Carlos Reyes v. Lee Farming & Packing LLC

Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff’s Objections

Objection 1 – Reyes’ objects to Hang’s testimony, stating that "the forklift drivers. . . just said that Carlos just says to do whatever. . . . So the drivers were just saying, 'Carlos said to do whatever that customer wanted"' (Houlihan Decl., Ex. M) as hearsay (Evid. Code, § 1200); lacking personal knowledge (Evid. Code, § 702); foundation (Evid. Code, § 403); and improper lay opinion as to Plaintiff’s directions (Evid. Code, § 800).

Objection 1 is overruled. The statements are for purposes of explaining Hang’s conduct, and not the truth of those statements.

Objection 2 – Reyes objects to Hang’s testimony at 54:19–25 that Reyes’ “reported to work under the influence of alcohol in 2023” (Houlihan Decl., Ex. M) for lack of foundation (Evid. Code, § 403) and lack of personal knowledge (Evid. Code, § 702). Reyes’ objection is sustained. Hang’s testimony relates to Ken Lee’s observations.

Defendants Objections

Defendants make 19 evidentiary objection. The Court declines to rule on these objections as they were not material to the Court’s reasoning.

Legal Standard

A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if he or she shows one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense. (Ibid.) A cause of action has no merit if either (1) one or more of the elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established, even if that element is separately pleaded; or (2) a defendant establishes an affirmative defense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o).)

As defendants are the moving party, they must prove that Reyes cannot prove an essential element of the second, fourth through sixth, and thirteenth through fifteenth causes of action. Once they have done so, the burden shifts to Reyes to show that there is a triable issue of one or more material facts.

Second Cause of Action - Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The elements of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) are (1) outrageous conduct by defendant; (2) intentional or reckless causing of emotional distress; (3) severe emotional distress; and (3) causation. (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259.)

Defendants challenge whether Reyes suffered IIED by only submitting “Plaintiff’s Responses to Defendants’ RFP, Set One” (SSF, No. 41; Houlihan Decl., Ex. O) where Reyes objected to the questions on the basis that Reyes was not obligated to provide substantive responses because the request was passed the discovery cut off dates. An objection is not proof of any particular fact.

Here, defendants fail to meet their burden of proof. Accordingly, the Court denies summary adjudication of the second cause of action for IIED.

Fourth Cause of Action - Failure to Accommodate

Reyes alleges in his fourth cause of action that defendants failed to make reasonable accommodations for his disability.

There are three elements to a failure to accommodate action: ‘(1) the plaintiff has a disability covered by the FEHA; (2) the plaintiff is a qualified individual (i.e., he or she can perform the essential functions of the position); and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff’s disability.” (CACI No. 2541; Hernandez v. Rancho Santiago Cmty. College Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1187, 1193-1194.)

Defendants argue that Reyes cannot establish that defendants failed to accommodate Reyes where defendants allowed Reyes approximately seven weeks off where Reyes had requested eight weeks off. (Defendants’ Moving Papers, pps. 9:27-10:5) As part of their motion, defendants provide time sheets demonstrating the time off Reyes was given. (SSUMFF No. 10; Houlihan Decl., Ex. D, LFP000263-264.)

Reyes disputes that defendants accommodated him. Reyes initially requested leave on January 7, 2022, but asserts he was pressured to come back early, and as a consequence, missed his scheduled physical therapy. (Reyes Decl., ¶¶6-12.) Reyes’ assertions of time missed and coming back a week after he requested time off are corroborated by the time sheets defendants introduced. (SSUMFF No. 10; Houlihan Decl., Ex. D, LFP000263-264.)

Accordingly, there is a triable issue of fact, as to whether defendants failed to accommodate Reyes, and summary adjudication is denied with respect to the fourth cause of action.

The Court notes that defendants switch gears and make a series of different arguments in support of their motion that Reyes cannot prove any harm even if there was a failure to accommodate. (Defendants’ Reply Papers, pg. 7:12-17.) But those arguments were not made in the moving papers, and the Court cannot grant summary adjudication based upon arguments (or evidence) presented for the first time in a reply. (SCI California Funeral Services, Inc. v. Five Bridges Foundation (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 549, 572 FN 18. “SCI California.”)

Fifth Cause of Action - Failure to Engage in Good Faith Interactive Process

Reyes alleges that defendants failed to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with Reyes to determine effective reasonable accommodations for Reyes’ disability.

