbitration, in any court, or otherwise; and (3) you and the Company shall only submit your own respective, individual claims in arbitration and will not seek to represent the interests of any other person.

This class/collective/representative action waiver does not apply to claims brought under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). You may challenge the enforceability of this class/collective/representative action waiver under the NLRA or in any other forum, and the Company agrees that it will not retaliate against you or any employee who challenges the enforceability of this waiver; however, the Company reserves all rights to seek to fully enforce the waiver and compel arbitration on an individual basis.

Consolidation of claims absent consent of all the parties to the dispute is also prohibited . . . . .... Should any term or provision, or portion of this Agreement (including, without limitation, any portion of the class/collective/representative action waiver), be declared void or unenforceable or deemed in contravention of law, it shall be deemed severed from this Agreement, and the remainder of this Agreement shall be fully enforceable in arbitration to the extent permitted under applicable law, with the intent to give broad effect to the Parties’ agreement to participate and resolve covered disputes via individual arbitration. (Bredehoft Decl., ¶¶ 6-9, Ex.

B) (emphasis added.) LEGAL STANDARD Under a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. section 1281.2, the trial court determines if there is a duty to arbitrate and must therefore evaluate the underlying agreement under general contract law. (United Transportation Union v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 804, 808; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1301.) California law is clear that there is no contract until there has been a meeting of the minds on all material points. (Banner Entertainment, Inc. v.

Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 357-358.) In addition, arbitration agreements are “valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.” (Dougherty v. Roseville Heritage Partners (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 93, 101; Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.) DISCUSSION Collateral Estoppel As an initial matter, the Court notes that this argument is improperly raised for the first time in Defendant’s Reply. (Reply, p. 1:15-2:6.) Points raised in a reply brief for the first time will not be considered unless good cause is shown for the failure to present them before. (Balboa Insurance Co. v.

Aguirre (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1010.) Notwithstanding this, the Court considers the argument. In this case and the related case, Case No. 25CV128535 (the “Labor Code Case”), the issue is specific performance of the same Arbitration Agreement. However, although the underlying wage-and-hour violations are the same in both, the causes of action are different and more properly deemed overlapping than identical. Further, the Labor Code Case includes among its seven claims a violation of the Unfair Business Practices or UCL, which is not an issue in this

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV140500: LUCERO vs REAL TIME STAFFING SERVICES, LLC, et al. 07/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by REAL TIME STAFFING SERVICES, LLC (Defendant) CRS# 650365703742 in Department 17 case. Thus, the Court does not find that issue preclusion applies. Plaintiff argues that the motion should be denied in its entirety due to the (1) unlawful prohibition on bringing of representative claims that severance cannot cure; (2) he is exempt from the FAA due to falling within the class of transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce; and (3) as the FAA is inapplicable, Labor Code section 432.6 renders waiver of such forums and procedures unlawful. The Court considers the argument about the transportation worker exemption first.

The Federal Arbitration Act is Applicable and Plaintiff is Not Subject to the Transportation Worker Exemption

First, Defendant argues that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies because of the Agreement’s choice-of-law provision which expressly indicates that the FAA applies. The Court agrees. Plaintiff argues that because his role "was direct and necessary to the continued movement of the equipment,” he fell within a class of workers engaged in interstate commerce as the warehouse was not the final destination for the equipment he audited. (Oppo., pp. 11:14-16, 12:5. This consisted of physical inspections of equipment received from China in their preparation for shipment, involving entry of their serial numbers into the computer and also physical handling of the equipment in unloading them and moving them to a staging area. (Lucero Decl., ¶¶ 15-18.)

Thus, per the continuous-journey theory, the transportation worker exemption applies and his claims are not subject to the FAA. (Oppo., pp. 1:15-23; 2:16-23.) The Court finds that the exemption is not applicable as Plaintiff’s duties are further removed from interstate commerce than in the cases cited by Plaintiff.

For instance, in Doss v. Tesla, Inc. (June 11, 2026, A173210), a case decided by the Alameda County Superior Court at the trial court level, Plaintiff was a yard hostler whose primary responsibility was physical transportation of the goods within the warehouse. There, his job duties also appeared to encompass safety inspections, but seemingly more peripherally while ensuring the trucks were properly loaded and unloaded. Here, Plaintiff seems to rely on the fact that he had a rolling cart in carrying out what were effectively clerical duties in support of the physical aspect of his job. (Oppo., pp. 2:4-5, 10:23-25.)

This is insufficient for purposes of finding Plaintiff to have fallen within a class of transportation workers. The Court finds this scenario closer to that in the case Defendant cites, Vela v. Harbor Rail Servs. of California, Inc. (2026) 120 Cal. App. 5th 353, in which the court found that even being involved in train repair services of trains temporarily taken out of service and delivered to the yard for the purpose of inspection, was insufficient to be considered active engagement in interstate commerce.

