Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint
# Case Name Tentative 49 Vega vs. Oliva Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint
26-01540072 Defendant Rynnerth Conrado Pineda Oliva’s motion to strike the punitive damages allegations and prayer from Plaintiff Zuli Vega’s First Amended Complaint is DENIED.
A court may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading or strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)
Punitive damages are governed by Civil Code section 3294: “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code § 3294(a).)
To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in section 3294. (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) “Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id. at 725.) Oppression is “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) Fraud is defined as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code § 3294
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In Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1004, the California Supreme Court explained that “punitive damages sometimes may be assessed in unintentional tort actions.” In Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-895, it noted that “something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton.” Indeed, “punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff's rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210 [internal quotation omitted].)
The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges, in pertinent part, as follows:
This action arises from an automobile collision in which Defendant allegedly failed to yield to Plaintiff’s vehicle and struck it “with great force.” (FAC ¶¶ 1, 8.) The police report states that Defendant was arrested at the scene for violating Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a), and identifies that violation as the primary collision factor. (FAC ¶¶ 17-18, 26-27.) The report also states that the collision occurred at approximately 1:10 a.m. and that Defendant fled the scene. (FAC ¶ 28.) The FAC further alleges that this conduct was despicable and that