White vs. Walmart Inc.

A pleading is adequate if it contains a reasonably precise statement of the ultimate facts, in ordinary and concise language, and with sufficient detail to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of the claim. The degree of detail required depends on the extent to which the defendant in fairness needs such detail, which can be conveniently provided by the plaintiff. Less particularity is required when the defendant ought to have co-extensive or superior knowledge of the facts. Under normal circumstances, there is no need for specificity in pleading evidentiary facts. However, bare conclusions of law are insufficient. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 425.10(a), 459; Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 549-50; Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126; Doheny Park Terrace HOA v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076,

1098-99; Berger v. California Insurance Guarantee Assn (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 989, 1006.)

Overlength Opposition

In a non-summary judgment motion, the opening brief and opposition are limited to 15 pages, absent prior leave of court. (Cal. Rules Ct., Rule 3.1113(d).) No reply or closing memorandum may exceed 10 pages. (Ibid.) Plaintiff’s Opposition is 17 pages, and Plaintiff did not obtain leave of court to file an over-length brief. Rule 3.1113(g) states that an over length brief shall be treated the same as a late filed brief (i.e., the court has discretion not to consider the brief pursuant to Cal. Rules Ct., Rule 3.1300(d), though if the court refuses to consider a brief because it is late, it must note this in the minute order.) The Court will exercise its discretion and consider the entire Opposition.

Request for Judicial Notice

With its Reply papers, Defendant filed a request for judicial notice of the docket and the February 8, 2022, Findings and Recommendations in case number 2:20-cv-02383-TLN-AC filed by Plaintiff in the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of California, styled as “White v. City and County of West Sacramento.” The Court grants this request. (Evid. Code § 452(d).)

However, because it was served with the Reply papers, Plaintiff did not have an opportunity to respond to the request for judicial notice and its significance with respect to the demurrer. Evidence Code § 453 requires that a party requesting judicial notice must “give[] each adverse party sufficient notice of the request, through the pleadings or otherwise, to enable such adverse party to prepare to meet the request.” (Id.; see also Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537-1538 [ordinarily, new evidence presented for the first time in the Reply is not considered, unless the opposing party has notice and an opportunity to respond].)

Thus, this hearing is continued for Plaintiff to have an opportunity to address the request for judicial notice.

Merits

A statute of limitations period generally begins to run after a cause of action accrues, which is when the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the existence of the claim. (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1318; Norgart v. Upjohn Co.

(1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 389.) “Where a claim is time-barred on its face, the plaintiff must specifically plead facts that would support equitable tolling.” (Long v. Forty Niners Football Co., LLC (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 550, 555.)

The first cause of action alleges Defendant violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, for denial of “full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments” on the basis of race or national origin, as Plaintiff is alleging here, the statute of limitations is two years. (Gatto v. County of Sonoma (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 759.)

The second cause of action is based on the Ralph Civil Rights Act, Civil Code § 51.7, which is part of the Unruh Act and is also subject to a two-year statute of limitations. (Gatto, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at 760.)

The third cause of action is based on the Bane Act, which is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1; Gatto, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at 760.)

The fourth cause of action for defamation is subject to a one year statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (c); see Hebrew Academy of San Francisco v. Goldman (2007) 42 Cal.4th 883, 895.)

The fifth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is subject to a two year statute of limitations. (Wassmann v. South Orange County Community College District (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 825, 853.) And the sixth cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress is subject to a one year statute of limitations. (Roman v. County of Los Angeles (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 316, 323.)

Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are governed either by a one or two year statute of limitations.

According to the FAC, Defendant’s allegedly wrongful conduct occurred on May 26, 2023. (FAC, ¶¶ 7-18.) Plaintiff filed this action on June 9, 2025 – over two years after the allegedly wrongful conduct.

Arguing that the claims are not time barred, Plaintiff relies on Code Civ. Proc. § 352(a), which provides:

If a person entitled to bring an action ... is, at the time the cause of action accrued either under the age of majority or

lacking the legal capacity to make decisions, the time of the disability is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 352(a).)

The FAC alleges:

19. The applicable statutes of limitation were subject to suspension pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 352(a) because, following the incident, Plaintiff experienced multiple debilitating conditions, both concurrently and sequentially, that materially and functionally impaired his ability to manage legal affairs and meaningfully assess or pursue his legal rights. This medically documented diagnosis and physician advisements constituted a factual condition of disability that existed during the periods alleged herein and cannot be resolved as a matter of law at the pleading stage.

20. Following the incident, Plaintiff experienced a severe mental and physical health crisis that materially and functionally impaired his ability to manage legal affairs and meaningfully assess or pursue his legal rights.

21. Specifically, from late 2023 through July 2025, Plaintiff was under continuous medical care for the following conditions: a. Severe trauma-related psychological conditions, including Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder, resulting in clinically documented impairments in concentration, executive functioning, and emotional regulation, as reflected in Kaiser Permanente mental health records. b. A debilitating inguinal hernia requiring surgical intervention and resulting in post-operative complications that imposed sustained physical pain, functional limitation, and medical restrictions. c. These conditions collectively created a functional impairment that materially and substantially impaired Plaintiff’s ability to comprehend, evaluate, and effectively pursue his legal rights during the relevant periods.

