Douglas vs. Gordon Lane Healthcare, LLC

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.410(c) provides that a motion for an order staying the taking of the deposition and quashing the deposition notice shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.040. Similarly, a motion for protective order under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420 “shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.420(a).) Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.040 provides that “[a] meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.”

Sun Mar’s counsel provides that on March 19, 2026, Plaintiffs’ counsel notified defense counsel by email that Plaintiffs would be serving a Notice of Deposition for Mike Oxford; that defense counsel responded via email stating the reasons why Mr. Oxford’s deposition was inappropriate, their intention to file a motion to quash, and an invitation to further meet and confer; and that Plaintiffs’ counsel responded by email inviting further meet and confer following the filing of the instant motion and served the Notice of Page 13 of 36

Deposition of Mike Oxford on March 19, 2026. (Declaration of Lydsay E. Dublin, ¶¶ 8-10, Exs. B-D.) Neither the moving nor the opposing papers show any additional or further meet and confer despite both parties’ invitation to do so. The email correspondence does not reflect adequate, reasonable, and good faith attempts to meet and confer to informally resolve the issue presented by the motion as to the deposition of Mr. Oxford. Nevertheless, in this instance, the Court will turn to the merits of the motion.

The Court warns the parties that any failure to adequately meet and confer with regards discovery in the future will result in either denial of the motion or a continuance for the parties to comply with their statutory obligations.

Merits Here, Sun Mar’s arguments to quash the deposition notice and to issue an order prohibiting the deposition of Mr. Oxford at this time is premised on the assertion that Mr. Oxford is an “apex” employee. To support that Mr. Oxford is an “apex” employee, Sun M ar’s counsel states that Mr. Oxford is the Chief Operating Officer of Sun Mar. (Declaration of Lyndsay E. Dublon, ¶ 2.)

Sun Mar argues that Plaintiffs have not complied with the principles set forth in Liberty Mutual in seeking the deposition of Mr. Oxford. The showing in Liberty Mutual to establish that the individual was an “apex” employee is not present here.

In Liberty Mutual, the Court of Appeal explained that “[t]he head of a large national corporation will generally not have knowledge of a specific incident or case handled several levels down the corporate pyramid,” and that “an insurance company’s chief executive will seldom, if at all, be involved in the day-today processing of claims.” (Liberty Mutual, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1287.) Additionally, in Liberty Mutual, the corporate executive at issue declared a lack of knowledge or involvement, and “his administrative assistant establish[ed] that individual case material or correspondence is habitually rerouted away from Countryman [the president and chief Page 14 of 36

executive officer of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company] and to a lower level official.” (Ibid.) More specifically, the plaintiff named as defendants, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and its president and chief executive officer, Gary Countryman. (Id. at p. 1285.) The deposition of Countryman was noticed and Countryman moved for a protective order to prohibit his deposition on the ground that the plaintiff had no legitimate need to depose him and was doing so only for the purposes of annoyance and harassment. (Ibid.) To support the motion, Countryman submitted a declaration stating that he was not involved in the handling, supervision or management of any claims for Liberty Mutual, and that he had no knowledge of the plaintiff’s case or any facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint. (ibid.) In addition, Countryman’s administrative assistant submitted a declaration stating that she was responsible for screening all of Countryman’s correspondence, and that she had no recollection of plaintiff’s matter or any legal papers or correspondence relating thereto, and that any such materials relating to plaintiff’s claim and addressed to Countryman would have been shunted to a lower level employee. (Id. at pp. 1285-1286.)

In contrast, the instant motion to quash and protective order is supported only by a declaration of counsel who states in conclusory fashion that Mr. Oxford is the Chief Operating Officer of Sun Mar. Mr. Oxford’s title, without more facts regarding the levels of corporate management, Mr. Oxford’s lack of knowledge or involvement of the instant lawsuit or facts upon which this lawsuit is based, does not sufficiently establish that Mr. Oxford is an “official at the highest level of corporate management” for Sun Mar to trigger the principles set forth in Liberty Mutual for the deposition of an “apex” individual.

There is insufficient information presented to the Court to establish that Mr. Oxford is an “apex” individual of Sun Mar. Consequently, Sun Mar fails to show that the deposition notice of Mr. Oxford should be quashed and fails to show good cause for a protective order prohibiting Mr. Oxford’s deposition. Page 15 of 36

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Sun Mar’s motion to quash the deposition of Mr. Oxford, and denies the requested protective order.