EVANS VS. DEL MAR REALTY AND INVESTMENTS
Case Information
Motion(s)
MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA
Motion Type Tags
Motion to Quash
Parties
- Plaintiff: AARON EVANS
- Defendant: DEL MAR REALTY AND INVESTMENTS
- Defendant: ALLVIEW REAL ESTATE, INC.
Ruling
Plaintiff and Cross-defendant Aaron Evans’ unopposed Motion to Quash Defendant and Cross-complainant Allview Real Estate, Inc.’s (Allview) business records subpoena issued to AT&T is GRANTED as to request numbers 2, 6, 10, and 14 only.
Legal Standard
Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 provides, in part: “[T]he court, upon motion reasonably made by [a party, witness, consumer, or employee] . . . may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subds. (a)-(b).)
Plaintiff moves to quash the subpoena in its entirety on the grounds Allview has not yet identified the alleged trade secrets with sufficient particularity. Plaintiff also moves to quash request numbers 2, 6, 10, and 14 on the additional grounds they are overly broad and seek Plaintiff’s private information and potentially privileged communications between Plaintiff and his counsel.
Sufficient Particularity
Code of Civil Procedure section 2019.210 provides, “In any action alleging the misappropriation of a trade secret under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act . . ., before commencing discovery relating to the trade secret, the party alleging the misappropriation shall identify the trade secret with reasonable particularity subject to any orders that may be appropriate under Section 3426.5 of the Civil Code.”
Plaintiff moves to quash the entire subpoena on the ground Allview’s SACC lacks the requisite specificity as it “broadly states that Del Mar’s alleged trade secrets effectively encompass any and all aspects of Del Mar’s business.” (Mtn. at 4:7-8.) The SACC defines “Trade Secret” as alleged to mean “1) client names and contact information, 2) the individualized terms of the clients’ respective property management contracts with Del Mar (particularly the fee rates charged to them for property management services), and 3) the clients’ individualized property management preferences and needs.” (SACC ¶ 19.)
Thus, the Court finds Allview sufficiently identified the trade secrets at issue and declines to grant the motion on this ground.
Request Numbers 2, 6, 10, and 14
Request numbers 2, 6, 10, and 14 request the following: Request No. 2 – All DOCUMENTS reflecting text messages to and from the telephone number (858) 736-4533 from September 29, 2023, through February 16, 2024.
Request No. 6 – All DOCUMENTS reflecting text messages to and from any telephone number associated with Aaron H. Evans, DOB 08/XX/1977, SSN 558-XX-XXXX, from September 29, 2023, through February 16, 2024.
Request No. 10 – All DOCUMENTS reflecting text messages to and from the telephone number (858) 736-4533 from May 3, 2023, through September 29, 2023.
Request No. 14 – All DOCUMENTS reflecting text messages to and from any telephone number associated with Aaron H. Evans, DOB 08/XX/1977, SSN 558-XX-XXXX, from May 3, 2023, through September 29, 2023.
Plaintiff moves to quash request numbers 2, 6, 10, and 14 on the additional grounds they are overly broad as they request text messages regardless of the subject matter and relevance to the action. (Mtn. at 5:22-24.) Plaintiff contends the documents requested pertain to text messages from Plaintiff’s personal cell phone. (Evans Decl., ¶ 4.)
When evaluating a privacy objection, a court must apply the following framework: “The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 [citations omitted]).
“The party seeking discovery must show a particularized need for the confidential information sought. The broad ‘relevancy to the subject matter’ standard is not enough here. The court must be convinced that the information is directly relevant to a cause of action or defense, i.e., that it is essential to determining the truth of the matters in dispute.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2025) Discovery, § 8:320 [citations omitted, emphasis in original].)
Discovery should not be ordered “if the information sought is available from other sources or through less intrusive means.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2025) Discovery, § 8:321, citations omitted.) The Court finds a request for every text message made for a period of over 9 months to or from Plaintiff’s personal cell phone with no limitation is overly broad. Plaintiff further contends he used his personal cell from May 2023 through the present to communicate via text message private, personal communications with his family, his friends, and multiple other individuals and entities unrelated to a business purpose as well as with his counsel. (Evans Decl., ¶¶ 5, 6.) As such, the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated a “threatened intrusion” onto his right to privacy based on the documents requested.
Given no opposition, Allview has not shown why the breadth of the information sought is relevant (e.g., all text messages regardless of the recipient/sender), nor demonstrated that legitimate and important countervailing interests of the requested disclosure outweigh Plaintiff’s privacy interest in his communications, both personal and privileged.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to quash as to request numbers 2, 6, 10, and 14 only.