As noted, “[t]he answer is not 'so plain' “when the class of workers carries out duties further removed from the channels of interstate commerce or the actual crossing of borders.” (Id. at p. 457, 142 S.Ct. 1783, fn. 2.) In such cases, to fit within the exemption, “[the] worker must at least play a direct and ‘necessary role in the free flow of goods’ across borders,” or, “[p]ut another way, ... must be actively ‘engaged in transportation’ of those goods across borders via the channels of foreign or interstate commerce.” (Id. at p. 458, 142 S.Ct. 1783.) “Saxon’s bottom line

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV140500: LUCERO vs REAL TIME STAFFING SERVICES, LLC, et al. 07/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by REAL TIME STAFFING SERVICES, LLC (Defendant) CRS# 650365703742 in Department 17 is that to qualify as a transportation worker, an employee's relationship to the movement of goods must be sufficiently close enough to conclude that his work plays a tangible and meaningful role in their progress through the channels of interstate commerce.” (Ortiz v. Randstad Inhouse Services, LLC (9th Cir. 2024) 95 F.4th 1152, 1160, italics added.)” (Vela v. Harbor Rail Services of California, Inc. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 353, 365, review filed (June 10, 2026).)

Representative Claims

Next, Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement at issue here effectively contains a carveout provision that expressly exempts from arbitration the entire PAGA claim, including the individual component. He maintains that various provisions of the Arbitration Agreement support his argument, including the statement that “representative action procedures shall not be asserted, nor will they apply, in any arbitration proceeding pursuant to this Agreement” and “neither you nor the Company will assert any class action, collective action, or representative action claims (including, but not limited to, claims brought pursuant to the California Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA")) against each other in arbitration[.]” (Oppo., p. 4:17-20.)

In ruling on a petition to compel arbitration, a court must determine two threshold matters: first, whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists; and second, whether that agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2.) Plaintiff does not dispute the existence of this Arbitration Agreement. But he argues that the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable albeit without expressly mentioning unconscionability except for reiteration of an argument made in passing reference, “[i]t [Plaintiff’s ability to decline the Agreement] may bear on contract formation or procedural unconscionability”. (Oppo., p. 6:12.)

Thus, the Court considers the issue of whether Plaintiff's single PAGA claim is arbitrable under the law based on contract construction. The parties disagree on the impact the interpretation of this provision has on Plaintiff's individual PAGA claim. Defendant argues that this provision merely means that, to the extent the waiver is not enforceable, the portion of the claims that may be arbitrated under this agreement (individual claims) must be arbitrated while the remaining portion of the claim (representative PAGA claims) must be stayed in court.

In contrast, Plaintiff argues that this provision must be interpreted to carve out the entire PAGA claim—both individual and representative claims. Plaintiff contends that the carve out is similar to the carve out in Duran v. EmployBridge Holding Company (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 59—thereby taking the entire PAGA claim (both the individual and representative claims) out of arbitration because it does not affirmatively distinguish the two. Nonetheless, the Court finds that it is sufficient to gather Defendant’s intent that there is a distinction by “you and the Company shall only submit your own respective, individual claims in arbitration and will not seek to represent the interests of any other person.” (Bredehoft Decl., Ex.

B, p. 2.) Thus, the scope of the Arbitration Claim is limited to only the individual PAGA claims and the carve-out only excludes the representative PAGA claims. As a result of the foregoing legal authority and the language in the Arbitration Agreement, the Court compels the parties to arbitrate Plaintiff's individual PAGA claims.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV140500: LUCERO vs REAL TIME STAFFING SERVICES, LLC, et al. 07/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by REAL TIME STAFFING SERVICES, LLC (Defendant) CRS# 650365703742 in Department 17 Federal Preemption In light of the fact that the Court has found that the FAA applies and therefore preempts state law, the Court need not consider Plaintiff’s third and last argument that Labor Code section 432.6 renders the Agreement unlawful and unenforceable. Thus, Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration as to Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim is GRANTED.

The representative PAGA claim is STAYED pending resolution of the arbitration process, all future hearing dates are vacated. The Court sets a Further Case Management Conference for January 29, 2027, at 9:00 a.m. Objections Plaintiff’s objection to GXO’s Notice of Joinder is overruled. Notwithstanding any procedural deficiencies in GXO’s initial Notice of Joinder indicating the hearing as being July 15, 2026 or the reservation showing it as a Joinder to a Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff does not offer any substantive opposition.

If a party does not timely contest the foregoing Tentative Ruling and appear at the hearing, the Tentative Ruling will become the order of the court.

HOW DO I CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING?

THROUGH ECOURT Notify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select “Search” 4. Select the Case Name 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select “Click to Contest this Ruling” 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select “Proceed”

BY EMAIL Send an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing. This will permit the department clerk to send invitations to counsel to appear remotely.

BOTH ECOURT AND EMAIL notices are required.