Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval and Motion for Attorney Fees
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Liapes is instructive. Mercury frames Liapes as a case about Facebook’s direct liability. This is partially true, but the plaintiff in Liapes also alleged that Facebook’s publishing of age-targeted insurance advertisements on its platform meant Facebook was liable for aiding and abetting the insurers’ Unruh Act violations. A person is liable for aiding and abetting another person’s Unruh Act violation if the first person knows the second person’s conduct violates the Unruh Act and gives substantial assistance to the second person in that conduct. (Liapes, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 926.)
The appellate court held the plaintiff had pled an aiding-and-abetting claim against Facebook: “The complaint satisfied these elements. It adequately alleged Facebook knew insurance advertisers intentionally targeted its ads based on users’ ages and gender—as explained above, a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.” (Ibid. (emphasis added).)
The insurers’ alleged violation of the Unruh Act was “intentionally target[ing] . . . ads based on users’ ages and gender.” Logically, for this to be a potential violation of the Unruh Act by the insurers, their advertisements must be a service, advantage, or privilege of the insurers. As a result, Tiley has adequately pled that she was denied a Mercury-provided service, advantage or privilege.
B. Merits
Mercury argues Tiley’s direct liability allegations fail because she has failed to allege denial of a Mercury-provided service, advantage, or privilege. For the reasons discussed above, Tiley has adequately alleged such a denial. The direct liability allegations are sufficient to survive demurrer.
Because Tiley’s claims are based on both direct liability and aiding-and- abetting liability, and because the direct liability allegations survive demurrer, there is no need to consider the aiding-and-abetting allegations. A demurrer does not lie to a portion of a cause of action. (See PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682.)
12 Hagey vs. Solar Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval and Motion for Attorney Service Experts, LLC Fees d/b/a Enery Service Experts Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of class action settlement is GRANTED. The Court awards the following distributions from the gross settlement amount:
6. Attorney’s fees and litigation costs in the amount of $150,000.
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7. An enhancement of $5,000 to Plaintiff. In making this award, the Court has considered only the factors set forth in Golba v. Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1251 and Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785.
8. The remainder is to be distributed to individual class members per the terms of the settlement agreement.
As discussed in the moving papers, settlement administration costs are to be paid by Defendant separately and apart from the gross settlement amount.