Lemus vs. BluKey

Nonetheless, the requirement that the judgment or order have been entered through “inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or mistake” is “not meaningless, and the party requesting such relief must affirmatively show that the situation is one which clearly falls within such category.” (In re Wolper’s Estate (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 249, 251.)

As the Court of Appeal has explained:

It is obvious that a party who seeks relief under [section 473] must make a showing that due to some mistake, either of fact or of law, of himself [or herself] or of his [or her] counsel, or through some inadvertence, surprise or neglect which may properly be considered excusable, the judgment or order from which he [or she] seeks relief should be reversed. In other words, a burden is imposed upon the party seeking relief to show why he [or she] is entitled to it, and the assumption of this burden necessarily requires the production of evidence.

(Hewins v. Walbeck (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 603, 609-610.)

In addition, a motion for relief from default under Section 473 “shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)

The “six-month time limitation is jurisdictional; the court has no power to grant relief under section 473 once the time has lapsed.” (Austin v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 918, 928.)

The six-month period “runs from the date of the default and not from the judgment taken thereafter. The reason for the rule is that vacation of the judgment alone ordinarily would constitute an idle act; if the judgment were vacated the default would remain intact and permit immediate entry of another judgment giving the plaintiff the relief to which his complaint entitles him.” (Rutan v. Summit Sports, Inc. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 965, 970, citations omitted, superseded by statute on other grounds, Sugasawara v. Newland (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 294, 296-297.)

As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not oppose setting aside the default of Defendant BluKey. Therefore, the court will grant the motion as to Defendant BluKey.

However, the default of Defendant Isabella Nguyen was entered on September 26, 2023, (see ROA #23), and her motion to set aside the default was filed on March 5, 2026, (see ROA #79).

In addition, default was entered against Defendants BluKey San Diego, Inc. and BluKey Real Estate, Inc. on March 15, 2025, (see ROA #34, #36), and they did not move to set aside default until March 5, 2026, (see ROA #83).

Thus, the motions are untimely as to Defendants Isabella Nguyen; BluKey San Diego, Inc.; and BluKey Real Estate, Inc. and the court lacks jurisdiction to grant the motions pursuant to Section 473(b).

Standard for Equitable Set Aside Entry of Default or Default Judgment

A court may vacate a default on equitable grounds even if statutory relief is unavailable. (Sakaguchi v. Sakaguchi (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 852, 862.)

For example, the court has inherent, equitable power to set aside a judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud or mistake. (Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1300; Bae v. T.D. Service Co. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 89, 97.)

However, “when a default judgment has been obtained, equitable relief may be given only in exceptional circumstances. ‘[W]hen relief

under section 473 is available, there is a strong public policy in favor of granting relief and allowing the requesting party his or her day in court. Beyond this period there is a strong public policy in favor of the finality of judgments and only in exceptional circumstances should relief be granted.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981-982, quoting In re Marriage of Stevenot (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1071.)

Extrinsic fraud only arises when one party has in some way fraudulently been prevented from presenting his or her claim or defense. (Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc., supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1300.)

There is no evidence of extrinsic fraud in this matter.

The other ground for equitable relief is extrinsic mistake — a term broadly applied when circumstances extrinsic to the litigation have unfairly cost a party a hearing on the merits. (Rappleyea v. Campbell, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 981.)

Extrinsic mistake exists when the ground of relief is the excusable neglect of the defaulting party to appear and present his claim or defense. If that neglect results in an unjust judgment, without a fair adversary hearing, the basis for equitable relief on the ground of extrinsic mistake is present. (Mechling v. Asbestos Defendants (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1241, 1246.)

There are three essential requirements to obtain equitable relief from default. The party in default must show a meritorious defense, a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action, and diligence in seeking to set aside the default once it was discovered. (Rappleyea v. Campbell, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 982; Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc., supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1301; Mechling v. Asbestos Defendants, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 1246 [“To qualify for equitable relief based on extrinsic mistake, the defendant must demonstrate: (1) “a meritorious case”; (2) “a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action”; and (3) “diligence in seeking to set aside the default once the fraud [or mistake] had been discovered.”].)