FEHA requires employers to engage in a good faith interactive process to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, “in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee . . . with a known physical or mental disability . . . .” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (n); Raine v. City of Burbank (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1222.) To establish a claim for failure to engage in the interactive process, a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant was an employer; (2) plaintiff was defendant’s employee; (3) plaintiff was disabled; (4) plaintiff requested reasonable accommodation; (5) plaintiff was willing to participate in a timely good faith interactive process with plaintiff to determine whether a reasonable accommodation could be made; (6) defendant failed to participate in this process; (7) plaintiff was harmed; and (8) defendant’s failure to engage in a good-faith interactive process was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm. (CACI No. 2546.)

Defendants’ attack on the fifth cause of action is premised on the argument that they granted Reyes seven weeks of time off from work, which is the same basis as their attack on the fourth cause of action. (Defendants’ Moving Papers, pps. 9:20-10:5) Reyes counters defendants offered no documented interactive process. Hang, as person most knowledgeable for LFP, admitted at deposition that she never discussed accommodations with Reyes. (Martirosyan Decl., Ex. A, Hang PMK Deposition 76:25-77:3.)

Accordingly, defendants have failed to establish their burden that defendants engaged in a timely, good faith, interactive process, and summary adjudication is denied for the fifth cause of action.

As with the fourth cause of action, cause of action, defendants make new arguments in their reply that Reyes cannot prove any harm even if there was a failure to engage in a good faith, interactive process. (Defendants’ Reply Papers, pg. 7:12-17.) However, this argument was not introduced in defendants’ moving papers, and accordingly, the Court will not consider it with respect to the motion for summary judgment. (SCI California, 203 Cal.App.4th at 572 FN 18.)

Sixth Cause of Action - CFRA Interference

Reyes asserts a CFRA interference cause of action where Reyes asserts the defendants interfered with Reyes’ right to leave under CFRA by forcing him to return to work while taking protected leave under the CFRA.

“A CFRA interference claim consists of the following elements: (1) the employee’s entitlement to CFRA leave rights; and (2) the employer’s interference with or denial of those rights.” (Choochagi v. Barracuda Networks, Inc. (2020) 60 Cal.App.5th 444, 454.)

Defendants argue that “[b]ecause Defendant LFP provided Plaintiff with CFRA leave for seven weeks and there is no evidence indicating LFP, Hang, or Lee requested 17

or required Plaintiff to return to work on January 11, 2022 or prior to when he was ready, willing and able to return, Plaintiff's CFRA interference claim fails.” (Defendants’ Moving Papers, pg. 17:24-27.) Defendants argue that there is no evidence that Reyes required hospitalization or continuing treatment. (SSUMF Nos. 11 and 12.) Defendants further argue Reyes never provided any information to defendants regarding a "serious medical condition," (SSUMF No. 12) and that there is no evidence that Reyes' wrist injury prevented Reyes from performing the functions of his position. (Id.)

However, Reyes’ rebuts defendants’ contentions by providing documentation of his wrist fractures, surgical referral, and seven weeks of continuous medical leave constitute a serious health condition. (Martirosyan Decl., Ex. E (Medical Record – Wrist Injury). Furthermore, the time sheets defendants introduced demonstrate that the facts are disputed with respect to an interference of those rights, as Reyes did work immediately after he requested leave. (SSUMFF No. 10; Houlihan Decl., Ex. D, LFP000263- 264.)

Defendants arguing in their reply papers that Reyes cannot prove any harm (Defendants’ Reply Papers, pg. 7:27-28) was not made in the moving papers, and the Court cannot grant summary judgment based upon arguments presented for the first time in a reply. (SCI California, 203 Cal.App.4th at 572 FN 18.)

Accordingly, defendants have not met their burden in demonstrating that a triable issue of fact does not exist, and summary adjudication is denied for the sixth cause of action.

Thirteenth and Fourteenth Causes of Action: Failure to Pay All Wages Owed and Failure to Pay Wages Due Upon Termination; Waiting Time Penalties

California Labor Code sections 201 and 202 require defendants pay all compensation due and owing to former employees at the time their employment is terminated.

To establish this claim, a plaintiff, must prove all of the following:

1. That the defendant was an employer; 2. That the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant; 3. That defendant did not pay plaintiff for all earned and unused vacation time at the final rate of pay in accordance with the contract of employment/employer policy; and 4. The amount owed to plaintiff for earned and unused vacation time.

(CACI, no. 7253.)

