Alden Ang v. BMW Financial Services NA, LLC

At the time of purchase, Plaintiff entered into a retail installment sale contract (“RISC”), in which he agreed to make monthly payments towards the purchase price for the Subject Vehicle. The RISC was assigned to BMW Financial Services NA, LLC (“Defendant”), which was and is the holder of the RISC.

In approximately July 2025, Defendant repossessed the Subject. (Complaint, ¶7.) Defendant sent Plaintiff a document titled “Notice of Our Plan to Sell Property” (“NOI”) bearing the date 1 August 2025. (Id. at ¶8.) Defendant also sent Plaintiff a letter with the subject “Auction Breakdown,” which was dated October 8, 2025 and explained that the Subject Vehicle had been sold and Plaintiff owed a deficiency balance. (Id. at ¶9.) Defendant reported and continues to report the deficiency balance to various credit bureaus. (Id. at ¶10.) Plaintiff contends that the NOI did not comply with the Rees-Levering Act (Civil Code §§ 2981, et seq.) or the requirements of the Commercial Code. (Id. at ¶¶11-13.) B.

Procedural History

On 9 December 20254, Plaintiff filed in the Santa Clara County Superior Court a complaint against Defendant raising a single cause of action for a public injunction under Business and Professions Code, § 17200.

On 20 January 2026, Defendant filed a notice of removal to federal court.

On 1 April 2026, the federal court filed its order remanding the case to this court.

On 13 May 2026, Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration and a demurrer. Plaintiff opposes both motions and Defendant has filed replies.

4 This Department intends to comply with the time requirements of the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act (Government Code, §§ 68600–68620). The California Rules of Court state that the goal of each trial court should be to manage limited and unlimited civil cases from filing so that 100 percent are disposed of within 24 months. (Ca. St. Civil Rules of Court, Rule 3.714(b)(1)(C) and (b)(2)(C).)

II. Motion to Compel Arbitration A. Motions to Compel Arbitration Generally. In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the Court must inquire as to (1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate, and (2) if so, whether the scope of the agreement covers the claims alleged. (See Howsan v. Dean Witter Reynolds (2002) 537 U.S. 79, 84.)

“Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate. [Citations.] The threshold question requires a response because if such an agreement exists, then the court is statutorily required to order the matter to arbitration.” (Fleming v. Oliphant Financial, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5t 13, 19, internal quotation marks omitted.)

The agreement at issue expressly provides that it is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) and not any state arbitration law to the maximum extent permitted by law. The moving party must prove by a preponderance of evidence the existence of the arbitration agreement and that the dispute is covered by the agreement. (See Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin’l Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413 (Rosenthal) [moving party’s burden is a preponderance of evidence].)

A moving party can meet their initial burden by showing that an agreement to arbitrate the dispute exists. (Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060.) The burden then shifts to the resisting party to prove a ground for denial. (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 413.)

“In determining the rights of parties to enforce an arbitration agreement within the FAA’s scope, courts apply state contract law while giving due regard to the federal policy favoring arbitration.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236; see also Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, 569 [“California policy, like federal policy, puts arbitration agreements on equal footing with other types of contracts”]; 9 U.S.C. § 2 [An arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”].)

B. Judicial Notice. In support of the motion to compel arbitration, Defendant requests judicial notice of (1) Plaintiff’s arbitration demand with JAMS, (2) Plaintiff’s statement of claims in the arbitration proceeding, (3) the RISC, and (4) the Order Granting Motion to Remand entered in Ang v. BMW Financial Services NA, LLC, Case No. 5:26-cv-00519-BLF in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on March 30, 2026.

The unopposed request is GRANTED insofar as the court takes judicial notice of the existence of the documents, though not necessarily the truth of any hearsay statements therein. (Brown v. TGS Management Co., LLC (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 303, 308, fn. 2 [taking judicial notice of arbitration documents]; see also Barri v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 428, 437 [court may take judicial notice of documents, but not of the truth of hearsay statements in such documents unless an independent hearsay exception exists; “it is improper to rely on judicially noticed documents to prove disputed facts”].)

V. Analysis. Defendant provides evidence that the RISC, which is signed by Plaintiff, contained an arbitration provision. (See Declaration of Amy Nolan in Support of Motion, Ex. A.)

In opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute that he signed the agreement or that it governs the claim raised in the instant case. Instead, Plaintiff claims that he offered to proceed to arbitration on the claim raised in the instant case but Defendant declined that offer.

Plaintiff also contends that, if Defendant takes the position that the arbitrator cannot order a public injunction, the rule in McGill v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 2 Cal. 5th 945 and, in that instance, compelled arbitration should be denied.

But, in its motion, Defendant expressly argues that the arbitration agreement does not waive the right to seek a public injunction and that the arbitration agreement provides that the “arbitrator may award any damages or other relief or remedies permitted by applicable law” and thus, the arbitrator may order a public injunction.

Accordingly, the motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED.

VI. Demurrer. In light of the Court’s order granting the motion to compel arbitration, the demurrer is MOOT. (See Lew- Williams v. Petrosian (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 97, 108-109 [“once a trial court grants a petition to compel arbitration and stays the action, the trial court retains only vestigial jurisdiction over the matter to determine once the arbitration is concluded whether the action should be dismissed”].)

VII. Order. Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. The proceedings are hereby STAYED pending the outcome of arbitration. Defendant’s demurrer is therefore MOOT.

___________________________ ______________________________________________ DATED: HON. SOCRATES PETER MANOUKIAN Judge of the Superior Court County of Santa Clara

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