The moving party bears the burden of proving that he or she is entitled to equitable relief where statutory relief is unavailable. (Sakaguchi v. Sakaguchi (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 852, 86.)

Defendant Isabella Nguyen has not shown that she was somehow prevented from participating in the action or that there is an otherwise satisfactory excuse for not presenting her defense in this matter earlier.

On the contrary, the evidence shows that Defendant was well aware of this action since August 2, 2023, but she believed this dispute was resolved simply by informing Plaintiff’s Counsel that she did not know who Plaintiff was and that Plaintiff was not an employee of BluKey. (Declaration of Isabella Nguyen, ¶¶ 6-19.) Specifically, Defendant Isabella Nguyen signed a Notice of Acknowledgment of Receipt on August 7, 2023. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-12.)

Plaintiff’s Counsel did not explain the legal significance of service of the summons and complaint, but Plaintiff’s counsel had no obligation to do so. On September 25, 2023, Defendant Isabella Nguyen emailed Plaintiff’s counsel, stating that Plaintiff was not an employee of BluKey. Plaintiff’s counsel responded the next day, saying “Ok. I will be taking your default and will obtain a judgment against you.” (Ibid.)

Defendant Isabella Nguyen has not met her burden showing she is entitled to equitable relief or that she has a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense earlier.

However, Defendants BluKey San Diego, Inc. and BluKey Real Estate, Inc. have sufficiently shown that they are entitled to equitable relief from the default and default judgment.

Defendants BluKey San Diego, Inc. and BluKey Real Estate, Inc. never hired and have no connection to Plaintiff or any other party that performed services at the property at issue in this matter. (Declaration of Bao Quoc Nguyen, ¶¶ 11, 24.)

Once they were served with the Summons and Complaint, Defendants BluKey San Diego, Inc. and BluKey Real Estate, Inc. contacted Plaintiff’s counsel and advised her that they had no

connection to Plaintiff or to the property at issue. (Id., ¶ 14.)

These defendants provided Plaintiff’s counsel with the contact information for Defendant Isabella Nguyen and Plaintiff’s counsel promised to dismiss them from the lawsuit. (Id., ¶ 15.) This evidence is relevant for its effect on the Defendants and their failure to file a responsive pleading. (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1115 [“Evidence of an out-of-court statement may be admitted for the nonhearsay purpose of showing its effect on the listener so long as that effect is relevant to an issue in dispute.”].)

Plaintiff did not dismiss Defendants BluKey San Diego, Inc. and BluKey Real Estate, Inc. Instead, their defaults were entered on March 15, 2024. (ROA #34, #36.) Those requests for entry of default indicated Plaintiff served the requests on Defendants at 9365 Fosteria Court San Diego, CA 92127, but that street name was misspelled and should have been spelled “Fostoria.” (Ibid.; Declaration of Bao Quoc Nguyen, ¶¶ 7, 13.)

Defendants BluKey San Diego, Inc. and BluKey Real Estate, Inc. have shown a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense earlier.

They have also met their burden of showing they have a meritorious defense and that they exercised diligence in seeking to set aside the default once it was discovered. Defendants have provided evidence that they had no connection to or involvement with Plaintiff regarding the work he was performing at the property in Mission Viejo. (Bao Quoc Nguyen Dec., ¶¶ 10-12, 14-26.)

Defendants discovered the judgment in late January 2026, attempted to resolve the issue, and filed this motion on March 5, 2026 accompanied by a proposed Answer. (Ibid.)

The court will deny the motion to set as to Defendant Isabella Nguyen and grant the motion to set aside as to Defendants BluKey; BluKey San Diego, Inc.; and BluKey Real Estate, Inc.

Defendants BluKey; BluKey San Diego, Inc.; and BluKey Real Estate, Inc. shall give notice of this ruling.