Here, defendants establish they did not have a vacation policy. (SSUMF No. 3.) Defendants’ Employee Handbook section 6.2 provides that sick days are not paid out on separation. (Houlihan Decl., Ex. D (LFP000071-072).) Furthermore, defendants provide in their response to Reyes’ Special Interrogatory No. 187 that defendants do not have a paid time off policy, other than the “state mandated leave such as paid sick leave.” 18

(Houlihan Decl., Ex. I, Defendant Lee Farming & Packing LLC’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories, Set Two, Response to Special Interrogatory, Nos. 187-189.)

Thus, defendants have met their burden that Reyes was not entitled to vacation pay or PTO at termination.

Reyes’ counters by arguing that “Defendant Hang's own statement to Plaintiff after termination that "they did not owe Plaintiff anything" suggests awareness of a wage obligation being refused, not the absence of any policy.” (Reyes’ Opposition Papers, pg. 8:14-16.) The Court cannot infer from this statement that defendants knew they owed something to Reyes, given that the explicitness of Defendants Employee Handbook section 6. (Houlihan Decl., Ex. D (LFP000071-081).)

Reyes’ only evidence in opposition is his own declaration, where he claims he "believed" he was accruing paid vacation starting in late 2022. (Reyes Decl., ¶¶ 19, 21.) Reyes’ self-serving conclusory statement does not satisfy his burden of proof. (Van Komen v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (C.D. Cal. 1986) 638 F.Supp. 739, 741.)

Reyes, raises an argument about unpaid wages due to alleged "off the-clock" work. (Reyes Opposition, pg. 15:17-21.) However, Reyes never plead any such theory and cannot do so now. (See, Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382 ["The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues."].) It is well settled law that a party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying on theories that are not alleged in the pleadings. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 332–333; Champlin/GEI Wind Holdings, LLC v. Avery (2023) 92 CA5th 218, 224-225.)

Accordingly, summary adjudication is granted for the thirteenth and fourteenth causes of action.

Fifteenth Cause of Action - Failure to Indemnify

Reyes’ complaint alleges he was never reimbursed for any portion of his cellphone expenses. Labor Code section 2802 requires an employer to indemnify its employee for all necessary expenditures incurred in direct consequence of the discharge of his duties. (Lab. Code, § 2802(a).)

Defendants’ moving papers never addressed this issue. Accordingly, defendants have not met their burden with respect to the fifteenth cause of action.

Retaliatory and Discrimination Claims

For employment discrimination and retaliation claims, “California follows the burden shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 ... to determine whether there are triable issues of fact for resolution by a jury.” (Loggins v. Kaiser Permanente Internat. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1109 (“Loggins”.) First, “[i]f the employee successfully establishes [the] elements and thereby shows a prima facie case exists, the burden shifts to the employer to provide evidence that there was a legitimate, 19

nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the employer produces evidence showing a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, the presumption of retaliation drops out of the picture, and the burden shifts back to the employee to provide substantial responsive evidence that the employer’s proffered reasons were untrue or pretextual.” (Ibid., citations and internal quotes omitted.)

However, '[w]hen seeking summary judgment or summary adjudication in an employment discrimination case, the burdens established by the McDonnell Douglas framework are altered.' (Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1, 32.) The employer, as the moving party, has the initial burden to present admissible evidence showing either that one or more elements of plaintiff's prima facie case is lacking or that the adverse employment action was based upon legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors. (Hicks v.

KNTV Television, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 994, 1003.) If the employer satisfies its initial burden, the plaintiff then has the burden to offer 'substantial evidence' that the employer's stated nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action was untrue or pretextual, or evidence the employer acted with discriminatory animus, or a combination of the two, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the employer engaged in discrimination. (Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997) 57 CalApp.4th 997, 1004-05.

Like claims for discrimination, retaliation claims are subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. (Husman v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1168, 1193.)

Retaliation Claims

Seventh Cause of Action - Retaliation in Violation of CFRA

Reyes alleges in his seventh cause of action that defendants retaliated against him for taking leave during the first several weeks of 2022.

“The elements of a cause of action for retaliation in violation of CFRA are: ‘ “(1) the defendant was an employer covered by CFRA; (2) the plaintiff was an employee eligible to take CFRA [leave]; (3) the plaintiff exercised her right to take leave for a qualifying CFRA purpose; and (4) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, fine, or suspension, because of her exercise of her right to CFRA [leave].” ’ [Citation.] Similar to causes of action under FEHA, the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis applies to retaliation claims under CFRA.” (Moore v. Regents of University of California (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 216, 248.)

