Jones v. Jaime

5 Arguelles v. O/C Albertson’s LLC 6 Jones v. Jaime The motion to strike filed by defendant Maria Jaime (Defendant) directed to the complaint of plaintiff Lydell Jones (Plaintiff) is GRANTED with 20 days leave to amend.

The allegations in the complaint fail to plead circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice. (See Civ. Code, § 3294(a), (c).) The allegation Defendant fled the scene, without more, is insufficient to demonstrate malice, oppression, or fraud as required to support entitlement to punitive damages. For instance, there is no allegation Defendant knew Plaintiff was injured. The Complaint also does not plead facts showing Defendant intended to harm Plaintiff. The Complaint also contains no allegations that Defendant engaged in any fraudulent conduct intended to cause injury to Plaintiff. The allegations as pled fall short of demonstrating despicable conduct carried on with a conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s rights. (Civ. Code, § 3294(c); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1159.)

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED with 20 days leave to amend.

Defendant shall give notice of this ruling. 7 Kwok v. The motion for new trial is DENIED as untimely. Genera Corp. The Court determined moving parties’ previous notice of intention to move for new trial as to the original judgment was untimely. The amended judgment merely added costs and interest and did not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Case law is clear that the mere addition of attorney fees, costs and interest does not restart post-trial timelines as to the matters determined in the original judgment. See Torres v. City of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 214, 222 (“It is well settled . . . that ‘[w]here the judgment is modified merely to add costs, attorney fees and interest, the original judgment is not substantially changed and the time to appeal it is therefore not affected.’”)

Moving parties cite Seeley v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 854, for the proposition that the entry of an amended judgment restarts the time for the filing of a motion for new trial. But Seeley does not specify the nature of the amended judgment involved in that case. Given that the amended judgment in Seeley was entered just one day after the original judgment, it would be illogical to assume it merely added costs, interest, and/or attorney fees.

Moving parties also cite Dickens v. Lee (1001) 230 Cal.App.3d 985, 987; but in Dickens, the original award did not include costs, which were first added in the later judgment. The Court of Appeal noted that as to these costs, “the judgment is appealable on this point.” (Emphasis added.) Applied here, Dickens simply stands for the proposition that the time for appeal of the added costs runs from the