Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint
Instead, the FAC alleges that there was a relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant because Plaintiff and Defendant Ford entered into a warranty contract. Thus, unlike in Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc., there was a transaction directly between Plaintiffs and Defendant.
This reasoning was confirmed in Dhital. In that case, which was a Song-Beverly action similar to this one, the Court of Appeal held that a car buyer need not allege a contract with the manufacturer in order to allege a duty to disclose:
Nissan argues Plaintiff did not adequately plead the existence of a buyer-seller relationship between the parties, because Plaintiff bought the car from a Nissan dealership (not from Nissan itself). At the pleading stage (and in the absence of a more developed argument by Nissan on this point), we conclude Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient. Plaintiff alleges that they bought the car from a Nissan dealership, that Nissan backed the car with an express warranty, and that Nissan’s authorized dealerships are its agents for purposes of the sale of Nissan vehicles to consumers. In light of these allegations, we decline to hold Plaintiff’ claim is barred on the ground there was no relationship requiring Nissan to disclose known defects.
(Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 844.)
Defendant further asserts that the FAC fails to plead that Defendant had exclusive knowledge of the defect and that it actively concealed the defect. However, the FAC alleges that Defendant knew the vehicle had one or more defects and that Defendant acquired that knowledge, prior to Plaintiff’s acquiring the Vehicle, through sources not available to consumers such as Plaintiff. (FAC, ¶ 95-97). The FAC, therefore, sufficiently alleges that Defendant has exclusive knowledge.
Thus, the court will overrule the demurrer to 6th Cause of Action on this basis.
Plaintiff to give notice.
3 Mattson vs. TENTATIVE RULING: General Motors LLC For the reasons set forth below, Defendant CarMax Auto Superstores, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is GRANTED.
Statement of Law
“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof....” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435
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“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436; Ng v. Superior Court (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 382, 386; 1550 Laurel Owner’s Assn., Inc. v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1146, 1153.)
“The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a); San Jose Sharks, LLC v. Superior Court (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 158, 165 [316 Cal.Rptr.3d 393, 399] disapproved, on other grounds, by Another Planet Entertainment, LLC v. Vigilant Ins. Co. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1106, 1150, fn. 9 [alleged actual or potential presence of COVID-19 virus on insured’s premises did not, without more, establish direct physical loss of damage to property; thus, the insurance policy did not provide coverage].) “ ‘We “read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all [their] parts in their context, and assume their truth.” ’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
Meet-and-Confer Obligation
“Before filing a motion to strike pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a).) “As part of the meet and confer process, the moving party shall identify all of the specific allegations that it believes are subject to being stricken and identify with legal support the basis of the deficiencies. The party who filed the pleading shall provide legal support for its position that the pleading is legally sufficient, or, in the alternative, how the pleading could be amended to cure any legal insufficiency.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a)(1).)
“The moving party shall file and serve with the motion to strike a declaration stating either of the following: (A) The means by which the moving party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised by the motion to strike. (B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the moving party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a)(3).) However, “[a] determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient is not grounds to grant or deny the motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a)(4).)
According to CarMax’s counsel, he sent Plaintiff’s counsel an e-mail on January 5, 2026, and he made four attempts to telephonically confer with Plaintiff’s counsel. (Setlur Declaration, ¶¶ 3-4; Exhibits A-B to Setlur Declaration.)
However, based on Exhibits A and B to the Setlur Declaration, it appears as if Plaintiff’s counsel never returned CarMax’s counsel’s calls.
Given the foregoing, the Court finds CarMax complied with its meetand-confer obligation, yet Plaintiff “failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the moving party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a)(3).)
Merits
When a substantive defect is clear from the fact of a complaint, the defendant may attack that portion of the cause of action by filing a motion to strike. (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1683; see Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 149, 163-164 [the adequacy of the plaintiff’s punitive damage allegations could be tested by a motion to strike]; see Security Pac. Nat. Bank v. Lyon (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d Supp. 8, 11- 12 [proper for trial court to grant motion to strike where the allegations of the pleading do not support a claim for punitive damages].)