Generally, “[a] demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. [Citation.] In order for the bar ... to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.” (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of

Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42 [internal citations omitted]).

However, it is a “well-recognized proposition that if on the face of the complaint the action appears barred by the statute of limitations, plaintiff has an obligation to anticipate the defense and plead facts to negative the bar. (Union Carbide Corp. v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 15, 25 [internal citations omitted].) “[P]laintiff must plead facts which show an excuse, tolling, or other basis for avoiding the statutory bar ....” (Spray, Gould & Bowers v. Associated Internat. Ins. Co. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1266 fn. 4.) Put another way, “the ‘plaintiff must “plead around” the defense, by alleging specific facts that would avoid the apparent defense. Absent such allegations, the complaint is subject to demurrer for failure to state a cause of action ....’ ” (Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 824.)

The issue is whether the FAC pleads “ ‘specific facts,’ ” which, if proven, could support a finding that Plaintiff lacked legal capacity at the time Plaintiff’s claims accrued. (Gentry, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 824.) For purposes of Section 352, a plaintiff lacks capacity if they are incapable of caring for his or her property or transacting business or understanding the nature or effects of his or her acts. (Alcott Rehabilitation Hospital v. Superior Court (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 94, 101.)

Plaintiff alleges he experienced “debilitating conditions, both concurrently and sequentially (FAC, ¶19), but Plaintiff is required to “plead facts to negative the [statute of limitations] bar.” (Union Carbide, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 25; see also Gentry, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 84.) The FAC does not plead specific facts showing that Plaintiff lacked legal capacity on May 26, 2023. Instead, the FAC alleges on multiple occasions that Plaintiff’s alleged incapacity began “following the incident.” (FAC, ¶¶ 19 and 20.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges facts regarding his alleged incapacity that relate to “late 2023 through July 2025.” (FAC, ¶ 21.)

Further, Defendant has provided judicially-noticeable documents that show that Plaintiff was actively litigating in federal court during his alleged mental and physical health crisis. Specifically, on the date of the incident in this matter (May 26, 2023), Plaintiff filed a motion to change venue in the Eastern District of California. (Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit 1.) Over the course of the next several months, Plaintiff filed at least 7 more pleadings. (Ibid.)

Courts have found that a plaintiff’s litigation activity negates a claim of a lack of capacity under Section 352. (See, e.g., McColm v. Santa Clara County (N.D. Cal., Jan. 15, 1997, No. C-95-20856-JW) 1997

WL 33016, at *2 [finding that Plaintiff’s litigation activity is relevant for purposes of determining Plaintiff’s capacity under Code Civ. Proc. § 352]; see also Est. of Blue v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1997) 120 F.3d 982, 984 [taking judicial notice of court filings in a related case to affirm the district court's decision to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint as untimely and deny the plaintiff equitable tolling]; Willis v. Lathrop Const. Associates (N.D. Cal., Feb. 25, 1998, No. C 97-3203 SI) 1998 WL 118184, at *1, aff'd (9th Cir. 1999) 172 F.3d 61 [“Defendants have filed various motions to dismiss, and have included requests for judicial notice, which are granted, concerning prior lawsuits and files handled by plaintiff during the years between 1982 and now.

Based upon these lawsuits and files, it is clear that plaintiff has been able to “transact business” and “understand the nature or effects of his acts” within the meaning of § 352(a).”]; Quan v. Smithkline Beecham Corp. (9th Cir. 2005) 149 Fed.Appx. 668, 670 [“The facts that Plaintiff had hired a lawyer and filed a separate employment discrimination action are matters of undisputed public record, of which we can take judicial notice. [Citation.] Plaintiff's ability to attend to such matters demonstrates that he is not insane within the meaning of the statute.”].)

The Court is inclined to sustain the demurrer, perhaps without leave to amend. However, the Court will first offer Plaintiff an opportunity to address the request for judicial notice submitted by Defendant.

Defendant to give notice.

5 Mendoza vs. TENTATIVE RULING: ISL Employees, Motion to Compel Arbitration Inc. Defendants ISL Employees, Inc., Integral Senior Living, LLC, and Vivante Newport Center, LLC move to compel Plaintiff Cristal Mendoza to arbitrate her claims against Defendants and stay this action pending completion of arbitration. For the following reasons, the unopposed motion is GRANTED.

On March 28, 2024, Plaintiff reviewed and signed the Employment Acknowledgment containing an Arbitration Agreement. (Torres Dec. ¶¶ 3-17 and Ex. B.) The arbitration provision states in relevant part:

Employee, on the one hand, and, on the other hand ISL EMPLOYEES, INC. and any of its past, present or future parents, subsidiaries, predecessors, affiliates, successors, officers, directors, assigns, investors, agents, owners, managing agents and insurers (“Company”) for itself and also