Defendants argue that Reyes cannot and does not meet the various prima facie elements because Reyes did not suffer an adverse employment action for taking CFRA leave where Reyes was promoted in 2022, after Reyes’ took CFRA leave, from tally clerk to shipping supervisor. (SSUMF No. 17.) Defendants further argue that Reyes was fired for legitimate business reasons, where Reyes was terminated for an alleged drinking problem and embezzlement scheme. (Defendants’ Moving Papers, pps. 14:1-15:9.)

Reyes’ counters that he continued to suffer wrist pain and limitations throughout 2022-2023 as a result of his wrist injuries he suffered during December 2021. (Reyes’ Decl., 20

¶24.) Reyes also argues that it was taking leave, as well as several reasons combined together, that an adverse employment action was taken against him. (Reyes’ Opposition Papers, pps. 12:6-14:3.) Reyes further disputes the legitimate business reasons that defendants assert. With respect to the embezzlement scheme and drinking allegations, Reyes points out that Hang admits LFP had no documents reflecting any investigation, (Martirosyan Decl., Ex. A (Hang PMK Depo.) 99:14-16), and conducted no drug or alcohol testing despite a reasonable-suspicion testing policy permitting it. (Id. at 105:1-21; Martirosyan Decl., Ex.

D (Drug and Alcohol Policy).) Reyes disputes most of the legitimate business reasons defendants proffered in SSUMF Nos. 24-37 for lacking contemporaneous documentation. Reyes’ succeeds in raising a triable issue of fact with respect to defendants’ legitimate business reasons.

Accordingly, summary adjudication is denied for the seventh cause of action, as plaintiff has succeeded in raising a triable issue of fact pertaining to the reasons why he was terminated.

Eighth Cause of Action - Retaliation in Violation of FEHA

Like the seventh cause of action, Reyes alleges in his eighth cause of action that defendants retaliated against him for taking leave during the first several weeks of 2022, in violation of FEHA.

To state a claim for retaliation under FEHA a plaintiff must show that (1) the plaintiff engaged in a FEHA-protected activity, (2) the plaintiff was subject to an adverse employment action, and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042.)

Summary adjudication is denied for the eighth cause of action, for the same reasons stated above in the seventh cause of action.

Ninth Cause of Action - Retaliation for Reporting Workplace Safety Hazard [Cal. Labor Code § 6310]

Reyes alleges in his ninth cause of action he was retaliated against for reporting unsafe conditions.

CACI 4605 provides that in order to establish a claim under Labor Code section 6310, a plaintiff must allege the following: (1) plaintiff was an employee of defendant; (2) plaintiff, on his own behalf or on behalf of others, made an oral complaint to defendant regarding unsafe working conditions or exercised his rights to workplace health and safety; (3) defendant discharged plaintiff; (4) plaintiff's complaint was a substantial motivating reason for defendant's decision to discharge plaintiff; (5) plaintiff was harmed; and (6) defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's harm. (See CACI 4605.)

Defendants argue that Reyes is unable to meet the second and fourth elements. (Defendants’ Moving Papers, pps. 13:14-15:9.)

Reyes provides that he personally complained to Hang two weeks before he was terminated that that there “were no ‘chops’ (wheel chocks) securing the trucks at LFP’s loading docks. Without chops, the trucks could move while we were loading them, creating a serious danger to me and other employees.” (Reyes Decl. ¶14.) Reyes also provides that the termination letter Reyes received with respect to alleged theft, alleged absenteeism, alleged policy violations does not provide any reference to any investigation, testing, or contemporaneous documentation. (Martirosyan Decl., Ex.

B; SSF no. 37.) As discussed above, Reyes provides that Hang’s deposition admits that defendants do not have any documents reflecting any investigation (Martirosyan Decl., Ex. A (Hang Depo. 99:14-16), and conducted no drug or alcohol testing despite a reasonable-suspicion testing policy permitting it. (Id. Ex. A at 105:1-21; Ex. D (Drug and Alcohol Policy).

In reply, defendants contend for the first time the first time defendants learned of the alleged unsafe condition of the “chops” missing from the loading area was after Plaintiff’s termination, during a Cal/OSHA inspection. (SSUMF No. 23.) Defendants argue that Reyes’ declaration letting Hang know of the dangerous conditions is nothing more than a self-serving declaration. (Defendants’ Reply, pg. 8:24-27.) The Court notes the same could be said about defendants’ attorney Moody specifically asking if Hang “recalled” any safety complaints. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (e).)

Here, summary adjudication is denied for the ninth cause of action. There is a triable issue of material fact, given the proximity of Reyes’ termination, and alleged reporting of unsafe conditions.

Tenth Cause of Action - Retaliation for Use of Sick Leave

Like the seventh cause of action, Reyes alleges in his tenth cause of action that defendants retaliated against him for taking leave during the first several weeks of 2022.