“Any buyer of consumer goods who is damaged by a failure to comply with any obligation under this chapter or under an implied or express warranty or service contract may bring an action for the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (a).)
“If the buyer establishes that the failure to comply was willful, the judgment may include, in addition to the amounts recovered under subdivision (a), a civil penalty which shall not exceed two times the amount of actual damages. This subdivision shall not apply ... with respect to a claim based solely on a breach of an implied warranty.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (c); see Duff v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 491, 501 [where the only claim plaintiff prevailed on was the breach of implied warranty, civil penalties were not available to him]; accord, Salas v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (C.D. Cal., Mar. 31, 2023, No. CV 15-8629 FMO (EX)) 2023 WL 12138754, at *4.)
Here, the only Song-Beverly claim Plaintiff has brought against CarMax is one for Breach of Implied Warranty. However, as noted, and as Plaintiff concedes, civil penalties under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Action are not available “with respect to a claim based solely on a breach of an implied warranty.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (c).) (Opposition, 5:18-5:20, 6:18-6:20.)
Thus, Plaintiff’s Prayer no. 5, “for civil penalty in the amount of two times Plaintiff’s actual damages,” is both irrelevant and improper.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues that his Prayer no. 5 is relevant and proper as to Co-Defendant GM. (See Martinez Declaration, ¶ 5 [Plaintiff’s counsel admits the request for civil penalties pertain to the first and third causes of action, which are alleged only against GM].) This argument has no merit. While CarMax filed its Motion to Strike before the Court ruled on GM’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff’s Opposition was filed and served on June 17, 2026, more than a month after the Court granted GM’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
In other words, at the time his counsel filed and served the Opposition, Plaintiff knew, or should have known, that Prayer no. 5 was no longer relevant and proper as to GM, who obtained judgment as to all of the Song-Beverly claims asserted against it.
Plaintiff also concedes in his Opposition that he does not seek punitive damages against CarMax. However, this is unclear from the First Amended Complaint, as Plaintiff’s Prayer for Relief states he seeks civil penalties “against Defendants.” In paragraph 6 of his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff defines the term “Defendants” to include GM, CarMax, and Simpson.
Thus, the Court grant CarMax’s Motion to Strike.
Moving party to give notice.
4 White vs. TENTATIVE RULING: Walmart Inc. Demurrer and Motion to Strike
Defendant Walmart Inc. demurs to and moves to strike portions of the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Robbie D. White. For the following reasons, the hearing on Defendant’s demurrer and motion to strike is CONTINUED to July 15, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. in Department N16. If Plaintiff elects to file a supplemental opposition as discussed below, Plaintiff shall do so by July 8, 2026.
Statement of Law
A demurrer presents an issue of law regarding the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint. (Lambert v. Carneghi (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1126.) The challenge is limited to the “four corners” of the pleading (which includes exhibits attached and incorporated therein) or from matters outside the pleading which are judicially noticeable under Evidence Code §§ 451 or 452. Although California courts take a liberal view of inartfully drawn complaints, it remains essential that a complaint set forth the actionable facts relied upon with sufficient precision to inform the defendant of what plaintiff is complaining, and what remedies are being sought. (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 413.)
On demurrer, a complaint must be liberally construed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) All material facts properly pleaded, and reasonable inferences, must be accepted as true. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.)
A pleading is adequate if it contains a reasonably precise statement of the ultimate facts, in ordinary and concise language, and with sufficient detail to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of the claim. The degree of detail required depends on the extent to which the defendant in fairness needs such detail, which can be conveniently provided by the plaintiff. Less particularity is required when the defendant ought to have co-extensive or superior knowledge of the facts. Under normal circumstances, there is no need for specificity in pleading evidentiary facts. However, bare conclusions of law are insufficient. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 425.10(a), 459; Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 549-50; Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126; Doheny Park Terrace HOA v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076,