“An employer shall not deny an employee the right to use accrued sick days, discharge, threaten to discharge, demote, suspend, or in any manner discriminate against an employee for using accrued sick days, attempting to exercise the right to use accrued sick days, filing a complaint with the department or alleging a violation of this article, cooperating in an investigation or prosecution of an alleged violation of this article, or opposing any policy or practice or act that is prohibited by this article.” (Lab. Code, § 246.5, subd. (c)(1).)

Defendants move for summary adjudication for substantially the same reasons provided in the seventh cause of action. Summary adjudication is denied for the tenth cause of action, for the same reasons stated above in the seventh cause of action.

Eleventh Cause of Action - Retaliation in Violation of California Labor Code § 1102.5

Like the ninth cause of action, Reyes alleges that he was retaliated against for reporting unsafe conditions.

To prevail on a cause of action for retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5, a plaintiff employee must demonstrate that the defendant employer retaliated against the plaintiff because the plaintiff disclosed or might have disclosed information to a government or law enforcement agency, or to a person with authority over the employee or has authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation. (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b).)

Defendants move for summary adjudication for substantially the same reasons provided in the ninth cause of action. Summary adjudication is denied for the eleventh cause of action, for the same reasons stated above in the ninth cause of action.

Discrimination Claims

Disability Discrimination Claims – First and Third Causes of Action

To establish a prima facie case for disability discrimination, the plaintiff must show that (1) the employee suffered from a disability, (2) the employee was otherwise qualified to do the job with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) the employee was subjected to an adverse employment action because of the disability. (See Higgins- Williams v. Sutter Medical Foundation (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 78, 84.) A cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination includes the following elements: (1) actionable discrimination or harassment by employees or non-employees; (2) defendant’s legal duty of care toward plaintiff (defendant is plaintiff’s employer); (3) breach of duty (failure to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring); (4) legal causation; and (5) damages to plaintiff. (See Trujillo v.

North County Transit District (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 287, 289.)

First Cause of Action - Disability Discrimination in Violation of FEHA

Reyes alleges in his third cause of action that he was discriminated against because of the wrist injury he suffered in 2022.

Defendants move for summary adjudication for substantially the same reasons provided in the seventh cause of action. Summary adjudication is denied for the first cause of action, for the same reasons stated above in the seventh cause of action.

Third Cause of Action - Failure to Prevent and Investigate Disability Discrimination and Harassment in Violation of FEHA

Reyes alleges in his third cause of action that defendants failed to prevent and investigate discrimination, in violation of FEHA, for injuries he suffered in 2022.

To state a claim for failure to prevent harassment or discrimination under FEHA, the plaintiff must allege: (1) actionable discrimination or harassment by employees or nonemployees; (2) the defendant’s legal duty of care toward plaintiff (defendant is plaintiff’s employer); (3) breach of duty (failure to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring); (4) legal causation; and (5) damages to plaintiff. (Trujillo v. No. County Transit Dist. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 287, 289; Gov. Code § 12940, subd. (k).) 23

Defendants move for summary adjudication for substantially the same reasons provided in the seventh cause of action. Summary adjudication is denied for the first cause of action, for the same reasons stated above in the seventh cause of action.

Twelfth Cause of Action – Tameny Claims

“Tameny claims permit wrongful termination damages when a termination is undertaken in violation of a fundamental, substantial and well-established public policy of state law grounded in a statute or constitutional provision.”) The implicated public policy “ ‘must be: (1) delineated in either constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) “public” in the sense that it “inures to the benefit of the public” rather than serving merely the interests of the individual; (3) well established at the time of the discharge; and (4) substantial and fundamental.’ ” (City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143, 1159.)

As discussed above, because triable issues exist with respect to the first, third, and seventh through eleventh causes of action, summary adjudication is denied for the twelfth cause of action.

Punitive Damages

As discussed above, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(1), a party may properly seek summary adjudication of one or more causes of action, one or more affirmative defenses, the issue of punitive damages or the issue of duty.

Here, although punitive damages are raised in the notice of motion, the memorandum of points and authorities did not discuss whether punitive damages should not apply to any of the individual claims. Accordingly, punitive damages may be sought for any applicable claims above where summary adjudication was not granted.

Accordingly, the Court denies summary judgment. The Court grants summary adjudication with respect to the first, third, seventh, eighth, tenth, thirteenth and fourteenth causes of action.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Tentative Ruling

Issued By: JS on 6/15/2026. (Judge’s initials) (Date)

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